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Introduction
Motivation and objectives of the thesis
Most retail financial services in the European Community (EC) have for a 
long time been characterised by a low degree of cross-border penetration and 
competition. This market fragmentation stemmed partly from government 
regulations obstructing free movement of capital, freedom of establishment 
and provision of services in the EC. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 1988 
Cecchini-report concluded that in the European financial services sector "... 
market openness, competition and low cost-efficiency is often deliberately 
not assured".
This lack of cross-border market penetration is supposed to change with 
the advent of the European internal market in 1993 after the adoption of the 
Single European Act and various EC Directives concerning financial 
services. The implementation of these measures in the financial services 
sector is predicted to lead to overall price reductions by 10% and a rise in 
European GDP by 1.5 % over a five-year period which accounts for a third of 
the total projected effects of the 1992 programme.1 In addition, the changes in 
the regulatory regime are expected to impact significantly the current 
structure, conduct and performance of the financial services industry. As the 
Banking Advisory Committee of the Commission of the EC (1988, p. 13) 
comments, for example, the new Directives "will result in the banking 
system undergoing fundamental and perhaps dramatic changes". Similarly, 
for insurance services, a practitioner claims that "operators will face dramatic 
changes in the near future ... which can be summarized by just these two 
single words: increased competition" (Bebear, 1990, p.359). Other academic 
commentators predict that "whether the 1992 deadline is met or not, 
financial markets will dramatically change to the point of bearing little 
resemblance to what they used to be" (Huveneers and Steinherr, 1990, p.3). 
Are such predictions realistic or do they overestimate the potential impact of 
regulatory reform?
Consider the mechanism which is supposed to bring about the changes 
in European financial services. According to the Price Waterhouse study on 
financial services which is part of the 'Cecchini Report', the large-scale 
economic study on the costs of market barriers between the EC countries, 
price differences across Member States will be gradually eliminated as the EC 
moves closer to financial integration. The report envisages two prerequisites 
for attaining greater price convergence: first, a "legislative {EC} programme
1 See Cecchini-Report, European Economy, 35,1988, p. 86.
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which is aim ed at stim ulating cross-border trade and encouraging 
investm ent and establishm ent in foreign territories". Secondly, an 
"intensified interest in Pan-European acquisition and merger opportunities" 
(Price Waterhouse, 1988, p.2).
The main vehicle to establish a more unified market in financial 
services is therefore the elimination of barriers to cross-border entry which is 
supposed to lead to increased international competition between firms, due 
to the resulting threat of potential or actual entry. Thus, whether or not the 
significant projected welfare effects in the financial services sector will obtain 
depends crucially on the extent, scope and effects on competition of cross- 
border entry.
Increased cross-border entry has so far been assumed rather than 
systematically analysed, however, in most studies of European financial 
services integration (e.g. Neven, 1990; Vives, 1991).2 As Gardener noted only 
most recently (1992, p.121):
"Although the general mechanism and broad direction of change 
for financial sectors hypothesised by Cecchini are generally 
accepted, there has been practically no research to date on the 
process and respective time period for financial prices to 
converge".
It is exactly in this area of analysing the actual cross-border entry process 
where this thesis shall make a contribution to the literature. It is thus 
intended to fill the 'black box' of the cross-border entry mechanism which 
was not subjected to analytical scrutiny in existing related studies.
Financial services are frequently divided into three different categories: 
insurance, banking and securities. Accordingly, the vast majority of industry 
studies analyse these three sectors separately. In contrast to these studies, this 
thesis follows an integrated approach to the analysis of retail financial 
services. This seems preferable for two major reasons: first, industrial logic is 
such that banks, insurers and securities firms have increasingly entered each 
other's traditional territories in the retail financial services market. Thus, a 
single industry study would miss out on the industry dynamics in this 
market. Second, the juxtaposition of the cross-border penetration process in 
the different sectors allows a comparative analysis of the fundam ental 
similarities and differences. The focus of this study is on retail financial 
services which are broadly defined as including personal customers as well as 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Cross-border entry in wholesale and
2 This is not just true for the banking industry: most academic analyses of European industrial 
integration assume increased cross-border penetration, but do not subject the penetration process 
per se to analytical scrutiny.
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investment banking as well as reinsurance is not examined in this study, 
since competition in these markets is internationalised already with few 
expected changes after 1992.
The thesis focuses on the two sets of issues relevant to a social welfare 
analysis of cross-border entry in retail financial services: first, regulatory 
factors in the EC need to be analysed, since increasing cross-border 
penetration has implications both for regulatory convergence across the EC 
countries and raises questions of attaining the original objectives of 
regulation. Second, the impact of foreign entry on domestic competition in 
retail financial services requires scrutiny, since the major benefits of 
financial integration are expected to result from the welfare-enhancing 
effects stemming from increased competition of foreign firms in the 
domestic market. The following figure illustrates schematically the 'black 
box' which is the catalyst in bringing about both regulatory convergence as 
well as increased competition in an integrated EC m arket
Regulatory
fragmentation
‘Black Box’
Regulatory 
harmonisation 
across the EC
Lack of cross-border Increased competition
penetration Cross-border entry
resulting in lower 
prices, tetter quality
by financial services firms
When breaking up this 'black box' we can distinguish between the 
regulatory and the competition issues. Consider first the regulatory issues: 
the Second EC Banking Directive taking effect in January 1993 and the Third 
EC Non-Life and Life Insurance Directives fundamentally change the rules 
governing cross-border entry of EC financial services firms: a 'single financial 
services passport' is established which allows any EC institution to enter 
other EC countries without the need to apply for a separate licence in the 
host country. In addition, supervision is mostly undertaken by the firm's 
home country regulators. Thus, entering foreign firms are regulated under a 
different regime than domestic competitors which may result in competitive 
distortions unless national regulatory environments start converging. Does 
cross-border entry therefore lead to 'strategic deregulation' among national 
EC regulators and does such a process jeopardise the underlying economic 
objectives of financial services regulation? Or is the home country rule an 
ingenious mechanism to ensure speedy harmonisation of EC financial 
services regulations by avoiding lengthy negotiations between Member
3
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States? In addition, is the existing regulatory framework sufficient to 
guarantee financial stability and attain the original objectives of financial 
services regulation, as cross-border entry activities result in increased 
internationalisation of domestic markets?3
Consider next the impact of cross-border entry on domestic 
competition which is the second main area analysed in this study. The 
rationale for European economic integration rests on one of the 
fundam ental theorems of industrial and, indeed, welfare economics: 
increased competition through new entry improves the resource allocation 
by shifting production to the most efficient suppliers and benefits consumers 
through lower prices and /o r better quality of services.
In order to adapt this proposition to the case of cross-border entry in 
retail financial services, two theoretical questions need to be addressed. First, 
in order to assess the significance and causes of increased foreign penetration 
a theory of cross-border entry is required. While there have been attempts to 
apply the theory of multinational enterprises to the financial services sector, 
no convincing theory exists which is able to explain why firms enter foreign 
markets particularly in the retail sector. Specifically, w hat competitive 
advantage may compensate a foreign firm for operating in an unfamiliar 
environment and still having to establish a reputation among domestic 
customers? And what factors determine the choice of the entry vehicle, once 
a firm has decided to enter a foreign market?
We find that the most likely form of cross-border entry in retail 
financial services is through acquisition. While domestic acquisitions have 
been the subject of substantial academic analysis, little research has been 
undertaken  on cross-border transactions, and so their economic 
determinants, effects, and consequences in terms of social welfare remain 
largely unexplored. Moreover, acquisitions in service industries may differ 
significantly in their motivation and welfare effects from industrial 
combinations. Yet, they have received comparatively little attention in the 
literature.4 *
3 Bryan (1990, p.121) claims that "Pan-European liberalisation of rules is taking place without 
fundamental reform of national safety-and soundness regulation". King (1990, p.577) notes the 
"urgent practical necessity to construct a new regulatory regime for financial services in the 
context of not only '1992' but also a global market with highly mobile capital".
4 As noted by Hannan and Rhoades (1987, p.67), for example: "rather surprisingly, (the 
rationale for mergers) has been studied fairly extensively by economists in connection with 
mergers in the industrial sector, but has received little attention in banking". Similarly, for 
the insurance sector, Schroath (1988, p.363) observes "an absence in the literature of empirical 
studies of international operations of service firms and international insurance firms in 
particular."
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The second requirement to analyse the actual or potential impact of 
cross-border entry on domestic prices and quality is to develop elements of a 
theory of domestic competition in retail financial services with cross-border 
entry. Entry of foreign firms may impact the domestic industry via two 
channels: first, cross-border entry may change the market structure, 
increasing the level of competition by breaking up (tacitly) collusive 
behaviour among domestic incumbents. Second, foreign firms may 
introduce new products or services and bring special expertise to the market. 
This may make an already competitive market more efficient. The impact on 
domestic social welfare of such foreign entry may not be unambiguous, 
however: the increase in consumer surplus due to lower prices could be 
more than outweighed by reductions in producer surplus, as domestic firms 
lose m arket share to foreign entrants. Does such a situation require 
delegation of regulatory control to the EC authorities, as domestic regulators 
(tacitly) discriminate against foreign entrants to protect domestic firms?
The general approach chosen in this study to address these questions is 
heavily influenced by the theory of industrial organisation (IO) and thus 
attempts to bridge a gap between the financial services literature and that of 
IO which is mostly concerned with the structure, conduct and performance 
of manufacturing rather than service industries.5 Rather than developing 
one 'grand' model of the retail financial services industry, however, it is 
attempted to apply the insights from several IO models to the specific case of 
this industry. While most of industrial organisation has recently become 
highly theoretical,6 this approach has the merit of indicating the areas where 
the recent theoretical developments can make significant contributions to 
understanding and elucidating the functioning of one particular industry. It 
is thereby able to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
models.
In order to address the area of cross-border entry from an empirical 
perspective, three complementary approaches are selected: first, an original 
database on EC cross-border entry activities in financial services from 1986 
until 1992 is developed to perform aggregate and time-series analyses. 
Second, detailed case study analyses are undertaken to inquire into the
5 In the third edition of their almost classic introductory textbook on industrial organisation, 
Scherer and Ross (1990, p.l) state that they have 'little to say about... banking, insurance and 
other financial intermediary industries, which are the province of money and banking 
specialists".
6 Tirole (1988, p.3), for example, emphasises that the "theoretical evolution has been very 
healthy" to the field of IO, but also observes an imbalance between theory and empirical 
research in a field "in which theoretical models are often lacking in generality and in which 
practical implications are so crucial".
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motives and strategies of cross-border entry activities.7 Third, a comparative 
analysis with the United States is undertaken to juxtapose the deregulatory 
process with respect to inter-state entry in the US and cross-border entry in 
the EC and to assess whether conclusions can be drawn for the integration of 
the European retail financial services market.8
Structure of the study
The first chapter starts by introducing the fundamental definitions for the 
study and gives a brief account of the historical development and current 
state of cross-border penetration of retail financial services in the EC.
The second chapter presents a brief overview of the theory of financial 
services regulation and analyses possible market failures which may 
necessitate public regulation. These theoretical insights are then applied to 
the case of regulatory reform in retail financial services on the EC level, 
analysing the im pact of capital liberalisation and the EC Banking and 
Insurance Directives. Rather than providing a full-fledged account of 
financial services regulation, this chapter concentrates on the interaction of 
regulation and cross-border entry. The focus of the analysis is therefore 
placed on the issue of 'strategic deregulation'. This refers to the process of 
competitive interaction between national regulators which may be forced to 
abandon regulations which place domestic firms at a disadvantage compared 
to foreign entrants. Alternatively, domestic regulators may attem pt to 
provide a permissive regulatory regime either to attract foreign entrants or 
to convey a regulatory advantage on domestic institutions which enter 
foreign EC markets under the home-country regime. A simple model is 
developed to analyse the likelihood and conditions of such strategic 
deregulation which is then applied to selected areas of financial services 
regulation.
A third chapter develops a theory of cross-border entry in retail 
financial services. It thereby synthesises concepts from industrial 
organisation, transaction cost economics and the theory of multinational 
enterprises. While the theory of cross-border entry is fairly well-developed in 
the context of manufacturing firms, it is not clear which qualifications, if 
any, are required to apply it to a service industry, such as the retail financial 
services sector. The starting point for the theoretical analysis is the question 
which competitive advantage may compensate a foreign firm for the cost
7 Tirole (1988, p.4) notes that "industrial organisation theorists have often felt more 
comfortable with case studies than with statistical analysis - perhaps because it may be easier 
to recover the industry's basic conditions and behavior from rich case studies than from 
selective statistics ...".
® Neven (1990, p.175), for example, notes that "the United States could be a laboratory 
experiment for European deregulation".
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disadvantages resulting from operating at a distance and in a foreign 
environment. A second stage in the theory then looks at the firm's choice of 
the mode of entry: a firm may decide between provision of services across 
national borders (i.e. 'exporting'), establishing a new branch or subsidiary, co­
operation with a firm in the host market through a strategic alliance, setting 
up a joint venture with a domestic or another foreign firm or acquiring a 
firm in the host country. It is analysed which factors influence the choice of 
the entry vehicle in the retail financial services sector.
Chapter four analyses various barriers to cross-border entry in European 
retail financial services which may pose significant impedim ents to 
increased cross-border penetration. Such barriers include 'public' entry 
barriers such as explicit or implicit regulatory restrictions, public ownership 
of banks and insurers or the lack of a level playing field for cross-border 
acquisitions, and industry or market-inherent barriers which include size 
economies, reputational barriers and switching costs.
A fifth chapter scrutinises the possible effect of cross-border entry on 
domestic retail financial services competition. Four key areas are identified 
where cross-border entry can impact domestic competition: foreign entrants 
can increase price competition, spoil domestic collusive equilibria, force 
incumbents to reduce X-ineffidency and introduce new products or services 
with greater quality levels. These four mechanism are analysed both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective.
In the sixth chapter statistical data on the extent of actual entry through 
cross-border provision of services, (majority or minority) acquisitions, 
strategic alliances, joint ventures and de novo entry are presented. For this 
purpose a new database needed to be developed which includes cross-border 
entry activities of the largest EC banks and insurers, as well as EC entry of the 
largest American, Japanese and other non-European firms for the time 
period from 1986 until 1992. This database allows an analysis of cross-border 
entry activities both over time and across different EC countries. It therefore 
addresses the questions of which EC countries are the main targets of cross- 
border entry and whether there have been significant changes of entry 
activities over time. In addition, the database permits a comparative analysis 
of entry vehicles chosen and therefore puts the theoretical predictions of the 
third chapter on the choice of the entry vehicle to an empirical test.
The aggregate analysis of chapter six encounters clear limits, however, 
when testing the theory of why cross-border entry activities take place and 
what impact they may have on competition. To further inquire into these 
questions, chapters seven and eight present individual case-study analyses 
for the banking and insurance sectors respectively. Publicly available 
background data are collected on individual transactions and these are 
supplemented by interviews at the firm level to gain an insight into the 
underlying strategies of entering firms. Particular focus is placed on the
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questions of post-entry strategies in relation to domestic incum bents 
concerning pricing, quality of services offered and marketing strategies to 
scrutinise how foreign firms attempt to cope with entry difficulties such as 
establishing a reputation and overcoming customer switching costs. In 
addition, the results of a questionnaire survey are reported which was sent 
out to more than 300 European banks and insurers.
The ninth chapter offers a comparative perspective by analysing inter­
state entry in the US. It focuses on the question whether conclusions and 
predictions can be drawn from the US experience in the past decade for the 
derestriction of cross-border entry in the EC after 1992. While there are a 
number of differences between the US and European systems, such as the 
functional separation imposed by the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, interesting 
analogies exist. These include in particular the restrictions on inter-state 
banking, both in terms of branching and acquisitions, as imposed by the 1927 
McFadden Act and the 1956 Douglas amendment. Most of these restrictions 
were gradually softened since the beginning of the 1980s, giving rise to a 
num ber of inter-state entry activities. This allows an analysis of both 
regulatory competition between state regulators and the impact of out-of- 
state entry on structure, conduct and performance of US banking and thus to 
draw up a comparative perspective to the EC process.
The tenth chapter presents some public policy implications which can 
be derived from the preceding theoretical and empirical analysis. These 
concern in particular the application of competition policy to EC cross-border 
transactions in retail financial services and the public policy means to 
maintain financial stability in an integrated European market increasingly 
characterised by cross-border penetration of financial services. *
A summary concludes the study.
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Chapter One: 
Cross-Border Penetration of 
Financial Services in the EC: 
Definitions and Evolution
This first chapter introduces the fundamental definitions for the study and 
presents an overview of the evolution and current state of cross-border 
penetration of retail financial services markets in the European Community. 
Section 1 discusses possible industry and market definitions of European 
financial services and introduces our definitions of the different vehicles of 
cross-border entry. Section 2 then analyses the evolution of cross-border 
penetration in European financial services.
1. Basic definitions
1.1. An industry definition of financial services
When defining the European financial services industry, we can distinguish 
two recent trends: first, there is an increase of traditionally non-competing 
firms from the same industry to enter each other's lines of business. This 
process is termed decompartmentalisation and is discussed in the next section 
for the case of banking. Secondly, there has been a dramatic trend towards 
infer-industry penetration especially in the retail banking and insurance 
sectors. This process is discussed in the second section.
1.1.1. Intra-industry dynamics: decompartmentalisation in the financial 
services sector: the case of banking
First, consider possible definitions of the banking industry. The term 'banking' 
is used to cover a wide range of financial services, and definitions vary from 
fairly narrow to very broad. According to Article 1 of the first EC Directive on 
banking,1 a "credit institution" is defined as taking deposits and investing or 
lending these funds.2 The appendix of the Second Banking Directive3 includes
1 OJL, 780,1977.
2 The 1986 French Banking Act adopted this definition but additionally includes the issue of 
means of payment as a third characterising criterion. In contrast, Article 1 of the German 
Banking Act subsumes a much wider range of activities under its banking definition.
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a range of financial services offered by banks including not only 'traditional' 
banking activities such as deposit-taking and lending but also trading and 
brokerage activities, mortgage business, leasing, money broking, portfolio 
management and consulting services.
Consider next the 'institutional' classification of banks. Traditionally, 
three main institutional groups of banks are distinguished in the EC whose 
numbers are published annually by the Commission of the EC:
• commercial or universal banks engaging in the full range of banking 
activities, extending from mass retail services over all types of corporate 
services to international investment banking;
• savings and co-operative banks whose main funding base are deposits 
from personal customers. They frequently have a regional focus and 
their lending activities are more restricted than those of commercial 
banks. In their activities they accord most closely w ith the first EC 
Directive's definition of banks;
• specialised banks which focus on a subset of banking activities. This 
group includes mortgage banks and building societies, as well as finance 
companies and investment banks. These institutions are characterised by 
engaging only in a limited range of activities.
Table 1.1 reports the number of credit institutions in the EC countries 
according to such an institutional classification.
3 OJL 386,30.12.1989.
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Table 1.1: Number of banks in EC countries in December 1990
Com­
mercial
Banks
Savings/
Mutual
Banks
Cooper­
ative
Banks
Special­
ised
Banks
Total 
number 
of banks
Inhabi­
tants per 
bank
Germany 312 595 3030 80 4,017 15,683
France 407 207 173 1078 1,865 30,027
Italy 259 84 716 % 1,155 49,922
UK 544 0 0 112 656 86,890
Spain 152 67 107 442 768 50,781
Denmark 77 131 34 22 264 19,469
Luxemb. 172 0 48 23 243 1,563
Netherl. 97 53 1 29 180 83,666
Belgium 84 428 0 41 553 17,793
Ireland 33 2 0 11 46 76,521
Greece 37 0 0 2 39 259,487
Portugal 22 1 0 3 26 379,615
EC Total 2,196 1,568 4,109 1,939 9,812 32,000
Source: EC Commission.
While such a differentiation of the industry according to types of 
institu tions reflects its historical developm ent, many formerly non­
competing banks have been moving into each others' territories, as their 
traditional customer base offered continuously less growth potential. This 
trend towards diversification and 'decompartmentalisation' (OECD, 1989, p.60) 
has resulted in increased market overlap between banks which have 
traditionally operated in separate markets.4
4 Two examples illustrate this blurring of demarcation lines: first, the decision of British 
building societies to actively enter retail personal customer services by offering interest- 
bearing current accounts with close to money market rates after the 1986 Building Society Act 
cleared the way for an expansion of activities. The success of the building societies' entry 
strategy prompted the large clearing banks to offer similar accounts to defend their market 
share in the strategically important personal customer market. Building Societies in Britain 
now offer very similar services in the retail financial services market as commercial banks and 
new legislation introduced in 1992 further extends their permitted scope of activities. The 
second example are the regional savings and co-operative banks which have cut into the 
market share of commercial banks by forming alliances and organising on a national level. 
France's Credit Agricole, for example, is not only the largest European co-operative bank but 
according to size of capital also the biggest commercial bank in Europe. While savings banks in 
Germany have traditionally had a regional focus, they have been actively expanding their 
international business through cooperating in the regional or interregional "Girozentralen" to 
become more competitive in the market of medium-sized and larger corporates. In most EC 
countries the business activities of savings and cooperative banks are now virtually 
indistinguishable from those of traditional commercial banks (see, for example, Denning (1990) 
on the reform movements of savings banks in the EC since 1972).
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In face of these recent strategies to enter new lines of business, 
Hawawini and Rajera (1990, p .ll)  conclude that "instead of 10,000 European 
banks with broad traditional categories of specialisation, we are currently 
observing 10,000 banks all more or less beginning to engage in similar 
activities". The next chapter analyses this trend towards universal banking in 
the EC, while the impact of such decompartmentalisation on competition is 
discussed in chapter four.
2.2.2. Inter-industry dynamics: increasing cross-industry penetration in retail 
financial services
When defining the retail financial services industry, one has to take account 
of the trend towards bancassurance or Allfinanz, i.e. unifying the whole range 
of financial services under one roof. In particular, banks have entered the 
insurance sector by distributing insurance products.5 At the same time, 
insurance companies progressively move into traditional bank business. This 
trend has been particularly pronounced in the life insurance sector where 
products constitute close substitutes to traditional banking products such as 
fund management, pension products and long-term savings plans. Since such 
cross-industry penetration plays a significant role also in cross-border 
transactions, we proceed to discuss these moves in greater detail.
In contrast to Japan and the US, there have been few to no regulatory 
restrictions on the crossing of market and product lines between banks and 
insurers in the EC.6 Probably the first European bank which actively entered 
the insurance business as early as 1967 was the UK Trustee Savings Bank 
(TSB), the amalgamation of the UK national savings banks. Today, TSB sells 
and through a subsidiary also underw rites life insurance through a 
specialised sales force of 450 employees who get referrals from the branches, 
as well as general insurance such as fire, travel and household coverage 
through its branch network. TSB Life, the life insurance subsidiary now 
contributes more than a quarter of group profits which demonstrates the 
success of TSB's venture into the insurance sector. Encouraged by its success 
in insurance products, TSB has entered a joint venture with Cariplo, the 
largest Italian bank, and French Caisse National de Prevoyance which aims at 
establishing an insurance sales force in the Italian market drawing on 
Cariplo's massive retail base.
TSB's success in the insurance sector encouraged the other major UK 
banks to emulate its strategic move. The five large clearing banks all chose 
different entry routes into insurance, however: while National Westminster 
decided to remain an independent insurance broker rather than entering the 
underw riting business itself or striking an exclusive alliance w ith one
5 See Salomon Brothers (1990) for a comprehensive account of the moves of European banks 
into the insurance sector on which part of our account is based.
6 Exisiting restrictions in the Netherlands were phased out in January 1990.
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insurer, Barclays has been selling unit-trust linked life insurance for as long 
as twenty years with a sales force of now almost 1,000 employees and plans to 
expand services significantly. Midland Bank decided to enter a joint venture 
w ith Commercial Union (CU), the fifth-largest UK life insurer to form 
Midland Life in which Midland owns 60 percent with the aim of establishing 
a sales force drawing on CU's insurance know-how and Midland's retail 
customer base. Lloyds Bank decided to engage in a merger with Abbey Life in 
1988, the country's tenth-largest life insurer, which created the country's first 
financial services conglomerate. Finally, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) has set 
up a life insurance joint venture with Scottish Equitable and also pursued de 
novo entry by setting up a new direct sales auto insurance subsidiary, Direct 
Line, which has achieved significant growth rates since its inception.7
In Germany, the trend towards Allfinanz has been a fairly recent 
phenomenon. Some banks perceived the need to enter the life insurance 
business, since their share of total savings had steadily decreased with the 
proportion of total savings invested in life insurance increasing from 15.8 
percent in 1970 to 21.5 percent in 1988. The first move towards Allfinanz was 
undertaken by Germany's fifth-largest insurer, the A&M Group, which 
acquired the troubled BfG Bank in 1987, the country's tenth-largest bank, to 
form the first financial services group.8 Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest 
bank followed A&M's move by founding a de novo life subsidiary in 1989 
after a long period of cooperation with Allianz, Europe's largest insurer. 
Allianz attempted to prevent this invasion of its traditional main line of 
business by threatening to withdraw its substantial fund management 
business from Deutsche.9 It finally settled with an exclusive distribution 
agreement with Deutsche's main rival, Germany's second-largest Dresdner 
Bank, culminating in the acquisition of a 24 percent stake in 1991.10
In France the process of cross-industry penetration has been even more 
pronounced with Credit Agricole, the giant cooperative banking group with 
almost 10,000 retail branches being the most prominent example. Only three 
years after founding a new life insurance subsidiary in 1986, it obtained an 11 
percent market share, making it the second-largest life insurer in France with 
plans to expand into the non-life business as well. BNP, the second-largest
7 UK insurance firms have also explored new outlets for their products, mainly striking 
distribution alliances with building societies and acquiring estate agencies. For example, the 
largest non-life insurer General Accident uses the Chelsea Building Society, third-largest 
Royal Insurance uses Leeds & Holbeck, while fourth-largest Sun Alliance has an agreement 
with the Woolwich.
8 With limited success, however, as A&M may be selling off BfG to Credit Lyonnais. Recently, 
French AGF acquired a 25 percent stake in A&M and will establish contacts to Credit Lyonnais.
® Allianz has an approxiamte investment portfolio of $66 billion.
In April 1992 Allianz was under scrutiny by the German Federal Cartel Office for having 
accumulated a majority stake in Dresdner Bank .
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French bank has its own life insurance subsidiary, while cooperating with 
UAP in the distribution of non-life products.
Very similar developments to those in the UK, Germany and France 
have taken place in other European countries. The symbiosis between 
banking and insurance has been most complete in Spain where almost all the 
major insurers are owned by the large domestic banks. The only major 
insurer not majority-owned by a bank, the mutual Mapfre group, in turn 
entered the retail banking field. In the Netherlands banks account for around 
20 percent of the distribution of insurance products.
In summary, it becomes evident that banks and insurers increasingly 
become direct competitors in the retail financial services sector. It appears 
that banks have so far made more successful inroads into the insurance 
sector than vice versa, largely because the distribution channels of insurance 
firms are more difficult to adapt to frequent-interaction bank products. Banks, 
however, have adopted some of the sales force methods of insurance firms 
with bank employees visiting customers outside branch opening hours. In 
addition, banks may have important reputational advantages over insurance 
firms.
Finally, an industry definition of retail financial services would be 
incomplete w ithout including the recent inroads by non-financial services 
firms such as automobile companies,11 department stores12 or retailers13 into 
traditional banking and insurance activities. These firms increasingly provide 
traditional financial services such as credit cards, life and non-life insurance, 
payment services, and even consumer loans or real estate financing. While 
these moves of non-financial services firms are still in the beginning stages in 
Europe, the success of US firms such as the retailer Sears or the auto producer 
Ford indicates that non-financial services firms may also become a significant 
force in European retail financial services.
1.2. Financial services markets
Concerning possible market definitions it is useful to identify particular sub- 
markets in the market for financial services. Such a market-led approach is
11 Volkwagen calls itself 'Europe's largest non-bank financial services company". It offers a 
current account with credit cards at low cost, loan financing as well as travel and car insurance. 
It maintains contact with its customers through free telephone banking. Customers who buy a 
car or bring in their cars for repair are offered this range of financial products.
12 For example, the German department store Hertie offers the Barclaycard.
*3 The German mail order company Quelle constitutes such an example with its banking 
subsidiaries Norisbank and Quelle Bank. Its main competitive advantage is thereby its 
customer database consisting of over 19 million addresses with information about spending 
habits and even income levels.
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preferable to an institutional classification, as firms belonging to similar 
institutional groups may operate in different markets and competition occurs 
in various sub-markets rather than along institutional lines.
Most current market definitions in financial services follow functional 
or institutional criteria, however. A typical differentiation of banking 
markets, for example, is given by the OECD definition (1989, p.107)14 which 
distinguishes between the following markets:
• retail financial services
• corporate financial services
• securities and brokerage business
• interbank services
• international services.
Such a functional classification is too broad for our purposes, however. 
Securities and brokerage business, for example, covers a wide range of 
products and services from the small transaction of a retail customer to the 
Eurobond issue of a large multinational. In addition, most banks are 
increasingly organised according to customer groups rather than functional 
lines. Both Barclays Bank and Deutsche Bank, for example, have recently 
undergone a complete internal reorganisation process to adapt a customer- 
focused organisational structure. Similarly, insurance firms increasingly adopt 
a customer-orientated organisation structure (Farny, 1990). Considering these 
trends, it is useful to further differentiate functional sectors by customer 
groups. We therefore differentiate the following segments:
1. Mass retail services: standardised products which do not require 
significant specific tailoring towards the needs of individual customers 
and are mostly distributed through a local branch or agent network. They 
include the vast majority of personal banking and insurance services and 
those financial services for small enterprises which are largely 
standardised with local specialists serving the clientele.
2. High net worth individuals: financial services for wealthy individuals 
which need to be tailored towards individual needs and require higher 
service skills than in mass retail, such as portfolio and tax management 
techniques or specialised investment advice.
3. Medium-sized enterprises: require mostly tailor-m ade solutions, 
frequently served by regional firm headquarters rather than local 
branches or agents, aided by centralised specialist departments, such as 
international services, tax and corporate finance.
4. Large corporates, financial institutions and public agencies: served 
exclusively by specialised firms such as merchant banks or by specific
14 OECD, Paris, 1989, Competition in Banking.
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departm ents in national headquarters of large commercial banks.
Insurance firms are served by reinsurance companies.
In this study, the focus is placed upon the competitive effects of cross- 
border entry in the first three markets. For the purpose of this study, I define 
the first three markets as the 'retail' financial services market which is a 
somewhat broader definition than the conventional definition which usually 
just includes the mass market. I intentionally neglect the 'wholesale' market 
for large corporates, financial institutions and government agencies, as this 
m arket is largely internationalised already. In the wholesale m arket 
characterised by low margins and large transactions, competition is on a 
European or even a global scale with few national restrictions remaining even 
before further European integration and therefore the effects of additional 
cross-border entry are expected to be comparatively sm all.1516
1.3. Vehicles of cross-border entry in financial services
A multinational financial services corporation (MNSC) is defined as a firm 
which owns branches or subsidiaries in at least one country other than that of 
its main legal incorporation. There is some doubt about whether a firm which 
merely owns representative offices in another country may be called 
'multinational' and I choose not to include such facilities in our definition, 
since representative offices merely serve a liasion function for the parent firm 
but cannot actively operate in the host market.
Cross-border entry is defined as a dynamic rather than a static concept 
where a firm follows the strategic objective of transacting with economic 
agents in the host country. Cross-border entry therefore has a wider scope than 
just aiming to become a MNSC, as it is not limited to acquiring or setting up a 
branch or subsidiary. A firm may choose other vehicles to enter a foreign 
m arket such as cross-border provision of services or a joint venture or 
strategic alliance with a firm in the host market or another foreign firm, 
aimed at entering or increasing the presence in the host market. Figure 1.1 
summarises the whole range of tools available to a firm wishing to undertake 
cross-border entry.
Large firms maintain several banking relationships with both domestic and foreign banks in 
addition to internalising many financial services in in-house banks. Therefore, financial 
officers in the large corporates have the ability to switch immediately to the bank which 
offers the best price (see also the discussion of switching costs in chapter 5). As one banker 
explained in a personal interview, "multinational and large firms calculate with every penny 
and are able to shift huge amounts from one bank to another just by pushing a few buttons. This 
market is therefore very international, highly competitive and offers minimal margins".
Reinsurance is a highly international market with few regulatory restrictions. In the EC 
reinsurance was deregulated as early as 1964 by the EC Reinsurance Directive (64/225/EEC).
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Figure 1.1: Means of cross-border entry in retail financial services
A
Level
of
Integration
I now give more detailed definitions of the different forms of cross- 
border entry. De novo entry is defined as setting up a branch or subsidiary in a 
foreign country from scratch. It involves a transfer of capital from the home 
to the host country.
A majority acquisition is characterised by the purchase of more than fifty 
percent of outstanding share capital which leads to a change in control in the 
acquired firm. Such a transaction has a cross-border dimension whenever the 
acquiring firm has its main headquarters incorporated in a different country 
than those of the acquisition target. Concerning such acquisitions, the 
definition of a "concentration" of the EC merger control regulation is 
follow ed.17 According to Article 3 (1), a majority acquisition may take two 
forms:
• a "legal merger" where the acquired company is dissolved and its assets 
and liabilties are fully transferred to the purchasing party or,
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings.
De novo entry
• greenfield entry with cross-border 
transfer of own capital and labour
Control acquisition
• stake of greater than 50% or 
minority stake which conveys 
strategic control
Joint venture
•jointly owned separate legal entity 
in host country
Multinational
Banking
Exporting
• cross>boider provision of 
services from borne base
Strategic alliance
• cooperation agreement in 
specific areas supported by cross- 
shareholdings or joint ventures
Correspondent banking
• correspondent bank represents 
domestic bank in host country
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alternatively, the two or more merging companies dissolve to form a 
single new company;
• a "takeover" where one party gains "direct or indirect control of the 
whole or parts of one or more other undertakings" through any kind of 
suitable means such as share or asset purchase, but the acquired company 
remains in existence.18
Legal mergers on a cross-border basis are not yet possible, however, as all 
cross-border transactions must be carried out under one or the other national 
company law due to the lack of a European cross-border merger option in EC 
company law (see Jacquemin, 1989, p.14-15).19 As a result of this, cross-border 
majority acquisitions always take the form of a takeover of a domestic firm by 
a foreign institution rather than a transaction between equal partners which 
leads to potential problems of arousing national or political resentment.20 21
A joint venture (JV) is defined as a legally independent entity owned by 
two or more parent companies which actively influence the corporate policy 
of the JV. Such a JV can be between two or more foreign banks which set up a 
company in the target country or between foreign and local firms.
A strategic alliance shall be defined as an explicit agreement between at 
least two banks to co-operate in a range of activities in a foreign host country. 
Such an agreement may be supported by mutual shareholdings.
Finally, exporting refers to cross-border provision of services from the 
home country rather than serving the customers through a local branch.
18 For the distinction between a legal merger and a takeover, see also paragraphs 4 and 6 of the 
explanatory memorandum of the proposed EC directive on takeovers, COM (88) 823; OJ 1989 
C64/8.
19 The merger between the Dutch and Belgium insurance firms AMEV and Groupe Assurances to 
form Fortis constitutes the only cross-border transaction in financial services so far which could 
be called a de facto though not a legal cross-border merger.
«
20 An interesting example of the failure of a proposed cross-border merger is that between 
Belgian Generate Bank and the Dutch Amro Bank. The two banks agreed in February 1988 that 
they want to create "an indissoluble banking combination with one group management and one 
strategy /corporate policy" by 1991. In September 1989 these plans were abandoned in favour of 
a strategic alliance. One of the main reasons for the failure of the cross-border merger was that 
neither bank was willing to be 'acquired' and thus forced to change nationality. In addition, the 
lack of a European company statute was cited as creating considerable tax and legal problems.
21 This problem has led the EC Commission to propose a Directive on cross-border mergers (the 
Tenth Company Law Directive, COM (84) 727; OJ 1985 C23IU) which aims to establish 
common rules for cross-border mergers and, in conjunction with the European Company Statute 
(COM (89)268; OJ 1989 C263/41 and C263/69), is to provide a legal means for setting up a 
European company under EC law rather than (possibly conflicting) national company laws. 
Both directives are still pending before the Council of Ministers, however, as there are 
differing opinions on the degree of worker participation.
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2. The evolution of cross-border penetration in EC financial services
Since the process of cross-industry penetration of the insurance and banking 
sectors is a fairly recent phenomenon, we follow the traditional 
differentiation of the financial services industry into banking and insurance 
when discussing the historical evolution of cross-border penetration of 
European financial services in this section.
2.1. Banking
Foreign penetration of banking in Europe is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon. While international banking activities can be traced back to the 
Florentine banking houses in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (see 
Davis and Lewis, 1987, p.216), it was only in the nineteenth century that 
British banks began to penetrate overseas market on a systematic scale, 
followed by other European banks.22 The British overseas banks provided a 
range of banking services in their host countries but focused especially on 
retail services. Although some of these banks set up branches in international 
financial centres such as Frankfurt and Paris, their main focus were countries 
outside Europe, and in particular developing economies and the colonies. Of 
the 1,286 foreign branches of British banks in 1913, for example, only 21 were 
established in Europe thus accounting for only 1.6 percent of the total.23 As 
Jones (1990a, p.3) notes "foreign penetration of the domestic banking systems 
of Britain {and} continental Europe ... was virtually non-existent" at the 
beginning of this century and this situation remained essentially unchanged 
until the beginning of the 1960s when the first wave of internationalisation of 
European markets started.
At the beginning of the 1960s, American commercial banks expanded 
into overseas markets and European banks responded by entering the US 
market in turn but also by increasing their presence in other European 
countries. Among the most prominent US entrants were the biggest 
commercial banks which mostly concentrated their European efforts on 
wholesale activities. Some banks such as Citicorp, Chase Manhattan or 
Chemical Bank even entered European retail banking through greenfield 
establishments and acquisitions. With the exception of Citibank, however, all 
banks withdrew only a few years later, as they incurred heavy losses in these 
markets. The move of expanding in Europe was part of a wider trend towards 
the multinationalisation of US banking. The number of foreign branches and
22 For a more detailed account of the history of multinational banking, see the contributions in 
Jones (1990a).
23 See Jones (1990b, p31). For British institutions the same author notes that they "never made 
more than a marginal impact in North America, continental Europe or Japan" (1990, p. 36).
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subsidiaries of US banks increased from 133 in 1960 to 1,759 in 1986 (Huertas, 
1990, p.253). Foreign assets accounted for 14 percent of total US bank assets in 
1986, while they stood at only one percent in 1960. The most international of 
the US commercial banks, Citicorp, had only 70 foreign branches in 1960. This 
number had increased to 2,135 foreign offices at the end of 1988 with foreign 
activities accounting for almost half of total revenues and pre-tax earnings.
At the same time, European banks responded to the invasion of US 
banks by entering the US market, but also by increasing their cross-border 
entry activities in Europe. The development of European cross-border 
banking can be exemplified for the case of France: in 1914 domestic banks had 
around forty foreign offices in Europe (Michalet and Sauviat, 1981). Only ten 
new offices were added between the wars and an additional eighty-three new 
foreign offices were newly founded until 1968 worldwide. This fairly slow 
growth significantly increased in the succeeding decade. In the period from 
1968 to 1973 alone, eighty-seven new offices were established and European 
offices accounted for ten new representative offices, eight new branches and 
thirteen new subsidiaries (Statistical Releases of the Association Française des 
Banques). Over the next five-year period, the growth rate of foreign offices 
rose even more dramatically: worldwide, 192 new foreign offices were 
established, more than twice the number between 1945 and 1968.
British banks took longer to recognise the importance of multinational 
banking in the industrial countries. With their traditional focus on the 
former colonies, they had neglected the industrialised countries and were 
forced to shift attention to these markets in the 1970s. As Jones (1990b, p.54) 
notes "it was only in the early and mid-1970s ... that British multinational 
bankers began to recognize that over the last thirty years not only had three 
major economic powers blocs emerged - the United States, continental Europe 
and Japan - but that they scarcely owned a single branch in any of them". In 
the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s British banks 
therefore actively entered these markets to make up for previous neglect.
The most recent entrants into the European markets were the Japanese 
banks which have continuously increased their presence over the past fifteen 
years. The late entry of the Japanese banks resulted from restrictions which 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance imposed on domestic banks where only the 
Bank of Tokyo was allowed to operate internationally. With the lifting of 
these restrictions at the beginning of the 1970s, Japanese banks began to enter 
European markets focusing almost exclusively on wholesale and investment 
banking. Between 1975 and 1987 the number of branches in Europe increased 
by 30 percent, while subsidiaries rose tenfold (Dueser, 1990, p. 110). By the end 
of the 1980s, Japanese banks had established a leading position in some areas 
of international banking such as the Euromarkets.24
24 The cross-border entry activities entry of European, American and Japanese banks are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
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An aggregate picture of multinational banking in the EC is conveyed by 
the number of foreign banks in different EC countries. These are listed in table 
1.2 which illustrates the development over time from 1960 to 1986. Not 
surprisingly, the UK leads the ranking with London being Europe's main 
financial centre and thus attracting the highest number of foreign institutions. 
Foreign-owned banks in the UK account for over sixty percent of total bank 
assets and they are mostly involved in investment banking and capital 
market activities. Germany is a close second as Europe's largest economy and 
the position of foreign banks in Germany is examined below in greater detail. 
Luxembourg's strong position stems from its special status as a financial 
centre, due to its favourable tax and bank secrecy regulations. Spain and Italy 
appear to be underbanked in terms of presence of foreign institutions due to 
former regulatory restrictions on cross-border entry. Of the 53 foreign 
institutions in Spain, thirteen had full access to the retail market in 1990.
Table 1.2: Number of foreign banks in ten EC countries from 1960 to 1986
1960 1970 1980 1986
UK 51 95 214 293
Germany 24 77 213 283
France 33 58 122 152
Luxemb 3 23 99 110
Belgium 14 26 51 57
Spain 4 4 25 49
N ether 1. 1 23 39 42
Italy 1 4 25 36
Greece 2 3 18 19
Denmark 0 0 5 8
Source: OECD (1989, p.147).
Table 1.3 illustrates the dramatic growth of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries of domestic banks. While in 1960 very few banks possessed an 
international network, there was a rapid increase in the 1970s and again since 
1980. In contrast to the constant or even decreasing number of domestic 
branches, the number of foreign branches and subsidiaries was still increasing 
between 1980 and 1986. In some countries international operations account for 
a substantial proportion of total business activities. In France, for example, 
activities of foreign branches and subsidiaries accounted for 41.5 percent of 
total business volume in 1984 (Metais, 1990. p.142).
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Table 1.3: Number of foreign branches and subsidiaries of domestic banks 
from 1960 to 1986
1960 1970 1980 1986
France n.a. 133 304 455
Ireland 60 84 224 276
Germany 3 8 126 230
Netherl. 3 55 145 170
Spain 5 25 82 136
Italy 17 22 44 75
Denmark 0 0 18 56
Belgium 5 6 14 27
Source: OECD (1989, p.148); Deutsche Bundesbank; France 1968,1980: Association Française des 
Banques, Statistical Releases.
Figure 1.2 shows aggregate foreign assets and liabilities of commercial 
banks in the twelve EC countries in 1990. These are expressed as a percentage 
of total domestic banking assets as recorded by the International Monetary 
Fund Financial Statistics. Foreign assets and liabilities of domestic banks 
(including subsidiaries but not branches of foreign banks) provide an indicator 
of the degree of internationalisation of the country's banking system. It is 
therefore not surprising that those countries with (former) capital controls, i.e. 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy have the lowest foreign assets, as domestic 
banks and residents were not able to freely lend abroad and engage in 
in ternational banking activities. Germany which has had no capital 
restrictions is also characterised by a low degree of internationalisation which 
appears surprising considering the significant export activities in industrial 
sectors. The most internationalised banking systems are Luxembourg with its 
large number of subsidiaries of foreign banks, Belgium and the UK with 
London as the world's most international financial centre.
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Figure 1.2: Foreign assets and liabilities of domestic commercial banks in 1990
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Data for Italy, France and Belgium are for 1988
Source: own calculation from IMF International Financial Statistics 1991.
We see that there has been a significant multinationalisation process in 
European banking since the beginning of the 1960s. Intentionally, this was 
referred to the as the 'first' wave of internationalisation which was 
characterised by cross-border entry activities almost exclusively targeted at 
wholesale and investm ent banking activities. Currently, we may be 
witnessing the second wave of internationalisation in European banking with 
cross-border entry activities being targeted at new banking markets and in 
particular the retail market, as broadly defined above. Data on cross-border 
entry activities in this area since 1986 will be presented in chapter six.
The best statistics on foreign bank representation in any EC country are 
available for Germany, as provided by the Bundesbank. An analysis of the 
countries of origin of branches of foreign banks in table 1.4 reveals that the US 
accounts for the largest number of foreign branches and subsidiaries in 1990, 
with Japan being a close second. Japanese banks still operate largely through 
branches, whereas banks from most other countries have established 
subsidiaries. It is interesting to note that the three countries which are most 
strongly represented and account for 58 percent of business volume are non- 
EC members. The largest EC country in terms of business volume is the UK 
which only accounts for 9 percent of business volume, however.
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Table 1.4: Countries of origin of foreign banks in Germany in 1990
Parent country Number of 
branches of 
foreign banks
Business volume 
(DM billions)
Number of 
subsidiaries of 
foreign banks
Business volume 
(DM billion)
US 18 8.1 18 32.3
Japan 14 25.3 14 5.7
France 2 0.5 8 12.7
UK 6 2.9 5 11.3
Switzerl. 0 0 8 16.4
Netherlands 2 0.3 7 6.8
Italy 7 8.2 2 1.0
other EC countries 14 2.3 7 3.1
rest of the world 31 2.9 12 12.7
Total 94 50.5 81 102.0
Source: own calculations from data in Die Bank 7/90.
Of the foreign banks which are represented in Germany in 1990 only two 
were engaged in retail banking with more than ten branches: these were KKB 
Bank owned by Citibank with around 300 retail branches and CC-Bank owned 
jointly by Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander with 36 branches. 
These will be discussed as case studies in chapter seven. Other foreign banks 
which offered retail business were mainly aimed at foreign workers in 
Germany such as the Turkish and Greek banks or were in areas close to the 
national borders such as French Societe Generale. Three British-owned banks 
and the subsidiaries of Swiss banks were involved in private banking for 
high-net wealth customers. None of these banks had more than ten retail 
branches, however, and are therefore unlikely to have much of an impact on 
domestic retail banking.
Table 1.5 reports market share data of foreign banks in Germany in 1991 
for selected banking segments. Branches of foreign banks account for 1.5 
percent of total bank assets and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for 2.6 
percent, amounting to a 4.1 percent share of foreign banks in Germany. The 
market share data show that the overall impact of foreign banks in these 
aggregate markets has been minimal. A time-series analysis reveals that the 
market share of foreign banks has not increased for the past five years, but has 
remained largely constant and even decreased in some areas.
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Table 1.5: Market share in 1991 of foreign banks in Germany for selected 
banking segments
Branches of 
foreign banks
Subsidiaries 
of foreign 
banks
Total market 
share of foreign 
banks
Loans to firms 0.7% 1.8% 2.5%
Loans to personal customers 0.04% 1.6% 1.64%
Loans to public authorities 0.4% 0.6% 1.0%
Loans to other banks 0.7% 1.6% 2.3%
Deposits from firms 0.4% 1.8% 2.2%
Deposits from personal customers 0.02% 1.1% 1.12%
Deposits from public authorities 0.04% 0.3% 0.34%
Deposits from other banks 1.7% 3.4% 5.1%
Securities accounts 0.02% 3.1% 3.12%
Interest rate/currency swaps 2.7% 4.0% 6.7%
Source: Own calculation from monthly report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, August 1991; 
Statistical Supplement to monthly reports, series 1, no.8; data are for June 1991.
It becomes apparent that foreign banks have a minimal market share in 
the most typical retail banking areas such as taking domestic deposits or 
lending to personal customers.25
These data clearly suggest that even fairly disaggregated market share 
data need to be interpreted cautiously, as they do not necessarily convey a true 
picture of the relevant market. At any rate, this example underlines the 
earlier discussed need to differentiate carefully the markets in which banks 
compete. Aggregate data are unlikely to provide much insight into the actual 
significance and impact of foreign banks in particular markets.26
25 Foreign banks have the greatest market share with the largest 500 firms. In this market a 
single firm maintains on average 19 banking relationships and 43 percent of the largest German 
firms had a banking relationship with a foreign bank in 1990 (Greenwich Associates, 1990). 31 
percent included a foreign bank as one of their five "main banks", whereas 14 percent even had a 
foreign "Hausbank".
26 For example, the "market share" data of Steinherr and Gilibert (1989) which are frequently 
re-quoted (e.g. Neven, 1990; Hawawini and Rajera, 1990) provide little insight into actual 
market shares of foreign banks. This results from the fact that their data are calculated as the 
percentage of foreign banks' assets of total industry assets and thus differentiate neither 
between retail and wholesale markets, nor between domestic and international activities (such 
as the Euromarkets). Not surprisingly therefore, foreign banks have a particularly high 
market share in Luxembourg and the UK which host significant international banking centres 
which may have little to do with domestic markets. Thus, a typical retail bank customer in 
the UK may notice little of the fact that 60 percent of total UK banking assets are owned by 
foreign banks.
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2.2. Insurance
Internationalisation in insurance has seen an equally dramatic expansion as 
in banking. It is interesting to note the differences betw een the 
multinationalisation processes between the two sectors, however: whereas 
cross-border activities in banking were for a long time targeted almost 
exclusively at the non-retail sector, insurers have expanded also into the retail 
sector in foreign countries. Some of the largest European insurers have been 
active in other European countries since the beginning of the century.
Figure 1. 7 illustrates that the number of foreign insurers has increased 
in some but not all EC countries in the period from 1968 to 1989.
Table 1. 6: Number of foreign insurers in ten EC countries from 1968 to 1989
1968 1982 1989
UK 134 170 143
France 206 168 147
Germany 47 116 145
Italy 48 49 n.a.
N etherl. 302 157 152
Denmark 71 65 n.a.
Belgium 304 147 n.a.
Greece 65 83 n.a.
Source: based on direct contacts with Swiss Re, several national sources.
Figure 1.3 presents the market shares of foreign insurers in the EC 
countries in 1986. These are calculated as the proportion of total domestic 
premium income accounted for by foreign insurers. Market share of foreign 
insurers is greatest in Ireland, where a number of companies are owned by 
British insurers. It is interesting to note that the UK which has the most open 
and unregulated insurance sector also has the second-lowest market share of 
foreign firms. This shows that the extent of foreign penetration does not alone 
depend on regulatory barriers to cross-border entry.
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Figure 1.3: Market share of foreign insurers in the EC countries in 1986
Source: Sigma, 2/1989; OECD, Statistics on Insurance, 1988; own calculations.
Some of the largest EC insurers are also the most internationalised: 
Italy's Generali, for example, derives more than 60 percent of its premium 
income from foreign operations, whereas AXA receices one third of its 
income from abroad. Half of UAFs assets are based abroad of which 90 percent 
are in Europe. Similarly, Allianz by now has almost half of its assets based 
outside Germany. Unlike in the banking sector, all of these insurers have the 
majority of their foreign activities in the retail sector rather than in the large 
corporate market. As an example of the internationalisation process in 
insurance over time, I dicuss the development of Allianz' cross-border entry 
activities in chapter eight.
Furthermore, also unlike in the banking sector there have been several 
large-scale cross-border acquisitions in the insurance industry which were 
targeted at some of the largest domestic institutions. These include, for 
example, the 1989 acquisition of Germany's second-largest non-life insurer, 
Colonia, by the French Groupe Victoire. In the N etherlands, UK's 
Commercial Union acquired Delta Lloyd as early as 1973, the third-largest 
insurer. Similarly, in Italy the second-largest insurer RAS was acquired by 
Germany's Allianz. In most EC countries we find at least a few foreign 
insurers among the largest 15 national insurance firms. This contrasts with 
the banking sector where there are virtually no foreign banks among the 
largest domestic institutions. Thus, even though foreign firms in insurance 
still play a limited role compared to some other service and manufacturing 
industries, they account for a significantly greater market share in retail 
financial services than foreign banks which have so far focused mainly on 
wholesale activities in their international expansion strategies. I will discuss 
reasons for this difference in the third and fourth chapters, where a theory of 
cross-border entry is developed and possible barriers to cross-border entry will
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be discussed. In chapter seven and eight individual case studies of cross-border 
entry activities are analysed.
Similarly to the banking sector, the best statistics on the significance and 
market share of foreign insurers in a domestic market are available for 
Germany as provided by the Supervisory Office for Insurance. Table 1.9 
provides an analysis of the countries of origin and the respective market 
shares of foreign insurers which operated in Germany in 1989.
Table 1.7: Countries of origin and market shares of foreign insurers in 
Germany in 1989
Parent country Number 
of foreign 
firms in 
life
Market
share
Number of 
foreign 
firms in 
non-life
Market
share
Total 
number of 
foreign 
firms
Total
market
share
UK 4 1.3 35 2.8 39 1.9
Switzerland 12 7.7 26 7.9 38 8.7
France 3 0.1 19 0.5 22 0.3
Netherl. 4 4.6 8 6.6 12 5.1
US 2 0.1 8 0.5 10 0.3
Italy 2 0.5 5 0.1 7 0.2
other EC countries 0 0 7 2.3 7 2.3
rest of the world 0 0 7 2.9 7 2.9
Total 27 14.4 115 19.8 142 17.3
Source: German Supervisory Office for Insurance, Annua] Report 1990.
Figure 1.3 shows the development of market shares of foreign insurers 
from 1975 to 1989. It becomes obvious that foreign firms in both life and non­
life have substantially increased their stakes in the German market, especially 
since 1987. In particular, in comparison to the banking sector foreign insurers 
in Germany have a significantly higher market share. This is despite the fact 
that regulatory barriers in the German insurance market are probably highest 
in the EC, while there are no official barriers to foreign entry in the banking 
sector. This shows that entry depends not just on the lack of regulatory entry 
barriers.
28
Cross-Border Penetration of Financial Services
Figure 1.4: Development of market shares of foreign insurers in Germany 
from 1975 to 1989
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Source: German Supervisory Office for Insurance, Annual Report 1990.
Unfortunately, similarly detailed data about the market share of foreign 
insurers are not available for the other EC countries. It appears, however, that 
foreign insurers have a significantly greater market share in the retail 
financial services than foreign banks.
3. Conclusions
This first chapter has introduced the basic definitions of the financial services 
industry and markets. Concerning a possible industry definition, it was noted 
that due to increasing decompartmentalisation an institutional classification 
no longer provides a sufficient basis for evaluating financial services 
competition in the retail sector. It was therefore decided to follow a market- 
oriented definition where retail financial services are broadly defined as 
comprising the mass personal and small business market, high net worth 
individuals and mid-sized corporates. M ultinational financial services 
corporations are defined as firms operating in at least one country other than 
that of their main legal incorporation through means of branches or 
subsidiaries. Finally, cross-border entry is viewed as a dynamic concept in this 
study where a firm follows the strategic objective of expanding operations to 
foreign markets through a range of possible entry vehicles ranging from de 
novo entry over acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint ventures or exporting.
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A brief overview of the historical evolution of cross-border banking in 
Europe has shown that significant foreign penetration started only around 
the beginning of the 1960s and was predominantly in the area of wholesale 
and investment banking. It remains to be seen whether the second wave of 
internationalisation in European banking which focuses on retail banking 
markets will be of equal significance.
In insurance services there has been an equally  significant 
multinationalisation process. In contrast to the banking sector, however, this 
has also concerned the retail financial services sector. Although data are 
scarce, foreign insurers seem to have a significantly greater market share in 
retail financial services than foreign banks.
I develop a theory of cross-border entry in chapter three to explain such 
differences in the significance of foreign financial services firms and analyse 
barriers to cross-border entry in chapter four. Before proceeding to these 
topics, the next chapter analyses the changes in the regulatory framework of 
cross-border entry in the EC.
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Chapter Two: 
The Regulatory Environment 
of Cross-Border Entry 
in EC Retail Financial Services
Financial markets in the EC were for a long time separated by restrictions on 
cross-border capital movements as well as rigid regulations which frequently 
had the effect of protecting the domestic industry from foreign competition. 
Regulatory entry barriers were erected with the legitimation of protecting 
depositors or policyholders and preserving monetary and financial stability. 
This linkage between entry barriers and regulatory objectives was recognised 
in the Cecchini-report which states that:1
"A common feature of the financial ... service branches is that the 
regulatory functions of government, while aiming primarily at 
prudential or safety objectives, also often tend to limit entry into 
the market as a side effect ... the general objective of European 
market integration ... is, therefore, to separate out far more clearly 
the setting and supervision of prudential and safety standards from 
the issue of market entry"
Due to the comparatively high degree of protection of the domestic 
financial services industries, it comes as no surprise that this sector has been 
singled out as a prime target for liberalisation in the context of the 1992 
programme. In fact, increasing competition due to cross-border entry in 
financial services is predicted to yield one third of the total projected increase 
in annual European GDP of 4.5%.2 This estimate underlines the significance 
of the financial services sector relative to other industries in the internal 
market programme.
Since many issues surrounding cross-border entry are related to 
regulation, it is indispensable to start from first principles and analyse the 
economic rationale for financial services regulation. The next section 
analyses financial services regulation as a response to market failures and 
critically assesses the resulting need for public intervention. Rather than 
giving a comprehensive account of all the issues involved, however, it 
provides an analysis of the questions most relevant to regulatory changes in 
the context of the internal market programme and their relationship to cross­
1 See Cecchini-Report, European Economy, 35,1988, p. 86.
2 ibid. (p. 161).
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border entry.3 In the second section, recent regulatory changes on the EC level 
are analysed, focusing on the liberalisation of capital movements and the 
implications of the recent EC Banking and Insurance Directives. Finally, the 
third section analyses the question whether increased cross-border entry will 
lead to competitive deregulation between European regulators.
1. Public regulation of retail financial services as a response to 
market failures
Financial services are usually subjected to a much higher degree of public 
regulation than any other service industry, even though the 1980s have 
witnessed a series of deregulatory moves in most Western countries4 and the 
internal European m arket programme for financial services has been 
described as a gigantic exercise in deregulation. Yet, despite these deregulatory 
moves there is widespread agreement in the economic and legal literature 
that some form of public regulation must be retained in order to achieve a 
smooth and efficient functioning of the financial services sector. For example, 
while industrial firm failures are usually considered the result of a natural 
selection process in a m arket economy which do not require public 
intervention, financial services firm failures are usually publicly regulated.5 
What then is the economic rationale for public intervention in the financial 
services market and what is 'special' about financial services firms that 
requires a different regulatory regime from other industries?
Two forms of 'market failures' are usually identified to justify the special 
regulatory attention given to financial institutions: firstly, informational 
asymmetries between financial services firms and customers necessitating 
measures to ensure consumer protection, and secondly, the possibility of 
systemic runs or 'contagion' in the case of individual firm failures inflicting 
negative external effects on the economy.6 Before discussing this
3 For a more complete discussion of the general issues involved in banking regulation see, for 
example, Coodhart (1989, chapters 8 and 9) or Baltensperger and Dermine (1987). For a 
discussion of regulatory issues in insurance, see, for example, McDowell (1989).
4 See, for example, Mayer (1990) for an analysis of the deregulatory moves in the UK, Vives 
(1990) for the case of Spain, Melitz (1990) for France, or Santomero (1990) for the US.
5 As the recent failure of the Bank of New England or the crisis of the Savings and Loan 
Associations in the US illustrate, public authorities prefer to l>ail out' failing institutions 
rather than subjecting them to bankruptcy procedures like in other industries. See White (1989) 
and Kane (1989) for an analysis of the recent crisis in S & Ls.
6 Both arguments are microeconomic in perspective. There have also been macroeconomic 
considerations put forward to justify banking regulation such as the need for a minimum reserve 
ratio to effectively pursue monetary policy. In their survey of such macroeconomic 
considerations Baltensperger and Dermine (1987, p. 70) conclude, however, that "regulatory 
decisions should be based not on macroeconomic stability considerations ... but rather on 
microeconomic efficiency grounds".
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'conventional' justification of financial services regulation, we address the 
agency problems which arise between customers, owners and management 
and which lie at the heart of market failures in financial services.
Regulatory Environment in the EC
1.1. The basic problem: agency conflicts between owners, managers and 
customers
Whenever there is separation of ownership and control in financial services 
or industrial firms, agency problems may arise due to different maximands 
and asymmetric information.7 In the parlance of principal-agent theory,8 the 
principals (owners) engage in a contract with the agent (management), 
delegating to them the right to lead day-to-day activities of the firm.
In the case of financial intermediaries, however, managers act not only 
as agents for the ultimate owners (i.e. shareholders or government), but 
concurrently as agents for depositors or policyholders (called 'customers' 
henceforth). Thus, they are engaged in two separate agency relationship with 
two principals and associated problems of incentive incompatibility.
It may happen, therefore, that the underlying preference orderings of 
owners, customers and managers diverge due to different degrees of risk- 
aversion, for example. Owners and customers both want to induce the agent 
to adopt their preferences (maximising the value of the firm or following a 
prudent portfolio strategy), by setting up an appropriate incentive and 
monitoring system. Accordingly, two types of failures may arise: first, it may 
be impossible to design an optimal incentive scheme to ensure that the agent 
acts in the principals' interest due to goal incompatibilities between 
customers, owners and managers.9 Second, complete monitoring may be
7 In his Wealth of Nations Adam Smith may have been the first observant of these agency 
problems: "the directors ... being the managers rather of other people's money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own ... 
negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company" (1776, p.700). The modem literature of this problem dates back 
at least to the seminal book by Berle and Means (1932).
® For the 'classic" application of positive principal-agent theory to the theory of the firm, see 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
® In particular, there is a problem of asymmetric information between principals and agents: 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989, p.89) note that "the presence of private information {on the part 
of managers} ... prevents inexpensive contractual solutions and provides a potential 
opportunity for the manager to pursue his own objectives rather than the owner's". Such 
asymmetric information exists also between managers and depositors. This is a problem of 
adverse selection.
33
chapter 2
prohibitively costly and asymmetric information between principals and 
agents may prevent fully effective monitoring altogether.10
Goal incompatibilities may be a result of differences in risk attitudes of 
agents and principals: portfolio theory illustrates the advantages of 
diversifying a portfolio of risky assets. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), for instance, derives the return of any single risky asset as the sum 
of a firm-specific component and a 'system atic' or non-diversifiable 
component associated with general market conditions. Once shareholders 
have diversified their portfolios, they are largely immune against firm- 
specific risk and therefore risk-neutral with respect to any particular firm. 
Managers, however, are unable to diversify their employment and are 
therefore overinvested in the firm they serve.11 A similar situation applies to 
customers who are unlikely to diversify their deposits or policies over a range 
of institutions due to increasing transaction costs which outweigh the benefit 
of lower risk of insolvency of the financial services firm.12 One may therefore 
hypothesise that shareholders are least and depositors or policy-holders most 
risk-averse with managers somewhere inbetween, but more likely to be risk- 
averse.13
To illustrate these different attitudes towards risk consider the choice 
between three asset management strategies as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Suppose h(X) is the distribution function of a low-risk strategy (e.g. a mutual
When ordinary share capital is widely dispersed, there is a large number of depositors and 
management control is costly, monitoring may become a public good: if a single shareholder or 
depositor decided to monitor management she would incur the full costs but receive only a 
fraction of the pay-off of her activity. Since other shareholders and depositors cannot be 
excluded from the benefit of the resulting higher share price or lower probability of 
insolvency, they are able to free-ride and therefore no individual principal has an incentive 
to monitor. Similarly for a coalition of principals: if such a coalition is sufficiently large, the 
expected benefits of monitoring may exceed expected costs However, the coalition is likely to 
be inherently unstable because it again faces a free-rider problem: if it is believed that the 
coalition will continue to monitor management, it is individually rational to exit the 
coalition, thereby avoiding the costs but continuing to enjoy the benefits. As a result, 
monitoring by principals will be sub-opdmally low due to this moral hazard problem.
11 In particular, managers' mobility may be limited due to development of firm-specific 
human capital (Williamson, 1984). In addition, stock option schemes intended to align 
managers' with shareholders' incentives (Demsetz, 1983) tend to exacerbate the 
overinvestment in the firm.
12 The effect of 'institutional diversification' on risk reduction is likely to be marginal, since 
the probability of any individual firm failure is fairly small. Furthermore, in the presence of 
deposit insurance or lender-of-last resort facilities the incentive to diversify is non-existent 
(see below). Transaction costs of maintaining several bank relationships, on the other hand, 
may be substantial.
13 Still, bank managers may be considerably less risk-averse than depositors would like them 
to be, as is illustrated in the recent S & L crisis in the US. Moral hazard problems increased 
considerably due to the existence of a comprehensive deposit insurance scheme.
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fund) with X being the net present value, f(X) is a higher return but also 
higher risk alternative (such as loans to an enterprise), whereas g(X) is the 
strategy with the highest risk but also the highest return (e.g. real estate, junk 
bonds). Thus, we have E(g(X)}>E{f(X)}>E{h(X)} and var{g(x)} > varlf(x)} > 
var{h(x)i with E{.) being the expectation operator and var{.} the variance.
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Figure 2.1: Choice between risky asset management strategies
Suppose that managers, shareholders and customers all have different 
degrees of risk aversion. A risk-averse management may easily prefer f(x) 
over distribution g(x) because it has a lower probability of a negative net 
present value, even though the expected net present value is lower, 
Customers may be even more risk-averse and prefer the most conservative 
asset management strategy h(X), since it has the lowest probability of default. 
W ell-diversified shareholders being risk-neutral, however, would prefer 
management to choose g(X) as it maximises the value of the firm.
In summary, therefore, financial services firm managers, in particular 
when performing a fiduciary function for depositors, have the difficult task of 
reconciling possibly incompatible objectives of customers and shareholders 
with respect to risk management, while at the same time maximising their 
own objective function. This is the most significant characteristic which 
distinguishes the financial services sector from most other industries.
Both 'conventional' economic justifications for financial services 
regulation can be stated in this agency perspective: the next section analyses 
the issue of asymmetric information which lies at the heart of the 
monitoring problem between customers and managers.14 Section 1.3 then 
analyses possible negative externalities which may result if management has 
pursued an overly risky strategy which resulted in insolvency.
14 The monitoring problem between shareholders and management is discussed in greater detail 
in chapter four in the section on the corporate control market.
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1.2. Informational asymmetries
Informational asymmetries result from financial services being mostly 
'experience' goods where quality can only be determined after purchase 
(Shapiro, 1983) or even 'credence' goods where quality may never be 
determ inable even ex post (see Nelson, 1970; Darby and Kami, 1973). 
Inform ational asym m etries are of two kinds: first, depositors and 
policyholders have incomplete information on the asset quality of the firm. 
Second, financial services products may be so complex that retail customers 
are unable to assess the quality of the particular service offered. Each of these 
is discussed in turn.
As financial services firms hold private information on the quality and 
riskiness of their assets, it is difficult for depositors and insured to assess 
whether it manages its funds in a prudent way.15 Full disclosure of all private 
information which the firm holds would eliminate asymmetric information, 
but is not feasible both for competitive reasons, as well as on grounds of 
protecting inside information given to the firm by its loan applicants. 
Asymmetric information also results from customers being unable ex ante to 
assess the quality of the services provided by the firm, since this would 
require specialised information. For example, in insurance services claims 
processing efficiency is unlikely to be known before actual liabilities arise. The 
possibility of 'repeat purchases', which usually constitutes a natural incentive 
for firms not to provide inferior services,16 may be insufficient protection in 
the case of single large financial transactions such as life insurance or 
mortgages. Leland (1979) presents a model of a market with asymmetric 
information where equilibrium obtains at sub-optimal quality standards due 
to the 'lemon-problem'. In such a case, it may be welfare-enhancing to 
improve on the market outcome through public regulation, such as setting 
minimum quality standards through the licensing of banks and insurers and 
monitoring activities.
Informational asymmetries concerning the quality of firm assets may be 
alleviated by private rating agencies which assess the prudency and risk of 
firms' asset management strategies.17 Compared to private depositors, such
15 Such informational asymmetries are aggravated by the recent increase in the use of off- 
balance sheet activities such as options, swaps or credit lines which do not appear in published 
accounts and are therefore difficult to monitor for outside observers.
16 Repeat purchases reduce moral hazard problems if they induce firms to establish a 
reputation for providing high-quality services (see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, 
1986). As building up a reputation requires time, however, customers may be unable to 
discriminate between high and low-quality providers in the first periods (Diamond, 1989).
17 Such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings of firms' bond issues ranging from AAA 
(Aaa for Moody's) for the least risky firms over C-rated bonds which are in the junk-bond 
category to D-ratings for firms which experience serious financial difficulties. The rating has 
significant implications for a firm's funding costs: those institutions which have lower ratings,
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agencies enjoy economies of scale in assessing firms' risks and solvency, but 
still face incomplete information about the firm's business policies. Thus, 
while these agencies reduce informational asymmetries they do not 
eliminate the problem and one may therefore argue that public intervention 
is required to lay down rules to ensure prudent asset management strategies.
The second main source of informational asymmetries stems from the 
complexity of the financial product which may be such that it requires expert 
know-how in order to assess the quality and type of the product. This applies 
especially to insurance products where as McDowell (1989, p.41) notes 
"policies have become so technical, so long, and so complex that only 
insurance specialists can understand them". This complexity of insurance 
contracts may justify regulatory intervention to standardise the contract 
format at least to some extent in order to ensure comparability of products 
and services.
Let us note at this stage that neither type of informational asymmetry is 
unique to financial services, but applies equally to other services such as the 
medical, legal or accounting professions. It is therefore not evident that the 
regulation of financial services should be any different from that of other 
services where public regulation is often complemented and even substituted 
by self-regulation.18 One could argue that in the presence of informational 
asymmetries, service providers have a natural incentive to engage in self­
regulation through formation of 'clubs' setting minimum quality levels and 
penalising 'black sheep' who want to free-ride on the good reputation thus 
established. At the same time, however, clubs may set up anti-competitive 
practises such as erecting entry barriers unjustifiable on prudential grounds 
or collusive behaviour on prices (see Shaked and Sutton, 1981, 1982). In 
Leland's model (1979), for example, self-regulation may lead to quality 
standards being set too high. Mayer and Neven (1991) show that self­
regulation is less effective for small clubs of firms whose reputation is not 
(yet) well-established. Thus, under these circumstances it may be preferable to 
have statutory rather than self-regulation.
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1.3. Negative externalities resulting from insolvencies
A second argum ent for public regulation of financial services is that 
insolvencies may inflict significant negative externalities on agents. In 
addition, firm failures may spark off a crisis of confidence in the financial
such as the American banks, suffer a serious competitive disadvantage, as their funding costs in 
the capital market increase proportionately.
18 Only in the UK do we currently find some degree of self-regulation in particular in 
investment services.
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system and lead to a contagious run of depositors or policyholders.19 I discuss 
each of these arguments in turn.
In contrast to the industrial sector where bankruptcy is seen to be the 
result of a natural process of weeding out weak and badly managed 
companies, failures in the financial services sector are usually considered to 
require public intervention. This stems from the fact that outright failures in 
the financial services sector affect not only owners, creditors and employees 
as in the industrial sector but also depositors and policyholders. Thus, if a 
bank or a life insurer become insolvent depositors and policyholders may 
lose part of their lifetime savings. Similarly, if a general insurer fails both 
first-party  and th ird-party  claimants may face significant financial 
calamities.20 Outright bankruptcy is therefore considered to be undesirable 
from an equity point of view.
Next consider the problem of contagious rims which may inflict losses 
not only on depositors and policyholders who are las t in the queue', but also 
on the productive efficiency of the economy, as financial services firms are 
forced to call in long-term loans, forcing the firms to which they have lend to 
sell possibly illiquid assets at a loss, disrupting otherwise profitable 
production. While runs have so far been exclusively modelled in the banking 
context, they may also occur in the life insurance sector.21 This is due to the 
fact that the fundam ental issues of runs are similar for banks and life 
insurers.
The possibility of runs in the banking context was formalised by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who construct a three-period model in which 
banks transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. They show that bank 
runs can emerge as 'sun spof equilibria if, for example, agents believe that a 
bank's assets do not cover its deposits.22 This is due to the fact that demand 
deposits are not 'earm arked', but are paid back according to a sequential
19 Bank runs were common during the Great Depression; see Bemanke (1983, esp. p.258-61) and 
Kindleberger (1989) who also gives a broad account of other financial crises.
20 See Wenk (1987) for an analysis of the causes, effects and regulatory approaches to insurer 
insolvency.
21 As the recent example of two life insurers in California illustrates: a run by policyholders of 
the First Capital Life Insurance Company of California set in, induced by the failure of 
Executive Life of California. This example has the typical characteristic of a contagious run: 
First Capita] Life, although technically solvent at the time, had an equally high proportion 
of assets invested in junk bonds as Executive Life. After the deterioration of the junk bond 
market policyholders concluded that First Capital Life may soon be in similar problems as the 
failed Exective Life.
22 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) construct a model where 'information-based' bank runs can 
emerge due to private information about bank returns on the part of depositors. Postlewaite and 
Vives (1987) scrutinise strategic expectations about behaviour of other depositors as a possible 
trigger of runs.
38
distribution rule. Hence, those last in the queue' have every reason to expect 
that their deposits will not be repaid if the initial assumption of insufficient 
total bank assets turns out to be correct.
As Diamond and Dybvig's model contains only one bank, however, it is 
unable to explain contagion, i.e. the spreading of massive deposit 
withdrawals from one particular institution to other banks or life insurers, as 
doubts about these other firm's solvency situation spreads among depositors 
or policyholders. Contagion may occur as a result of irrational 'panic', as 
depositors are affected by a general decline of confidence in the solvency of 
the financial services institutions. The failure of a bank or an insurer with a 
high risk exposure in a particular market such as real estate or junk bonds, for 
example, may therefore be interpreted as a signal of difficulties looming 
ahead for other firms also active in the market concerned.23
As the value of the firm's assets plunges, possibly to a level insufficient 
to cover all liabilities, it may be a rational strategy for depositors and 
policyholders to transfer their funds from threatened institutions to firms 
with a less risky asset portfolio. This is the 'flight towards safety' which can 
frequently be observed in times of increased firm failures.24 While such asset 
transfers do not jeopardise the entire financial system, they may still inflict 
real costs on the economy, as firms which are affected by a run have to call in 
loans and these may not be immediately replaced by loans on similar terms 
from other financial institutions due to transaction costs. In addition, those 
depositors and policyholders who are last in the queue may suffer significant 
financial losses.
Moreover, as Bemanke (1983) notes, the reduced efficiency of financial 
intermediation during a time of runs may lead to a credit crunch, with its 
associated contractionary effects on output. Without the provision of credit by 
banks, an economy is likely to contract. Bank lending conveys significant 
positive external effects on the economy which are not captured by either the 
borrower or the lender. Runs may therefore inflict substantial negative 
externalities on the economy spreading far beyond the financial sector and 
therefore constitute a main economic rationale for public regulatory 
intervention which aims at preventing such runs.
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23 Thus, the failure of the Bank of New England, for example, which had a substantial stake 
in the troubled real estate market in the north-east of the United States, may be interpreted as 
a signal of solvency problems ahead for banks with a similar involvement in that market.
24 Kaufman (1988) argues that this threat of transferring funds from high-risk to lower-risk 
firms serves as a disciplining device on financial services managers to pursue prudent asset 
portfolio strategies. However, informational asymmetries between managers and depositors or 
policyholders make this constraint less binding.
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2. The changing regulatory approach to financial services in the EC
2.1. Liberalisation of capital movements
The abolition of remaining restrictions on the free movement of capital is an 
obvious prerequisite for an internal market in financial services, since agents 
must have free choice to transfer capital internationally. The legal concept of 
'movement of capital' hereby refers to the transfer of financial assets across 
national borders or between citizens of different nationalities, without an 
accompanying exchange of a good or service.25 Liberalisation of capital 
movements was already envisaged in Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Rome, 
which also included 'safeguard clauses' such as Articles 73(2), 108 and 109, 
however, enabling Member States to restrict full liberalisation in the case of 
capital market or balance of payments difficulties. These clauses constituted a 
frequently used escape from the 1960 and 1962 EC Directives26 aimed at 
im plem enting the provisions of the Treaty.27 Thus, progress on the 
liberalisation of capital movements had been slow up to 1985 when only 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the N etherlands and the UK had a 
completely open capital m arket
Further liberalisation measures concerning the free movem ent of 
capital were therefore targeted in the Commission's White Paper with the 
major legislative measure being the Directive on 'Complete Liberalisation of 
Capital M ovem ents'28 which aims to abolish most remaining exchange 
controls by 1992.29 Such complete liberalisation of capital flows has obvious 
macroeconomic implications for the effectiveness of domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies.30 I focus here on the microeconomic impact, in particular 
concerning financial services.
25 Capital movements which accompany such exchanges are referred to as 'payments' in the 
sense of Article 106(1) of the Treaty of Rome. Current payments related to the movement of 
capital, e.g. concerning interest or dividend, are captured by Article 67(2) which fully 
deristricts these transactions.
26 O/L, 12.7.1960 and O/L, 22.1.1963.
27 In particular, they enabled countries like France, Italy, or Belgium to maintain exchange 
controls (such controls were abolished in 1979 in the UK).
2*OJL 178,8.7.1988.
29 Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are given until 1992 or 1995 to implement the directive.
30 See, for example, Padoa-Schioppa (1987), p. 72-80.
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2.1.1. The impact of liberalising capital flows on financial services 
competition: theoretical considerations
With free capital flows both personal and corporate customers have an 
increased choice when diversifying their portfolio internationally or 
purchasing foreign financial services products. In particular, customers who 
were previously confined to deposit their assets within national boundaries 
now have the possibility to invest in other countries, for example by opening 
savings and fund management accounts31 or purchasing life insurance 
abroad.
Suppose free capital flows are introduced in a country which was 
previously characterised by restrictions on capital outflows. Investors are then 
given the opportunity to move capital abroad if they wish.
Consider first the implications in terms of international portfolio 
diversification which can be modelled in the Markowitz (1959) mean- 
variance framework: agents assess risks and returns of investm ent 
opportunities abroad and maximise expected utility.32 It follows from one of 
the basic principles of portfolio theory that international diversification will 
be more effective the less correlated are risks and returns of assets. Two 
characteristics distinguish international diversification from a standard 
portfolio problem: first, agents have to form expectations about the rate of 
change in exchange rates. The variability of exchange rates is reduced, 
however, through the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) which sets 
upper and lower limits on the maximum exchange rate fluctuations (2.5% 
and 6% respectively). Second, international investment may involve higher 
transaction  costs than domestic investm ent (e.g. m onitoring and 
communication costs). Such transaction costs may be a significant deterrent to 
investing abroad, reducing the expected return. They include in particular 
higher search and communication expenses and limited accessability if the 
foreign firm has no domestic presence. Such transaction costs are 
continuously lowered by technological advances, however, facilitating cross- 
border communication and accessability. In addition, market opportunities 
open up for brokerage firms specialised in international investment, 
performing the role of financial intermediaries in reducing transaction costs. 
Thus, while exchange rate fluctuations and transaction costs may reduce the
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31 This was prohibited in countries such as France, Italy, or Spain where residents were not 
allowed to open accounts abroad.
32 The benefits of international portfolio diversification for reducing risk at a constant return 
were first demonstrated by Levy and Samat (1970). Hawawini and Jacquillat (1990) examine 
the benefits of diversification for the case of European equities, calculating correlation 
coefficients for European stock markets, explicitly taking into account foreign-exchange risk. As 
the correlation between European markets on the one hand, and share price movements and 
exchange rates on the other hand is fairly low, they conclude that diversification across 
European equity markets results in a reduction of risk at constant returns.
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expected return of international assets, they are unlikely to absorb completely 
the benefit of risk reduction through international diversification.
In addition to being able to reduce portfolio risk, agents will be able to 
invest in assets and products abroad which may not be available in the same 
form in their home country (e.g. mutual funds, unit-linked life insurance) 
either due to regulatory restrictions or lack of competition between domestic 
financial services firms. Domestic agents may also be able to circumvent tax 
regulations by investing abroad.
With free capital flows, private and corporate customers will seek loans 
where capital costs are lowest. Banks from countries with former capital 
restrictions may therefore be able to expand their international lending 
activities. Similarly, insurers will be able to expand activities and invest in 
foreign assets.
As domestic residents are given the opportunity to expand their 
portfolios to include foreign assets, domestic financial services firms are 
forced to expand their coverage of international m arkets to provide 
interm ediation services and reduce transaction costs for customers who 
invest internationally. In addition, as banks are given the opportunity to lend 
to firms and residents in foreign countries, new market opportunities open 
up abroad.
At the same time, foreign financial services firms from countries which 
have had free capital flows for some time may gain domestic market share in 
the country which just abolished capital flow restrictions. This may result 
from a competitive advantage over domestic firms due to greater experience 
in in ternational portfolio m anagem ent and lending, resulting from 
accumulated know-how and learning effects,33 an established reputation 
among customers and a greater international network.34
Thus, while domestic financial services firms become more in ter­
national in their coverage by entering foreign markets, foreign firms are 
likely to enter the domestic market. Free capital flows are therefore the 
conditio sine qua non for this mutual cross-border penetration process in 
European financial services industries.
33 The first economic analysis of learning effects is that by Arrow (1962). The impact of 
learning by doing on strategic competition is analysed by Spence (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983) and Stokey (1986). Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) show that the concept goes back to 
Aristotle.
34 Indeed, as was discussed in chapter one, banks from countries with former capital flow 
restrictions such as Italy and Spain have a smaller international network than banks from 
countries with free capital flows.
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2.1.2. Abolishing UK exchange controls in 1979: an application of the theory
What are the actual effects of lifting capital flow restrictions on cross-border 
movements of deposits and loans? This question is analysed for the case of 
the UK where exchange controls were progressively abolished from June to 
October 1979.35 The controls applied to direct and portfolio foreign 
investment, as well as imposing restrictions on residents to hold foreign 
currency deposits and prohibiting financial services firms to undertake 
overseas sterling lending unrelated to UK trade.36
With respect to portfolio investment, the controls prohibited residents 
to acquire foreign exchange for international investment purposes, except 
when investing proceeds from the sale of foreign securities or borrowing 
from overseas. Figure 2.2 illustrates the impact of lifting these controls on 
portfolio investment flows.
Figure 2.2: Flows of portfolio investment in the UK from 1975-85
i million
lifting of 
exchange controls
outward
inward
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Year
Source: UK Central Statistical Office, Balance of Payments Pink Book 1986.
Outward flows increased significantly leading to a large net outflow, as 
inward investment rose only slightly. In 1979 outward flows were £0.9 billion 
with a net inflow of capital of £0.6 billion. In 1985 these figures had changed 
significantly: outward portfolio investment stood at £18.2 billion leading to
35 This case study focuses on the effects of the abolition of controls on portfolio investment and 
bank lending. For a more complete coverage of the macroeconomic issues involved, see in 
particular Bank of England (1981) and Artis (1988) on which part of our account is based.
36 See Bank of England (1977).
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net capital outflows of £11.2 billion. This illustrates the significant impact 
which liberalisation of capital flows had on portfolio investment.
The impact on stocks of portfolio investment of UK residents was 
equally significant. UK liabilities to overseas residents increased from £9.7 
billion in 1978 to £32.1 billion in 1985, while total external assets rose even 
more dramatically from £10.3 billion to £100.6 billion. This rise is illustrated 
in Figure 2.3 which shows the large increase in external assets held by UK 
residents.
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Figure 2.3 Stocks of UK portfolio investment from 1975-85
£ 1,000 million
■  UK liabilities to overseas 
residents
O  external assets of UK
Source: UK Central Statistical Office, Balance of Payments Pink Book 1986.
How did the lifting of exchange controls affect direct bank lending 
abroad? Figure 2.4 shows two categories of bank lending: that related to export 
financing which was largely unrestricted under exchange controls and a 
second category which subsumes all other forms of overseas bank lending. 
Not surprisingly, export-related lending did not change significantly after the 
abolition of controls. Other bank lending, however, experienced a significant 
rise from £100 million to £4.7 billion in 1984.
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Figure 2.4: Bank lending (in sterling) abroad
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Source: UK Central Statistical Office, Balance of Payments Pink Book 1986; table 8.4.
As is demonstrated by this example, domestic banks may be able to 
significantly expand their international lending activity after the abolition of 
exchange controls. This shows that entry barriers concerning transaction and 
switching costs can be successfully overcome.
2.2. The EC Services Directives: minimum harmonisation and the home- 
country principle
Freedom of establishment and provision of services in the EC were already 
enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, with Article 61 stating that "the 
liberalisation of banking and insurance services connected with movements 
of capital shall be effected in step with the progressive liberalisation of 
movement of capital". While freedom of establishment was largely achieved 
by the First Banking and Insurance Directives,37 harmonisation of financial 
services regulations, widely perceived as a necessary prerequisite for opening 
up domestic markets, made slow progress. In particular, cross-border 
provision of financial services was seriously hampered by exchange controls 
and regulatory restrictions.38
37 The First 1973 Non-Life and 1979 Life Directives established the right for any authorised 
EC insurer to set up a branch or subsidiary in any other EC country after having gone through an 
authorisation procedure which was harmonised across all EC countries. In banking, freedom of 
establishment for EC banks has been secured in all EC countries.
38 In legal terms, "cross-border provision of services" in the sense of Articles 59 to 66 of the 
Treaty of Rome refers to the 'exporting' of a service, i.e. a cross-border transaction of a 
performance of tasks for renumeration where the provider resides in a different Member State
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Does freedom of services play a significant role in financial services, 
however? For the insurance sector, Famy (1990, p.380) implies that freedom 
of services is unlikely to have much of an effect when creating the internal 
market. More specifically, he questions
"whether the enormous efforts involved in introducing de jure 
and de facto steps to create freedom of services within the EC are 
not perhaps a great waste, considering the meagre results which 
are to be expected in direct insurance business."
This author takes a too narrow view of the concept of freedom of 
services, however. The concept does not only involve uninhibited cross- 
border provision of services which is indeed unlikely to play a significant role 
in retail financial services. More importantly, the principle of host-country 
control erected significant barriers to entry, as the entering firm until 1993 
had to comply with the regulations in the host country. This implies that a 
firm which opened a branch in another EC country had to adhere to the 
foreign regulatory regime. In insurance, for example, foreign firms wishing to 
enter the German market had to submit detailed business plans. If such a 
business plan included products which were not allowed in Germany it was 
not authorised by the German authorities. This practise may have provided a 
significant disincentive to seek authorisation in another EC country.
With the adoption of the Single European Act which was based on the 
comprehensive "White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market" 
presented by the EC Commission in June 1985, a new concept was introduced 
in order to achieve a truly internal market: Apart from establishing qualified 
majority voting in major areas of Community decision-making, this new 
approach is based on the following four principles:
i.) minimum harmonisation of essential regulations such as solvency 
and liquidity ratios, capital requirements or forms and contents of 
published accounts;39
than the recipient. The concept of "freedom of establishment" refers to the right of setting up a 
permanent branch or subsidiary in the market of another Member State.
39 The First Insurance Directives laid down common principles concerning technical reserves, 
solvency requirements and a minimum guarantee fund. In addition, a separation between life 
and non-life business was imposed for newly authorised companies. In banking, the Own Funds 
Directive (OJL 124, 5.5.1989) and the Solvency Ratio Directive (O/L 386, 30.12.1989) 
established common rules for capital adequacy. The Directive on 'Annual Accounts of Banks' 
(O/L 372,31.12.1986) sets a common format for published accounts of EC financial institutions. 
The analoguous Directive for insurance company accounts (COM89 474) is to take effect only in 
1995. Directives on the winding-up procedures are proposed for the banking and insurance 
sectors which ensure equal treatment of creditors and customers across the EC.
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ii.) mutual recognition of the regulatory regimes in other EC countries, 
concerning authorisation and prudential supervision systems;40
iii.) home country control, i.e. prudential supervision, monitoring of 
financial soundness and solvency of financial services firms operating 
in other EC markets is undertaken by the home country's authorities;
iv.) host country supervision of rules of conduct in the Member State.41
Mutual recognition and home country control result in the so-called 
'financial services passport' which allows firms authorised in one Member 
State to establish branches or export services to other EC countries, without 
requiring a separate licence from the host country's authorities.
Minimum harmonisation is required to ensure that players in the 
market follow at least a basic common set of rules and to avoid too stark 
competitive distortions.42
In the banking sector the Second Banking Directive establishes the 
'single banking passport' which enables all EC-authorised banks to operate 
under the home-country rule starting in January 1993. Concerning capital 
adequacy, the basic principles of the BIS-guidelines (BIS, 1987) were taken up 
in the EC Solvency Directive. The main difference between the Basle rules 
and the EC Directive is that the former are only applicable to a few 
internationally operating banks in the G-10 countries, whereas the EC 
Directive is binding for all EC credit institutions. Thus, those five EC 
countries which are not members of the G-10 group are affected as well.43 The
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40 This principle was first legally evaluated by the European Court of Justice in its Cassis de 
Dijon decision (ECJ, 1979, 649) which forms the basis for its application in all areas of mutual 
recognition (see Paragraph 58 of the White Book for the Completion of the European Internal 
Market, Commission of the EC, 145.1985).
41 Host country supervision of rules of conduct is not formally recognised like the first three 
principles. However, it will be a constituent part at least for the first phase of the "Financial 
Services Passport".
42 The need for minimum harmonisation is also emphasised in judgements by the European 
Court of Justice: for example, in Case 205/1984 the Court stressed the need for further 
harmonisation measures in insurance legislation.
43 The imposition of capital requirements is not costless in practise: if the Miller-Modigliani 
theorem held, then requiring banks to hold higher capital reserves, i.e. "core" capital, equity, 
or long-term bonds, as opposed to non-capital liabilities, such as deposits or CD's, would not 
impose higher funding costs on the bank. For this result to hold, however, there must be 
complete information and tax neutrality. In practise, non-capital financing tools appear to be 
cheaper than raising capital and so increasing capital requirements leads to higher funding 
costs which in turn translates into higher prices for financial products, reducing consumer 
welfare. Regulators therefore face a trade-off when raising capital requirements: while the 
risk of firm failures is reduced, prices for financial products may rise. The optimal level of 
capital requirements therefore obtains where the marginal social benefit of fewer bank 
failures is just equal to the marginal social cost of higher product prices.
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Second Banking Directive further establishes in Article 4 (1) minimum 
capital requirements of ECU 5 million44 and abolishes the previous 
requirements of holding separate 'earmarked' capital for foreign branches. 
Thus, entry requirements are kept to a regulatory minimum and include 
only the most basic safety requirements.
While in the banking sector the EC Commission proceeded directly from 
the establishment directive to a 'single banking passport', it deemed it 
necessary to introduce an intermediate step in insurance services in the form 
of the Second Insurance Directives before proceeding to the 'single insurance 
passport7 Directives. The Second Non-Life Insurance Directive which came 
into force in seven Member States in June 199045 only establishes the passport 
rule for so-called "large risks" which includes mainly transactions with large 
commercial firms.46 Retail financial services are excluded from the freedom 
of services provision, however. The Second Life Insurance Directive to be 
implemented by May 199347 only establishes the home-country rule if the 
customer on her own iniative seeks an insurance policy from a company in 
another Member State (Art. 13 para.l). Further, by May 1996 the consumer 
must have the right to be able to contact a broker who will be able to 
distribute products from foreign life insurers which are not licensed in the 
domestic country (Art. 27 para.2). The Directive also allows for direct 
advertising of foreign life insurers in the domestic market, though not 
allowing personal solicitations. Most importantly, however, the Directive 
does not introduce the home-country rule of supervision as yet.
The need to differentiate between transactions with retail customers and 
large commercial clients in the form of the Second Insurance Directives is 
mainly a result of the 1986 Commission v. Germany decision by the 
European Court of Justice. In this case the Court decided that insurance 
services are characterised by a high degree of asymmetric information which 
necessitates special measures to ensure consumer protection in the retail area 
though not necessarily in the commercial sector. Thus, until further 
harmonisation of insurance regulation on the EC level is obtained, detailed
44 Art. 4 (2) provides for exceptions where the minimum capital must not be less than one 
million ECU and which need to be notified by the Member State to the Commission.
4  ^OJL, 88, 357, EEC. Longer implementation periods were granted to Ireland, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece.
46 More specifically, it includes all marine, aviation, transport, commercial credit and surety 
ship risks and to all transactions where the insured is a substantial commercial undertaking 
which is defined as firm which fulfills at least two of the following criteria: balance-sheet 
total of 12.4 million ECU, net turnover of 24 million ECU or at least 500 employees. These 
thresholds are to be halved by the beginning of 1993.
47 Of 1990 L 330/50. Spain is given until the end of 1995, Greece and Portugal are given until the 
end of 1998 to implement the Directive.
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authorisation requirements by individual Member States are compatible with 
the freedom of services provisions of the EC treaty.48
To complete the internal market in insurance services the proposed 
Third Insurance Directives which the Commission hopes to have passed by 
the Council in 1992 establish a single licence also in the mass risk non-life 
sector as well as allowing life companies to actively solicit business across 
borders without requiring an additional licence from the host country's 
authorities and being regulated under the home country's regime. In the 
non-life sector the Third Directive which was passed by the Council in June 
1992 and is to be implemented by July 199449 and the proposed Third Life 
Directive introduce the single insurance passport which is identical to the 
single banking passport. The Directives includes a range of harmonisation 
measures concerning licensing, technical reserves, the calculation of solvency 
ratios and the monitoring of insurance undertakings by the home country 
regulator, while not containing specific guidelines on the calculation of 
premiums. The degree of harmonisation goes further in insurance than in 
the banking sector which is a direct result of the requirements laid down by 
the European Court of Justice in its insurance decision.
By establishing a single financial services licence in the EC, the problem 
of large-scale harmonisation is circumvented, but only at the cost of 
regulatory ambiguities during a transitionary period of adaption: some degree 
of host-country regulation remains, as foreign institutions have to obey the 
same conduct of business rules as domestic institutions. This may imply that 
financial services firms continue to have to deal with twelve different sets of 
rules. Thus, foreign firms offering consumer credit or investment services in 
the UK, for example, have to adhere to the rules of conduct of the Consumer 
Credit or Financial Services Acts respectively, even though the licensing 
requirement does not apply. This combination of home country supervision 
with host country rules of conduct may therefore lead to clashes between 
possibly incompatible regulations, as the borderline between supervision and 
conduct is not clearly defined in the Directives. These ambiguities shall be 
discussed for the banking sector, as the legislation concerning retail financial 
services has progressed more than in the insurance sector where the Third 
Directives have not been finalised as yet.
Article 21(2) of the Second Banking Directive states that the public 
authorities of the host country can enforce domestic regulations if they find 
that
"an institution having a branch or providing services within its territory
is not complying with the legal provisions adopted in that State
Regulatory Environment in the EC
48 For a more detailed interpretation of the Court decision see, for example, Pool (1990, p.42- 
45).
49 Spain is given until the end of 1996, while Greece and Portugal have until the end of 1998 to 
implement the Directive.
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pursuant to the provisions of this Directive involving powers of the 
host Member State
What exactly constitutes these legal provisions, however, is subject to 
interpretation. Article 21(5) only specifies that authorities of the host country 
have the power
"... to take appropriate measures to prevent or punish irregularities 
committed within their territories which are contrary to the legal rules 
they have adopted in the interest of the public good."
From the articles of the Directive it is not clear, however, which 
provisions do lie "in the interest of the public good". This lack of clarity was 
already noted by the Banking Advisory Committee of the Commission of the 
EC (1988) which consists of top-level representatives of the Member States' 
central banks. The Committee commented that "the Directive should state 
more clearly the coverage of 'public interest' with regard to national rules of 
good conduct of financial services business (appropriate accounting rules, 
investor protection, advertising rules) and how far the competent authorities 
of the host Member State could continue to apply those rules in future in 
respect of branches of credit institutions from other Member States".
For example, paying interest on current account deposits is prohibited in 
France, while in Belgium variable-rate mortgage loans are outlawed; both 
activities are standard practice in other EC countries, however, and foreign 
banks operating in the two countries can therefore offer such services. 
According to officials at the Commission, both examples would not be 
captured by the rules of conduct provision of Article 21 and it therefore seems 
reasonable to predict that domestic firms will place pressure on home 
regulators to scrap such restrictions which put them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to foreign firms.
In personal interviews at the Directorate-General 15 of the Commission 
of the EC which is responsible for EC financial services regulation, an official 
confirmed that the public interest criterion will be subjected to a narrow 
interpretation. It will only apply in circumstances where there is a well- 
defined case for subjecting foreign institutions to national rules of conduct. 
Legitimate reasons may include the preservation of financial stability to 
prevent negative externalities or reasons of depositor protection which result 
from asymmetric information. The danger of a too general application of the 
rules of conduct provision by the Member countries is recognised at the 
Com m ission.50 As the official at DG15 noted: "We need to be on the guard
50 The Director General of DG 15 notes that "the division between home and host country is a 
cause of some concern to us. There is clearly a risk that host country regulation of the conduct of 
business or even the marketing and advertsing can lead to the creation of serious obstacles to 
cross-frontier trade ... it is clear that further litigation before the European Court and perhaps 
also some further harmonisation may be necessary to remove "host country" rules which 
constitute serious obstacles" (Fitchew, 1990b, p.36-37).
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that the home-country principle of the Directives is not made ineffective 
through a broad interpretation of the rules of conduct clause by Member 
States".
Some degree of inconsistency exists concerning the relation between 
mutual recognition and host country financial services contract law. While 
in the banking sector an institution offering services abroad may choose 
whether it does so under the contract law of the home country or the host 
country (Williams, 1986),51 in the insurance sector the Second Life Insurance 
Directive stipulates in Art. 4(4) that a Member State may require domestic 
contract law to be applied to all insurance contracts where domestic residents 
are involved. This, in effect, implies that countries can establish the host- 
country rule for insurance contracts.
To summarise, despite regulatory ambiguities concerning rules of 
conduct clauses and contract law, the Second Banking Directive and the 
Second and proposed Third Insurance Directives establish a significant step 
towards reducing regulatory entry barriers. In particular, they establish that 
foreign institutions no longer have to deal with twelve different supervisory 
regimes but can operate according to the familiar home-country regime in 
other EC countries. This not only lowers barriers to cross-border entry but 
may also have significant effects for the shape of domestic regulatory regimes. 
The latter aspect is now analysed in greater detail in the following section.
Regulatory Environment in the EC
3. Free capital flows and the EC Directives: scope for strategic 
deregulation?
It has been predicted that the Second Banking and Second and Third 
Insurance Directives will lead to a process of 'strategic deregulation' among 
European regulators, each attempting to provide the best starting position for 
domestic institutions when entering other EC markets.®2 Whether such a 
process leads to an improvement in social welfare is not clear a priori., 
however. Two opposing views of strategic deregulation can be formulated: on 
the one hand, 'competitive disequilibria' may be the fastest route to a level 
playing field in the EC without requiring large-scale harmonisation. The 
perceived need for such harmonisation had been the main obstacle to 
financial market integration with negotiations dead-locked over minor 
details for years. With increased cross-border entry of foreign FS firms 
regulated by their home-country authorities, domestic regulators are forced to
51 This rule was established in the 1980 Rome Convention concerning contract law which does 
not apply to the insurance sector.
52 The EC Commission is expressly following a laissez-faire policy in this respect. The 
Director-General of DG15 stated that "the motto (the EC Commission has) adopted ... is 
solvitur ambulando; in other words, to wait until the problems are thrown up and hopefully 
solved by the market itself." (Fitchew, 1990, p.12).
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abandon restrictions which other countries consider superfluous, thus 
reducing regulatory differences. One could therefore argue that since national 
regulators all pursue similar objectives, the main one being the preservation 
of financial stability, harmonisation of regulations does not jeopardise these 
objectives.
In contrast, most academic commentators have argued that strategic 
deregulation bears the danger that the original purposes of financial 
regulation are sacrificed, as market forces lead to a level of European 
regulation at the lowest common denominator. Vives (1991, p.25/26) warns 
that:
"The application of the home country principle to solvency and to 
the approval of banking services, coupled with the application of 
the host country principle for deposit insurance schemes, gives 
incentives for national authorities to be very liberal in setting 
standards to provide national banks a competitive advantage 
abroad. If disaster happens, foreign taxpayers will foot the bill"
While solvency requirements were harmonised by the Solvency and 
Own Funds Directive (see above) and the jeopardy of "competitive 
deregulation" was thus reduced, for deposit insurance schemes the host 
country principle will be established (see chapter ten). Thus, it is the domestic 
rather than the foreign taxpayer who "will foot the bill".
In a similar spirit, Masera (1990, p. 337), notes that:
"the solution of these fundamental problems {of achieving a 
stable integrated environment in financial services} should not be 
left to competition between regulatory systems; competitive 
deregulation cannot be the answer to the problems posed by those 
'market-failure' instances which require regulation in the first 
place."
In a similar spirit, Mayer (1988, p.346) observes that:
"Competition between regulators may act to dim inish the 
effectiveness of regulation. The major concern that has been 
expressed about the effects of international competition between 
regulators has been that it has a levelling down effect ... This is 
not the right basis on which to make policy decisions regarding 
the operation of markets. In sectors in which externalities provide 
the rationale for the imposition of regulation, there can be no 
presumption that competition between regulators will be welfare- 
enhancing".
According to this view, competitive deregulation may result in 
'regulatory arbitrage' with financial institutions locating in those countries 
with the least rigid regulations, as they have "freedom ... to 'vote with their
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feet' for the regulatory jurisdiction of their choice" (Hirshleifer, 1976). Such 
arbitrage opportunities may therefore induce regulators to provide a 
permissive and lax regulatory environment to attract foreign firms and 
provide domestic institutions with a regulatory advantage when entering 
other EC markets. Thus, it is argued that the financial services directives 
could lead to the de facto imposition of the most permissive regulations and 
this may cause concern over attaining the original objectives of financial 
regulation.
This view of competitive deregulation holds that in the absence of 
significant transaction costs of relocation the market for regulation is to some 
extent contestable: national regulators cannot impose restrictions which raise 
the 'price' of regulation imposed on institutions operating in the country to a 
level significantly above that in other EC States, as there would be immediate 
exit from the market with institutions relocating to those countries which 
charge lower 'regulatory prices'. Thus, in the presence of competing national 
regulators the continuous interaction of regulators and regulatees responding 
to shifts in the regulatory environment, leads to a market-determined long- 
run equilibrium level of international regulation. However, it is by no means 
evident per se that this long-run equilibrium reached by market forces is 
optimal in terms of addressing the objective of alleviating market failures in 
financial markets.
The next section develops theoretical considerations on competitive 
regulation in an international setting, while sections 3.2 and 3.3 apply the 
model to selected areas of EC financial services regulation.
Regulatory Environment in the EC
3.1. Financial services regulation in an international setting: game-theoretic 
considerations
I develop a model of strategic interdependence where regulators and 
regulatees continuously respond to each others' actions. This implies that 
domestic regulators are in constant competition with other national 
regulators in determining and responding to shifts in the environment.53 
Regulatees, on the other hand, respond to shifts in the 'net regulatory burden' 
(NRB) which is the difference between the benefits of regulation (e.g. greater 
financial stability) and the costs of regulation imposed on the institution (e.g. 
interest foregone on holding reserves).54 Thus, the NRB concept incorporates 
the notion that regulations not only impose costs on regulatees but also 
benefits.
53 Even though Article 7 of the Second Banking Directive postulates that supervisory 
authorities should cooperate on regulatory matters, in practice one finds ample examples of 
regulatory competition rather than cooperation (see below).
54 This concept was introduced by Kane (1987).
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Consider a simple two-country model, each country with one national 
regulator and m FS firms, so that there are 2(m + 1) players. Regulators 
control a vector of x  = (xi, ...jn) regulatory measures. Let Zc> = ci (xi) + ... + cn 
(xn) be the sum of costs and Zb> = bi (xi)+ ... + bn (xn) be the benefits of the n 
possible regulations to the firm and define the net regulatory burden as a 
continuous function f(c,b) = Zci - Zbi. FS firms minimise a cost function C{Q, 
L, f(c, b)} where Q is output and L are relocation costs of moving part of the 
business to another country. Domestic industry profit is assumed to be a 
decreasing function of the net regulatory burden, i.e. we have 7td{f(c,b)} with 
*'{.} < 0.
Regulators, on the other hand, maximise an objective function Kind, 
CSd, S), where nd is domestic industry profits, CSd is domestic consumer 
surplus and S is financial stability. Regulatory agencies are required by 
statutory law to preserve domestic (and international) financial stability and 
are thus unlikely to deregulate infinitely. In addition, both nd and CSd 
depend to a certain degree on S such that regulators place particular weight 
on preserving financial stability. This argument of the objective function 
therefore sets a lower bound on the possible regulatory outcome, consisting of 
'core' regulations necessary to preserve an orderly function of the financial 
system. Which measures constitute this core, however, is unknown ex ante 
and national regulators may disagree on the scope of the regulations. Let the 
regulatory vector which maximises the regulator's objective function be
*
given by Xj..
I assume that regulators place different weights on the arguments of 
their objective function such that dR/dS > dRjm > dRfdCSd. Thus, regulators 
are most concerned about preserving financial stability and more concerned 
about domestic industry profits than consumer surplus.55 The latter 
assumption can be explained by two arguments: first, regulators may be 
'captured' by FS firms (Stigler, 1971). Second, as higher profits lead to a lower 
probability of bank insolvency, they contribute indirectly to greater financial 
stability. Higher consumer surplus, on the other hand, has no comparable 
beneficial effect on financial stability and is therefore valued less highly by 
regulators. The regulators' choice when maximising their objective function 
is illustrated in figure 2.5. The first case illustrates an example where 
regulators place most, but not too much weight on preserving financial 
stability. The second example refers to a case where regulators actually place 
too much weight on preserving financial stability.
55 'Consumer' surplus in this framework refers not only to actual consumers but to all users of 
domestic financial services including firms.
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Figure 2.5: Two examples of regulators' hypothetical hyperplanes and social 
welfare
It is obvious that regulators have a set of possible regulatory vectors to 
choose from, as indicated by the darkly shaded hyperplane. Which point 
actually maximises the regulators' objective function depends on the relative 
weights they attach to the welfare arguments.
Notice further that the regulator's objective function is not necessarily 
identical to the domestic social welfare function Wi = Wd (m + CSd, S) which 
places equal weights on industry profits and consumer surplus such that
* * * 
dR/dxd = dR/dCSd..56 Thus, we may have xr * * sw  w^ ere xsw  *s 
regulatory vector which maximises social welfare.
If the two functions were identical, i.e. the two hyperplanes would 
coincide, then regulatory competition could only lead to a decrease in social 
welfare after allowing FS firms to re-allocate. This results from the simple fact 
that in the absence of the relocation threat, regulators pursue unconstrained 
maximisation of domestic social welfare. Introducing the relocation 
constraint through regulatory competition can therefore not improve on the 
pre-competitive equilibrium which already constitutes the social optimum. 
Social welfare in the competitive world will therefore be less than or equal to 
the pre-competitive outcome. This simple reasoning establishes our first
56 This results from the assumption that through appropriate redistributions the desired 
wealth allocation can be obtained.
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proposition: suppose that regulatory competition is introduced in period n. 
Thus, we have:
Proposition 1: { Rn~* (.) = W/-) } =>{W* < w ”’1}
This simple proposition sheds some light on the diametrically opposed views 
about the impact of regulatory competition which were described above. 
Those who believe that regulatory competition is unlikely to improve social 
welfare implicitly assume that domestic regulators already maximise social 
welfare. Those, however, who welcome regulatory competition as doing 
away with unnecessarily strict regulations may assume that regulators have 
so far placed too much emphasis on preserving financial stability by keeping 
industry profits high to the detriment of consumers.
National regulators choose between three principal strategies when 
determining the regulatory vector: first, they may aim to provide the best 
starting position for domestic FS firms moving abroad, by decreasing the 
NRB for domestic FS firms for those activities which they pursue in the 
foreign country, as this raises ltd and does not impact CSd or S. This is the 
strategy to which critics of regulatory competition commonly refer. However, 
it is not clear that reducing the NRB for domestic FS firms is at all necessary 
for providing an edge to domestic FS firms. For those activities where FS 
firms are able to open a subsidiary abroad, they can escape the (possibly 
stricter) domestic regulatory regime anyway.
Second, regulators may want to eliminate a possible competitive 
disadvantage of domestic FS firms if these are governed by more stringent 
rules than actual or potential foreign entrants. This primarily ensures that m 
does not fall as a result of declining market shares of domestic institutions. 
The impact on CSd and S is ambiguous and depends on the type of regulation 
under consideration. CSd is most likely to be unaffected or rise if the 
regulation being relaxed contributed to higher prices for financial services 
(such as the prohibition to pay interest on current accounts, for example). The 
NRB for domestic FS firms is thus reduced for those activities where foreign 
FS firms can effectively compete in the domestic country.
Third, regulators may want to attract foreign entry by creating a 
regulatory regime conducive to foreign entry and thus boosting the country's 
position as an international financial centre. Such a strategy entails providing 
a regulatory regime which offers a low NRB to both domestic and foreign FS 
firms. It has an ambiguous effect on domestic profits: on the one hand, it 
raises nd as the presence of many international institutions conveys positive 
externalities on domestic firms which increase their business. On the other 
hand, domestic institutions may lose market share to foreign entrants. In 
general, the first effect is likely to over-compensate the second effect if the 
domestic financial services industry is small and the entry of foreign FS firms 
is substantial. In addition, CSd rises as competition is fostered with its 
associated beneficial effects on prices, quality and variety of services. Finally,
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there may also be significant tax and employment effects as foreign FS firms 
create a substantial number of jobs in the domestic economy as well as being a 
source of tax revenue.57
FS firms are the second major players in this regulatory game. FS firms' 
objective function is to minimise the net regulatory burden subject to 
relocation costs. The latter are likely to be low as entry solely for regulatory 
purposes is near-contestable. We assume that with freedom of entry and exit, 
FS firms will open subsidiaries for particular lines of business in those 
countries where the NRB is lowest.58 The costs of setting up a subsidiary only 
for regulatory purposes are minimal and not sunk, as they are largely 
recoverable. This is demonstrated by the 'brassplate'-institutions located in 
offshore tax havens which sometimes consist of little more than small offices 
with minimal staff. A conceivable strategic response by FS firms to the home- 
country rule is therefore for parent companies to select the regulatory regime 
in that country with the lowest NRB for any particular line of business (e.g. 
credit cards, mortgages) and open a subsidiary. Through cross-border 
branching they are then able to impose this regulatory regime on the whole 
of their European operations. Thus, it is not necessary for a bank to 
completely relocate its headquarters, a threat which may not be credible, but 
merely to establish a subsidiary in another country which carries with it 
much lower relocation costs and is therefore a more feasible strategy.
Consider first a situation where both countries start out from different 
regulatory regimes, i.e. x * xf in period 1 where the subscript /  denotes the 
foreign country. The model structure is that of an infinitely repeated game 
where each period consists of two stages: in stage 1 regulators determine the 
NRB and in stage 2 FS firms decide on their strategies. Suppose first that 
regulators cannot cooperate (e.g. due to the prohibitive complexity of 
reaching a cooperative outcome) and thus pursue a non-cooperative strategy 
taking the actions of the other country as given (Nash regulation game). The
Regulatory Environment in the EC
57 An example where domestic regulators successfully tried to create an attractive regulatory 
enviromment for foreign banks is described by Grubel (1989, p.70) who cites the case of 
Singapore where the government asked international banks to "prepare a wish-list of 
regulatory and tax concessions" which would make the city state an attractive location as an 
international financial centre. A similar story can be told of Luxembourg where every fifth 
employee depends on the financial services industry and which has consistently and 
successfully tried to create a regulatory and tax environment which would attract foreign 
banks. As these two examples illustrate, it is most likely to be smaller countries where 
national regulators pursue such a strategy of providing a favourable regulatory environment.
58 Capie and Wood (1990, p.308) assume that "trans-European banks would be likely to develop 
substantial branching networks. If, for example, France were an attractive country from the 
point of view of regulation and banks made their headquarters there, they would do that with 
a view to establishing themselves in other countries also. Such an assumption appears veiy 
unrealistic, however, as it is hard to imagine that Barclays or Deutsche Bank move their 
headquarters to Paris. We therefore assume that banks do not move headquarters but only 
subsidiaries and lines of business (e.g. credit cards).
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following proposition constitutes the conventional wisdom in such a 
regulation game:
Proposition 2: After n repetitions of the game, we have NRB - C« = NRBf.
where C« are relocation costs of domestic FS firms. The reasoning for this 
result to obtain rims along the following lines: suppose that in period 1 the 
domestic NRB is substantially above the foreign NRB. At the beginning of 
period 2 the possibility of relocation is introduced. A forward-looking 
domestic regulator anticipates that FS firms will respond in stage 2 of the 
game by relocating at least part of their business and will therefore reduce the 
domestic NRB in stage 1 of period two. The response of FS firms then largely 
depends on the success of the regulator's attempt to reduce the NRB. After a 
few repititions of the game, a long-run equilibrium obtains where the NRB 
has equalised across countries except for differences persisting due to 
relocation costs. This is the process of competitive deregulation which is 
referred to in many recent writings on European regulatory integration (e.g. 
Joerges, 1991).
This result, however, is too simplistic considering the arguments of the 
objective function and the complexity of strategies available to regulators. 
Consider a domestic regulator who 'sticks to his principles' by not 
participating in competitive deregulation through continuous reductions in 
the NRB. Instead, the regulator keeps the NRB persistently above that of the 
foreign country. This has the effect of inducing domestic FS firms to open a 
subsidiary in the foreign country and pursue cross-border branching into the 
domestic country. Since the earnings of foreign subsdiaries are usually 
consolidated, the reduction in m  is likely to be negligible. CSa is likely to 
increase, since the costs of offering services decrease due to the lower 
regulatory burden. Finally, S is not detrimentally affected as it would be in the 
case of competitive deregulation, since regulations are kept at a level 
ensuring financial stability. By pursuing such a strategy of not participating in 
the competitive race, the domestic regulator effectively free-rides on the 
benefits provided by the permissive regulatory regime in the other country 
without jeopardising financial stability in his own country.
Consider next the possibility of coordination between the two national 
regulators. Recognising their strategic interdependence, the two regulators 
could maximise a joint regulatory objective function rather than individual 
functions. In contrast to collusion between firms, explicit cooperation 
between regulators is not prohibited but actually commonplace. In a static 
model with costless collusion, regulators will do at least as well as in the non- 
cooperative outcome, since the latter is always a possible equilibrium in the 
game with coordination. However, there may be significant obstacles to 
reaching an explicit cooperative agreement due to negotiation costs,
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uncertainty about FS firms' responses and heterogenous regulations on 
whose practical effects regulators may disagree.59
Consider, for example, a situation where x  = x* in period 1. In such a 
case, regulators may have an incentive to differentiate their regimes to avoid 
head-to-head competition and attract foreign FS firms.60 It is conceivable, for 
instance, that regulators tacitly or explicitly 'divide' the market in a way that 
each country is able to specialise in a certain area. For example, if the domestic 
country has a comparative advantage in stock market activities due to 
accumulated reputation and know-how, the foreign country may 'concede' 
this area in return for specialisation in another area. Both regulators would 
be better off by cooperating and agreeing to specialise. However, there is an 
incentive to invade the other regulator's market to gain additional market 
share. This is the classical Prisoners' Dilemma where regulators end up in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium both in the static formulation as well as the 
finitely repeated version (by backward induction). In an infinitely repeated 
game, however, collusion may be sustainable.
Such a collusive equilibrium in an infinitely repeated supergame suffers 
from the inherent threat of cheating, however (see, for example, Rubinstein, 
1979, 1980). A regulator will cheat if she expects the discounted benefit of 
deviating from the collusive agreement to be greater than the potential 
future loss of non-cooperative behaviour. It can be shown that for high 
values of the discount factor, regulators will stick to the tacitly collusive 
equilibrium, as long-term losses from reverting to non-cooperative strategies 
are valued greater than short-term benefits from cheating (e.g. Aumann, 
1959; Friedman, 1971).
A regulator may expect to gain significantly if expecting that the other 
player retaliates only with a lagged response due to administrative 
sluggishness, for example. Due to the publicity requirements of public 
regulation, however, any move to engage in strategic regulation by deviating 
from the cooperative solution would be instantly detected. Regulators can 
therefore threaten to punish cheating by engaging in a 'regulation war'. Such 
a threat to retaliate would be credible if the welfare loss of sticking to the 
cooperative solution is large. Since this is likely to be the case for regulations 
which may draw away business from the country which sticks to an 
unfavourable agreement, the threat of retaliation is likely to be more credible 
the greater the adverse impact on domestic profits and consumer surplus. 
Thus, the instant detection of chiseling as well as the credibility of the 
retaliation threat tend to increase the stability of a cooperative equilibrium.
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59 Supervisors in the EC have started to cooperate by reaching a "memorandum of 
understanding" to avoid regulatory arbitrage. The concrete impact of such a cooperative 
solution has yet to be seen.
60 Compare the incentives of firms to differentiate their products to avoid Bertrand 
competition.
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What emerges from this analysis is that competitive deregulation is a far 
more complicated process than most commentators assume. It is clearly not 
the case that regulators will simply engage in lax supervision and provide as 
permissive a regulatory regime as possible under the home-country rule. 
Instead, there are equally plausible scenarios where a regulator intentionally 
maintains a high regulatory burden or where national regulators cooperate to 
set a high level of regulation. In the next two sections I look at areas where 
competitive deregulation may play a role.
3.2. Competitive strategic deregulation in the EC: an application of the model 
to banking
Applying this game-theoretic framework to competitive deregulation in the 
EC has interesting implications. I look at four areas of regulation which may 
come under intense scrutiny as the Second Banking Directive comes into 
effect. The methodology of the analysis is as follows: as suggested by the 
preceding theoretical considerations, we first have to examine the costs and 
benefits of particular regulations to the bank. Thereafter, the credibility of the 
relocation threat needs to be determined by analysing the costs and benefits of 
moving location and /o r business abroad in order to reduce the NRB.
3.2.1. Minimum reserve requirements
The first area which may be affected by strategic deregulation are minimum 
reserve regulations. These require the bank to hold a particular proportion of 
demand deposits at the central bank. Table 2.1 reports the level of reserve 
requirements in the EC countries in 1988.
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Table 2.1: Reserve requirements in the EC in 1988
Italy 25%*
Spain 18.5%*
Portugal 15%
Ireland 10%
Germany 4.15 -12.1%
Greece 7.5%*
France 25-5%
UK 0.5%
Belgium 0
Luxembourg 0
Netherlands 0**
Denmark 0
* reserves remunerated to some degree
“  A small, variable and remunerated reserve requirement was introduced in 1988 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, No 5 ,1988
It is obvious that there are distinct differences between the EC countries 
concerning the required level of reserves. Let us first analyse the NRB. The 
cost of reserve requirements is given by the difference between the 
remuneration rate (where existent) and the return which the bank would 
receive if it could freely lend or invest the funds. To understand the implicit 
cost of reserve requirements consider the following simple example. A bank 
in Luxembourg obtains the Franc equivalent of a 100 ECU deposit on which it 
pays a 10 percent interest rate. It keeps a liquid reserve of 10 ECU, lends out 90 
ECU at an interest rate of 12 percent and so makes a gross margin of 0.8 ECU. 
Now consider a bank in Ireland which also obtains the equivalent of a 100 
ECU deposit but has to keep 10 ECU with the Irish Central Bank. Keeping the 
same liquidity margin of 10 ECU, it can only lend out 80 ECU.61 Suppose the 
deposit and lending rates in the two countries happen to be identical. In this 
case the Irish bank has a negative margin of -0.4 ECU! As can easily be 
calculated, the deposit/lending margin has to be greater by 75 percent for the 
Irish bank to earn a similar gross operating margin as the Luxembourg bank. 
Thus, different reserve requirements may lead to significant competitive 
distortions between the EC countries and such differences need also to be 
taken into account when assessing differences in deposit/lending margins.
Empirically, a conservative approximation for the return which a bank 
could earn if it freely invested the funds which it currently needs to keep 
with the central bank is given by the rate on short-term government bonds, 
as listed in IMF Financial Statistics, for example. Let this be denoted as rg. Data 
were obtained for the period 1985 to 1990 and averaged out for this five-year
61 Only if one considers reserve requirements and liquidity margins to be substitutes aie the 
costs of keeping reserve requirements lower.
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period. These data were then employed to calculate the opportunity cost of 
reserve requirements as shown in Table 22. These costs are computed as M(rg 
- rd) where M is the reserve coefficient and rd denotes the remuneration of 
deposits held with the central bank (where existent).
Table 2.2: Opportunity costs of EC reserve requirements per unit of deposit
Italy 2.4%
Portugal 2.4%
Spain 1.4%
Ireland 1%
Greece 0.8%
Germany 0.4%
France 0.3%
UK 0.05%
Belgium 0
Luxembourg 0
Netherlands 0
Denmark 0
Source: own calculation from Table 2.1 and average interest rates on short-term government 
bonds (treasury bilb) from 1985-89 as listed in row 6c of IMF Financial Statistics.
The table shows that there are significant differences in the opportunity 
costs of reserve requirements. Italy and Portugal stand out with the highest 
opportunity  cost and this may constitute a significant competitive 
d isadvantage in international operations. The benefits of reserve 
requirements are not clear. While they are mostly regarded as a monetary 
policy instrument, countries are able to pursue effective monetary policy by 
other means, as the examples of the Netherlands or Belgium illustrate. 
Primarily, reserve requirements constitute an important source of revenue 
for the government and thus replace other forms of taxes (Romer, 1985). This 
implicit tax conveys no direct benefits on banks, however. The NRB for 
reserve requirements therefore depends largely on costs, as benefits are fairly 
insignificant.
So far, reserve requirements have been considered a monetary policy 
instrument by the EC Commission and are therefore exempt from the home- 
country rule. Nevertheless, international capital mobility may lead to a 
situation where banks from a system with high reserve requirements are 
disadvantaged due to higher funding costs. This is likely to lead to pressure 
on the domestic central bank to relax reserve requirements and rely on other 
policy means to pursue monetary and fiscal policy which have more neutral 
effects on financial services competition.62 Alternatively, banks could place
62 Such a process could already be observed in France where minimum reserve requirements 
were reduced in May 1992 from 4.1 percent on current accounts to 1 percent and from 2 percent on 
savings accounts to 1 percent. A similar development has taken place in Spain where reserve 
requirements were reduced in March 1990.
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pressure on the central bank to introduce a more competitive remuneration 
rate for the deposits held at the bank in order to reduce the implicit cost of 
reserve requirements and the competitive distortions which result as banks 
from countries with different reserve requirements start competing.
An interesting example of the effects of competitive deregulation is 
given by the recent plans in Germany to allow the introduction of money 
market fluids by th end of 1992. These funds were so far legally prohibited 
because they do not underlie any reserve requirements. The Bundesbank 
claimed that these funds therefore make it more difficult to pursue effective 
monetary policy. Possibly even more importantly, the Bundesbank feared 
increasing funding costs for banks if there are large shifts from inexpensive 
savings deposits into more costly money market funds. Such an increase in 
funding costs is supposed to lead to a higher probability of insolvencies, as 
competition increases. It is interesting to note that the Bundesbank 
apparently places greater emphasis on financial stability than on consumer 
surplus which clearly increases, since money market funds pay significantly 
higher interest rates than banks currently pay on savings accounts which still 
constitute the majority of savings in Germany.63 Banks for a long time joined 
the Bundesbank in its opposition to money market funds, as the funds 
obviously increase refinancing costs for the banks. After January 1993, 
however, foreign financial services firms will be able to offer money market 
funds in the German market under the home-country rule. German banks 
fearing the competition of foreign institutions finally placed pressure on the 
German regulators to abolish the restrictions on money market funds in 
order to be able to compete with foreign firms.
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3.2.2. Deposit rate regulation
Deposit rate regulation is an example where the NRB appears to be negative. 
Banks reap substantial benefits from the prohibition of paying market rates 
on demand and saving deposits, as margins on sight deposits are the largest 
single contributor to banks' profits averaging up to 80%.64 There are therefore 
enormous benefits but few costs resulting from deposit rate regulation for the 
financial services sector which makes the net regulatory burden negative. 
This situation is likely to change dramatically, however, with the 
implementation of free capital flows and the home-country rule. First, with 
free capital movements domestic residents will be able to move their funds to 
countries which pay interest on their deposits (see above). Second, the home- 
country rule may be applicable if entering banks will be allowed to offer
63 Money market funds at the beginning of 1992 pay around 9 percent compared to an average of
25 percent on savings accounts.
64 See chapter five.
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interest-rate bearing accounts.65 These mechanisms are likely to make the net 
regulatory burden positive and induce banks to circumvent domestic 
restrictions to reduce the NRB.
In France, for example, paying interest on current accounts is prohibited 
by the 1967 regulation concerning interest rates on bank deposits. This 
regulation further specifies that interest rates on savings deposits are subject 
to governm ent control.66 The intention of such public intervention is to 
avoid 'excessive competition' jeopardising margins, profitability, capital ratios 
and thus financial stability. Such reasoning appears flawed, however, as it 
introduces cross-subsidisation which may have distortionary effects. In 
addition, rate regulation reduces (though not eliminates) price competition 
and may force banks to compete and possibly over-invest in quality such as 
the number of branches.67
In practise, governm ent restrictions on in terest rates can be 
circumvented up to a certain degree. In France, for example, the development 
of UCITS (undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities), 
the MATIF (marché à terme international de France) and cash management 
techniques constitute close substitutes for demand deposits which pay market 
interest rates. Nevertheless, despite these financial innovations purely 
designed to circumvent public regulations, a substantial degree of cross­
subsidisation still remains in the French market: a significant proportion of 
payment-related services such as cheques, for example, are distributed free of 
charge or substantially below costs (such as credit cards which have among 
the lowest fees in the world). This leads to an estimated annual loss of FF40 
billion in the area of payment services (Henrot and Levy-Lang, 1990). This 
loss is cross-subsidised by the significant profits made on current accounts 
resulting from the suppression of competition in this area due to 
government prohibition of paying market rates of interest. Attempts by the 
banking industry to introduce charges on cheques, for example, to establish a 
more cost-oriented pricing structure, failed due to resistance from consumer 
organisations. Under the home-country rule, foreign banks will be able to
65 An EC Commission official noted that the prohibition of remunerating sight deposits may be 
motivated by monetary policy considerations and would therefore not fall under the home 
country principle.
66 Since May 1986 interest rates on time deposits with a maturing of more than three months 
have been deregulated which now closely follow money-market rates. In Belgium the interest 
rate on current accounts was fixed by interbank agreement (at 0.5%) but this practice was 
discontinued due to the prohibition of interbank agreements in the Traety of Rome.
67 For the case of Spain, for example, Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990, p.268) note that "after 
the liberalisation of branching in 1974 there was a large geographic expansion of banks 
competing through proximity to the customer and service instead of prices, which were 
regulated". In fact, the number of branches actually doubled in only two years after 
deregulation. A similar though less dramatic development occured in France after branch 
banking was deregulated in 1967/68 (see de Boissieu, 1990).
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offer interest-bearing accounts, however, and therefore these prohibitive 
regulations are likely to come under substantial pressure by domestic banks.
Government regulation is not solely responsible for the national 
differences in current account interest rates, however. No restrictions on such 
activities exist in Germany, the UK and since March 1987 in Spain. But while 
competitive forces have led to the introduction of interest-bearing current 
accounts in both the UK and Spain, no interest is paid on demand deposits in 
Germany. I will discuss possible reasons for this in chapter five.
3.2.3. Taxation of interest rate earnings
Another area which is likely to be affected by the possibility to freely transfer 
capital across borders to foreign banks or subsidiaries of domestic banks is that 
of taxation of interest rate earnings. Taxation practise currently varies widely 
with some countries relying exclusively on the honesty of the resident to 
declare her interest rate income in the annual income tax declaration. 
Generally, the domestic government has two principal options to tax interest 
rate income. First, it may place a withholding tax on the income which is 
subtracted 'at source' from the interest payment. Such a tax may or may not be 
'definite' meaning that the taxpayer does not have to declare that income in 
the annual income tax declaration. Second, the regulator may require banks 
to submit 'control messages' to the tax authorities about the interest rate 
income of depositors. These may be on a sample basis to constitute a 
sufficient deterrent to tax evasion or cover all interest payments. Table 2.3 
illustrates the different practises in eight EC countries as well as the EFTA- 
countries Austria and Switzerland which need to be considered due to their 
potential status as a 'tax haven'.
Regulatory Enxrironment in the EC
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Table 2.3: Regulations concerning interest rate income in 1991
Country Residents Non-residents
Germany 25 percent withholding tax -
UK 25 percent withholding tax no tax
France control messages or source tax 
(18.1%) depending on type of 
investment
25 percent tax on bonds, 46 percent on 
deposits
Italy 125 percent on bonds, 30 percent on 
deposits, definite tax
30 percent on both bonds and 
deposits, some exemptions
Spain 25 percent tax and control messages 
forbonds
25 percent tax
Denmark control messages -
Luxembowg - -
Ireland 35 percent source tax on 
bonds/deposits
35 percent on bonds, no tax on 
deposits
Netherlands control messages -
Belgium 10 percent withholding tax, 
definite tax
10 percent tax
Switzerland 35 percent withholding tax, 35 percent withholding tax; no 
tax for bonds of foreign issuers
Austria 10 percent withholding tax 10 percent w ithholding tax; 
exemptions for deposits/ bonds
Source: own compilation from several national sources.
Table 2.3 illustrates that there are significant differences in the way 
interest rate income is subjected to taxation. Luxembourg is the only EC 
country which has neither a withholding tax nor control messages.
Depositors may be highly sensitive to differences in taxation principles. 
In Germany the introduction of a withholding tax of 25 percent in 1988 
resulted in a capital flight of more than DM 70 billion, forcing the German 
government to quickly abandon this tax. This example illustrates that 
economic agents respond quickly to differences in taxation. A significant 
proportion of the capital was transferred to Luxembourg where domestic and 
German banks offered special investment funds which were regulated under 
Luxembourg law and thus exempt from the German withholding tax. While 
investors were quick to respond to the change in the regulatory regime, they 
were much slower to disinvest after the tax was abolished: it is estimated that 
eighty percent of the capital transferred to Luxembourg remained there.68
The economic analysis of taxation of interest rates can also be framed in 
terms of the NRB. The stricter the principles concerning interest rate taxation, 
the greater the incentive for agents to invest at least part of their wealth 
abroad. Thus, the higher the interest rate burden, the more difficult it is for
68 See Capital 8/1991, p.71.
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domestic banks to refinance themselves through deposits, as these are more 
likely to flow abroad. The NRB is therefore likely to be positively related to 
the enforced interest rate burden.
Capital transfers will lead to pressure on governments to harmonise 
taxation principles.69 In particular, other EC governments will place pressure 
on tax-lenient EC countries such as Luxembourg to introduce some form of 
taxation. It is likely that plans for a common withholding tax on the EC level 
will re-surface. Nevertheless, Luxembourg has so far successfully resisted 
with the argument that the introduction of a tax in the EC will only lead to a 
capital flight to non-EC countries such as Switzerland or Austria and off­
shore centres such as the Channel Islands. With the accession of the EFTA 
countries, however, which will be obliged to implement the EC Directives 
such concerns may have lost in force.
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3.2.4. Universal banking versus separation
One form of prudential regulation is the restriction of admissible lines of 
business which a bank may enter. There are significant imbalances across the 
EC countries in the type of services which regulators permit banks to engage 
in: these range from the all-encompassing 'universal bank' system in 
Germany or Spain to a much more restricted range of permitted services in 
Italy, for example.
Universal banking systems can be divided into different categories: first, 
a banking system such as in the UK may be de facto universal where banks 
are allowed to engage in brokerage services only through subsidiaries. Such 
'fire walls' are supposed to reduce possible conflicts of interest inside the 
organisation. Second, in a banking system such as in the Netherlands banks 
are allowed to engage in all investment and brokerage services but are not 
permitted to hold significant equity stakes in industrial firms. Finally, the 
third category is characterised by no such restrictions on industry equity 
participations. Examples are the universal banking systems in Germany, 
Spain and Greece.
To assess the NRB of restrictions on the permitted range of activities we 
need to assess both costs and benefits of these restrictions. The costs of such 
restrictions consist mainly of not being able to attain potential economies of 
scope. Such economies may arise due to pooling of information collection if 
several services are offered to the same customer, since a customer 
creditworthiness evaluation needs to be undertaken only once.7® In addition,
69 On the issue of tax harmonisation in the EC see, for example, Giovannini and Hines (1991). 
They report a tendency of EC corporate income tax rates to converge which may be the result of 
a similar process as that for withholding taxes.
70 The empirical studies in the US on economies of scope reviewed in chapter 4 cannot capture 
information collection advantages due to the lack of a universal banking system in the US.
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allowing bank officials to be represented in the supervisory boards of non­
bank firms may establish a closer working relationship between bank and 
firm, further reducing costs of information collection. Finally, diversification 
advantages resulting from a broader range of activities may contribute to 
achieving the same bank return at lower risk.
What are the social costs of allowing unrestricted universal banking? 
Permitting banks to hold equity participations in non-bank firms may lead to 
higher risk of bank failure as bankruptcy of the firm may induce solvency 
problems of the participating bank. Second, possible conflicts of interest may 
occur if a bank acts as underwriter and broker at the same time.71
Due to the complexity of the effects of restrictions on permissible lines of 
business it seems difficult to determine the NRB.72 However, casual 
observation of banks in countries where restrictions on full universal 
banking exist, shows that through 'creative' organisational forms such as 
holding companies banks attempt to circumvent official restrictions. This 
seems to suggest that banks perceive the NRB of line of business restrictions 
to be positive. Even for a holding company structure, there may be significant 
transaction costs of administering such a firm structure, since organisational 
complexity rises compared to an unrestricted universal bank form. In 
addition, economies of scope between different lines of services may be 
foregone if communication between the legally separated subsidiaries is 
prohibited through 'firewall' provisions.
How credible is the threat of relocation in the case of line of business 
regulation? First, note that it is possible for a bank from a country with a 
universal bank system to operate its full range of activities in a host country 
in which there may be substantial restrictions on permitted activities. Entry 
by the universal bank would be based on Article 18(1) of the Second Banking 
Directive which requires that any activity listed in the annex to the Directive 
may be carried out by authorised institutions in any Member State. Banking 
activities included cover the whole range of services typically carried out by 
universal banks, including securities trading, underw riting, brokerage 
services and consultancy.
Second, in addition to operating the full range of banking services with 
no need to maintain separate subsidiaries, the Directive contains no principal 
preclusion of banks participating in other non-bank firms and non-bank 
firms acquiring stakes in banks. Thus, existing restrictions on industry 
participations in Member States do not apply to foreign banks where such 
restrictions do not exist in their home countries. However, Article 12 (4)
71 For an account of possible conflict of interest situations which typically arise in universal 
banks, see OECD (1989, p.228-229).
72 See Huveneers and Steinherr (1990), however, for such an attempt.
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determines that such non-bank participations may not exceed 15 percent of 
the bank's equity capital.
Thus, domestic banks may react by calling on home regulators to ease 
hampering restrictions which put them at a competitive disadvantage in 
countries where a stricter separation of commercial and investment banking 
is in place. Secondly, domestic banks may threaten to open a subsidiary in a 
country with no restrictions and make domestic branches a legal part of this 
foreign subsidiary. In this case, it would be possible to operate under the 
universal bank principle and circumvent existing domestic restrictions.
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3.3. Competitive deregulation in the EC insurance sector
Currently, two different approaches to regulating insurance services in the EC 
can be distinguished: the "maritime" model (Albert, 1987) which is
predominant in the UK, Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark where regulators 
grant a license and monitor the solvency of insurers but abstain from direct 
premium or profit regulation. The second model is the "Alpine" model 
where regulators interfere directly in the product and pricing structures of the 
insurance sector. The most extreme example of such a material control 
system is Germany where new products need to be approved by the 
supervisory authorities, a process which has taken up to six years in some 
cases. In addition, premiums are determined and monitored by the regulators 
with detailed rules on how to distribute excess profits to the insured.
Under the passport rules it will be possible for a UK insurer, for 
example, to offer according to its own regulatory regime in the German 
market. The draft proposals for the Third EC Insurance Directives therefore 
include provisions which require Member States to give up any prior 
approval of premiums and products and instead to ensure the solvency of the 
insurer. Thus, the Directives basically follow the "maritime" model rather 
than the "Alpine" model. The Directives are therefore likely to lead to a 
process of strategic deregulation as those countries which have followed the 
material control approach are forced to abandon their strict premium and 
product controls. This process shall be discussed for the examples of the life 
and motor insurance sectors in the next two sections.
3.3.1. The regulation of life insurance
Table 2.4 provides an overview of the different approaches to regulating life 
insurance in the largest six EC economies which together constitute 95 
percent of the total life insurance business in the EC. It becomes apparent that 
the regulatory approach differs in some main respects in the EC countries. In 
particular, as was mentioned above products and premiums are subject to 
prior regulatory approval by the supervisory authority in Germany, France 
and Italy, while in Spain premiums and conditions need to be communicated
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to the regulator. No such ex ante approval is required in the UK and the 
Netherlands.
Table 2.4: Comparative summary of life insurance regulation in six EC 
countries
Official 
prescription of 
key actuarial 
parameters
Official rules 
for distribution 
of excess profits
Official rules 
for investing 
assets
Valuation 
principle of 
assets
Germany yes yes yes historical cost
UK no no no market value
France yes yes yes historical cost
Italy no no yes hstorical cost
Spain no no no market value
Netherl. no no no market value
Source: own compilation from several national sources
In Germany and France key actuarial data required for calculating 
premiums are provided by the regulatory authorities. In France, for example, 
statistical data on mortality rates are prescribed by the regulator. The interest 
rate which is to be used to calculate the development of the value of the 
assets is officially determined to be 4.5 percent (3.5 percent for older contracts). 
Similarly, the cost component which the insurer is allowed to add to the 
actuarial premiums is officially determined. Thus, since the calculation of 
premiums is standardised, resulting premiums for life insurance are more or 
less identical for all insurers in the market. This leads to the virtual 
elimination of price competition in terms of premiums. As is apparent from 
table 2.4, however, both countries also have official rules for distributing 
excess profits which result from the conservative calculation of premiums. 
Thus, life insurers differ mainly in terms of the amount they are able to 
distribute to policyholders which in turn depends on their management of 
operating costs as well as the success of their asset management strategies.
Concerning these asset management strategies, Germany, France and 
Italy have explicit rules on the permitted composition of the asset portfolio. 
In France, for example, minimum and maximum percentage rates for specific 
assets such as government bonds or shares need to be obeyed. Similar rules in 
Germany and Italy are mainly targeted at preventing excessive investment of 
the funds of a life insurer in risky assets. These rules lead to a high 
proportion of investment in bonds of around 70 percent in Italy and 60 
percent in France. Only 10 percent were invested in shares in Italy, while this 
figure was 20 percent in France. In contrast, in the UK where no rules on the 
composition of the asset portfolio of life insurers exist, more than 50 percent 
were invested in shares and only 20 percent in bonds. This indicates that in a 
less regulated market insurers invest to a greater extent in higher-risk, 
higher-return assets.
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Restrictions concerning asset management strategies can also be viewed 
in terms of the NRB: at first glance, such restrictions provide only costs to the 
insurer, as life insurers cannot pursue an unconstrained portfolio 
management strategy but have to obey the official rules. Apart from 
adm inistrative costs, conservative investment rules result in a lower 
expected return. Thus, by relocating to a country with less strict investment 
rules an insurer from a high-regulation country will be able to pursue a 
riskier strategy and thus is likely to be able to offer a higher return to the life 
policyholder. On the other hand, a high-risk strategy also results in a higher 
default risk with a life insurer facing a greater risk of not being able to cover 
its liabilities. Thus, a firm from a high regulation country will be able to build 
a reputation for offering low-risk policies. Thus, the balance of costs and 
benefits of asset investment rules are not dear. In figure 2.6 the real return to 
policyholders of life insurers for a ten-year policy in the twelve EC countries 
is shown.
Figure 2.6: Real returns to policyholders of life insurers
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It becomes apparent that the real return is substantially higher in those 
countries which have established the 'maritime' regulatory approach, namely 
the UK, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. In fact, in all other EC 
countries the real return to the life policyholder is negative. The only 
exception is Germany where returns were also positive. This is at least partly 
attributable to the low rate of inflation rather than to high nominal returns. 
In summary, there is therefore some evidence that a high regulatory 
intensity leads to lower returns and therefore to a positive net regulatory 
burden for insurers.
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The motor insurance sector constitutes by far the largest individual branch in 
premium terms of the non-life business in all EC countries. Due to the 
compulsory status of motor third-party liability insurance resulting from the 
specific policy objective of protecting third parties in automobile accidents, 
this sector was initially excluded from the Second Non-Life Directive.73 
Freedom of services for large risks (i.e. fleet policies) will be introduced by an 
am endm ent74 to the First and Second Non-Life Directives, however, after the 
Third Motor Liability Insurance Directive passed in May 1990 has paved the 
way for such an approach.75 Even more importantly, motor insurance will be 
included in the Third Non-Life Directive which introduces freedom of 
services at the end of 1994 also in the mass retail market.
Regulations concerning motor insurance currently differ significantly 
across the EC countries, as is illustrated in table 2.5. In particular, the setting of 
tariffs is free in seven EC countries, while being subject to government 
control or public authorisation in the other countries.
3 .32 . The regulation of motor insurance
73 See Pool (1990, p.69-82) for a detailed account of the development of EC legislation on motor 
insurance.
74 OJL, 90,618.
75 OJL, 90/232.
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Table 2. 5: Regulations concerning motor insurance in 12 EC countries
Statutory minimum cover for cars (in ECU)
Tariff Setting Personal Injury 
(per person)
property damage per event
Germany regulated 489,300 195,700 734,000
France free 719,200 431,500 -
UK free unlimited 354,000 unlimited
I ta ly regulated 454,600 194,800 974,100
N etherl. free - - 867,400
Belgium regulated unlimited unlimited unlimited
Lux. uniform unlimited unlimited unlimited
Denm. free 7,620,300 1,524,100 -
Irel. free unlimited 52,100 unlimited
Greece uniform 69,800 14,000 -
Spain free 61,400 16,900 unlimited
Portugal free 65,900 (overall) 109,900
Second EC 
D irective 
(minimum 
coverage)
350,000 100,000 (per 
accident)
600,000 (personal 
injury & property 
damage)
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma 1/1991
Concerning statutory minimum cover for cars involved in accidents, 
there are still significant differences between the EC countries despite the 
harmonisation measures of the Second EC Motor Insurance Third-Liability 
Directive which establishes minimum amounts for liability coverage. 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal have until 1995, however, to establish the 
Directive. In addition, Member States are free to establish higher amounts for 
minimum coverage and frequently do so, as is apparent from the table. 
Regulatory competition may therefore also take place in the area of liability 
coverage. This stems from the fact that a Greek insurer, for example, which 
sells motor insurance in Germany according to home-country rules is able to 
offer substantially lower premiums due to significantly lower coverage in the 
case of an accident. It is not clear, however, whether German insurers 
therefore face a higher NRB, since high amounts for compulsory liability 
coverage also have benefits for insurers, as consumers may prefer higher 
rather than lower liability coverage. Thus, if consumers are willing to pay 
higher premiums for better coverage, such regulations do not lead to a higher 
NRB for those firms which are located in high coverage countries.
The impact of the EC Directives is likely to be most significant in the 
area of tariff setting in those countries in which tariffs were determined by 
the public authorities such as in Italy or are subject to authorisation such as in 
Germany or Belgium. In Germany, for example, premiums are based on the 
number of years of accident-free driving of the person seeking insurance, the 
county of residence, the horsepower of the car and the occupation of the
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owner. Thus, an automobile owner has to look at only one tariff when 
comparing premiums for different insurers.76
With the deregulation on the EC level, tariff and premium regulation 
will quickly disappear in those countries where it was formerly practised. In 
addition, the bonus/malus system which is currently uniform for all insurers 
in Germany is likely to be deregulated as soon as foreign insurers will be able 
to introduce different schemes which offer higher premium reductions for 
good risks.
In summary, in the motor insurance sector we expect the greatest 
changes in those countries which will be forced to abandon tariff and 
premium regulation, as foreign insurers will be able to offer unregulated 
rates which may be more advantageous to consumers.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter the regulatory environment of cross-border entry in retail 
financial services in the EC was analysed. It was argued that at the heart of 
market failures necessitating public regulation lie agency problems which 
arise between depositors or policyholders, managers and owners.
Two main market failures were identified which constitute the 
economic rationale for financial services regulation. First, informational 
asymmetries between customers and firms arise due to private information 
on the part of managers about the asset quality of their firm, as well as from 
the complex nature of many financial services products which prevents fully 
effective monitoring by customers. Secondly, negative externalities in the 
form of 'runs' on financial institutions may arise which have real effects on 
other sectors in the economy and may reduce the efficiency of financial 
interm ediation.
Against this background, the changing regulatory approach of financial 
services regulation on the EC level was assessed. First, capital liberalisation 
provides the necessary prerequisite for increased cross-border penetration, as 
it allows both agents and firms to freely transfer funds across national 
boundaries and thus seek the optimal risk-return portfolio in the EC 
countries, as well as purchasing financial products in those countries which 
offer the best terms and conditions. Secondly, the Second EC Banking 
Directive and the Third EC Insurance Directives establish a regulatory regime
76 This has led m any insured to believe that there is also a uniform prem ium  for the same 
tariffs which is not true, as there is indeed price competition between German insurers. 
Schulenburg (1989, p.10) reports the result of a survey which shows that 33 percent of German 
insured did not know that there is price competition between insurers and another significant 
proportion believed that they have inexpensive insurance even though they are actually with 
an  expensive insurance company. He concludes that "insurance m arket regulation has not 
increased consumer information but has decreased it".
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which allows cross-border provision of services and freedom of 
establishm ent under the home-country rule. While there are some 
ambiguities concerning the boundary between home country regulation and 
host country supervision of "rules of conduct", it seems certain that foreign 
financial services firms will be able to operate under home country regulatory 
rules for most of their activities and will therefore no longer have to deal 
with several different supervisory agencies when operating internationally.
A simple game-theoretic model was developed to analyse the process of 
'strategic deregulation' where national regulators may aim to provide 
domestic financial institutions with competitive advantages abroad or attract 
foreign firms to the home country. It was shown, however, that once 
objective functions and strategies are fully specified, regulators have no 
interest in deregulating infinitely, since this would jeopardise financial 
stability in their home country. In addition, they are able to 'free-ride' on the 
deregulatory moves of other national regulators. It became clear that 
regulatory competition is a complicated process where regulators may choose 
from a variety of plausible strategies. In particular, it is by no means evident 
that regulatory competition results in lax supervision or leads to neglect of 
the original economic objectives of alleviating market failures, as predicted by 
some academic commentators.
Four areas which are likely to come under intense scrutiny in the 
banking sector after 1992 were identified, including minimum reserve 
requirements, deposit rate regulation, taxation of interest rate earnings and 
line of business restrictions. It appears likely that in these areas the dynamics 
of free capital flows and banks placing pressure on their home country 
regulator will lead to greater convergence on the EC level.
In the insurance sector even more significant changes will take place in 
those countries which have so far relied on a material control system of 
supervision with premium and profit regulation. This regulatory approach 
will quickly be replaced by a deregulated system of free price competition 
where regulators control only solvency and reserve requirements. This 
process of deregulation was discussed for the life and motor insurance sectors 
which are likely to be most affected by liberalisation.
Regulatory Environment in the EC
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Chapter Three:
An Eclectic Theory of Cross-Border Entry 
in Retail Financial Services
The postwar multinationalisation process in manufacturing industries has 
been the subject of frequent theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Cross-border 
entry activities in financial services, however, which have undergone a 
similarly significant expansion process have attracted much less attention in 
the academic literature. Existing studies on financial services focus almost 
exclusively on cross-border entry in wholesale and investment banking and 
not on retail financial services. This chapter therefore develops an eclectic 
theory of cross-border entry in retail financial services and the focus of the 
analysis is thereby placed on three crucial questions:
• Why does a financial services firm enter a foreign market, i.e. what 
competitive advantage may compensate a foreign firm for operating 
at a distance and in a foreign environment?
• Where does a financial services firm enter a foreign market, i.e. what 
particular host and home" country characteristics induce cross-border 
entry?
• How does the financial services firm enter, i.e. which environmental 
and strategic factors determine the choice of cross-border entry 
vehicles?
Following this research agenda, an eclectic theory of cross-border entry 
needs to comprise and analytically penetrate three fundamental aspects:
• firm-level conditions: possible sources of competitive advantages of 
foreign entrants giving them an edge over domestic financial services 
firms;
• locational conditions: characteristics of the target market in relation to 
the home market which makes cross-border entry attractive;
• market-based conditions: variables influencing the decision of 
whether to exploit firm-level and locational advantages by market 
transaction or internalisation.
While the first two conditions are each necessary for cross-border entry, 
it requires additional internalisation advantages resulting from market 
im perfections to make the financial services firm choose m ulti­
nationalisation rather than other forms of cross-border entry such as 
exporting or a strategic alliance.
An eclectic model of multinational enterprises was developed by 
Dunning (1977, 1980)1 and I use this paradigm as a structuring analytical 
framework to guide the analysis of cross-border entry in financial services. 
The analysis is more than a mere application of this eclectic model to the 
financial services industry, however, as I attempt to point out possible 
extensions and modifications of the eclectic framework.
The first section provides an overview of trade theory and its 
applicability to the financial services industry. The second section develops a 
firm-level approach to the theory of cross-border entry and looks at factors 
which may provide competitive advantages to foreign financial services, 
while the third section considers locational characteristics which may induce 
cross-border entry. Finally, a fourth section discusses the choice of the mode 
of entry into foreign markets.
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
1. A first approach: trade theory
The theories of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have 
evolved rather separately. In fact, authors of the latter theory claim to start 
where trade theory supposedly ends.2 The traditional separation of trade 
theory and the theory of FDI is sometimes explained by a different focus of 
analysis: while trade theory examines the question why countries trade with 
each other by means of exporting, the theory of FDI scrutinises why firms 
choose international production. Such a separation of issues does not seem to 
be warranted, however: in most industries the decision between exporting 
and FDI is not mutually exclusive.3 In practise, the distinction between 
exporting and FDI has become blurred: exporting activities are frequently 
supported by at least some form of foreign direct investment, such as opening 
a representative office, for example, to support distribution of the exported 
product. Exporting and FDI may even be chosen simultaneously by a firm 
such as in large-scale project finance or reinsurance which are frequently 
handled from headquarters, rather than being delegated to foreign branches. 
These considerations call for an integrated approach to the theory of trade
1 Dunning's eclectic model is neatly summarised in his 1988 overview paper where he states 
that "it is ... the juxtaposition of the ownership-specific advantages of firms contemplating 
foreign production, or an increase in foreign production, the propensity to internalise the cross- 
border markets for these, and the attractions of a foreign location for production which is the 
gist of the ecelectic paradigm of international production" (p.5)
2 Dunning (1988, p .l), for example, states that "the point at which the Heckscher-Ohlin- 
Sam uelson theory of trade fails is precisely that at which the m odem  paradigm  of 
international production starts...".
3 This is stressed by Veugelers (1990, p.156) who notes that "whereas in the theoretical 
literature on the choice between exports and foreign direct investment both modes are taken as 
extreme opposites,... it should nevertheless be stressed that the difference between exporting 
and local production is rather vague and in reality is more a question of degree."
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and international production, rather than a separation of the issues into two 
distinct theories. Although such a 'general' theory is not developed in this 
chapter as our focus is on one particular industry, I hope to demonstrate the 
merits of such an eclectic approach when employing it to explain cross-border 
entry in the financial services industry.
The theory of international trade also underlies the methodology of the 
Cecchini report with many of its (implicit) assumptions and predictions 
originating in traditional trade theory.4 In the study on financial services, 
barriers to trade are considered to be a form of tariff: "die net effect {of barriers 
to trade) is as if there were a set of tariffs protecting the producers of financial 
services in the high price countries" (Price Waterhouse, 1988, p.19). Their 
removal is claimed to lead to welfare effects similar to those of a "move to 
free trade".
In the following section, I analyse whether the theory of international 
trade is suitable as an analytical framework for financial services.5
1.1. A brief overview of trade theory in services
Traditional trade theory started with Ricardo's Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation (1817) in which he showed that countries can gain 
from trade if they have different production technologies resulting in 
differing opportunity costs of one country in the production of particular 
goods or services. Ricardo showed that trade can be beneficial even if one 
country has strictly lower marginal productivities in all factors of production, 
since specialisation allows exploitation of a comparative advantage in 
producing a good or service.
While Ricardo placed the focus on differing production technologies, 
Ohlin (1933) and Heckscher (1949) examined the consequences of differing 
factor endowments, assuming identical production technologies in a two 
country model with two goods or services and two production factors. Under 
a range of additional assumptions which basically assume away all 
differences between the two countries except factor endowments, they show 
that countries will export the good or service which requires a greater input 
of the factor in which the country has a greater endowment. In addition, free 
trade is a perfect substitute for international factor mobility, as it equalises 
input prices in the two countries.
4 See chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis of the Price Waterhouse study on financial services 
in the Cecchini-Report.
5 See, for example, Heffeman and Sinclair (1990) for a more comprehensive overview of m odem  
trade theory.
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Much of the succeeding theoretical developments in trade theory 
developed as a response to empirical evidence which seemed to be at odds 
w ith the Heckscher-Ohlin approach6 and also attempted to provide 
explanations of the increasing importance of infra-industry as distinct from 
infer-industry trade. The most interesting new developments in trade theory 
address economies of scale and imperfect competition (see Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985, for a review). Economies of scale are usually analysed in the 
context of monopolistic competition models where it can be shown that 
intra-industry trade occurs as a result of product differentiation and 
increasing returns. Models of imperfect competition in international trade 
have primarily addressed the impact of protective policy measures such as 
tariffs, export subsidies or import quotas (see Krugman, 1989).
Just like most of industrial organisation theory, international trade 
theory is almost exclusively addressed at manufacturing and extractive 
industries rather than the service sector. This has led Kierzkowski (1987, p.14) 
to observe a "general neglect of services by trade theorists". This neglect may 
partly be explained by the common notion that services are essentially 'non- 
tradeable', since they mostly require personal proximity between service 
provider and recipient. Thus, the few existing models on services in trade 
predominantly refer to trade in service factors where production and 
consumption of service products are inseparable (e.g. Melvin, 1989; Burgess, 
1990).
We can distingiush two principal types of service transactions: the first 
category of services requires the transacting agents to be at the same location. 
Clearly, while physical proximity is required for some services (e.g. haircuts, 
medical examinations) which cannot be provided at a local distance, there is a 
wide range of services which can be provided across borders at an arms- 
length level, i.e. where service provider and recipient do not need to be in 
physical proximity. In particular, the recent advances in communication and 
information technology have shifted some services from the first into the 
second category. As will be discussed below, this is particularly true for 
financial services where particular products can now be provided or traded 
across borders. This implies that services which already account for a 
constantly increasing share of up to two thirds of the national product in 
some countries (see Enderwick, 1989, p.8) will also gain in significance in 
international trade. This rising importance is illustrated by the inclusion of 
services in the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Are the theoretical models to explain international trade in goods also 
applicable to trade in services? Hindley and Smith (1984) argue that the 
theory of comparative advantage can be used to explain services trade. Sapir 
and Lutz (1981) apply the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm to a range of services in
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
6 The best-known example being the Leontief 'paradox' (Leontief, 1953) which seemed to show 
that the United States imported capital-intensive goods and exported labour-intensive goods. 
See, however, Learner (1980) for a critical evaluation of Leontief s methodological approach.
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the developed and developing countries and find that factor endowments 
have some explanatory power but leave a significant degree of trade 
unexplained. Jones and Ruane (1990) build a simple Ricardian trade model 
for services and find that both factor and product trade unambiguously 
improve domestic social welfare over a situation of autarky. In the following 
section I analyse the applicability of trade theory for the case of financial 
services.
1.2. The applicability of trade theory to financial services
In a survey article on international financial services, Aliber (1984, p.663) sets 
the research agenda for a Ricardian comparative advantage approach to 
explaining trade in financial services: "In a competitive world economy, 
which countries produce bank deposits or financial intermediation services 
at the lowest possible cost?". In other words, for a comparative advantage 
explanation of international trade in services we need to search for factors 
which convey a relative cost advantage on financial services firms in one 
particular country. I discuss possible sources for such a comparative 
advantage for the example of banking.
Operating costs in financial services as in most other industries include 
labour (wages and salaries) and physical capital (e.g. buildings and 
equipment). In addition to these standard input factors, banks use funds to 
make loans to personal or commercial customers. Since funding costs 
constitute a crucial determinant of the firms' overall cost position, it is 
decided here to include them as an input factor.7 In particular, the variables 
in the bank's cost function are to some extent substitutable: a bank may have 
high labour and capital costs if it decides to gather loanable funds through a 
retail network. Alternatively, it may purchase funds in the interbank market 
and thus has higher interest rate costs but lower labour and capital costs. Cost 
of funds should therefore be included in the bank's cost function.
Access to cheaper funds may be the most important explanatory variable 
in the context of a comparative advantage explanation of international trade 
in banking services, as argued by Aliber (1976, 1984). While Aliber looks only 
at the cost of capital, however,8 one needs to include general funding costs of 
a bank including access to the interbank market and retail deposits. In 
particular, as funding costs vary between countries, those financial services 
firms which have access to cheaper funding sources at home are able to 
provide banking services abroad at lower costs. One may therefore expect
7 Therefore, the 'intermediation' approach to defining bank output is followed which includes 
interest expenses. The 'production' approach, in contrast, takes only operating costs, i.e. labour 
and physical capital into account (see Humphrey, 1984).
8 He only mentions the cost of equity finance: "The cost of capital is given to the firm by 
investors, who price the capital on the basis of the risk they associate with the firm and the 
returns available to them on other securitries" (1984, p.669).
80
those countries which have lower funding costs to be net exporters of 
banking services and especially international loans, the more so the greater 
the cost differential between the trading countries.
Funding costs of a bank are determined by a range of factors such as 
access to retail deposits including the interest rate which needs to be payed on 
demand and time deposits, access to the international and domestic 
interbank markets and the cost of equity finance determined by the risk 
which investors associate with the bank. Most importantly, however, the real 
rate of interest in a particular country determines a bank's funding costs, as it 
crucially influences the rates which the bank charges to borrowers and offers 
to depositors. Although the largest international financial services firms 
have the possibility to tap international capital markets and can therefore 
make themselves to some degree independent of the domestic interest rate 
level, other factors such as the domestic customer base impose the domestic 
interest rate on the bank. Thus, there is a correlation, though not a perfect 
one, between the national interest rate and the funding costs of the bank. As a 
result, banks from countries with lower real rates of interest can be expected 
to have a comparative advantage in offering particular services in 
international banking activities. In the European Community, however, 
continued economic and monetary integration will lead to smaller 
differences in real interest rates and therefore interest rate advantages will 
become less and less significant as a source of a comparative advantage.
In addition, a comparative advantage in terms of a lower national 
interest rate is not easily transferred to another country through 
international lending activities. Quite apart from country risk which has 
turned out to be significant in third world lending, there is still substantial 
currency risk even for stable economies and members of the EMS. Consider, 
for example, a German bank which sells a ten year fixed-rate mortgage to a 
Spanish customer for 6 million Pesetas at an annual interest rate of 12 
percent. The mortgage is refinanced at a rate of 9 percent per annum in the 
German interbank market and Deutschmark are exchanged into Pesetas at an 
exchange rate of DM1.60 for 100 Pesetas. Now suppose that the Peseta 
depreciates to an exchange rate of DM 1.55/100 Pesetas after the first year and 
remains at this rate for the next nine years. As can easily be calculated, this 
leads to a total loss to the bank despite the initial handsome profit margin.
As this simple example demonstrates, an apparent comparative 
advantage stemming from lower funding costs cannot be translated quite that 
easily into a real funding advantage, once exchange rate factors are explicitly 
incorporated into the analysis. To determine the comparative advantage of a 
country in terms of funding costs it is therefore essential to determine the 
difference in cost of funds and the expected currency risk between two 
countries. In other words, to determine whether a comparative advantage 
exists it is necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of the economic 
differences between two countries.
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
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It is becomes clear from the preceding analysis that the theory of 
comparative advantage provides a useful starting point for analysing cross- 
border entry in financial services. However, it throws up as many new 
questions as it answers. In particular, a more thorough analysis of the roots of 
greater labour or capital productivity is needed. It is most useful to undertake 
such an analysis at the firm-level rather than at the aggregate macro-level.
2. A firm-level approach to the theory of cross-border entry
Cross-border entry may take a variety of organisational forms such as 
exporting, strategic alliances or multinationalisation. For any type of cross- 
border entry it is commonly argued that the entering firm needs to possess 
some competitive advantage to compensate for inherent cost disadvantages. 
Such cost disadvantages result purely from the fact that the entering firm is 
'foreign' and yet unfamiliar with the host market. In the theory of FDI this 
argument was first formulated for manufacturing industries in Hymer's 1960 
doctoral dissertation (published 1976).9 On a macro level this proposition is 
also implicit in much of traditional trade theory. In fact, as was discussed 
above, Ricardian trade theory is based on differences in production functions, 
while the Heckscher-Ohlin model cites differing access to production factors 
as the main rationale for trade. Both of these approaches can therefore be 
reinterpreted as exploring competitive advantages of firms involved in 
international trade or production which thus provides a micro foundation of 
the macro theory of trade. Before discussing the possible sources of such 
competitive advantages for the case of the retail financial services industry, I 
first analyse possible reasons for inherent cost disadvantages of foreign 
entrants.
It is essential for the understanding of the role and functions of 
multinational financial services firms to analyse why financial services firms 
exist and why intermediation replaces market transactions. The next section 
therefore develops a theory of the economic function of banks in an economy 
with transaction costs. In section 2.2 the economic role of insurance firms is 
analysed.
2.1. Direct financing versus financial intermediation: a contractual theory of 
the economic function of banks
Any theory of cross-border entry in banking must come to grips with the 
question of why banks exist, restating Coase's (1937) classic question of why 
internal transaction (intermediation) replaces direct contracting in the 
market. Hicks (1974) distinguished between the 'auto-economy' and the 
'overdraft economy'. The latter is characterised by the insignificance of direct
9 See Dunning and Rugman (1985) for an assessment of the impact of Hym er's dissertation on 
other theories of FDI.
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finance, as borrowers use financial intermediaries and rely on bank credit 
rather than capital market funding. The crucial question is to determine why 
agents prefer to contract with financial intermediaries rather than use direct 
finance. We proceed by analysing the relative efficacy of alternative means of 
contracting, assuming that agents want to minimise the level of transaction 
costs when informational asymmetries are present.10
In an Arrow-Debreu (1954) economy where markets are frictionless and 
complete contracting is possible, financial intermediation does not exist due 
to the absence of transaction costs and uncertainty, since there is the 
possibility of writing contingent contracts for all possible future events. As 
Williamson (1975, chapter 2) argues, however, complete contracting for all 
future contingencies is impossible, due to the existence of bounded 
rationality,11 placing limits on the agent's capacity to process all required 
information. Thus, contracts necessarily remain incomplete with many 
implicit rather than explicit corollaries which are difficult to litigate in court 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). Once we depart from the assumption of complete 
contingent contracting and explicitly formalise the existence of transaction 
costs,12 sole reliance on direct contracting between agents in financial markets 
may lead to a Pareto-inferior equilibrium compared to a situation where 
financial interm ediaries exist. To explain the existence of financial 
intermediation, we therefore have to show that banks are able to help agents 
economise on the different forms of transaction costs.
The concept of transaction costs is employed with several different 
m eanings.13 At the heart of our analysis is the study of the type of contract 
which borrowers and lenders enter into. The term 'contract' is hereby not 
confined to purely legal arrangements with its standard characteristics of offer 
and acceptance, but is interpreted in a broader economic sense, describing any 
form of relationship between economic agents which establishes an (implicit 
or explicit) mutual agreement or expectation to perform certain tasks or
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
10 Williamson (1989, p.136) notes that such a transaction costs approach to the theory of the 
firm m ust entail "an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapting and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures".
11 Simon (1947 p. xxiv) defines bounded rationality as agents' behaviour which is "intendedly 
rational, but only limitedly so."
12 Bolton (1990, p.303) notes that "... a large part of the theoretical research effort of the past 
three decades (scnitinised) the implications of gradually limiting the set of feasible contracts 
further and further away from the set of fully contingent Arrow-Debreu contracts".
13 For example, Leland and Pye (1977, p.382) include only those costs which arise in actual 
market transactions, excluding information or monitoring costs. Arrow (1969, p.48), on the other 
hand, defines transaction costs as the "costs of running the economic system", a view which 
appears too broad for our operational purposes. The view that transactions should be the 
primary focus of firms' and market analyses goes back to Commons (1934).
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behave in a particular way.14 Since the focus of the analysis is placed on 
contracts, we therefore introduce a 'contractual' definition of transaction 
costs, encompassing all costs associated with arranging, completing, 
monitoring and enforcing contracts. To make our discussion more precise, 
we distinguish pre- and post-contractual transaction costs.
Pre-contractual transaction costs include the costs of searching for a 
suitable contracting partner with matching preferences concerning type, 
length and conditions of the contract. Secondly, as bounded rationality 
prohibits complete specification of all possible future contingencies, the 
agreed contract will necessarily be incomplete. Thus, expectations about post- 
contractual bargaining behaviour decisively determine the contractual 
agreement. An example is ex ante relationship-specific investment which is 
at least partly non-recoverable in other contractual relationships. The two 
contracting parties thus recognise their post-contractual interdependence of 
bilateral monopoly. In particular, an asymmetric distribution of ex post 
bargaining power may jeopardise the efficient level of idiosyncratic 
investm ent ex ante, since expected opportunistic behaviour by the other 
contractual party may reduce the willingness to commit to pre-contractual 
specific investment.15
Post-contractual transaction costs include the monitoring of the contract 
as both parties have to check that the other party abides by the agreement. In 
its simplest form monitoring causes only opportunity costs as time is 
sacrificed to check on the other party. Real resource costs arise if investment 
in monitoring technology is required which tends to be more sophisticated 
the greater the complexity of information and informational asymmetries. 
Second, in case of contractual disagreements arising from incompletely 
specified contingencies there may be enforcement costs as arbitration or legal 
means are required to settle the dispute.
Consider an economy with n potential lenders and m potential 
borrowers. Lender k has a maximal amount of ak to invest and borrower j 
requires funds fj to undertake a project which yields stochastic returns. The 
value of capital to the borrower is given by vj and the lender requires a return 
of at least rk given by the next-best alternative use of funds. Thus, direct
contracting will only take place if 3 k, j such that vj > rk. If i is the negotiated 
interest rate at which lending occurs then the lender's surplus is given by i - 
rk and the borrower's surplus is vj - i. Both borrowers and lenders have the 
option of contracting directly or using an intermediary when maximising 
their respective surplus margins subject to a given level of risk aversion. Let 
the sum of transaction costs of direct contracting be represented by xt. If rk - xt 
> i then no direct contract will be agreed upon.
14 W illiamson (1990) therefore suggests replacing the term 'contract' by 'treaty ' to avoid 
unwanted "legalistic" connotations.
15 See Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978).
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Transaction costs of direct contracting and intermediation depend on a 
variety of factors. Direct contracting may be difficult for the following reasons: 
first, differing preferences of borrowers and lenders of funds regarding type, 
length and maturity of contract may cause incompatabilities between 
borrowers and lenders. For example, borrowers may require long-term funds 
for project financing, whereas lenders prefer fairly liquid short-term 
liabilities. Even where such preferences coincide, there may be considerable 
search and information costs involved in finding the adequate contracting 
partner. Second, information impactedness may preclude efficient ex ante 
contracting, since lenders face informational asymmetries which coupled 
with post-contractual opportunism lead to problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection:16 borrowers hold private information about their 
probability of being able to repay the loan. The lender therefore faces the 
problem of determining the optimal interest rate i* such as to screen out 
good from bad loans: there is adverse selection, since for a higher interest rate 
the pool of applicants becomes riskier, and moral hazard results as borrowers 
are induced to undertake riskier projects to recover the higher cost of 
capital.17 As a result, a market for loans may cease to exist due to the 'lemon 
problem '.18 In order to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
the lender has to incur considerable transaction costs when assessing the 
creditworthiness of the potential borrowers, collecting information on the 
likelihood of repayment.19
We see that lenders in particular may be unwilling to incur the 
transaction costs of loan contracts and prefer less risky uses of their funds.
16 See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for a survey of the theory of incomplete contracting with 
asymmetric information. The problem of post-contractual opportunism  has recently been 
incorporated into the theory of incomplete contracts, by requiring contracts to be 'renegotiation 
proof' (see Dewratripont, 1988 and Hart and Tirole, 1988).
17 See, for example, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on the methods of 
banks to induce borrower self-selection by rationing credit. Bester (1985, 1987) shows that 
collateralisation may serve as a signalling device where borrowers with a high probability of 
repayment are willing to accept a higher increase of the collateral for a given reduction in the 
cost of capital than those with a lower probability of success. Collateralisation thus reduces 
the problems of adverse selection through 'natural' screening of candidates.
18 Akerlof (1970). As lenders have imperfect information about borrowers' abilities to repay, 
lending rates have to incorporate a risk premium to reflect average project qualities. Thus, the 
presence of lem ons' in the market tends to drive up rates and (potential) good borrowers who 
have to bear part of the costs of written-off loans may drop out of the market. The result is a 
market consisting of many bad borrowers.
19 Broeker (1990) shows that when there is pre-contractual competition between lenders there 
may be a w inner's curse problem if the outcome of the creditworthiness assessment is not 
publicly observable, since the 'winner' of the contract has to fear that she is stuck with the 
borrower that nobody else wanted. On the other hand, there is a free-rider problem insofar as 
credit assessments are public knowledge, as borrowers have an incentive to free-ride on the 
monitoring activities of competitors.
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Borrowers may face pre-contractual transaction costs as well, however, 
resulting from the Arrow paradox of information (Arrow, 1962b). For a 
potential lender correctly to assess the risk of the borrower's project, she 
needs to have complete information on the project. If she does, however, and 
assesses the project to be creditworthy she no longer has an incentive to lend 
the capital but may as well undertake the project herself.
Given these transactional difficulties of direct contracting, both 
borrowers and lenders may prefer to contract with financial intermediaries 
instead of engaging in direct contracts. To cover operating costs, 
intermediaries reduce the margins of both borrowers and lenders, however. 
In addition, as noted by Hell wig (1991) the longer chain of transactions 
between borrower and final investor in interm ediation may increase 
transactions costs. Thus, intermediation is only preferred by agents if it offers 
a less costly contracting alternative.
Financial intermediaries may reduce the problems associated with direct 
contracting described above in several ways and therefore help agents to 
economise on transaction costs:
i.) Coordination function: financial intermediaries may help to reduce 
search and information costs simply by co-ordinating and matching 
lenders' and borrowers' preferred habitats by assuming the role of 
middlem en.
ii.) Transformation function: through bundling and diversification of 
lenders' funds and own equity, banks are able to transform highly liquid 
short-term liabilities into largely non-marketable long-term loans and 
may thus help to reconcile diverging preferences of borrowers and 
lenders concerning maturity or type of contract.20
iii.) Monitoring function: banks may be able to reduce transaction costs 
associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems by 
acquiring special expertise in evaluating the initial creditworthiness of 
loan applicants as well as developing monitoring technology to detect 
possible defaults.21
20 This pooling of funds allows larger projects to be financed. Yanelle (1989) refers to this as the 
'expansionary effect' of intermediation.
21 Bemanke (1983) describes a model where the main function of banks is to sort out 
creditworthy borrowers from loan applicants whose projects do not deserve funding. Diamond
(1984) develops a model in which financial interm ediaries are delegated the role of 
monitoring loan contracts. These institutions are able to avoid costly duplication of monitoring 
and enjoy a net cost advantage due to diversification advantages. In practise, banks have 
developed quite sophisticated credit analysis systems of screening potential borrowers. The 
effort invested by banks depends on the amount and riskiness of the loan, ranging from standard 
'credit scoring' procedures for consumer loans to extensive industry and company analyses in the 
case of high-risk venture capital. Additionally, banks have developed risk-m anagem ent 
procedures for early detection of liquidity problems, ranging from computerised analysis of
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iv.) Size and learning economies: compared to individual lenders, banks 
enjoy economies of scale in establishing common screening and 
m onitoring techniques through centralisation, thereby avoiding 
wasteful duplication of efforts, but reaping the benefits from learning 
economies as special expertise and experience accumulates.22
v.) Reputation effects: intermediaries may build up a reputation of not 
exploiting confidential information provided by borrowers and thus 
solve the public good nature of information. In addition, a long-term 
relationship between bank and borrower reduces monitoring and 
verification costs.
These factors tend to explain why the vast majority of financial 
transactions are channeled through banks rather than using means of direct 
con tracting .23 The raison d'etre of banks is applied to an analysis of the 
inherent cost disadvantages of foreign institutions in section 2.3.
2.2. Diversification and risk pooling: the economic function of insurance 
firms
The issue of the economic function of insurance firms seems a lot less 
contentious than for the case of financial intermediaries. Insurers serve the 
main purpose of reducing risk for economic agents. There are many different 
definitions and classifications of risk.24 Any individual economic agent faces 
the risk of being confronted with 'unforeseen' circumstances which have 
only a low probability of occurence but may have disastrous financial effects. 
Such events include, for example, a fire destroying all personal belongings, 
car accidents with liabilities to third parties or injury leading to permanent 
disability. The agent could provide for such events by saving funds which 
may be used in the case of financial need arising from the occurence of these
paym ent streams on the current account to in-depth monitoring of a company's financial 
performance.
22 Notice, however, that these economies are not limited to financial intermediaries: the 
recent emergence of 'corporate banks' which are bank-like departments inside industrial firms 
demonstrates that once an industrial firm reaches a minimum efficient scale, it may pay to 
internalise financial transactions rather than to contract with an intermediary. Many of the 
functions traditionally performed by intermediaries such as portfolio and foreign exchange 
management are now performed by in-house departments.
23 However, the recent trend towards securitisation may be interpreted as a move away from 
intermediation. Direct contracting is also observed in the venture capital market, for example, 
where entrepreneurs sometimes seek direct contractual arrangement with a capital provider. 
One could argue, of course, that these entrepreneurs have been weeded out by banks' screening 
procedures and are therefore the "lemons” in the market (Akerlof, 1970).
24 See, for example, Greene and Trieschmann (1988, p.3-10).
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events. These funds are unlikely to be sufficient, however, in the case of large 
financial liabilities. In addition, even though such a 'savings fund' earns 
interest, there are still significant opportunity costs if the agent could derive a 
higher marginal utility from spending these funds on consumption.
Rather than providing funds for 'emergency needs' himself, the agent 
could get together with a sufficiently large group of other economic agents 
and form a coalition which has the function of pooling the emergency funds 
which are provided by each agent. Such centralisation can be shown to be cost 
efficient due to the operation of the well-known law  of large numbers'.25 Let 
X i, ..., Xn be a random sample from a distribution with finite mean fi and and 
finite variance a2. Then
lim P{ IX- fi I < e } = 1 
n—>°°
n
where X = Xi/n, i.e. the sample mean. The law of large numbers can be 
t=l
easily proved using Chebychev's inequality. The law states that as the sample 
size increases, the sample mean approaches the true distributional mean. For 
insurance this implies that as the number of insured increases, the greater 
the likelihood that the actual distribution of claims equals the expected 
distribution. Building upon the law of large numbers, it can be easily shown 
that the average claim per insured approaches the true mean of the claims 
distribution and that the insurer can therefore predict the actual claims more 
accurately the greater the number of insured. Insurers therefore serve the 
following functions in an economy:
i.) Pooling function: through the working of the law of large numbers 
insurers are able to pool the risk of several agents more effectively than 
if agents were to set aside funds for financial emergencies on an 
individual basis;26
ii.) Risk assessment: insurers are able to predict risk more accurately 
through accumulating experience to predict actuarial losses. In 
particular, insurers can effectively set up and monitor schemes to reduce 
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection;27
25 See, for example, Cummins (1991) for an overview of the statistical approach to insurance.
26 Note, however, that pooling does not eliminate risk completely, since nX - njx can be quite 
large even if X - n becomes small as n increases.
27 See, for example, Stiglitz and Am ott (1990) on the issues of moral hazard and adverse 
selection in insurance markets.
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iii.) Learning economies: closely related to the risk assessment function, 
insurers are able to refine their actuarial techniques and predictive 
capabilities, the longer they operate in the market;
iv.) Diversification function: by operating in several different markets, 
insurers are able to reduce operating risks and even out large unexpected 
losses in one particular insurance market by a more favourable loss 
distribution in another market;
v.) Reputational effects: insurers are able to establish a reputation for 
being financially solvent and prudent in their actuarial management of 
premiums and claims. This may be particularly important where the 
economic agent has to pay premiums several years ahead of being able to 
file claims, such as in life insurance.
This analysis of the economic functions of banks and insurers is now applied 
to an analysis of possible cost disadvantages of foreign entrants in the next 
section.
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2.3. An application to the theory of cross-border entry: inherent cost 
advantages of foreign financial services firms
The analysis of the economic function of financial services firms is now 
applied to analyse the question which cost disadvantages foreign financial 
services firms may have. Let us note at this stage that we adopt a modified 
approach from that of the conventional theory of FDI as proposed by Hymer. 
In addition to analysing inherent cost disadvantages and locational and 
competitive advantages of foreign firms as compared to the opportunity costs 
of domestic incumbents,28 I also analyse the competitive position of foreign 
firms as compared to potential domestic entrants. Such a comparison permits 
a better focus on the question under scrutiny: in particular, when comparing 
domestic incumbents and foreign entrants it is hard to separate those cost 
disadvantages which result purely from the entry process and which are 
incurred by any entrant no matter if domestic or foreign (e.g. gathering 
market intelligence), from those costs which result purely from the 
'foreigness' of the entrant (e.g. lack of know-how about local customs). It is 
the latter which should be the primary focus of the theory of cross-border 
entry, as the question under scrutiny is not that of entry in general but that of 
foreign entry as compared to domestic entry. Using potential domestic 
entrants as a yardstick therefore allows a better separation of these two 
distinct issues.
28 See Hym er (1976, p.41-43). For the eclectic paradigm, Dunning states that "(ownership 
advantages) must be sufficient to compensate for the costs of setting up  and operating a foreign 
value-adding operation, in addition to those faced by indigenous producers or potential 
producers" (1988, p.2).
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The cross-border entry decision can be modeled in a simple decision- 
theoretic framework where firm-level or locational advantages need to 
exceed inherent cost disadvantages of operating in unknown territory. In 
order to predict whether or not cross-border entry will take place, we 
therefore need to analyse both expected costs and benefits of the entry 
opportunity. In particular, the nature and the (qualitative, if not quantitative) 
magnitude of the inherent cost disadvantage of foreign entrants needs to be 
analysed. The eclectic paradigm of multinational enterprises, however, has 
almost completely neglected this aspect of the cross-border entry decision. It 
does not explore the type, size and nature of such an inherent cost 
disadvantage but exclusively focuses on the competitive advantages which 
may compensate for such a disadvantage. Without further analysis, however, 
it is not possible to make useful predictions about cross-border entry, since 
inherent cost disadvantages differ between firms, markets and countries and 
therefore constitute a crucial explanatory variable of the entry decision.
Two possible ways of modeling the inherent cost disadvantage of 
foreign entrants exist: first, one could assume that entrants have to incur a 
once and for all set-up cost K. Thus, the cost function would include a fixed 
set-up expense in addition to regular fixed costs only in the first period of 
foreign operation. This set up cost consists of an entry cost c* which needs to 
be incurred by both domestic and foreign entrants into the market and an 
additional cost c/ which has to be incurred only by foreign entrants. The cost 
difference between domestic and foreign entrants may result from the fact 
that foreign firms have to incur higher set-up costs than domestic entrants, 
since they are unfamiliar with the target market, its legal structure, customs, 
economic environment and administration. These costs include expenses 
such as acquiring market intelligence or recruiting and training personnel.29 
Potential domestic entrants, on the other hand, may already possess some 
familiarity with the market and therefore enjoy lower set-up costs.
Alternatively, one can model the inherent cost disadvantage of foreign 
entrants by assuming that they have continuously higher costs than domestic 
firms even after entry costs are sunk. Grubel (1989, p.67) seems to have such a 
continuous disadvantage in mind when he speaks of the "innate advantages 
accruing to local entrepreneurs" of domestic financial services firms.
As was discussed in the previous section, banks reduce transaction costs 
by performing several functions. Consider first the coordination function. In
29 The lack of know-how of foreign banks concerning the host country's environment is supported 
by survey evidence across eight EC countries by the banking consulting firm Greenwich 
Associates (1988). The Chief Financial Officers of almost 1,000 EC companies were interviewed 
and asked whether the account officers of both domestic and foreign banks "know the domestic 
financial needs" of the companies. For foreign banks only 95 percent of respondents agreed with 
this statement, compared to 405 percent for domestic banks. The lack of know-how of foreign 
banks of the domestic operating environment is also illustrated by the observation that foreign 
banks are more frequently involved in lending to domestic institutions which later experience 
financial difficulties such as Co-op in Germany or the Federconsorzi in Italy.
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order to perform the role of middlemen, banks need a sufficient number of 
transactional relationships on both the depositors' as well as the lenders' side. 
Foreign banks may be disadvantaged simply by having a lower number of 
domestic customer relationships.
Next consider the monitoring function of banks which was identified as 
a main tool to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems. For 
effective monitoring to take place, banks need to be familiar with domestic 
business conventions in order to be able to pursue successful credit 
worthiness evaluations. This requires intimate knowledge of a country's 
business environment which foreign banks may not possess. In addition, 
where loans to smaller corporate customers are undertaken, an effective 
monitoring technology requires a sufficient number of branches which are 
situated close enough to the customer in order to reduce communication 
costs. In addition, in areas where learning economies are significant, foreign 
banks are disadvantaged unless they 'buy in' the required know-how through 
hiring experienced personnel. Finally, reputational effects are likely to place 
foreign banks at a significant disadvantage compared to domestic in­
cumbents.30
Foreign insurance companies may also face cost disadvantages during 
the first phase of entering a new market. In particular they may not be able to 
perform the risk pooling function as effectively as large domestic institutions 
unless they enter at a similar size as domestic firms. Even if pure size does 
not necessarily result in a cost disadvantage, foreign firms are likely to be 
disadvantaged performing the risk assessment function, as they lack the 
experience of calculating actuarially correct premiums. This results from less 
experience with handling actual claim distributions such that foreign 
insurers are likely to be on a lower point on the learning curve than domestic 
incumbents. Finally, similar to the banking sector foreign insurers may have 
reputational disadvantages compared to domestic incumbents, since they face 
difficulties transferring the reputation of being financially solvent from their 
home market to the host market.
Given that foreign financial services firms suffer an inherent cost 
disadvantage, we need to explore what kind of competitive advantage may 
compensate for this.31 In the next section, I first analyse competitive 
advantages which have their origin at the firm level, while section 3 
examines locational factors which may induce cross-border entry.
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
30 See the discussion of reputation as an entry barrier in the next chapter.
31 For the case of banking, Grubel (1977, p. 350) defines the research agenda for a theory of 
(traditional) m ultinational banking when stating that "the basic phenomenon ... to be 
explained by the theory of multinational banking is why a bank abroad can profitably offer 
lower lending and higher borrowing rates than its domestic competitors and thus attract 
customers away from them."
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2.4. Follow and lead the customer
Probably the most prominent explanation of cross-border entry in service 
industries is that a firm 'follows' its customers into foreign markets. This 
explanation is particularly dominant in the banking sector.32 A dynamic 
version of the hypothesis runs as follows: a financial institution has an 
established long-term relationship with a domestic firm. The firm then 
decides to enter a foreign m arket either by exporting or by 
multinationalisation. Market intelligence, trade finance or international 
insurance coverage can be provided by the international department of the 
home institution without the need to pursue cross-border entry on the part 
of the financial institution itself. Alternatively, the firm 's financial or 
insurance needs resulting from foreign operations can be served by a 
cooperating institution of the home bank or insurer, such as a a firm which 
has a strategic alliance with the home supplier. Once the firm decides to 
actively enter the foreign market by transferring capital and labour, however, 
the need for direct access to banking and insurance services in the host 
market increases. This may induce the home financial institution to establish 
some form of presence itself in the host market in order to better serve the 
needs of the now multinational firm. Thus, the financial institution's main 
objective when entering the foreign market is to preserve the overall 
business relationship with the domestic customer.
The move into the foreign market by the financial services firm is 
therefore defensive in the sense that it attempts to prevent the customer to 
do business with a different financial institution in the host market. This 
would reduce profits for the home supplier as the international activities of 
the customer are lost and may even jeopardise the entire client relationship 
if the host country institution is able to serve the firm in the home country as 
well. This may be the case if the new supplier serving the firm in the host 
country also possesses a presence in the home country either because it is a 
foreign firm with a significant presence in the home market or, more likely, 
because it is a domestic competitor of the home financial institution.
Equally plausible to such a defensive explanation of cross-border 
movements of financial institutions would be the hypothesis that firms 
pursue an offensive strategy in the sense that rather than following their 
customers they lead their customers into foreign markets. A financial 
institution will undertake such a move if it sees promising business potential 
in the host market either due to home firms which are interested in entering 
that market or, additionally, if there are host market firms which constitute 
potential customers. The latter may be the case if there are firms in the host 
market which already have business links with the home market or plan to 
enter it. The home market financial institution has a competitive edge over
32 See, for example, Brimmer and Dahl (1975) or Goldberg and Saunders (1981). Kim and Miller 
(1983, p.24) note that "just as US banks had followed the international operations of US 
multinational corporations, so did foreign banks repeat the pattern with their pursuit of home- 
country subsidiaries which had moved into the United States".
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host market suppliers due to its intimate knowledge of the domestic markel 
Thus, one could hypothesise that an equally significant reason for 
multinationalisation is that financial services firm lead rather than follow 
their existing customers or even seek new customers in addition to existing 
ones.
The follow or lead the customer explanation is usually presented in the 
context of corporate relationships with only the largest firms which turn or 
are already multinational. In the single European market one can expect 
increased cross-border entry movements not only of the largest firms which 
are already present in most European countries anyway, but especially of 
medium-sized and even smaller firms which will increasingly exploit 
business opportunities in other EC countries. Although most banks and 
insurers have traditionally served this segment through the international 
department in their home country, a firm which has an extended presence in 
the host country will have a competitive advantage by being able to provide 
the firm with local market intelligence and finance. Thus, a financial 
institution which has a local retail presence in the host country is better able 
to serve smaller corporate customers from home. Thus, the follow-and-lead 
the customer hypothesis can be readily extended to the case of small and 
medium-sized corporate customers.
In the personal customer segment there may be an increasing number of 
'Eurotravellers' who require banking services outside their home country 
when being on business trips or on holidays. In addition, there are a number 
of customers who work and live in two different countries or have 
permanent homes in other European countries. A bank with a European 
retail presence is able to offer significantly cheaper services to these 
customers. Nevertheless, while the number of such 'European' retail 
customers is increasing, they are unlikely to become a major force and surely 
not suffice as an explanation of increased cross-border entry in retail financial 
services.
In the next section we turn to another explanation when scrutinising 
competitive advantages of foreign entrants in the form of intangible assets.
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2.5. Intangible assets
A dominant explanation in the theory of MNEs is to assume that the firm 
possesses some intangible asset which can be transferred at low marginal cost 
to the target market.33 In manufacturing industries such an intangible asset 
may be a particular production technology developed and possibly patented 
by the firm, or specific employee know-how such as marketing skills or
33 See Hymer (1960) and Kindleberger (1969). Caves (1982, p.3) notes that among the theories 
of MNEs, the intangible asset approach "has proved most fruiful for explaining non-production 
bases for the MNE".
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accumulated experience. In financial services, however, due to the lack of a 
patent protection system it is frequently argued that such intangible assets 
have little or no significance.34 While this may be true for some product 
differentiation advantages and innovations, it does not necessarily hold for 
organisational capital or informational advantages, as will now be discussed.
Product differentiation allows firms to create a unique product and thus 
gain a degree of market power compared to a homogeneous product world.35 
However, the scope for direct product differentiation in financial services is 
comparatively limited due to the low number of product attributes36 and the 
possibility to easily imitate any product innovation.37 In fact, the number of 
product innovations or newly developed products is extremely low in 
financial services as compared to manufacturing industries and consists 
mostly of rebundling of product attributes rather than new product 
developments.
Nevertheless, production know-how in financial services may play a 
more significant role than would appear at first sight. Perhaps the most 
important input factor in financial services is employee and product know­
how. Such know-how is accumulated through learning by doing and results 
in special expertise which can be passed on to other employees through 
significant investment in training and education. In addition, product know­
how advantages may result from learning economies which occur after a 
firm has operated in a particular product market for a longer time than 
competitors (e.g. in the area of international asset management).
A different type of product differentiation is that of building up a 
reputation. A firm may develop a reputation of being a specialist in a 
particular area or for providing high-quality services through especially 
qualified employees. In chapter two, I discussed the significance of consumer 
confidence and the detrimental effects which a financial services firm failure 
may have on both individual customers and the economy. Individual
34 Casson (1990, p .l7), for example, notes that in banking "(competitive) advantages ... are not 
only difficult to patent, but difficult to keep secret too".
35 Caves (1982, p.4), for example, notes that "the distinctiveness of the firm 's marketing- 
oriented assets may rest with the firm 's ability to come up  with frequent innovations; its 
intangible asset then may be a patented novelty, or simply some new combination of attributes 
that its rivals cannot quickly or effectively imitate."
36 The main characteristics of a financial product can be enumerated as follows: reputation of 
supplier and product, length or maturity of financial contract, expected risk and return, resale 
possibilities (marketability), currency and country of denomination and after-sales services.
37 For example, Citicorp and White, Weld & Co. were the first banks to introduce a Eurodollar 
certificate of deposit after 15 months of extensive internal legal and strategic consultations. 
When they finally decided to introduce the new product, the first buyer was Chemical Bank 
which immediately introduced its own version of a Euro CD (see, Dufey and Giddy, 1981, p.40). 
A similar story can be told of many products in the retail financial services sector.
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depositors or policyholders attach a probability of failure to each firm and 
assess the firm's quality at least partly based on its financial soundness. Thus, 
a firm which has managed to build up a reputation of being safe may have a 
significant competitive advantage over competitors.38 Such a reputation may 
be transferred to another market at little cost if the firm operates in an 
international setting where information flows are efficient. While this may 
be the case in investment banking or reinsurance, in retail financial services 
reputation in specific areas is difficult to transfer across borders. This results 
from the fact that a retail financial services firm is less well-known in the 
host market, as most of these firms have so far been purely domestic 
operations and while they may be T^rand names' in domestic markets, they 
are unlikely to have a high recognition value in foreign countries.
In summary, we find only few sources of a possible firm-level advantage 
which can be transferred to a foreign market in the retail financial services 
sector. Only product know-how seems to be transferable to some degree to 
foreign retail markets, as firms may have accumulated experience in one 
particular market and have therefore progressed higher on the learning 
curve than competitors in the host country.
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3. Locational factors: the relation between host- and home-country 
characteristsics
In order to answer the question where a financial services firm is most likely 
to enter we need to address locational advantages which an entering firm 
may possess in comparison to host-country institutions. Locational 
advantages are a relative concept which arise from the specific relation 
between home- and host-country characteristics. They may induce cross- 
border entry if the host country has certain locational advantages compared 
to the home country or, alternatively, they may provide a competitive edge if 
the home country confers certain locational advantages to the entering firm 
in the host market. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that the host market 
needs to have 'attractive' locational characteristics to induce cross-border 
entry. However, it is equally plausible that an entering firm transfers 
locational advantages from its home market into the host market and thus 
gains a competitive edge. Thus, locational factors can give the firm a 
disadvantage in the domestic market and induce foreign expansion, for 
example, by gaining access to cheaper funds abroad or circumventing a more 
stringent home country regulatory regime.
Alternatively, the reverse situation may hold where locational factors 
give the domestic firm a competitive advantage as compared to host country
38 For example, Swiss banks frequently have a reputation of being particulaly safe even though 
this reputation is likely to suffer from the recent downgradings of Swiss institutions by the 
rating agencies.
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firms. M ost o f the conventional theory o f the M N E considers only the 
'attractiveness' o f the host market (e.g. access to cheap labour) when analysing 
locational factors. In this analysis I stress that there m ay be a two-way 
relationship, since an 'unattractive' host market (e.g. high labour costs) may 
equally induce cross-border entry. The most important locational factors 
which may induce cross-border entry are different regulatory regimes, market 
structure and conduct, funding and borrowing costs (which were already 
discussed above), and diversification. Each will be discussed in turn.
As was discussed in the second chapter, regulatory factors may induce 
cross-border entry if the host country offers a more favourable regulatory 
environment, i.e. one with a lower net regulatory burden. Alternatively, a 
stricter regulatory environment for domestic financial services firms may 
confer a competitive advantage on foreign firms which may be less strictly 
regulated by their home country authorities. While entry for sole regulatory 
purposes plays a significant role in wholesale financial services (e.g. booking 
centres in off-shore locations), it is unlikely to be a sufficient explanation for 
cross-border entry in retail financial services.
A possible reason for cross-border entry in retail financial services which 
has so far not been analysed is the possibility of firms entering foreign 
markets characterised by lacklustre competition due to (tacit) collusion 
among domestic incumbents. Thus, a foreign firm which has no efficiency 
advantage may still decide to enter a foreign market in order to participate in 
oligopoly profits. It will be able to earn a positive profit by undercutting 
domestic firms but still pricing above the competitive outcome.
Whether or not such a strategy is successful depends crucially on the 
reaction of domestic firms. If incumbents match the entrant's price and 
quality conditions instantaneously, customers have no reason to change their 
supplier relationship. If they respond only sluggishly, however, entrants will 
be able to gain market share at the expense of incumbents and make positive 
profits. This crucially depends on the significance of switching costs and the 
entrants' strategies to overcome them.39 As noted by Kessides (1990), there are 
therefore two opposing effects of high margins on the entry decision: on the 
one hand, the higher the margins the greater the attractiveness of the foreign 
market for cross-border entry. At the same time, entrants must expect a more 
aggressive response of incumbents, as they have proportionately more to 
lose.
As the final locational advantage explanation of cross-border entry, 
consider a simple diversification view of multinationalisation. As retail 
financial services are highly dependent on the general economic situation, a 
firm can expect risk reduction advantages from diversifying its income 
stream across several economies. The diversification view of cross-border 
entry is particularly applicable to the insurance sector where risks such as
39 See chapter four.
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natural catastrophes are unlikely to be related across countries. 
Diversification is also one of the main arguments for liberalising interstate 
entry in US banking, as it is supposed to lead to a lower dependency on 
regional economic conditions. Bernanke (1983, p.259), for example, argues 
that a country with mostly small, independent banks such as the US is more 
vulnerable to bank failures than countries with only few large banks such as 
Britain and France. Historical evidence suggests that bank failures in the US 
have indeed been more common than in Europe.40
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4. Market imperfections and transaction costs: factors determining 
the mode of cross-border entry
In this section I consider the question why a financial services firm chooses 
multinationalisation rather than other forms of cross-border entry to reap the 
benefits from competitive and locational advantages. The existence of a 
special competitive or locational advantage of the potential multinational is 
not a sufficient condition for FDI, as was stressed by Hymer (1960, p.48). An 
alternative method to exploit the benefits of these advantages would be to 
operate through the market rather than use internalisation. Thus, a firm 
could export its product or service, sell a license to a firm in the foreign 
market or strike a strategic alliance.
The decision between arm's length transaction and multinationalisation 
depends on an assessment of market transaction costs. In this context the 
need for an integrated approach to trade theory and the theory of FDI 
becomes apparent once again: it is possible to re-interpret firm-level and 
locational advantages as a 'micro foundation' of trade theory. At the firm 
level either one of these advantages must hold for international trade to 
occur. W hether the firm chooses to exploit these advantages through 
exporting or multinationalisation therefore depends on market transaction 
costs.
I now discuss the relative merits of each means of cross-border entry in 
order to make predictions about the most likely route of entry given the 
firm's objectives.
40 Jaffee (1989) reports the following average annual failure rates for US banks (excluding 
thrifts): 1950-59: 5 annual failures, 1960-69: 6 failures, 1970-79: 8 failures 1980-84: 38 failures, 
1985-88: 172 failures. This illustrates the dramatic increase in bank failures in the US over the 
past ten years. In most European countries, on the other hand, bank failures are a rare 
occurrence. Going back further in time Schwartz (1986) shows that between 1790 and 1930 the 
US had bank panics in 14 years, while Britain had eight and France and Italy each had four 
years of bank panics. Bordo (1986) shows that between 1870 and 1933 twenty bank crises and 
panics occurred in the US, but none took place in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden and 
Canada.
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4.1. Exporting versus FDI: the decision between cross-border provision of 
services and multinationalisation
Cross-border provision of financial services as a form of 'exporting' may be 
conceivable where the services sold through the market do not require 
personal proximity between customer and supplier. This is the case in the 
market for large enterprises and multinational firms which have significant 
international activities. It is conceivable, for instance, that a large German 
firm entertains a banking relationship with a London-based American 
investment bank if this bank has greater expertise in certain financing 
techniques or advisory services such as M&A or possesses greater placing 
power in the bond market than German banks operating in the same 
market.41 In particular, for highly specialised services such as equity issues or 
reinsurance activities personal proximity is no immediate requirement.
The financial services firm will prefer opening a foreign branch or 
subsidiary over exporting only if the reduction in transaction costs outweighs 
the cost of foregoing possible scale and scope economies arising from 
centralisation. A cross-border relationship is more likely to occur in 
specialised services rather than covering the whole range of corporate 
banking services, however, as relationship banking requires much contact 
and communication which is difficult to achieve across borders.
In retail financial services, however, there may be significant transaction 
costs associated with cross-border provision of loans in particular for personal 
and small corporate customers. Three stages of a loan can be distinguished 
(Llewellyn, 1989): the acquisition stage, the raising of the required funds and a 
monitoring phase. Domestic institutions have a natural advantage in the first 
and third stages, as they are provided with an extensive branch network. 
Foreign banks, however, face significant transaction costs in particular 
concerning monitoring activities on a cross-border basis. Cross-border 
provision of loans is therefore unlikely to become significant in the retail 
financial services sector.42
For a foreign firm successfully to enter a domestic retail market, it may 
therefore be necessary to establish some form of presence in the domestic 
market or alternatively to establish a cooperative agreement with a domestic
41 The American investment bank Goldman Sachs, for example, for a long time serviced the 
German market by ' exporting' from its London European headquarters rather than opening a 
branch or subsidiary in the German market. It still managed to secure a leading position in the 
M&A market.
42 An exam ple of cross-border lending, however is that of the Germ an Rheinische 
Hypothekenbank. The bank has actively penetrated the Spanish market where it sells up to 
DM100 million in new mortgage financing. As it does not (yet) have a branch in Spain, the 
responsible official flies to Spain, sells the mortgage and returns to Germany. As a bank 
official describes it: "margins in the Spanish mortgage market are so high that they actually 
cover such a fairly uneconomical way of servicing the market and still leave a handsom e 
p r o f i r .
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institution. This results from the fact that the vast majority of services 
requires advice and personal interaction. In the insurance sector, for example, 
retail customers require close contact to an agent who handles claims. 
Similarly, in the area of payment services customers require a sufficient 
number of outlets for gaining access to their funds. Such outlets are usually 
provided by the branch network but, in principle, could also be provided by a 
cooperating bank or an ATM network in the host country. In addition, recent 
advances in communication technology such as 'home banking' may 
facilitate the interface between customer and bank and reduce the number of 
routine transactions requiring personal interaction between customer and 
service provider.43
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive mass retail financial services 
being provided on a cross-border basis, as communication expenses and 
language barriers raise transaction costs and preclude successful market 
penetration on such a basis. In the financial services market for small and 
medium enterprises personal interface is even more important, as banks 
have to monitor their loans by analysing the firms' financial performance 
which appears prohibitively costly on a cross-border basis.
In the high net worth individual (HNWI) market, cross-border 
provision of services may play a more significant role, as the size of financial 
transactions increases and transaction costs therefore become less significant 
as a proportion of the total amount. In addition, individual country or firm 
advantages such as tax considerations or accumulated know-how in 
specialised activities rise in significance and may make cross-border 
transactions more feasible.44
While exporting is feasible in some areas of financial services, licensing 
is much less common. This may be due to the lack of patent protection and 
the resulting possibility of immediate product imitation. As was argued in 
the previous section, the main types of special advantages which induce
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43 In the US, for example, the limitations on cross-border branching induced an early 
introduction of technology-intensive distribution methods. Santomero (1990) observes that as 
banks attem pted to expand their geographic markets "telecommunications and electronics 
began to replace brick and mortar as a delivery system of retail products". An example of such a 
non-branch based distribution system are the brokerage firms Dean Witter and Charles 
Schwab which are able to undercut competitors since they rely on electronic distribution 
systems rather than a high fixed costs branch network. Similarly, Bryan and Allen (1988) note 
that in 1975, 44 percent of non-mortgage based debt was branch-based, whereas in 1985 this 
proportion had fallen to 32 percent
^  In practise, we observe a higher degree of cross-border provision of services in the HNWI 
market. In particular, banks in 'tax havens' such as Luxembourg or the Channel Islands and the 
'trad itional' HNWI country Switzerland advertise in the international media for their 
investment, advisory and fund management services which almost always require a significant 
minimum financial amount on the part of the customer. Frequently, these banks service their 
clients through their home base rather than host country subsidiaries and therefore this type 
of service qualifies as exporting rather than multinationalisation under our definition.
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cross-border entry in financial services are of an intangible nature such as 
know-how or accumulated expertise. Markets for trading know-how do not 
work well, however, as noted by Teece (1982). This may explain why licensing 
or other direct market transactions are practically non-existent in financial 
services even though they are more common in other service industries 
such as advertising or hotels.
In summary, cross-border provision of services is confined to play only a 
marginal role in retail financial services, since the vast majority of services 
require at least some degree of interaction between supplier and customer.
4.2. Cross-border majority acquisitions versus de novo entry
De novo entry is a common form of entry in the market for wholesale 
financial services where it is usually characterised by the setting up of 
branches or subsidiaries in the major financial centre of the host country. In 
the first phase, mostly corporate customers from the home country are 
served and multinational companies with whom the bank already has a 
business relationship in the home country. After a period of settling in, a 
branch will usually attempt to establish a relation with the largest local firms.
In retail financial services, however, de novo entry is frequently 
considered unfeasible due to prohibitive entry costs and the time-consuming 
process of building up a reputation. However, while de novo entry may be a 
slower way of entering a foreign retail market, it is not the case that there is 
necessarily a prohibitive cost disadvantage compared to incumbents. This 
results from the fact that the relevant costs for incumbents are opportunity 
costs, rather than accounting costs. Nevertheless, the scope of de novo entry 
is limited especially when switching costs are high and consumers are locked 
in' with their current suppliers (see next chapter). In addition, de novo entry 
is more time-consuming, as expertise and special know-how need to be 
accumulated through a gradual learning process.
Firms may have to pay a wage premium both to current employees who 
require wage supplements for working in a foreign country, as well as for 
employees recruited in the host country who may demand a premium if job 
security is lower for foreign firms than for domestic institutions due to 
greater risk of failure.
In contrast, acquisitions have the advantage that the firm is already 
established in the market and has local expertise. Employees of the acquired 
bank are likely to have accumulated significant know-how and have 
therefore moved up on the learning curve. This may be a significant 
advantage where learning constitutes a significant part of establishing a 
position in a different operating environment. This is likely to be the case in 
areas such as credit worthiness evaluations where intimate knowledge of 
domestic legal and accounting rules, the economic environment, as well as 
payment habits are essential for risk and return assessments. Similarly,
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accumulated know-how with the actuarial distribution of claims provides a 
significant asset in insurance which can only be secured through acquiring an 
established insurer. There may even be cultural factors which domestic firms 
are more aware of than foreign institutions and where they have a 
competitive advantage. One of these factors in retail financial services is that 
domestic consumers may simply prefer a domestic 'brand name' to a foreign 
supplier.
Caves (1982) argues that due to these factors acquisitions are 
characterised by lower risk but also by lower return than de novo entry. 
While the lower risk stems from the established position of the acquired 
company, the lower return is a result of efficiency in the market for cross- 
border takeovers. In this market, firms are valued according to their 
fundamental underlying value to a potential acquiror and thus acquisition 
prices represent the net present value of the future income stream. Hence, 
there is no such thing as a 'bargain' in the market for cross-border 
acquisitions, as current acquisition prices reflect the discounted future 
value.45
In addition to being competitively priced, acquisitions have the 
drawback that they may bring with them significant costs of integrating or, if 
necessary, restructuring the acquired firm. This problem may be particularly 
severe for the case of cross-border transactions where the acquiring firm has 
to deal with a different corporate culture and economic environment.46 
There may be substantial control loss where the new owner has to operate at 
a distance. Such control loss is examined by Williamson (1967) who 
formalises the earlier intuition of Coase (1937) that as a firm gets larger, there 
may be managerial diseconomies due to increasing organisational 
complexity. Williamson finds that the further the distance of headquarters 
from the actual level of production (such as retail outlets in banking), the 
greater the dilution of managerial control. This may provide an explanation 
why cross-border acquisitions present special integration problems as 
organisational complexity rises.
Control loss in large (multinational) organisations can be reduced by 
choosing an organisational form which reduces such problems. Drawing on 
the historical analysis of the development of business structure by Chandler
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value. For instance, competitive bidding between potential acquirers may drive up the 
acquisition price. In addition, there is a considerable degree of asymmetric information on the 
part of acquirers which have difficulty correctly assessing the 'true' underlying value of the 
acquisition target.
46 Kreps (1990) argues that corporate culture serves an important strategic function in building 
up a company reputation by influencing employees behaviour and serving as a signalling 
device to clients and business partners. Odagiri and Hase (1989) list problems in combining two 
different corporate cultures as a main reason why mergers and acquisitions have not been as 
popular in Japan as elsewhere.
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(1962), Williamson (1975) cites the M-fonn as an organisational structure 
which economises on internal transaction costs. The M-form is characterised 
by a decentralised structure where a number of cost and profit centres exist 
within the firm which are managed by headquarters which sets both the 
incentive structure and performs a monitoring and capital allocation 
function. Williamson (1985, p.283/284) notes that:
"the M-form structure removes the general office executives from 
partisan involvement in the functional parts and assigns operating 
responsibilities to the division ... Not only is the goal structure 
altered in favor of enterprise-wide considerations, but an improved 
information base permits rewards and penalties to be assigned to 
divisions on a more discriminating basis, and resources can be 
realloacted within the firm from less to more productive uses. A 
concept of the firm as an internal market thus emerges".
Applying this M-form framework to the multinational financial 
services firm implies that foreign subsidiaries and acquisitions do not need 
to be fully integrated. Rather they can be run on a divisionalised basis where 
central headquarters sets certain return on capital goals. Williamson notes 
that such an organisational form is similar to the firm as an internal capital 
market. Central control through headquarters remains essential for an 
effective functioning of the M-form. Chandler (1982, p .12) notes from a 
business history perspective that for US firms
"when growth came through mergers and acquisitions, the major 
challenge, in addition to rationalising and reshuffling the activities 
and boundaries of the divisions, was building an effective general 
office".
Thus, it is clearly not sufficient to run foreign acquired subsidiaries on a pure 
market transaction basis but strategic control needs to be exercised by firm 
headquarters. Nevertheless, it seems that foreign acquisitions are most likely 
to be run on an M-form organisational basis which may significantly reduce 
the adjustment and integration costs described by Caves (1982). In addition, 
leaving day-to-day management to local headquarters allows the exploitation 
of local know-how which is unavailable to central headquarters. The M-form 
may be a particularly effective way of organising internal firm transaction 
where the need for integration is low since economies of scale and scope are 
not significant, as is likely to be the case in multinational retail financial 
services.
4.3. Joint ventures
A joint venture (JV) can be defined as a legally independent entity owned by 
two or more parent companies which actively influence the corporate policy 
of the venture. They are a mechanism for pooling complementary assets of 
the parent firms. In the context of cross-border entry we are particularly
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interested in JVs which are set up between two or more foreign firms in a 
host country or those where domestic and foreign firms set up a venture 
together and the foreign firm does so with the strategic objective of entering 
the domestic market.47
A theory of JVs as a form of entering foreign markets needs to explain 
under which circumstances firms choose a joint ownership arrangement 
rather than other forms of cross-border entry such as de novo entry, 
acquisition or contractual arrangements. In the following section I therefore 
focus on the special advantages of JVs in comparison to other entry forms.
Consider first the case of two or more foreign firms which set up a joint 
venture in the domestic country. Alternatively, each firm could pursue its 
own cross-border entry strategy. Why do they choose a JV? As JVs are mostly 
new ventures, one needs to explain in particular why a firm chooses this 
entry form over de novo entry.
One of the main arguments for a JV is that it helps firms to share the 
risk of a new venture. Risk results from uncertainty related to the success of 
the entry decision. Even though a firm may undertake a careful examination 
of the firm-level and locational advantages it possesses in the host market, 
gathers market intelligence and on the basis of this information analyses its 
market potential, there is still a significant element of uncertainty left. This 
results from a combination of imperfect information about the host country's 
operating environment and the unknown strategic reaction of domestic 
incumbents. This uncertainty results in considerable difficulties when 
predicting the demand function over the first few years of operation which is 
manifested in a significant potential variance of operating profits.
By engaging in a joint ownership venture, the firms are able to reduce 
their individual stakes and therefore limit their risk. For a risk-averse 
management the reduction in the return on investment of a smaller stake 
may be more than compensated for by the reduction in associated risk. 
Balakrishnan and Koza (1989) argue, however, that JVs are a less efficient 
means of reducing risk than what could be achieved in the capital market. 
Specifically, they claim that firms would always have the option of raising 
capital at a risk-related rate and since investors are able to diversify their 
portfolio more efficiently than firms, this should be the preferred option for 
risk reduction. They conclude that "as purely risk sharing arrangements, 
firms should reject joint ventures" (p.5).
Whether or not this argument holds depends to some degree on the 
definition of risk. Especially, if we follow a broad definition of risk the capital 
market may be a less efficient means of sharing risk. To see why, consider the
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competitive effects of horizontal JVs where firms are direct competitors. Bresnahan and Salop 
(1986) analyse the competitive effects of a cross-border joint venture between GM and Toyota.
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following argument: as was explained above, risk of the cross-border entry 
decision arises due to uncertainty about the future market potential in the 
host market. At the heart of the uncertainty lies imperfect information about 
the host country's operating environment etc. Thus, the capital market can 
only imperfectly estimate the entrant's chances of success and will likely add 
a risk premium to the 'normal' cost of capital.48
If the joint venture with a domestic firm helps to reduce such 
uncertainty it contributes to a risk reduction which cannot be achieved by the 
capital market, as the information which the domestic firm possesses is not 
reflected in the risk-related cost of capital of the foreign firm.
This argum ent can be reframed in terms of an intangible assets 
explanation of JVs. I have defined JVs as a means of bringing together 
complementary assets. In combination, these assets may be worth more than 
valuing them separately. This is the synergy theory of explaining JVs (e.g. 
Hennart, 1988).
JVs face stability and steering problems where parent firms have 
differing objective functions. This may result in free-rider problems where 
one parent firm tries to reap the benefits of the venture by gathering know­
how, for example, while not contributing to the venture in the same way.49
A particular problem of JVs in the services sector is the apportioning of 
the customer base, once the JV is to be split up. Unlike in industrial JVs 
which are targeted at developing products, for example, JVs in the service 
sector are burdened by the fact that one of the aims of the venture is to build 
up a customer base and to lock in' these customers. When a services JV is 
dissolved, therefore, one partner usually buys out the other participating 
firms.
4.4. Strategic alliances and cooperation agreements
Cooperative agreements and strategic alliances, just like joint ventures, are 
an intermediate form of organisation between markets and hierarchies. A 
strategic alliance shall be defined as an explicit, medium- or long-term 
agreement between at least two firms to co-operate in a range of activities. 
This definition is very similar to Goto's (1982) definition of business groups
48 See Poitevin (1989) who presents a model where the financial market knows the marginal 
costs of incumbents but has only prior probabilities about the entrant's marginal costs. Such 
uncertainty in financial markets makes entry more difficult, as incumbents can pursue a strategy 
which lets the entrant go bankrupt. See also Benoit (1984), Brander and Lewis (1986) and 
Martin (1989).
49 Kogut (1989), however, reports data on factors which tend to influence JV stability and finds 
that R&D ventures (which tend to be know-how intensive) are more likely to be stable than 
other ventures in the area of marketing and distribution, for example.
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as "coalitions of firms pursuing their common interests through a system 
which coordinates decisions made by member firms". Such agreements may 
be supported by mutual minority share holdings. We can distinguish 
multilateral cooperation groups where three or more firms agree to cooperate 
in certain areas from bilateral strategic alliances with only two cooperating 
partners. Similar to joint ventures, cooperation groups have the advantage 
that they allow the pooling of complementary assets. However, their main 
distinguishing characteristic from a JV is the lack of incorporation of a 
separate legal entity in which the parent firms hold equity stakes. Rather, 
allied firms transact directly and not through means of the JV.
The choice between a cross-border acquisition and that of a strategic 
alliance can be framed in terms of a transaction cost analysis between arm's 
length contracts and integration. At the heart of any strategic alliance is a 
long-term contract which regulates the details of the agreement as well as 
possible pay-offs and incentive structures. An acquisition, however, is 
characterised by conferment of residual rights of control over the target's 
assets to the acquirer. Possible incentive problems for the case of integration 
(i.e. cross-border acquisitions) are analysed by Grossman and Hart (1986). They 
observe that ownership, as distinct from an alliance, for example, has the 
benefit for the acquirer of getting a greater share in residual profits and being 
able to freely exercise property rights. However, there are also costs attached 
to integration arising from the fact that the acquired firm's top management 
has a lower share of the residual income stream and thus a lower incentive 
to invest in specific assets.50
As is well known from the transaction cost literature, long-term 
contracts face problems of opportunistic behaviour due to bounded 
rationality and impacted information and may lead to underinvestment in 
specific assets (Williamson, 1989; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).
If two mainly domestic firms have entered an agreement to serve each 
other's customers in their respective home markets then there is little threat 
of breach of agreement, as neither firm has the opportunity to entice away the 
client in the cooperating firm's home market. If, on the other hand, both 
firms are already multinationalised and have a sizeable presence in the 
cooperating firm's home market then a strategic alliance is an unlikely 
outcome. This reasoning suggests that strategic alliances are more likely to be 
struck between medium-sized firms, since the largest firms may become or 
may already be direct competitors.
Kay (1991) argues that the completion of the internal European market 
should increase export and cross-border M&A activities, whereas cooperative 
agreements such as JVs and strategic alliances are likely to decrease. This 
results from the fact that with the reduction of barriers to cross-border entry a
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'go-it-alone approach' becomes easier and there is therefore a reduced need 
for cross-border cooperation with another firm. In addition, as competition 
increases on a European scale, firms become more reluctant to share 
information with other firms who may become potential competitors in the 
near future. Kay also presents some evidence that the share of JVs as a 
proportion of total cross-border entry activities has fallen most recently in the 
manufacturing sector.
In the financial services sector, however, this reasoning does not 
necessarily apply. As will be argued in the next chapter, significant barriers to 
cross-border entry persist. In addition, cross-border provision of services is 
unlikely to account for a high proportion of cross-border activities especially 
in retail services. Thus, the scope of cross-border entry vehicles in financial 
services is reduced. Cross-border collaborative activities are therefore 
substantially more attractive than in manufacturing industries and for many 
firms which lack the necessary financial resources to pursue an extensive 
acquisition programme to be the only feasible cross-border entry route.
5. Conclusions
In this chapter I have developed a theory of cross-border entry activities in 
the retail financial services sector. A brief review of traditional trade theory 
focuses on comparative cost differences as the main explanatory factor of 
international activities. However, trade theory while serving as a first 
approach to the question of cross-border penetration, throws up as many 
questions as it answers. In particular, a firm-level approach to the theory of 
cross-border entry is needed in order to reveal the sources of possible capital 
and labour productivity differences.
Such a firm-level theory is developed on the basis of the eclectic theory 
of multinational enterprises which builds on an analysis of corporate-level 
competitive advantages transferable to foreign markets and locational 
factors which may induce cross-border entry. The firm-level analysis builds 
on a scrutiny of the economic functions of banks and insurers. In principle, 
foreign banks can perform exactly the same functions as domestic banks but 
they may suffer from cost disadvantages due to a reputation which has yet to 
be established, a lower position on the learning curve and fewer transactional 
relationships which makes the basic intermediation function more costly. 
Similarly, foreign insurers face cost disadvantages, as they may not be able to 
perform the risk pooling function as effectively as large domestic firms due to 
the operation of the law of large numbers. In addition, foreign firms have 
less experience with risk assessment and may face reputational dis­
advantages.
In order to compensate for such inherent cost disadvantages foreign 
firms need some competitive advantage which they can transfer to the 
foreign market. It was argued that the follow-or-lead the customer hypothesis
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is not only applicable to the largest corporate customers but applies equally to 
medium and small-sized firms and even to some extent to personal 
customers who travel extensively across Europe. Similarly, product know­
how resulting in learning economies can be transferred to foreign markets at 
low marginal costs.
Among locational factors which may induce cross-border entry, high 
oligopoly profits in foreign markets may be particularly significant However, 
expectations of incumbents' reactions are crucial in determining the 
attractiveness of foreign markets. This question is further discussed in the 
next chapter. Moreover, diversification across several national markets can 
achieve risk reduction at constant returns if these markets are less than 
perfectly correlated.
Concerning the mode of entry, it was argued that cross-border provision 
of services will play only a marginal role in retail financial services, as the 
vast majority of services require at least some degree of personal interaction 
between customer and supplier. De novo entry faces the problem of building 
up a distribution and customer network entirely from scratch. In retail 
financial services, acquisitions or strategic alliances are therefore likely to be 
the most likely entry routes. While large firms are likely to prefer 
acquisitions, medium-sized institutions may opt for alliances due to lack of 
financial resources to undertake a large-scale acquisition prgramme and a 
lower degree of competition across national borders. Joint ventures are an 
intermediate form of entry between de novo and a strategic alliance and 
therefore face both advantages and problems of these two entry forms.
Theory of Cross-Border Entry
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Chapter Four: 
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry 
in European Retail Financial Services
In a single European financial services market with no entry barriers we 
would expect price and efficiency differences to be eliminated by foreign entry. 
In practise, however, there are a range of entry barriers in the retail financial 
services sector.1 Generally, one can distinguish between regulatory barriers to 
cross-border entry and market- or industry inherent entry barriers.2 While the 
former are attacked by the internal market programme, the latter are likely to 
persist and remain largely unaffected by regulatory efforts towards market 
integration.
Generally, several sources of potential entry barriers have been identified 
in the literature. In his classic work on entry barriers, Bain (1956) focuses on 
the ability of incumbent firms to raise price above long-run average costs 
without inducing potential entrants to enter an industry. He defines the 
maximum entry-forestalling price (or limit price in modern parlance) as the 
highest price a firm can charge without inducing entry.
Bain's definition encounters a number of operational and theoretical 
problems, however: to determine the limit price, it is necessary to make 
assumptions about post-entry strategic behaviour and so the limit price 
depends crucially on entrants' expectations about the incumbent's reactions, 
which in turn may be influenced by the incumbent through building up a 
reputation of 'fighting' entry.3 In addition, expectations are dependent on the
1 The importance of entry barriers in retail financial services is pointed out, but not further 
analysed by Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990, p.299) who query whether "barriers to entry in the 
retail and small-firm area (will) persist and be sufficient to deter foreign institutions from 
acquiring a substantial part of the national markets".
2 In addition, there may be managerial barriers to cross-border entry which may stem from a 
lack of internationally experienced personnel, know-how, limited ambition or unrecognised 
opportunities. See Schroath and Korth (1989) for an attempt to explain the lack of foreign 
entry activities of US insurers by such managerial barriers.
3 Consider a market with two players: a potential entrant and an incumbent monopolist who 
has the option of fighting entry or to co-operate. In his 'chain-store paradox' Selten (1978) 
shows that the only perfect Nash equilibrium in a finitely-repeated game occurs where entry 
and co-operation take place at each stage. This results from a simple application of backward 
induction, as it does not pay to fight entry in the final repetition of the game. However, 
Selten's result depends crucially on the assumptions of complete and perfect information, such 
that players have full information on the game tree structure, pay-off functions and players' 
previous moves. Relaxing these rather unrealistic assumptions, one can show that it may pay a 
firm to fight entry in the first few stages of the game to gain a reputation of 'being tough'. To
credibility of the threat: for example, if it is more profitable ex post for the 
incumbent to share the market with the new entrant by co-operating, then 
the threat to fight entry may suffer a credibility problem. We see that Bain's 
definition, while having the merit of relating market structure to conduct, 
encounters operational problems.
A different definition of entry barriers is given by Stigler (1968): he 
focuses on asymmetries in cost and demand conditions between an 
incumbent firm and a potential entrant and defines an entry barrier as a cost 
of production "which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an 
industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry".4 Thus, any 
competitive advantage of incumbents relative to potential new entrants must 
be considered a barrier to entry, whereas no such barrier exists if both face 
identical cost and demand conditions.5
Stigler's definition is again different from the preceding ones, since it 
focuses on market asymmetries. Consider cross-border entry in financial 
services: in contrast to Demsetz, Stigler would not consider prudential 
regulations a barrier to entry if these have to be met both by incumbent banks 
and potential entrants. However, if an Irish bank has to incur substantial 
communication costs to offer banking services to Continental customers, it 
clearly operates at a cost disadvantage compared to local institutions. This 
would be considered a barrier to entry by Stigler, but not by Demsetz and Bain 
(if pricing is competitive).
Each of the major potential sources of barriers to entry are now analysed 
for the financial services sector. The focus is hereby placed on barriers to cross- 
border entry in the EC, rather than entry in general, although some issues are 
obviously identical.
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obtain this result, Kreps and Wilson (1982) employ the assumption that there is a small but 
positive probability that "there may be a short-term benefit from a fighting response" (p.256). 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) account for an arbitrarily small but positive probability that "a 
simple behavioural rule guides the actions of the established firm" (p.285) such as, for 
example, always fighting entry even if a negative pay-off results. Under both assumptions it 
can be shown that building up a reputation of fighting entry may be sufficient to deter further 
entry in subsequent stages (see Phlips, 1988, p.204-18 for a more complete discussion).
4 Von Weizsäcker (1980, p.400) adds the requirement that such a cost disadvantage needs to 
imply "a distortion in the allocation of resources from a social point of view". This requires 
explicit modelling of the demand side for a full-fledged welfare analysis of entry barriers.
5 Demsetz (1982) suggests a much stricter definition of entry barriers: he refers to entry barriers 
as government-induced legal restrictions such as, for instance, tariffs or regulations. According 
to Demsetz any public restriction which tends to increase production costs should be considered 
a barrier to entry. For example, minimum capital requirements would be considered an entry 
barrier by Demsetz, but not by Bain, as long as firms compete away supra-normal profits. 
Demsetz' definition stems from a somewhat naive belief in the working of a competitive 
economy, however: he argues that in the absence of government intervention, competition in an 
unregulated market economy will eradicate monopoly rents in the long run and that the only 
persistent obstacle to free entry in a particular market is some form of government restriction.
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1. Regulatory barriers to cross-border entry
As was discussed in the third chapter, foreign entry can take the form of de 
novo entry, acquisition of domestic institutions or some type of co-operative 
agreement. Thus, regulatory restrictions on foreign entry can be differentiated 
according to the mode of entry. Additionally, one has to differentiate between 
entry by EC institutions and entrants from non-EC countries. Entry by EC 
institutions is discussed first.
1.1. Entry by other EC institutions
Official restrictions on de novo entry in banking are non-existent in all EC 
countries, as prudential rules applying to new entry, such as minimum 
capital requirements, for example, do not discriminate between domestic and 
foreign institutions.6 Freedom of establishment is also fully established in the 
insurance sector since 1973 in the non-life and since 1979 in the life sector. 
The PW study therefore comes to the conclusion that already in 1988 "in 
general, there are no overt barriers to the establishment of foreign firms in 
the countries surveyed" (p.8).
Acquisitions of domestic banks, however, are subject to a higher degree 
of regulatory supervision. Official restrictions on acquisitions by foreign 
institutions exist in Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Portugal, where the public 
authorities need to give their consent to such transactions. Even though 
discrimination on the basis of nationality of the acquirer is legally unfounded, 
it can be argued that covert restrictions continue to apply.
An example of overt interference in a cross-border acquisition attempt, 
is the Bank of Spain's intervention in the long-delayed takeover of Banco 
Comercial Transatlantic© (BCT) by Deutsche Bank. As noted by Price 
W aterhouse, foreign acquisitions of banks in Spain are "only granted 
exceptionally and usually for the acquisition of a distressed bank" (p.74). 
Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990, p.295) note that government intervention in 
Spain "seems to be founded in the belief that ... (it is necessary) to prevent 
national banks from being taken over by foreigners". Nevertheless, the 
Spanish authorities did eventually allow some takeovers by foreign banks 
such as Deutsche Bank's eventual acquisition of BCT or Credit Lyonnais' 
purchase of Banco Comercial Espanol.
6 In Spain foreign banks were mostly limited to having no more than three branches but several 
exemptions were granted to foreign banks wishing to operate in the retail market. All 
remaining restrictions were phased out by 31 December 1992. In Italy some minor limitations on
the range of services and territorial expansion of foreign banks existed and conveyed an 
incumbency advantage to indigenous banks. However, the deregulation of branching restrictions 
in 1989 reduced this bias. All remaining restrictions are eliminated by the Banking passport7 of 
the Second Banking Directive, as discussed in chapter two.
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In Britain an example of overt public inteference is the 1981 takeover 
attempt of Royal Bank of Scotland by Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSB) 
which failed due to an intervention by the Bank of England on regulatory 
grounds.7 Finally, in France, a similar willingness of public regulators to 
intervene against foreign acquisitions can be observed. The Bank of France 
and the Ministry of Economy have the possibility of intervening in any 
foreign share acquisition where the stake exceeds 20 per cent of outstanding 
shares.8
In practise, acquisition of domestic banks may therefore be subject to 
substantial resistance from the regulatory authorities, the more so, the larger 
and more significant the target bank. This resistance of domestic authorities 
against foreign takeovers is probably less pronounced in the insurance sector.9 
Such regulatory intervention in banking is usually justified on industrial, 
monetary or competition policy grounds. First, industrial policy concerns may 
arise because large banks can have substantial influence on domestic industry 
through cross-participations and direct shareholdings, as well as their ability 
to monitor individual firms' business policies. Therefore, the government 
may prefer to keep the banking industry under domestic ownership to be able 
to exercise greater influence on management.
Secondly, since banks are the main channel for the operation of 
domestic monetary policy, public authorities may resist against these 
institutions 'falling into foreign hands'. It is far from clear, however, why and 
how foreign-owned banks should transmit monetary policy measures any 
differently from domestic institutions. Moreover, monetary policy becomes 
more rather than less effective if there is greater competition in the deposit 
and loan markets induced by the entry of foreign banks. This results from the 
fact that in a price-rigid market the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy 
is reduced through lack of interest rate response by banks who may collude to 
keep loan rates high and deposit rates low. Fine-tuning through monetary 
policy means is therefore made easier if greater competition forces domestic 
institutions to respond to changes in public interest rates.10
7 In a takeover attempt of Midland by HSB in 1992 the Bank of England does not seem to 
interfere.
8 Franks and Mayer (1990, p.209) note that in the industrial sector "it is thought that the 
French government has delayed takeovers by foreign firms while a Trench solution' has been 
sought" Even some French academics cannot refrain from giving advice on how "to solve the 
problem" that private French banks can be subject to foreign takeovers (e.g. Artus, 1990, 
recommends to increase the share of institutional investors).
9 As the example of Generali's takeover attempt of Compagnie du Midi illustrated where 
Generali ended up taking only a minority shareholding.
10 For the case of Italy, for example, the OECD comments that "the effectiveness of monetary 
policy is also impaired by the financial markets' lack of responsiveness to the impetus 
imparted by monetary policy. This is reflected in the fact that when money market rates
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Thirdly, a separate set of competition policy issues is raised if a potential 
foreign acquiror is publicly owned. It has been argued that public ownership 
may result in a competitive advantage in the target bank's market due to 
cheaper funding sources of the publicly owned bank. In particular, the UK 
Industry and Trade Ministry pursued a tough line on planned acquisitions in 
the UK market by French publicly-owned banks which was only abandoned 
after a threatened investigation by the Commission of the EC on grounds of 
discriminating against foreign acquirors.11
Explicit or covert regulatory restrictions are likely to continue to exist, 
even after the Second Banking Directive is fully implemented, since it 
provides scope for domestic regulators to oppose acquisitions by foreign firms. 
More specifically, Article 11 determines the rules of acquiring a "qualifying 
holding" in a credit institution. First, the acquiror needs to inform the 
domestic authorities of any propsed acquisition and a change in the stake it 
holds in the institution exceeding 20%, 33% and 50%. The competent 
regulatory agency is then given three months to decide whether it will give 
its permission to the acquisition "in view of the need to ensure sound and 
prudent management of the credit institution". While this procedure applies 
to both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, it may leave potential scope 
for covert - though not legally founded - discrimination against foreign 
acquirors.
In practise, however, overt regulatory barriers to cross-border entry are 
not likely to pose a significant barrier. Perhaps more important are entry 
barriers which result from domestic regulations applying equally to domestic 
and foreign banks and are therefore not targeted at restricting foreign entry, 
but nevertheless constitute de facto regulatory barriers.12 An example of this 
kind of entry barrier is the French policy of subsidising loans to particular 
sectors of the economy, including agriculture, housing and exports. As de 
Boissieu (1990, p.10) notes "traditionally, the financing of the French economy 
has been effected largely through subsidised interest rates" and these loans 
still accounted for 42 per cent of total credit granted to firms and households 
at the end of 1987. For foreign entrants into the market for loans, it is 
therefore essential to have equal rights to grant credit at subsidised rates. In
change, banks adjust their interest rates only slowly and to a limited degree" (OECD, Economic 
Survey on Italy, 1990, p.51).
11 This concerns in particular the acquisitions by Credit Lyonnais which were referred to the 
MMC even though the Office of Fair Trading had no objections on competition policy grounds. In 
the case of Credit Lyonnais' attempted acquisition of credit-card processor Signet the delay 
caused by the MMC investigation was charged to have caused Signet to be acquired by 
American Express Company (see Financial Times, 11 June 1991).
12 The PW study only lists "differences in licensing, minimum capital and solvency 
requirements and territorial restrictions {which) may make some EC countries less attractive 
than others for foreign bankers" (p. 80). All of these barriers will either be harmonised or be 
subject to mutual recognition after 1 January 1993.
112
the allocation of subsidised loans, however, the government may decide to 
favour domestic banks over foreign-owned institutions.13 A second example 
of such hidden barriers to cross-border entry stemming from domestic 
regulations is the privilege of the French Post Office bank, savings banks and 
mutual banks to offer tax-free passbooks, so-called A and Blue passbooks. This 
privilege not granted to either domestic or foreign commercial banks confers 
a significant competitive advantage in the retail sector.14
In the insurance sector, the PW report also finds little discrimination of 
foreign insurers: "insurance appears to be similar to the banking sector in that 
established foreign and domestic insurers are treated in a homogeneous 
manner, with there being little in the way of open discrimination." However, 
there may be similar implicit entry barriers which arise from regulations 
which are not directly aimed at erecting foreign entry barriers but 
nevertheless make foreign entry more costly. An example from the insurance 
sector is rate regulation in Germany which raises premiums above 
competitive levels and requires insurers to pay out excessive profits to 
customers. Due to this ex post pricing practise new (foreign) entrants cannot 
tell their customers the effective prices charged for the insurance cover, as 
they only learn actual prices after at least the first period of operation. New 
foreign entrants therefore face a significant entry barrier, as they are unable to 
quote exact prices for their products (Outreville, 1990).
One may argue that entry barriers for foreign firms rise as the regulatory 
intensity in the target country increases. In insurance, for example, the level 
of regulatory intervention seems highest in Germany. For this country, 
Finsinger and Pauly (1986, p.4/5) note that "the sheer complexity of the 
regulatory review process, the thousands of written and unwritten rules, 
forms to be filled in ... can only be learned by doing". In particular, they 
observe that in Germany "firms must learn how strictly regulations must be 
observed, how they can be circumvented etc. until a new firm is on equal 
footing with the old experienced ones". These barriers will change, however, 
with the entry into force of the third generation EC Insurance Directives, as 
was discussed in chapter two.
These examples illustrate that domestic regulations which are not 
explicitly aimed at restricting foreign entry may nevertheless constitute a 
significant barrier to foreign entry. Such covert barriers appear more
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
13 Such subsidisation runs contrary to Articles 92 and following of the Treaty of Rome concerning 
state aids and shall therefore be discontinued in the future.
14 Hemot and Levy-Lang (1990, p.92) report that such tax-free passbooks account for more than 
eighty percent of outstanding passbooks in 1987. The original economic policy objective of these 
tax-free passbooks is not to deter foreign entry (even though this may be a side effect), but to 
finance long-term low-interest loans for low-rent housing institutions (habitations à ¡oyer 
modéré). However, they are likely to be either discontinued or extended to all banks in the 
future.
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important than remaining regulatory entry barriers in the financial services 
sector.
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1.2. Entry by non-EC financial services firms
Entry by non-EC institutions is subject to a different regulatory regime than 
intra-EC entry, as the principles of the Second Banking and Insurance 
Directives concerning mutual recognition and home country control do not 
apply. Instead, the Second Banking Directive, the Second Non-Life Directice 
and the Motor Insurance Directive contain 'reciprocity' provisions which call 
for "effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to 
undertakings from that third country". As the insurance reciprocity 
provisions closely follow those of the Second Banking Directive, I discuss 
reciprocity in the context of banking.
EC financial institutions report any difficulties when entering non-EC 
m arkets to their national authorities which inform the Commission 
accordingly. The Commission may then be given a mandate by the Council to 
open negotiations with a third country whenever that country "is not 
granting Community credit institutions effective market access comparable to 
that granted by the Community to credit institutions from that third country" 
(Art. 9 (3)). As a possible sanction, the Commission may impose (temporary) 
restrictions on market entry by credit institutions from the country 
concerned.15
To avoid repeated scrutiny by the domestic authorities of market access 
in a third country whenever a financial institution from this country wishes 
to enter, the Second Banking Directive applies the principle of home country 
control in a somewhat modified version to non-EC entrants: once such an 
institution has been authorised to operate in at least one EC country, it may 
enter any other Member State without requiring further authorisation from 
the host country's authorities. Initial authorisation, however, requires that 
the reciprocity provisions are fulfilled. These reciprocity provisions do not 
apply to subsidiaries of non-EC institutions which are already established in 
the EC by the end of 1992, however, as these enjoy an identical status to EC 
institutions through a 'grandfathering' clause in Article 9 (4) Para.4 which 
exempts already authorised institutions from repeated authorisation.16 This 
grandfathering clause may explain the rapid increase in international entry 
and acquisition activities by non-EC institutions (see chapter 6), aiming to 
establish a foothold in the EC market to avoid possibly more stringent 
reciprocity rules after 1992.
15 These need to be approved by the Council after a three months period; Art. 11(3).
16 For branches of third country enterprises, however, the reciprocity provisions do not apply, 
as they remain sole responsibility of each Member State. Accordingly, the single European 
passport does not apply to branches authorised by one Member State.
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Whether or not reciprocity will constitute a significant entry barrier for 
non-EC institutions depends to a large extent on the way the Commission 
enforces the reciprocity provisions. If they are subjected to a strict 
interpretation then the Commission could challenge the separation of 
commercial and investment banking in the US and Japan, for example, since 
no comparable restrictions exist in most European countries. Personal 
interviews at DG15 of the Commission, however, revealed that no such 
intentions exist. As the Vice-President of the Commission, Sir Leon Brittan 
(1991, p.3) clarified "there will be no grounds for {the Commission} to seek 
sanctions against a country which treats foreign banks no less favourably than 
native ones and offers genuine market access to them". This concerns in 
particular the separation of commercial and investment banking in non-EC 
countries which will not be challenged by the Commission. It is also unlikely 
that the delegation of insurance licensing in the US to the state rather than 
the federal level as imposed by the 1945 McCarran Ferguson Act will be 
challenged under the reciprocity provisions.17 Nevertheless, the reciprocity 
provisions give the Commission considerable bargaining power when 
negotiating over market access with third countries. Apart from obvious cases 
where market access of foreign firms is explicitly limited by quantitative or 
qualitative entry barriers, the Commission can also address the de facto 
discrimination of EC institutions in countries with no overt barriers to 
foreign entry.18
To summarise, the reciprocity provisions in the EC Banking and 
Insurance Directives constitute first and foremost a bargaining tool for the 
Commission to negotiate full market access in third countries rather than 
serving the purpose of constituting an actual entry barrier in the European 
Community for non-EC banks.
1.3. Cross-border acquisitions and the lack of a market for corporate control in 
European financial services
It has been argued by the Commission of the EC that in a single European 
market there must be equal opportunities to undertake acquisitions across 
national borders in order to be able enter foreign markets. Currently,
17 However, restrictions by some US states concerning foreign insurers are likely to be 
challenged. These include states which do not allow the operation of foreign insurers which 
are partly or entirely owned by the government (e.g. New York) or which impose additional 
deposit and capital requirements on foreign insurers.
18 In personal discussions, Commission officials have dted Turkey as an example where there 
are no overt barriers but where it may take up to three years to obtain the required banking 
license. That the Commission already uses this bargaining power becomes obvious in the speech 
by Sir Leon Brittan before the American Chamber of Commerce (1991, p.4/5) where he lists a 
number of requirements concerning market access and in particular a full grandfathering 
provision for established EC banks in the US.
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however, there is a conspicuous absence of such a level playing field for cross- 
border takeovers in the EC. This may have distortionary competition effects 
w hen establishing the internal m arket, since it provides unequal 
opportunities for firms entering other European m arkets through 
acquisition. In May 1990, the Commission therefore announced a set of 
measures aimed at reducing barriers to cross-border acquisitions, by proposing 
a common set of directives for takeover regulation in the 13th Company Law 
Directive (COM, 823, 88), as well as various amendments to existing 
Directives.
The corporate control view of takeovers is due to Alchian and Kessel 
(1962), Marris (1963)19 and Manne (1965). The view that acquisitions occur in 
order to replace an inefficient management of the target firm is currently 
probably the most influential theory of explaining domestic industrial M & A 
behaviour, in particular in the US and Britain.20 Is this approach equally 
applicable to cross-border acquisitions in a service industry such as banking or 
insurance however? Additionally, does the corporate control theory apply to 
takeovers in Continental Europe where hostile bids are still mostly 
unknow n?21 If these transactions serve to discipline and replace inefficient 
management and thus help to move resources to their highest-valued use, 
then this may call for a supportive public policy to reduce barriers to cross- 
border acquisitions.
Generally, cross-border takeovers compete with other devices aimed at 
replacing an inefficient incumbent management. These are, for example, 
replacement of operating managers by the board of directors, exerted pressure 
by main creditors or influential shareholders (e.g. the government, other 
banks, institutional investors, individual shareholders with a large stake) or 
simply a vote by shareholders in the annual meeting. In particular, however, 
cross-border takeovers 'for control' compete with domestic takeovers aimed 
at gaining control of an inefficiently run firm.
If we assume that foreign acquirers suffer from a cost disadvantage 
compared to a domestic bidder or that managerial inefficiencies are more 
likely to be detected by a domestic firm rather than a foreign observer, then it
Marris (1963, p.189) noted that "any firm which refused to maximise the welfare of its 
shareholders would instantly be taken over".
20 For the United States, Varian (1988) states that "it is generally agreed that such 
(acquisition) activities are primarily a manifestation of the 'market for corporate control'." 
Similarly, Phlips (1989) notes that the idea that acquisitions are the outcome of the market 
for corporate control "has gained widespread acceptance" and that "all in all, mergers 'for 
monopoly' have become mergers 'for corporate control'."
21 France is the only Continental European country with some significant hostile takeover 
activity (six bids in 1988). These have led the French President Mitterand to warn against 
"gangsterism and the law of the jungle" (Le Monde, 14 February 1989). In Germany, only two 
hostile takeovers attempts have occured so far (Feldmühle and Continental) and both have 
failed.
116
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
would be impossible that a cross-border takeover takes place for control 
reasons alone, since domestic firms would always be first to take over an 
inefficiently run institution.
Let us take a closer look at the possible sources of cost disadvantages of a 
foreign acquirer. These may stem from several sources, for example:
• Takeover-related fees: advisors such as investment banks, lawyers or 
consultants usually charge higher commissions for foreign than for 
domestic acquisitions.
• Organisational restructuring: incumbent management needs to be 
replaced by a new team either from the acquiring firm or recruited in the 
target country's labour market. If close knowledge of the domestic 
market environment is essential for effective management then a 
foreign acquirer unfamiliar with local customs and tastes may be at a 
disadvantage.
• Search and information costs: the costs of searching and detecting 
managerial inefficiencies in foreign markets may be higher than in 
domestic markets. Managers may be less well-informed about the quality 
of managers of foreign firms due to information impactedness (possibly 
severed by language barriers) and bounded rationality (impossibility to 
monitor managerial performance of a vast number of potential foreign 
targets).
• Regulatory and institutional barriers to foreign takeovers: fo re ign  
bidders may be subject to a different regulatory regime than domestic 
transactions or may be disadvantaged due to cultural bias (e.g. preference 
to sell to domestic acquirer,22).
Nevertheless, there may be factors which tend to reduce these cost 
disadvantages. First, a foreign acquirer may, for example, appoint managers 
from its own ranks who are experienced in the market of the target firm and 
familiar with the local business environment. If it does not command over 
such suitable staff itself then it may be able to recruit personnel familiar with 
the local business environment in the target managerial labour market.23 If 
the managerial labour market is fairly competitive in the sense that the 
foreign acquirer does not have to pay a wage premium only because he is 
foreign, then he may be able to compensate any cost disadvantage which 
stems from a lack of knowledge with the target market by recruiting suitable 
managers.
22 See section one above.
23 This strategy was frequently pursued by Japanese banks entering foreign markets.
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Second, consider the cost disadvantage due to higher information and 
search costs of a foreign bidder. One could argue that in the European 
Community, where a vast number of specialised information services exist, 
there is no a priori reason to expect that information about managerial 
inefficiencies should cross national borders only at a cost premium. In 
particular, with continuing market integration and 'Europeanisation' of 
competition in financial services in the context of the internal market 
programme, managers will be more likely to look beyond national borders to 
search for inefficiently run banks which constitute prime takeover targets.
Third, the regulatory, institutional, or cultural bias towards domestic 
transactions requires closer scrutiny of the legal and institutional framework 
in the EC countries which exceeds the scope of this study. Let it suffice to note 
at this point that since the corporate control view of takeovers is usually 
associated with the phenomenon of the hostile tender bid and these are 
largely confined to the Anglo-Saxon countries, some authors have concluded 
that the 'corporate control' theory of acquisitions is not relevant to other 
European countries, such as Germany or France, for example.24 One may 
dispute, however, whether the market for corporate control is really inactive 
in the Continental European countries or just takes a different form than in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries.25
To summarise, it was argued in this section that the threat of cross- 
border acquisitions may well impose a disciplining constraint on incumbent 
management even though barriers to cross-border takeovers especially in the 
Continental European countries contribute to a lack of a level playing field 
for cross-border takeovers. The biggest obstacle to cross-border acquisitions in 
the financial services market remains unaffected by the legislative efforts on 
part of the Commission, however: that of public ownership of financial 
services firms in some EC countries, in particular banks. This is discussed in 
the next section.
24 For example, Fairbum and Kay note that "the market for corporate control is active in 
Britain and the United States ... but in most industrial countries - even ones with a developed 
stock market, such as Japan, France, Germany, or Switzerland - the hostile takeover bid is 
legally impracticable or virtually unknown in practice" (1989, p.28).
25 An inefficient management may be replaced through other measures than the hostile tender 
bid. In particular, large shareholders such as institutional investors or family owners may 
exert considerable pressure on the incumbent management to change corporate policy or push 
them into resignation (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Whether or not hostile bids are required 
to replace an inefficient management therefore depends on the relative efficacy of these 
alternative replacement mechanisms (for a comparative analysis of the market for corporate 
control in France, Germany and the UK, see Franks and Mayer, 1990).
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1.4. Public ownership of financial services firms
A question which deserves particular attention in the context of entry barriers 
is that of public ownership. In the EC countries less than half of the largest 
162 banks are privately owned.26 It follows that only few banks can become 
subject of a cross-border acquisition attempt. In addition, it is frequently 
argued that publicly owned banks enjoy cheaper funding costs and other 
regulatory advantages over their privately owned competitors, since their 
liabilities are explicitly guaranteed by the government. Thus, does public 
ownership constitute a significant competitive distortion in the single 
financial market?
Table 4.1 presents evidence on the structure of ownership, average size 
and two performance measures for the largest 162 EC banks.
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
Table 4.1 Ownership, size and performance of largest 162 EC banks in 1988
Type of 
Ownership
Proportion Mean
Assets*
Pre-tax
ROA
Pre-tax
ROE
Capital/assets
ratio
Private 43% 32.6 0.77% 16.4% 4.8%
Public** 41% 26.9 0.61% 14.3% 3.7%
Co-operatives 9% 35.9 0.89% 17.3% 5.2%
Mutuals 7% 9.0 0.81% 14.8% 6.1%
* in ECU billion
* * central or local government ownership 
Source: The Banker, 1 /89, p.39.
The table illustrates the large number of banks owned by national or 
local governments. It shows that a corporate control market can only operate 
for less than half of the largest banks in the EC, due to the closed ownership 
structure of publicy owned banks, mutuals and cooperatives which constitute 
57 percent of the largest 162 EC banks. Publicly owned institutions are slightly 
smaller in terms of mean assets than private banks and co-operatives. In 
particular, however, they are characterised by lower profitability, both in 
terms of return on assets and equity, and are not as well capitalised as non- 
publicly owned institutions. This may be surprising considering the popular 
claim that publicly owned companies have access to cheaper funding sources 
than private firms due to the advantages of government borrowing.27 These 
result from the lower risk premium which the market attaches to public as 
compared to private loans, due to the lower risk of insolvency.
26 Unfortunatly, no comparable data are available for the insurance sector.
27 Vickers and Yarrow (1988, chapter 2) note that differences in the objective functions of 
owners may explain differences in performance. Publicly owned institutions may have the goal 
to maximise general economic welfare rather than maximising profits.
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In general, it is not clear whether public ownership leads to changes in 
the objective function of bank management. As is stressed by de Boissieu
(1990) for the case of France, for example, whether or not nationalisation or 
privatisation leads to changes in banks' objective functions depends crucially 
on the extent and effectiveness of 'moral suasion' of the central bank and 
other regulatory agencies (e.g. the Finance Ministry). Nevertheless, it is 
recognised that public ownership may confer competitive advantages on the 
bank. When discussing the weak pre-BIS rules capital ratios of French banks, 
Metais (1990, p.144) acknowledges that "their public ownership status 
probably more than compensated for the risks presumably attached to their 
lower capital ratios".
Publicly-owned banks can also pursue unconventional methods of 
boosting capital in order to meet the BIS guidelines and the EC Solvency 
Directive. French Credit Lyonnais, for example, engaged in an intricate series 
of 'financial engineering' manoeuvers which include the issue of shares to 
other state-owned enterprises.28 It is difficult to determine whether or not 
publicly-owned banks enjoy cheaper capital costs due to such 'engineered' 
capital injections, as details of the deals are hardly ever available. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that publicly-owned banks enjoy the advantage 
of being provided with capital at non-market rates.
2. Market-inherent barriers to cross-border entry
2.1. Economies of size
2.1.1. Scale economies
Bain (1956) argued that if scale economies are present, the potential entrant 
faces a predicament: coming in at a level below the minimum efficient scale 
(MES) results in a cost disadvantage compared to incumbents. If, however, a 
level above the MES is chosen the new entrant may contribute significantly to 
total industry output so that prices and profits fall - possibly even below unit 
costs so that a loss results. Since the incumbent also makes a loss, however, 
we need to know the strategic interactions between the firms to predict who 
will be squeezed out. Economies of scale would not be considered a barrier to 
entry under Stigler's definition if entrant and incumbent face the same cost 
and demand conditions. This results from the argument that the entrant only 
has to match the incumbent's scale of activity to be on equal terms and 
therefore no competitive disadvantage exists.
28 Credit Lyonnais was injected with fresh capital by the Caisse de Dépôts and exchanged 
shares with state-owned Rhône-Poulenc and Thomson-CSF resulting in a total capital increase 
of FF9.8 billion (Alexander and Shreeve, 1991).
120
In addition to posing a potential barrier to cross-border entry, economies 
of scale play a significant role in the EC internal market programme. For 
example, the Price Waterhouse study (1988, p.20) claims that "the expanded 
market opportunities presented by an integrated European financial services 
market would enable prices to fall below existing lowest prices, as economies 
of scale are exploited" (emphasis added).
For single-output production, scale economies refer to decreasing long- 
run average costs, as the scale of activity increases. In the case of a 
multiproduct firm, scale effects are defined either as ray economies or 
product-specific economies.
Ray economies of scale measure cost behaviour of a proportionate 
output change as the composition of the output bundle remains unchanged.29
For a multiproduct output vector Q, ray average costs are defined as C (aQ) /
a , where a  is a scalar of the level of output. Ray economies of scale are then 
defined as
(1) S r = C ( Q )  I ¿  Q' MC.
i=l
where Sr greater, equal or smaller than one implies increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale.
To measure product-specific scale economies, Bailey and Friedlaender 
(1982) introduce average incremental costs (AIC). For the two-product case 
these are defined for each product as follows:
(2) A1G = C ( Q i, Q2) - C( 0 , Q2) I &
i.e. average incremental costs for the first product are total costs less the costs 
of not producing commodity 1, divided by its output (analoguously for the 
second good). Product-specific returns to scale are then given by:
(3) Si = A lC i ( Q)  f MO
Again, & greater, equal or smaller one implies increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale.
What are the potential sources of size-related cost reductions in financial 
services? Two main sources can be distinguished: 'production' and financial 
scale economies. Production scale economies refer to the case of spreading
fixed costs such as research or technology expenses over a larger scale of
activities. Even though most banks have a research department, the costs of 
these are hardly comparable with R&D expenditures in other industries.
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
29 See definition 3 of Baumol (1977, p.811) and definition 2 of Panzar and Willig (1977, p.484).
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Expenses on new technology, such as setting up a central processing 
departm ent or acquiring computer systems, may be substantial, but are 
unlikely to provide a major source of cost advantages.
Financial scale economies may be more significant in banking than 
production economies. These result firstly from diversification advantages: 
generally, as the scale of activity increases, the bank can diversify across risky 
assets and liabilities, and thereby reduce the variance of earnings at a constant 
level of expected returns. For example, as the number of depositors increases, 
the variability of withdrawals is reduced and proportionately fewer liquid 
reserves need to be held. Conversely, a larger scale of activity may lead to a 
reduction in the variability of returns at a constant level of risk. This may 
allow the bank to increase its leverage. An additional aspect which may lead 
to cost advantages for larger banks is some kind of de facto guarantee of the 
central bank that large institutions are not allowed to fail to avoid a financial 
crisis. This may allow larger banks to pursue riskier strategies, achieving 
higher returns.30
In the insurance sector financial scale economies may result from the 
operation of the law of large numbers, as a larger number of independently 
distributed risks leads to a lower variance of claims which allows the insurer 
to charge lower premiums. Possibly even more importantly, insurance firms 
invest large amounts of assets in the capital markets. Again, there may be 
diversification advantages for larger insurers. Additionally, a large insurer 
may enjoy a lower probability of failure than a smaller one and may therefore 
be able to earn a higher return on the invested funds in the capital markets.
Empirical evidence on scale economies is almost non-existent for 
European banking, contrasting with myriad studies available for the US.31 
The question whether economies of scale actually exist in the US banking 
sector is far from settled, however, due to different methodological 
approaches to estimating cost functions econometrically. First, one has to 
define what it is that banks actually 'produce'. While some authors (e.g. 
Sealey and Lindley, 1977) consider deposits to be an input factor which 
combined with labour and physical capital produce loans as an output, it 
seems preferable to include deposits as an output rather than as an input. 
This results from the fact that services for depositors constitute an important 
element of labour and capital costs (Humphrey, 1991). Banking output should 
therefore include deposit services such as current and savings accounts, time 
deposits, fund management and payment services.
Related to the definition of banking output is the definition of the cost 
variable. While some studies consider only operating costs such as labour and 
physical capital (e.g. Nelson, 1985), others include interest expenses. Interest
30 This moral hazard problem is discussed in section two of chapter two.
31 See Clark (1988) for a recent review of the US literature.
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expenses usually exceed actual operating costs and include the cost of 
purchasing funds in the interbank market as well as interest paid on deposits. 
As Humphrey (1990) shows, purchasing funds is to some extent a substitute 
for deposits gathered through a retail network and since the latter causes high 
operating costs whereas the former does not, estimates of scale economies 
which do not include interest expenses in the cost variable tend to be biased 
towards banks with a greater proportion of purchased funds. Thus, it seems 
preferable to include interest expenses in the cost variable.
A third critical issue is the specification of the cost function to be tested. 
Most early studies have used a simple log-linear Cobb-Douglas function (e.g. 
Benston, 1965; Bell and Murphy, 1968) and can largely be disregarded as this 
specification is not able to capture a U-shaped cost curve but pre-supposes that 
returns to scale are identical across the whole range of activity levels. More 
recently, the Cobb-Douglas specification has therefore been replaced by more 
general translog functions which avoid this strong assumption and are also 
better able to capture scope effects (see below).32
Most US studies do not find evidence for significant economies of scale 
in banking, w ith more recent studies even providing evidence for 
diseconomies beyond a certain activity level (e.g. Athanasios, Subhash and 
Miller, 1990). Typically, the cost function estimated displays a U-shaped form 
with most major size economies exhausted at a capital size of around $50 
million (e.g. Berger et al., 1987; Mester, 1987).33 A similar result is obtained in 
the few European studies: Dermine and Roller (1991), for example, use data 
for the French mutual funds industry and find that economies of scale are 
relevant only for small institutions with total assets of up to FF2.9 billion and 
diseconomies setting in for larger firms. These empirical results seem to 
confirm the conclusion of the theoretical discussion that scale economies are 
exhausted at a fairly low level of firm size.
The empirical evidence on the relative insignificance of scale 
economies strangely contrasts with the practitioner's view on the importance
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
32 See Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) for the first application of the translog cost 
function.
33 One needs to differentiate between small and large banks. The inclusion of small banks is 
likely to distort results, as they enjoy a number of regulatory advantages under US law. These 
include the fact that deposit insurance premiums are collected on all deposits and not just on 
insured deposits, such that small banks which depend almost exclusively on insured deposits 
are effectively subsidised by larger banks which pay premiums also on uninsured deposits. In 
addition, larger banks hold more non-interest bearing reserves, since reserve requirements are 
graduated and, finally, most consumer protection laws have explicit exemptions for small 
banks, reducing the regulatory burden. Most of the available US evidence is based on FCA data 
which does not include the larger banks with deposits above $1 billion. Hunter and Timme 
(1986), Shaffer (1988), and Hunter et al. (1990), however, focus on large banks and find more 
significant evidence for scale effects.
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of sufficient size to compete successfully, however.34 In particular in the US, 
where the empirical evidence on the relative insignificance of scale effects 
seems strongest, there have been a range of large-scale mergers with the 
stated objective to reach bigger scale to be able to cut costs.35 A similar 
economic rationale based on size economies was given for the domestic 
mergers in Spain and the Netherlands, where it was argued that domestic 
banks needed to be "of sufficiently large size to compete effectively in the 
European internal market" (see section 4.1 below). According to the empirical 
evidence on scale economies, however, such 'mergers for size' seem to be ill- 
founded.36
In the insurance sector, there have been fewer studies on the existence 
of scale economies and these have so far not led to a clear picture. Again, the 
majority of early studies can largely be disregarded, since they use the 
restrictive Cobb-Douglas production function. Similarly to the banking 
studies, there is some disagreement as to the right output measure of the 
insurance firm (see, for example, Homstein and Prescott, 1989; O'Brien, 1991). 
This debate seems less fundamental, however than for banking: the most 
common output measure is premium income (either gross or net of 
reinsurance), while some authors have argued in favour of "total claims". In 
a recent study on scale economies, however, Suret (1991) using the translog 
production function shows that results are virtually identical using either 
output measure.
Suret (1991) finds significant scale economies in the Canadian 
property/liability sector only for medium-sized firms with assets between $40 
and $100 million. Prosperetti (1991) finds evidence for scale economies in the 
Italian non-life sector, while Kaye (1991) also finds modest scale economies 
for the UK life insurance industry. According to her regressions, the rate of 
the increase in average costs to premium income is 92 percent. Finally,
34 For example, The Economist reports an estimate that a merger between any two big US banks 
may lead to cost savings of 30 percent, due to pooling of computer systems, as well as merging or 
closing directly competing branches (see 'Big-bank mergers', The Economist, 26 January, 1991, 
p.86).
35 These include the 1991 mega-mergers between Manufacturers Hanover/Chemical Bank, 
NCNB/C&S Sovran and Security Pacific/Bank America. In the latter merger cost savings are 
expected to result from redundancies, branch closures and the combination of computer systems. 
All these measures are thus targeted at cutting fixed costs and thereby reduce operating costs 
for a given level of output, i.e. they are founded on the belief that scale economies are 
significant.
36 Of course, the significance of scale effects depends to a certain extent on the type of market in 
which the bank operates. In wholesale banking, for example, a larger scale of activity may 
manifest itself in a wider international branch network which could lead to a stronger 
competitive standing with large multinational firms. Since most empirical studies have so far 
looked at 'traditional' banking activities such as deposit-taking or consumer and commercial 
loans, but do not consider other activities such as capital-intensive foreign exchange 
transactions or technology-intensive credit card or electronic fund transfer systems they cannot 
be generalised to these areas.
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Fecher et al. (1991) examine the French insurance industry and find for a 
sample of 84 life and 243 non-life firms that scale economies are present in 
both sectors even though being comparatively modest in size. A comparative 
study of several countries by Imfeld (1991) finds scale economies for the 
Dutch non-life sector but not for the German non-life sector. As a tentative 
conclusion, we can state that there is some evidence for the significance of 
scale economies in the insurance sector. Cost advantages resulting from size 
seem modest at best, however.
Possibly most interestingly, all studies find significant differences in 
terms of average costs between firms of the same size. Imfeld (1991) shows 
that average costs as a percentage of premiums range from 5 percent to 65 
percent for firms of the same size in several countries examined. Prosperetti
(1991) shows that in the Italian insurance sector this figure ranges from 15 to 
110 percent. Similarly in the banking sector, Berger and Humphrey (1991), 
stratifying banks according to size, find that cost differences among banks in 
the same size cluster are significant and may average up to 34 percent.
These results suggests that efficiency issues may be much more 
important than previously thought. Thus, a firm which is large may at the 
same time be inefficient and therefore have lower profits than a highly 
efficient small firm. It seems that profitability in financial services has much 
less to do with pure size than with internal efficiency. This implies that 
entrants should not face significant entry barriers resulting from pure size 
advantages which they could not compensate by an efficient cost structure.
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2.2.2. Scope economies
As financial services typically involve multiproduct services, we also need to 
consider economies of scoped Formally, these are defined as follows: let Qb be 
an output vector of i = products. A cost function is then called strictly 
sub-addititive if
(4) C< ¿ Q .) <  £ C ( Q .)
1=1 1=1
n
for all Q such that £  Q. > 0. In a two product case, economies of scope exist 
i= 1
for a strictly sub-additive cost function if
(5) C ( Q i, Q2) <C( 0 , Q i ) + C(Q2,0)
37 See Panzar and Willig (1982) for a short account on scope economies and chapters 3 and 4 of 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) for a more general treatment.
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where C (0,  Qi)  and C (Q2, 0 ) are called stand-alone costs.38 This implies that 
the cost of jointly offering services Qi and Q2 is smaller than offering them 
separately. A measure of scope economies is thus given by:
(6) S c  = C(Qi,0) + C ( 0 , Q 2 ) - C ( Q i, Q 2 ) I C ( Q i,Q2)
Scope economies in financial services may derive from several sources:
i.) Shared inputs: common inputs may be utilised more efficiently when 
applied to various products, avoiding excess capacity. This applies particularly 
to spreading fixed costs, for example from maintaining a retail branch or 
agent network which enables firms to distribute a range of financial services, 
or computer systems which may be used to support various financial 
analyses.
ii.) Intangible assets: a special case of shared inputs are intangible assets such 
as managerial know-how, brand loyalty or reputation.39 Managerial and 
employee know-how, for example, is probably the most important input 
factor in financial services with labour costs constituting by far the largest 
contributor to a firm's operating costs. It is likely that know-how can be 
transferred at little costs to new products or services.40
iii.) Marketing economies: Another category of scope economies exist in the 
marketing and distribution area. Customers may prefer to acquire a range of 
financial products all from one institution, rather than maintaining 
relationships with a number of service firms, since 'one-stop shopping' saves 
on transaction costs such as transportation and communication expenses.
iv.) Diversification: similar to the case of scale economies, financial services 
firms may be able to reduce risk by diversifying across different activities and 
by matching the maturity of assets and liabilities.41
In retail banking where customer-supplier interactions are frequent, 
personal customers may prefer to purchase a range of products such as 
various payment services, portfolio management services or loan 
arrangements from the same institution. It follows that financial institutions
3® See Willig (1977).
39 Informational economies are another example of an intangible asset: for instance, Gilligan et 
al. (1984) note that credit analyses of bank customers with current and/or deposit accounts are 
less costly than for 'unknown' loan applicants.
40 Prescott and Visscher (1980) scrutinise firms' investment in 'organisational capital' which 
consists of personnel information (i.e. knowledge about the abilities of employees), matching of 
employees to form optimal teams and investment in human capital through training, for 
example.
41 For example, foreign exchange risk in foreign loan activities can be hedged by forward 
options.
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entering this market have to come in at a sufficiently diversified level to 
compete effectively with incumbents.
As Teece (1982) points out, however, these factors alone are not 
sufficient for necessitating internal organisation, but must be complemented 
by transaction costs when using the market. If, for example, contractual 
agreements could be devised to exploit the presence of scope economies then 
firms may as well use the market instead of internalising transcations. As is 
stressed by Teece, however, markets for trading intangible assets such as 
special know-how, for example, are riddled with market failures and thus 
reaping the benefits stemming from these sources may require internal 
organisation. This does not necessarily apply to other shared inputs such as 
the retail branch or agent network, however, where contractual agreements 
are conceivable and actually practised in reality.42
The empirical evidence on scope economies in banking is limited to US 
studies and as yet somewhat contradictory: Murray and White (1983), Gilligan 
and Smirlock (1984), and Kim (1986) all find evidence for the existence of 
significant cost complementarities. Berger et al. (1987), however, scrutinise a 
sample of US banks with less than $1 billion in deposits and do not find 
evidence for scope economies. A similar insignificant result is found by 
Hunter et al. (1990) who apply the same methodology to a sample of the 
largest 400 US banks and Mester (1987) who analyses a sample of Savings & 
Loan Associations.
In the insurance sector, Suret (1991) finds no evidence for cost 
complementarities or scope economies in the Canadian property/casualty 
sector. To the author's knowledge no other studies exist on scope economies 
in insurance.
Negative results do not necessarily imply that scope economies are 
insignificant, however: Berger et al. (1987) note that scope effects arising from 
marketing and diversification economies, while revenue-enhancing, may not 
immediately feed through to the cost function. Statistical estimates of the cost 
function are therefore likely to underestimate the long-term effects of scope 
effects, as the effects on revenue are only insufficiently captured. Thus, it may 
be the case that the cost function actually displays diseconomies of scope, 
while profits increase as the number of products increases because the 
revenue-enhancing effect outweighs the cost increase.
Economies of scope may serve to explain an observed trend towards 
universal banks, with formerly specialised banks expanding their line of 
activities. Similarly, the recent increase of banks selling insurance products 
could be explained by scope economies, as banks have established customer
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
42 Such as in a distribution alliances, for example, where a bank distributes insurance products 
for a (foreign) insurer through its retail branch network.
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relationships, as well as employees with financial expertise who do not 
require as much new training as novices to the field.43
Scope economies encounter clear limits, however: as the number of 
services offered increases, economies of specialisation are foregone, due to 
bounded rationality on the part of employees or limits on the possible 
complexity of the organisation.44 In addition, it is not dear that internal 
organisation is required to reap the benfits of scope economies. Alternatives 
are joint ventures or co-operative agreements with other financial 
institutions which offer complementary products. Which of these alternative 
means of organisation is chosen depends on an appraisal of transaction costs, 
as was discussed in chapter 3.
2.2.3. Some evidence on the size/profitability relation for European banks
The lack of evidence on scale and scope economies for European banks 
mainly stems from the scarcity of detailed data on cost structures which is 
more readily available in the US. I have therefore chosen to test the more 
general hypothesis that size is positively correlated with profitability. This 
approach has the obvious drawback that it is not able to pin down the source 
of differing profitabilities and therefore gives no insight into the relative 
significance of scale and scope economies and differing degrees of market 
power. It has the advantage, however, that it is able to capture size advantages 
stemming from revenue-related scale effects. Consider, for example, a retail 
bank which takes into account customer transaction costs when maximising 
profits. M aintaining a large branch netw ork reduces custom ers' 
transportation costs and may therefore enhance revenue although adding to 
costs. Thus, a profit-maximising bank which takes customer transaction costs 
into account may appear to have higher costs than a bank which solely 
minimises costs. Only if we analyse the relation between size and profits are 
such revenue-related scale effects captured. Thus, the hyothesis tested in this 
question is whether larger banks enjoy greater profits, where size is measured 
in both capital and assets.
I assembled a sample of the largest 173 EC banks from the biggest 1000 
banks worldwide and calculated two correlation coefficients. Table 4.2 reports 
the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for each of eleven EC 
countries45 and one-tailed significance tests.
43 In addition, informational economies may play a significant role since banks can monitor 
current account movements to check on the selling potential of insurance business.
44 This point is already discussed in Coase's seminal paper (1937): Coase notes that "as a firm 
gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of 
organising additional transactions within the firm may rise". It is also referred to as the 
'Penrose-effect', as Penrose (1959) focused on diminishing returns of adding additional 
management to a firm.
45 Ireland has only two banks among the top 1000.
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Table 4.2: Size/profitability correlation for largest 173 EC banks
n cap/
POC
ass/
ROA
Belgium 10 -0.34 -0.44
Greece 5 -0.93 0.32
Germany 31 0.58*** 0.37*
UK 16 -0.4 -0.46
France 17 -0.25 -0.26
Spain 27 0.15 0.33*
Italy 30 -0.09 -0.5
Luxemb. 5 -0.88 -0.96
Netherl. 8 -0.11 -0.28
Denmark 15 0.43 0.53*
Portugal 9 0.31 0.09
EC total 1173 | 0.03 | -0.04
Variables:
n: number of observations; cap: tier-1 capital; ass: total assets; POC: profits on capital; ROA: 
return on assets.
Significance levels:
* 5%-level; ** 1%-level; *** 0.01% level.
Source: compiled from top 1,000 banks listing in The Banker, July 1990.
At the country level, the correlation between capital and profits on 
capital is significant only in Germany. A similar correlation between asset size 
and returns on assets leads to a significant relationship for Germany, Spain 
and Denmark.46 In other countries such as the UK, France and Italy, size 
seems to be negatively correlated with profitability, i.e. smaller institutions 
are on average more profitable than their large counterparts. I also ran some
simple OLS regressions of the form POC = a + (JCAP and ROA = a  + f3ASSETS 
for each individual country. These regressions largely confirmed the results 
of the correlation analysis. Only for Germany was there a statistically 
significant relationship between POC and CAP with the following regression 
equation: POC = 855 + 0.002CAP where the t-statistic for the coefficient was 
3.81 which is significant at the 0.1 percent level (R-Square: 33.4). There was 
actually a negative relationship between ROA and ASSETS for the case of the 
UK, statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and for Greece between POC 
and CAP significant also at the 5 percent level (R-Square: 86.4). For all other
46 These results show a more significant relationship between size and profitability than found 
by Steinherr and Gilibert (1989). This may be due to their smaller sample size and their choice 
of correlation coefficient (Spearman rank instead of Pearson).
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EC countries, there was no statistically significant relationship between either 
size measure and ROA and POC respectively.
These results suggest that the predicted higher profitability of large 
institutions stemming from size advantages does not hold for most European 
countries. Smaller banks should therefore not be at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their larger rivals. In addition, attempts by public 
authorities to make domestic financial institutions more competitive by 
supporting large-scale mergers seem to be misguided and are even likely to 
achieve exactly the opposite result considering the integration problems 
which inevitably result from a merger.
Even where size effects may be important such as in electronic 
distribution and processing systems, it is not clear that they necessarily 
constitute a potential source of entry barriers if public policy ensures market 
access at reasonable prices. Rather than resulting from size economies, entry 
barriers are more likely to arise from the established position of the 
incumbent having build up a reputation or from switching costs which lead 
to customers being 'locked in' with their current supplier. It is this question 
which is analysed in the next section.
2.2. Reputation and switching costs
An incumbent firm may enjoy a competitive advantage over a potential 
entrant due to consumer preferences for the incumbent's products or services 
as a result of product differentiation.47 This may arise, for instance, if there is 
an established 'brand loyalty': a firm may have earned a reputation of 
supplying good quality with its service products and following a prudential 
strategy when managing its assets. A new entrant still has to prove that its 
service quality is superior or at least equal to the incumbents' services. In 
addition, new entrants first have to demonstrate that their solvency is 
sufficient to cover possible liquidity problems. An established reputation may 
allow the incumbent to charge above unit costs without inducing entry, since 
entrants have to incur higher selling expenses or are only able to sell their 
products at a price discount. Thus, the incumbent enjoys an absolute cost 
advantage until entrants have established their services on equal terms.48 
Building up a reputation, however, is a time-consuming process and
47 According to Chamberlin (1933, p.56) products or services are differentiated if "any 
significant basis exists for distinguishing the goods (or services) of one seller from another". In 
particular, Chamberlin stresses that product differentiation may stem from intangible factors 
such as the location of a branch or agent, "the general tone or character of the establishment", 
or the specific relationship between banker/agent and customer.
48 Product differentiation also impacts competition between incumbents: Martin (1989) shows 
that a higher degree of product differentiation leads to a higher probability of non- 
cooperative collusion being sustainable ceteris paribus, as it reduces the incentive to depart 
from such an equilibrium.
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therefore the initial extra costs for establishing itself on the market act as a 
deterrence, the more so the higher the costs and the longer the required 
'break-in' period.
Farrell (1986) formalises this reasoning and shows that in an experience- 
goods industry such as financial services, reputation can become an entry 
barrier when the incumbent has a first-mover advantage. The entry barrier 
will be higher the greater the consumer surplus offered by the incumbent, as 
the first entrant faces a less severe moral hazard problem than succeeding 
entrants who have yet to prove that they offer high-quality services, similar 
to those of the incumbent. This may be difficult where consumers realise that 
an entrant can make a higher profit through 'fly-by-night' entry, i.e. by 
offering a low quality product and then exiting the market once customers 
discover this fact.49
Klemperer (1987b) analyses strategic entry deterrence of incumbents if 
consumers face switching costs when changing suppliers.50 Under these 
circumstances, it may pay the incumbent to sacrifice short-run profits in order 
to build up a customer base, by lowering price in the first period and thus 
'locking in' consumers. In subsequent periods, prices can be increased just 
below the level of switching costs. Incumbents therefore enjoy some degree of 
market power, once they have build up a customer base, even if products are 
completely homogeneous and no other barriers to entry and exit exist. Farrell 
and Shapiro (1988) show that in an overlapping generations model with 
Stackelberg competition, incumbents faced with entry at a price p continue to 
price at p + s where s are switching costs and therefore leave new customers 
to the entrant. This results from the fact that it is more profitable for the 
incumbent to 'm ilk' locked-in customers rather than reduce price to 
competitive levels.
Switching costs may be substantial in retail financial services. First, there 
may be significant search costs of collecting information on prices and quality 
of different offers. Search costs in insurance seem to be greater than in 
banking, as insurance conditions are usually highly specific51 and thus require 
a greater number of transactions with several agents or sales representatives. 
Prices in retail banking are usually standardised and more easily obtainable.52
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
49 Compare the BCCI-scandal where the vast majority of customers did not discover the fact 
that the bank was embezzling funds, however.
50 See also von Weizsacker (1984) who constructs a model where price sensitivity rises, as 
switching costs increase and thus competition between suppliers rises rather than decreases.
51 For example, the price of automobile insurance for a 25-year old male driver with a history 
of two car accidents, driving a 3-year old Fiat with 90 horsepowers.
52 As will be argued in the next chapter, however, it requires detailed information on the 
number of services used to calculate and compare relevant prices, as banking mostly involves 
product bundles rather than individual products.
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Second, actual switching costs result from the transfer of accounts or policies, 
as this process is likely to involve costs including, for example, the need to 
communicate the new banking relationship or insurance policy to business 
partners, redirecting standing orders for the case of banking or the need to 
learn new rules and regulations for making claims in the case of insurance.53 
This results in a potentially significant first-m over advantage of 
incumbents.54
In addition to factual switching costs, there may be 'psychological' 
barriers to changing an established relationship solely as a response to price 
differentials: these result from a possibly year-long personal relationship 
between banker and customer creating an atmosphere of trust and loyalty 
which may be immune to minor price differences. Similarly, an insurer has 
acquired information about the claims history of the insured. Such a year­
long relationship may constitute an informational asset and may lead to a 
situation of asset specifity. Asset specifity results from the fact that the 
information which both sides gain about each other cannot be costlessly 
transferred to another banking or insurance relationship55 and leads to lock- 
in effects, as is explained by Williamson (1981, p.1546):
"The reason why asset specifity is critical is that, once the 
investm ent has been made, buyer and seller are effectively 
operating in a bilateral ... exchange relation for a considerable 
period thereafter".
Casual evidence suggests that banks do indeed follow a strategy of 
attracting new customers in the retail area by offering accounts at below-cost 
prices. An example of such a strategy are the expense-free accounts offered to 
students in most countries. In the UK, for example, students are offered 
various 'incentive packages' by the large commercial banks which not only 
include free account management, as well as cash and credit cards, but also a 
'start-up bonus' of up to twenty pounds. The focus on students and starting- 
out employees reflects the difficulty of acquiring new customers through
53 Switching costs may also result from government regulations. Berghe (1990), for example, 
reports that until very recently some insurance branches required the consumer to sign up for a 
period of 5 to 10 years. See Harris and Schulenburg (1991) for an analysis of the implications of 
search and switching costs in the insurance market.
54 A first-mover advantage may stem from the highly idiosyncratic relationship between firm 
and customer (see, for example, Sharpe, 1990): once the financial services firm has sunk the 
costs of acquiring information about the loan or insurance applicant, it is able to offer better 
terms for a new loan or insurance contract, as it holds private information about the 
characteristics of the applicant which has yet to be obtained by another firm with no previous 
relationship with that particular customer. Thus, financial services firms are able to lock in' 
current customers and exercise a certain degree of market power.
Sharpe (1990) builds a model of the bank-corporate customer relationship where customers 
are "informationally captured', since banks holding inside information about characteristics of 
their customers may exercise ex post market power even if the market is competitive ex ante.
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other forms of competition such as price or quality differentiation. Once these 
new customers have been 'locked in', prices can be raised towards higher 
levels, as switching costs may prevent customers from changing banks until a 
significant price differential is reached. Similarly, insurance companies offer 
rebates for a history of low claims which may lead to lock-in effects if such 
rebates are not fully transferrable to another insurer.56
Switching costs are reduced if products are 'separable' from the whole 
product bundle. This may be the case, for example, for credit cards where 
customers maintain separate accounts with a credit card supplier without the 
concurrent need to shift their whole account to the credit card supplier. 
Similarly, consumer credit can be offered directly by the merchant or dealer 
rather than by a bank. Moreover, switching costs in banking are further 
reduced by the recent trend of personal customers to maintain two or more 
banking relationships which enables them to compare prices more effectively 
and switch to the supplier with lower costs for a particular service.57 In 
insurance it is lot more common to maintain relationships with several 
insurers since the transaction cost savings of purchasing all products from the 
same insurer are significantly smaller than in banking.
In insurance, additional entry barriers may arise for foreign insurers 
where distribution channels are such as to favour long-term transactional 
relationships between customer and supplier which increase switching costs. 
This is likely to be the case where the main distribution channels are 
exclusive agents rather than brokers or non-tied agents. In Germany, for 
example, 79 percent of insurance products are sold by tied agents who work 
exclusively for one insurer and only 16 percent are sold by brokers (Aerthoj, 
1990, p.162). In the UK, in contrast, 70 percent of non-life insurance products 
are sold through brokers, whereas only 18 percent are sold by exclusive 
representatives. Clearly, it is easier for a foreign insurer to enter a market 
where it can induce established brokers to distribute its products rather than 
establishing a sales force or agent network from scratch. This also stems from 
the fact that switching costs are likely to be lower if the customer uses a broker 
mainly due to lower search costs. Even for brokers or independent agents 
there are likely to be cost disadvantages for foreign insurers, however. In 
France, for example, foreign insurers had to pay significantly higher 
commissions to independent agents to induce them to distribute their 
products: commissions as a percentage of premia in 1987 were on average 80 
percent higher for foreign insurers than for domestic firms (Salomon 
Brothers, 1990).
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56 In particular in motor insurance bonus/malus schemes are important which may reduce 
regular premiums by up to 75 percent. Unless such rebates are fully transferrable in case of 
changing the insurer, significant switching costs arise.
57 Large firms entertain several banking relationships and are therefore more likely to be able 
to compare prices for individual products. Even in Germany where the Hausbank principle 
originated, the largest firms on average maintain 19 banking relationships (Greenwich 
Associates, 1988).
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Firms' optimal strategy in the presence of switching costs is to help 
agents reduce switching costs in the 'acquisition' period of new customers and 
increase switching costs, once customers have been locked in. Casual 
observation indicates that financial services firms do indeed follow such a 
strategy: some firms offer sign-up bonuses and help new customers with 
administrative costs of account and policy transfers, while at the same time 
increasing switching costs by offering rebates or charging for account 
closures.58
What are the effects of switching costs on (potential) entry? Klemperer 
(1989) analyses a four-period model of a market with a homogeneous product. 
In periods 1 and 2 the market is served by a dominant firm and fringe firms 
enter in period 3, taking the incumbent's quantity as given. After entry, prices 
fall as new entrants undercut the incumbent to gain market share and the 
incumbent responds by lowering price as well. The special feature of the 
model, however, is that prices rise again in period 4, as new entrants have 
locked in' their acquired customers. Thus, price behaviour follows that of a 
tem porary price war, rather than a permanent reduction in prices. In 
addition, Klemperer shows that when switching costs are small and 
information complete about entry in period 3, firms will engage in limit 
pricing, i.e. lowering prices in period 2 to lock in as many customers as 
possible and to prevent or reduce new entry in the next period.
This model has interesting implications when applying it to the 
financial services market: first, it implies that new (cross-border) entry does 
not necessarily result in lasting price reductions. Instead, a temporary price 
war may be followed by price hikes, as new entrants have 'locked in' 
consumers. Second, in the 'run-up period' to an open market (i.e. period 2 in 
Klemperer's model) domestic incumbents may attempt to lock in customers 
before foreign entry occurs by offering attractive conditions. Such predatory 
behaviour, serving the sole purpose of deterring foreign entry, is difficult to 
detect, however, as price reductions are likely to be interpreted as pro- rather 
than anti-competitive behaviour.59
The presence of switching costs may also affect the strategy of entry 
deterrence of incumbents: as was discussed in chapter one, many financial 
institutions have been invading each others' lines of business, broadening 
the scope of products offered. Thus, firms which traditionally divided the 
market among each other, have now become direct competitors. Generally, 
this broadening of product lines is interpreted as a sign of increasing 
competition in the financial services market.
58 Some banks in Italy charge up to 20 ECU for closing accounts.
59 Price reductions with the sole purpose of locking in customers are unlikely to be detected by 
the Areeda-Tumer test (1975) for predation, as price always exceeds marginal costs (see 
Klemperer, 1989, Appendix 2).
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Does this observed trend towards retail financial services market 
necessarily result in increased competition, however? Klemperer (1990) offers 
an interesting analysis of multi-product competition in the presence of 
'shopping costs' and brand (or firm) loyalty. In the absence of switching costs, 
it is well-established that firms usually act according to the 'principle of 
differentiation', i.e. rather than competing head-to-head (e.g. as integrated 
financial services 'supermarkets'), firms prefer to differentiate products, since 
this allows them to charge higher prices and avoid Bertrand competition (see, 
for example, Shaked and Sutton, 1982 and Neven, 1985).
When consumers face switching costs, however, this result may be 
reversed. Consider the following example: there are two financial services 
firms located some distance apart in a small town. Both firms first decide on 
the range of products to be offered and subsequently on the price charged. 
Two strategies are available to the firms: either to offer the whole 
(undifferentiated) product line ('supermarket' strategy) or to specialise on 
particular differentiated products ('specialist' strategy). If both firms choose the 
supermarket strategy and they are not differentiated in any other respect (such 
as qualification of employees, for example), then consumers will maintain 
relationships w ith one firm only, as location is the only differing 
characteristic.60 If, however, each firm offers a different product range then 
consumers may maintain relationships with both institutions to reap the 
benefits of specialisation. If both players choose the specialist strategy, then the 
incentive to cut prices may be greater than for the supermarket outcome, 
where more customers are 'locked in' with one of the two identical suppliers 
and are therefore less sensitive to price movements in single products.61 
Hence, when firms choose specialist strategies the resulting non-cooperative 
equilibrium may be characterised by lower prices (and profits) than the 
supermarket outcome, since in the latter case the lock in' effect of customers 
is stronger.62 Social welfare, defined as consumer surplus plus industry profits 
is always lower when firms offer identical product lines than in the case of
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
60 See also Shaked and Sutton (1990) who focus on the question which demand characteristics 
lead to a large number of specialised firms offering only few products (such as specialist banks) 
or alternatively to a small number of firms offering a complete product range (universal banks). 
They frame their analysis in terms of an 'expansion effect' defined as the increase in profits 
from introducing a new product, and a 'competition effect' which measures the difference 
between industry's profits under monopoly and competition.
61 In addition, there may be an aggravated informational asymmetry. If consumers have only 
one supplier relationship then they are less likely to be informed about competitors' prices 
than when they have several supplier relationships.
62 Which strategy is more profitable to firms depends on the distribution of shopping costs and 
on consumer preferences concerning product variety (see Klemperer, 1990, p.13-15). A 
supermarket strategy is more profitable if, for example, many customers have switching costs 
which differ at different firms (e.g. one firm has a particular high degree of customer loyalty) 
and which are not so large as to make customers completely insensitive to price changes at 
other suppliers.
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product differentiation or specialisation.63 Therefore, the trend towards an 
integrated financial services market does not necessarily enhance competition 
in the presence of consumer switching costs and significant lock-in effects.
2.3. Strategic entry deterrence of domestic incumbents
The possibility of strategic entry deterrence was already mentioned in the 
previous discussion of switching costs. I now focus on three particular areas 
where entry-deterring strategies may play a significant role.
2.3.2. Domestic consolidation as a means of deterring foreign entry
Faced with the threat of increased foreign entry, a frequently pursued strategy 
by EC financial services firms to adapt to the changing competitive 
environment is to engage in domestic majority and minority acquisitions. 
Domestic concentration and consolidation is seen as an effective way of 
preparing the domestic industry for further increases in competition from 
foreign entrants after 1992. In countries like Spain and Italy it is therefore 
actively supported by the public authorities. In addition, domestic 
consolidation is sometimes rationalised by the 'excessive' number of financial 
institutions in the EC, not viable in a single financial market, as smaller firms 
supposedly lack critical size to compete effectively.64
For Spain, for example, Vives (1990, p.408) notes that in many domestic 
mergers "the government seems to have intervened in the belief that a large 
size is needed to compete in the European market and to avoid takeovers of 
national banks by foreigners". The two largest banks in Spain, Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya and Banco Central Hispanoamericano, were both formed by merger 
with the active support of the public authorities.65
A similar situation exists in Italy where the central bank actively 
supports projected merger plans between various regional banks.66 Over the
63 See Klemperer (1990, p.12).
64 For example, Hawawini and Rajera (1990, p.15) argue that concentration has to increase first 
in domestic markets and subsequently on a European level.
65 For the latter merger, one observer noted that the Spanish economics minister "has long been 
urging the banks to merge to protect themselves from foreign competition and reduce the risk of 
(foreign) takeovers" (The Banker, June 1991, p.7/8). Apparently a stem believer in the benefits 
of scale economies, the minister was also quoted as saying that the banks' size was "totally 
insufficient" for the single European market (ibid.).
66 The governor of the Bank of Italy recently noted that "{banks in Italy} are characterised by 
greater weight of operating costs and medium size. The first Italian bank in the world's top 100 
ranks at 35. There are only three in the the top 50" (as quoted by Lane, 1991, p.16).
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period from 1986 to mid-1988, forty-one mergers and acquisitions have 
already taken place in Italy and this number is expected to continue to rise.67
While official statements of both regulators and public authorities cite 
economic efficiency as the main rationale for increasing domestic 
concentration, an equally plausible economic interpretation is that domestic 
authorities attempt to raise barriers to cross-border entry activities by foreign 
banks. Such entry barriers may result from the fact that a more concentrated 
oligopoly is able to coordinate strategies more effectively to pursue entry- 
deterring strategies.68 Increased domestic consolidation may thus serve to 
deter foreign entry, as a more concentrated domestic oligopoly is likely to 
react more aggressivley the more concentrated the industry (see, for example, 
Kessides, 1990). Alternatively, regulators may merge banks which are 
particularly 'vulnerable' to foreign takeovers into bigger institutions which 
are more difficult to acquire.
As is shown in figure 4.1, the number of such domestic transactions has 
increased substantially, especially since 1986/87.
67 See Bruni (1990). Most mergers have so far been between small banks, however (Onado, 1990) 
The largest acquisition so far was that of Banco di Santo Spirito and 65 percent of Banco di 
Roma by Cassa di Risparmio di Roma in 1991 /92 to form Banca di Roma, the second-largest 
bank in Italy.
68 See Davidson and Denercke (1984), however, who show that if a tacitly collusive agreement 
enforced by trigger strategies is initially unstable then domestic mergers may actually lower 
the probability of collusion being stable. This results from the fact that a domestic merger 
increases the profits which are attainable at the threat point and thus cheating is punished 
less severely, making it more profitable.
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Figure 4.1: Number of domestic acquisitions in financial services in the EC 
Number of
acquisitions
CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate
Source: Report on Competition Policy, EC Commission (1991, p.233); CAGR: own calculations.
Does this rise in domestic acquisitions lead to a rise in domestic 
concentration levels? While several authors report concentration ratios, the 
quoted figures are frequently not coherent. For example, two authors who 
have calculated 5-firm concentration ratios for the EC countries disagree by as 
much as 30 percent for the same country.69 These differences usually result 
from different proxys for market shares, as precise data are seldomly 
available.
In addition to such data problems, one must recognise that the r-firm 
concentration ratio is only an imperfect indicator of effective market power. 
For the case of differentiated products, market power depends not only on 
market share but also on price elasticity, as market power is lower for more 
price-elastic products, as well as expected reactions of competitors who may 
change their output levels more or »less significantly to changes in the 
product's price, and also on the degree of product differentiation, since for 
highly differentiated products the r-firm concentration ratio underestimates 
market power if calculated as a proportion of total rather than effective 
output.70
69 Neven (1990, p.171) calculates a 5-firm concentration ratio of 55 percent for Italy, while 
McKinsey (1990) reports only 25 percent. Since Neven does not reveal the basis of his 
calculations, the reasons for the differences cannot be examined.
70 See Martin (1992). Since financial products are certainly differentiated, concentration 
indices are likely to underestimate effective market power.
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Table 4.3: R-firm concentration ratios for banking and insurance in 1988/89
Insurance Banking
CR3 CR5 CR10 CR3 CR5 CR10
Germany 22 29 42 18 26 41
UK 31 44 60 22 29 35
France 32 45 65 31 45 63
Italy 39 50 65 29 42 68
Netherl. 32 42 60 67 87 n.a.
Spain 33 39 50 27 38 56
Source: own calculations from data in Sigma, 1/1992; OECD; The Banker.
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Concentration in insurance is about the same in the six EC countries 
surveyed in table 4.3 with Germany being least and Italy most concentrated. 
In banking there are greater differences among the EC countries with some of 
the smaller countries being highly concentrated. In particular, Dutch banking 
is highly concentrated and concentration has even increased since 1988. After 
the domestic banking mergers, the three-firm concentration ratio stood at 87 
percent in 1990.
The low concentration ratio for the UK is actually misleading as UK 
banking assets include all subsidiaries of foreign banks which deal with 
international activities rather than the UK market. Focusing on the retail 
banking sector, it becomes apparent that domestic concentration is higher 
than for general banking activities. As individual market share data were not 
available to compute the Herfindahl-index, r-firm concentration ratios are 
presented which were calculated as the proportion of the total retail branch 
network accounted for by the largest five commercial banks and the largest 
three banks plus the savings and coooperative banks in each country.71 These 
are presented in figure 4.2.
71 See Kwoka (1985), however, who shows for a sample of 314 1982 US manufacturing industries 
that the 2-firm, 4-firm and Herfindahl indices are highly correlated. However, Sleuwagen 
and Dehandschutter (1986) regress different concentration indices against a market 
performance indicator and show that the H-index has greater explanatory power. This may 
result from the fact that the r-firm concentration ratio neglects everything below the cut-off 
point (see Hannah and Kay, 1977).
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Figure 4.2: Concentration ratios in retail banking in 1988
h  TOP 5
Commercial Banks
n  TOP 3, Cooperatives 
and Savings Banks
Market 
Share 
in %
of branch 
network
NL UK* P* B PL E I D
* UK includes Postoffice Bank 
** Top 2 + Savings + Coop. Banks
Source: McKinsey (1990).
In particular in the Netherlands and the UK the largest five commercial 
banks have a significant market share, whereas in countries such as Germany 
and Italy the regional savings and cooperative banks play a significant role in 
the retail sector.72 Since 1988 domestic concentration has increased even 
further especially in Spain73 and the Netherlands.74 75
72 In the Netherlands, for example, the merger between ABN and Amro led to a market share 
of 33 percent in brokerage, provoking a warning by the chairman of the stock exchange that 
effective competition is jeopardised (Bakker, 1991).
73 Due to the October 1988 merger between the fourth-largest Banco de Bilbao and the sixth- 
largest Banco de Viszcaya, the merger between two of the largest savings banks La Caixa and 
Caja de Barcelona to form the largest bank in terms of deposits, the 1991 conglomeration of six 
public banks to form Corporacion Bancaria de España, the country's largest bank and finally 
the 1991 merger between seventh-largest Banco Hispano Americano and fourth-largest Banco 
Central which now ranks as the biggest private bank.
74 Especially due the 1989 merger between the fourth and fifth largest banks, NMB and 
Postbank, and the 1990 merger between ABN and AMRO, second and third largest bank 
respectively.
75 In specific segments, market shares may be even higher. In France, for example, the largest 
three banks have a market share of 49 per cent in the bank credit market and 55 per cent in
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Farrell and Shapiro (1990) examine the price effects of mergers in a 
Cournot oligopoly setting. They find that if horizontal mergers do not 
generate significant synergy or size economies, they will raise price. Even if 
they do generate such cost savings, these need to be fairly substantial to lead 
to actual price reductions to the benefit of the consumer, the more so the 
bigger the firms which are merging.
Considering the empirical evidence on the relative insignificance of size 
economies in most areas of financial services, one may have doubts about 
whether the required cost savings are sufficient to justify large-scale mergers. 
Moreover, mergers always entail significant adjustment and integration costs. 
In a study of a range of domestic bank mergers, Adolf et al. (1991) find 
significant post-merger problems arising from difficulties combining different 
corporate cultures, the duplication of top and middle management positions, 
different salary systems, incompatible computer systems and advertising 
costs.76 Thus, the anticipated synergy and efficiency benefits which are 
supposed to compensate possible increases in market power all too often 
prove to be elusive.77
A second economic justification for domestic consolidation is the notion 
that increased foreign competition may serve as a disciplining device on 
domestic prices. Increasing competition in the internal market on a 
European-wide scale, it is argued, requires larger domestic units to compete 
effectively with bigger foreign firms. In an integrated European financial 
market the concentration indices are supposedly supra-national: Caminal, 
Gual and Vives (1990, p.297), for example, claim that "the relevant 
concentration indices for an integrated market are global (European or even 
worldwide) ... and not national". While this may be true for wholesale 
banking and reinsurance activities, it certainly does not hold for the retail
demand and time deposits. The top eight banks have a market share of almost ninety per cent 
of all banking activities (de Boissieu, 1990, p.19). In Spain the largest six banks account for 
approximate market shares of 78 percent for deposits and 66 percent in loans even though losing 
market share to the savings banks (Caminal, Gual and Vives, 1990).
76 In the merger of Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya, for example, there are significant 
problems in combining two different corporate cultures and with closures in the oft-duplicated 
branch network where one-quarter of its branches shall be closed by 1993.
77 In addition, mergers may not be privately profitable: Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) 
show that horizontal combinations may actually lead to a reduction in the merging banks' 
profitability, since the merged firms lose market share. However, their model rests on the 
unrealistic assumption that the merged bank is identical in size to its competitors. Perry and 
Porter (1985) specify a model in which the merged bank has control over the combined amount 
of an input factor whose total supply is limited and show that the incentive to merge is greater 
than in the SSR model- Davidson and Denercke (1985) examine a price-setting oligopoly with 
product differentiation and show that mergers are generally profitable, since both the merged 
bank as well as competitors raise prices. Finally, Kwoka (1989) shows that with non-Cournot 
behaviour, mergers are likely to be more profitable in a competitive industry or when absorbing 
a more rivalrous firm (i.e. one with a small conjectural variation).
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financial services markets where the relevant geographical market are more 
likely to be national and may even be local or regional.78
The relevant geographic market includes all products which are 'good' 
substitutes in demand or in supply. Thus, two regions A and B should be 
included in the same geographic market if a price increase in region A 
induces consumers to switch to region B or if such a price change induces the 
producer from region B to enter region A. This implies that regions A and B 
are in the same geographic market only if the extent of substitution on either 
the demand or the supply side is sufficiently great such that a single firm 
controlling region A would not find a price increase profitable unless it is able 
to control the prices in region B as well. Applying this principle to the retail 
financial services market, it seems most plausible to assume that the relevant 
gegraphic markets are so far still national, since barriers to cross-border entry 
are still sufficiently great to allow price differences to persist without 
immediate entry from foreign producers. In addition, consumers are still 
restricted due to prohibitive transaction costs to maintain cross-border 
business relationships with foreign retail financial services suppliers. Thus, 
substitutability both on the demand and supply sides is not sufficient to 
prevent national market power to be exercised.79
The notion that opening a domestic market to foreign competition can 
serve as a substitute for a stringent national merger policy is theoretically 
examined by Ross (1988). He shows that for an oligopoly with dominant 
domestic firms and foreign firms constituting the competitive fringe, the 
price effects of a domestic merger depend entirely on the elasticities of the 
domestic demand and foreign supply curves. If the foreign supply function is 
relatively price inelastic due to significant start-up costs, for example, as is 
likely to be the case in retail financial services, it may be that for a more open 
economy domestic mergers have greater price-increasing effects. Thus, it is 
not evident a priori that opening up the domestic market to foreign 
competition can justify permissive merger policy on the grounds that foreign 
competition will discipline domestic firms with increased market power.
Empirical evidence on the disciplining effects of foreign entry is 
presented by Geroski (1989). He regresses domestic and foreign entry against 
expected industry profits, market size and the industry growth rate and finds 
that neither domestic nor foreign entry "appear to provide much in the way 
of a substantive challenge to incumbents in the market" (p.25).
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
7® In die cross-border merger between Belgian Groupe AG and AMEV where the new EC merger 
control regulation was applied, the Commission considered the relevant markets in life and 
non-life insurance to be national rather than Community-wide.
79 An amusing story about defining the relevant geographic markets in the US is told by Rose 
(1989, p.22/23) who recalls a conversation with a local banker who boasted an amazing 7 
percent return on assets, compared to the 1 percent US average. Asked how he attained such an 
outstanding performance the banker replied: "It's simple. We are the only bank in town; 
branching is outlawed, and the nearest town is 70 miles away."
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Moreover, if regulatory policies of domestic public authorities go as far 
as actually hindering acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign institutions 
then such interventions may jeopardise the expected beneficial effects of 
integrating European banking. Instead of opening domestic markets to 
foreign competition, authorities may create more concentrated domestic 
oligopolies which are only ineffectively disciplined by foreign firms especially 
in the retail area.
The EC merger guidelines which took effect in September 1990 do not 
provide a sufficient tool for preventing increased domestic concentration, as 
mergers with a mainly domestic significance do not fall within the scope of 
the regulation.80 Thus, there may be a significant threat to attaining the 
original objectives of market integration, if domestic authorities attempt to 
protect domestic producer surplus by actively supporting greater 
concentration and at the same time hindering acquisitions by foreign 
entrants.
2.3.2. The example of ATM networks
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) have had a major impact in retail 
banking over the past decade. An ATM allows the customer to make certain 
routine transactions at the machine without requiring face-to-face interaction 
with a bank employee. Among the services offered are usually at least cash 
dispension and balance inquiries, but sometimes even the possibility to order 
cheques or information packages and make deposits and giro credits. It is 
expected that the range of services provided by ATMs will increase even 
further in the near future. The increased usage of ATMs provides not only a 
source of saving personnel costs for banks but also the possibility to provide 
banking services at non-branch locations ('off-premise') such as shopping 
malls or supermarkets. Figure 4.3 illustrates the rising significance of ATMs 
in the Western industrial countries.
80 Article 1 (2) in conjunction with Article 5 (3a) of the EC merger regulation defines two citeria 
for bank mergers to have a "Community dimension": first, one-tenth of combined total assets of 
the banks involved has to exceed ECU 5 billion. Second, one-tenth of total assets multiplied by 
a ratio of loans and advances to Community residents divided by transactions with non-EC 
residents has to exceed ECU 250 million of at least two banks involved in the concentration. The 
second provision essentially excludes acquisitions of EC banks abroad, as well as acquisitions of 
EC banks by non-EC institutions with little previous involvement in the EC. A bank 
concentration does not fall under the regulation, however, if more than two-thirds of the loan 
activity of each of the banks involved takes place within one and the same Member State.
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Figure 4.3: Number of ATMs in 6 EC countries, Japan and the US in 1990 
Number of inhabitants per ATM
Source: Bank for International Settlemets; Statistics on Payment Systems, December 1991.
In contrast to the US where ATM networks are independently operated 
or are set up as joint ventures of a number of banks,81 most European banks 
have their own ATM networks. Still, it is mostly possible for the customer of 
bank A to use the ATM of other banks B ,..., N which are inter-linked through 
a network switch. Bank B, however, charges bank A a 'foreign fee' for the 
usage of the ATM which is then usually passed on by bank A to the customer. 
The foreign fee charged by bank A to the customer is likely to be higher than 
if the customer uses the bank-owned network. Thus, banks with a large 
network have the competitive advantage of offering the customer more 
possibilities for ATM transactions.
Does the rising significance of electronic distribution and processing 
networks constitute a potential source of size advantages and barriers to 
entry?82 ATMs are an example of network externalities where the utility of 
using a system depends on the number of other users in the network, as well 
as the compatability of the system with other networks. Katz and Shapiro 
(1985, 1986a,b) analyse a static oligopoly model in which such consumption 
externalities exist. Assuming that consumers form rational expectations about 
the future size of the network, they find that if consumers expect one firm to 
be the market leader, they are willing to spend more to enter the leader's 
network to participate in the greater network externalities. Thus, (expected)
81 See Salop (1990) and Gilbert (1990) who discuss the competition policy aspects of jointly 
owned ATM networks in the US.
82 We discuss this question in the context of ATMs, but the general thrust of the arguments 
applies equally to other banking technologies where network externalities are present such as 
alternative clearing systems or computer-based asset trading systems.
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market leaders are able to charge higher prices and are more likely to oppose 
network link-ups of smaller firms and efforts to establish common 
com patibility.83 Social welfare, however, may be increased through inter­
linkage of networks.84
Consider the case of a bank wishing to enter a foreign retail market. As it 
is nearly impossible to establish an extensive branch network from scratch, 
another possibility would be to rely on alternative distribution channels such 
as telephone or home banking. In particular, a foreign bank may want to 
enter an existing ATM network in the target country to establish a means of 
interacting with its customers on a nation-wide basis. Domestic banks, 
however, have an incentive to keep out foreign intruders into the market, 
especially if these entrants disturb a (tacitly) collusive domestic pricing 
equilibrium. Restrictions to access the domestic ATM networks may therefore 
serve as a means of strategic entry deterrence.
Therefore, in areas where significant network externalities exist, public 
policy intervention may be required. Two alternatives exist to ensure 
reasonable access of foreign institutions to domestic ATM networks: First, 
strict competition rules prohibiting 'bribes' between firms could be relaxed:85 
Katz and Shapiro show that allowing firms to make side payments increases 
the likelihood of firms adopting an industry-wide standard if (and only if) 
compatability raises joint profits by more than joint costs. Thus, public policy 
could rely purely on a co-operative market outcome to ensure accessability of 
networks. Such a market outcome is likely to maximise social welfare if there 
is a mutual interest of firms to enter each others' markets. If, however, a bank 
from a relatively efficient market (such as the UK, for example) wants to enter 
a less efficient market (e.g. Spain), but banks in Spain have little interest in 
entering the UK market due to little chance of success, even allowing for side 
payments does not necessarily lead to a welfare-maximising outcome. In such 
a case direct intervention by the competition policy authorities may be 
required. As national regulators may have little interest to open the domestic 
market to foreign competition, market access needs to be monitored at the EC 
level.
83 The classic example being IBM's efforts to hamper computer compatibility with low-price 
competitors (e.g. by introducing a new standard in its PS-2 personal computer system).
84 Farrell and Saloner (1985), however, show that agreeing on and adopting a common standard 
for the network may also have socially harmful effects. These stem from the fact that when 
firms have incomplete information about competitors' willingness to switch to a new 
technology, there may be inertia in adopting a new (and welfare-improving) technology once 
firms have agreed on a common standard.
85 Such as Article 85 (1) of the Treaty of Rome, prohibiting co-operative agreements between 
firms intended to limit or distort competition, e.g. by sharing markets (Sec. lc) or controlling 
markets and technological development (Sec. lb).
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To illustrate the possibility of market failure in the case of side 
payments, consider a simple game with the following pay-off structure where 
the first term in brackets gives the Spanish bank's pay-off:
UK bank
grant access no access
grant access (a+fi-n,b + fi-fi) (c+p,d-fl)
no access (e-frf + yO (g. h)
Spanish
bank
where fi and fi stand for the level of side payments. We assume that the 
domestic bank loses some market power by granting access to the foreign 
institution. Consider first the case of fi, fi = 0. Clearly, whenever (e > a, g > c) 
and (d > b, h > fi, the dominant strategy equilibrium obtains where both 
banks prefer not to grant access. In other words, if the loss in domestic market 
power exceeds the profits to be made in the foreign country for at least one 
bank then, not surprisingly, neither bank will grant access.86
More interestingly, allowing for side payments may lead to an 
asymmetric outcome. Suppose that the British bank has a greater interest in 
entering the Spanish network, but stands to lose little of Spanish entry into its 
market and is thus indifferent to granting access ( i.e. let a = c,e = g and n  = 0). 
It may then set a level of fi which just compensates the Spanish bank for its 
loss in market power. A necessary condition for the Spanish bank to agree to 
access is fi > e - a and fi> g - c. The British bank will only be interested in 
bribing the Spanish bank if b- fi> f  and d - fi > h. In other words, if the gain to 
one player exceeds the loss to the other player, access will be agreed. Thus, 
when side payments are allowed, the likelihood of at least one firm granting 
access is increased. Nevertheless, a no-access equilibrium may still obtain 
when the expected profit from entering for the British bank is not sufficient to 
compensate the Spanish bank for loss in monopoly power, i.e. i f e - a > b - f  or 
g - c > d - h. In such a case, even allowing for side-payments leads to a no­
access equilibrium and thus public policy intervention may be required.87
Equivalently, we could consider the players to be a perfectly coordinated 
cartel of the banking industries rather than individual banks. In this case the 
assumption that the cartel takes into account the loss in market power may be 
more reasonable. The domestic banking industry may enter a (tacitly)
86 This outcome seems to be prevalent in practise. Kane (1987, p.139) argues that "what began 
as cooperatively shared ATM networks within the US or a single European country are 
increasingly competing with each other across countries".
87 In practice, access is frequently granted to a type of card rather than to a particular bank or 
issuer. Such a practice largely avoids the entry deterrence problems discussed in this section. 
Issuers may be discriminated against as well, however, as the example of American Express in 
France demonstrates where the majority of banks opposed interoperability with the AMEX 
ATM network.
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collusive agreement not to grant access to foreign banks to prevent successful 
entry into the retail area. However, the problem with such a collusive 
agreement is that individual banks may cheat if they are offered a sufficiently 
high 'bribe' by the foreign bank.88 Thus, a collusive equilibrium is unlikely to 
be stable.
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2.3.4. Branch proliferation
Faced with the threat of increased cross-border entry, incumbent retail 
financial services firms may decide to increase their number of outlets to fill 
up location space. Similar to Schmalensee's (1978) model of crowding the 
product space through brand proliferation, banks may attempt to crowd the 
geographic location space by opening an excessive number of branches. 
Bonano (1987) builds on models by Hay (1976), Prescott and Visscher (1977) 
and Eaton and Lipsey (1979) which analyse strategic entry deterrence in spatial 
competition settings. These models show that an incumbent firm or the 
ruling cartel have an incentive to open retail branches to make new entry 
unprofitable in order to protect excess profits. They can do so by ensuring that 
there are no profitable locational niches left which a new entrant may occupy. 
For such locational preemption to be effective, incumbents have to invest in 
new branches just slightly before new entrants would come into the market 
in the absence of preemption. Locational entry deterrence is more effective if 
the investment in new branches is likely to have a large element of sunk 
costs, since this increases the committment value of investment (Judd, 1985).
Entry deterrence is usually analysed in the context of only a single 
incumbent or a tightly coordinated cartel. In contrast, the financial services 
industry is characterised by oligopoly interaction with its associated problems 
of coordinating strategic decisions. With several incumbents entry deterrence 
may become a public good: all domestic banks profit from the successful 
prevention of cross-border entry and can therefore free-ride on the 
investment undertaken by competitors.89 Gilbert and Vives (1986) examine 
such a situation with several non-cooperating incumbents and a single 
entrant and come to the conclusion that incumbents never under-invest in 
entry-deterrence. This somewhat counter-intuitve result depends on their 
assumption that investment in entry deterrence by a single firm actually 
increases revenues and therefore confers immediate benefits on the firm 
which invests in excluding rivals. In the context of branch proliferation this 
assum ption may not be unreasonable since increasing the number of 
branches is likely to increase revenues at the same time.
88 This point is raised by Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990, p.296) who question "whether the 
large banks will be able ... to coordinate their actions to make entry of foreign institutions 
difficult (e.g. by denying them easy access to the main ATM systems)."
89 See also W aldman (1987,1991) who examines a situation where there are not only multiple 
incumbents but also a sequence of potential entrants.
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Neven (1990) points out that banks will open branches until the 
marginal cost of collecting deposits through a retail network equals the 
interbank rate. Although this neglects, of course, the fact that branches serve 
not only as deposit collection units but also as distribution and monitoring 
centres for loans and other products, it provides some useful insight into the 
rationale for branch proliferation. Banks in high deposit margin countries 
attempting to erect barriers to foreign entry have a greater incentive to engage 
in branch proliferation than banks in low-margin countries. This results 
from the fact that since the difference between the marginal cost of financing 
by deposit collection through branches and interbank financing is greater, 
opening branches is more lucrative. Thus, maintaining a high number of 
branches is not only a cheaper way of refinancing in high margin countries, 
but may at the same time serve the function of deterring foreign entry.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the density of retail branch networks in the EC 
countries. It shows significant differences in the number of inhabitants 
served by a particular branch. While Germany, Denmark and Spain have a 
particularly high number of residents per branch, Italy seems to be under­
banked in terms of number of branches. Not surprisingly, table 4.4 reveals 
that those countries with the highest branch density also had the largest 
growth rate of domestic branches. In particular, the case of Spain stands out 
where the number of branches has almost tripled, since I960.90 It is also 
apparent that in most countries the level of branches has stabilised since 1980 
and in some cases has even started to decline again.91 This seems to suggest 
that as far as the number of branches is concerned, a level of saturation has 
been reached in some countries and that new entry may be constrained to 
acquiring existing branches, rather than establishing an entirely new branch 
network from scratch.
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
90 The average size of retail branches in Spain is substantially smaller than in all other EC 
countries, however.
91 jn  Prance, for example, the deregulation of branch banking in 1966/67 led to a vast increase in 
branches, peaking in the early 1970s. This has led to overbranching in some areas and since 1986 
commercial banks have started to dose unprofitable branches (see de Boissieu, 1990).
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Figure 4.4: Number of inhabitants per bank branch in 1989/90
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Source: same source as table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Number of Branches in 8 EC countries from 1960 to 1991
1960 1970 1980 1984 1991 CAGR
Spain n.a. 12,642 24,566 31,117 34,519* +4.9%
France n.a. 15,037 23,659 25,676 25,632* +2.6%
Ita ly 9,211 10,807 12,175 12,965 17,721 +2.4%
Belgium 1,870 3,151 3,811 3,741 3,618 +0.7%
Germany 30,027 40,800 44,666 44,698 43,977 +0.4%
N eth erl. 3,459 5,177 7,399 6,529 5,371 +0.2%
Denmark 2368 3,465 3,707 3,581 3,318 -0.2%
UK n.a. n.a. 19,796 20,541 20,560 n.a.
Note: all data are without Postbank outlets
* data are for 1989
CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate calculated from 1970
Source: OECD (1989, p.127; 1991); Denmark: Annual Statistical Yearbook; Germany: Deutsche 
Bundesbank; France: de Boissieu (1990, p.12); Italy: Lane (1991); UK (data include building 
societies): Bank for International Settlemets, Statistics on Payment Systems; CAGR: own 
calculations.
In other countries such as Italy, on the other hand, branch openings 
were for a long time heavily restricted which changed only in March 1990. 
Since then, there were 2,562 new branch openings in a one-year period alone, 
an increase in total branches of 14 percent. Branch proliferation in Italy thus 
provides an example of how the threat of foreign entry may result in moves
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by domestic regulators to relax unnecessarily restrictive domestic regulations. 
At the same time, of course, such moves of filling up location space make 
entry by foreign banks more difficult, as remaining locational niches are likely 
to be occupied by domestic institutions.92
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2.4. Retail financial services: a contestable market?
It is frequently argued that financial services can be considered a contestable 
market where potential competition may be sufficient to ensure a near- 
competitve outcome. Dermine (1991, p.33), for example, states that "overall, 
the analysis of barriers to entry from the demand and supply side predicts 
great contestability, especially in the deposits and consumer loan markets".93 
In this section, I analyse this claim that retail financial services can be 
considered to be a contestable market.
A market is called 'contestable' if it fulfills the following three conditions 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982; following Shepherd, 1984):
• there are no 'Stiglerian' entry barriers, i.e. the entrant can match and 
duplicate all dimensions of costs, technology, brand loyalty and other 
characteristics of the incumbent firm;
• the incumbent firm is assumed not to respond to new entry and to 
keep its price, quality and output at the pre-entry level;
• exit from the market is costless, since sunk costs are negligible due to a 
perfectly efficient second-hand market.
If these propositions held then it is easily shown that a market would satisfy 
the following long-run welfare properties: first, long-run profits must be zero; 
second, costs are minimised by incumbent firms and third, price has to equal 
marginal costs.94
92 In practice, branch proliferation does not necessarily deter foreign entry when margins are 
sufficiently high, as the example of Spain demonstrates where foreign entry in retail services 
has been very active despite the high number of branches. This casts some doubt on the likely 
success of a strategy of branch proliferation to deter foreign entry.
93 Similarly, Spence (1983, p.987) suggests that hit-and-run entry may be more likely in service 
industries where sunk costs are claimed to be lower. Neven (1990, p.176) argues that for 
financial services which can be dissociated from a branch network "barriers to entry and exit ... 
seem rather small. As a result, the market for those services is to some extent contestable, so 
that the mere threat of competition should discipline the existing firms." Nelson (1988) builds 
a model of banking competition assuming contestable market conditions.
94 First, long-run profits must be zero because any positive profit means that an entrant could 
come in, replicate the incumbent's product and services, slightly undercut prices and take away 
all business from the incumbent. When profits are bid down to zero the entrant can leave the 
m arket at no cost, since exit is assumed to be costless ('hit-and-run-entry'). Second, costs are 
minimised by incumbent firms, since any deviation from cost minimisation (just like supra-
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Does the retail financial services market fulfill the rather stringent 
conditions required for these welfare properties to result? The assumption of 
a complete absence of Stiglerian entry barriers implies that products cannot be 
differentiated, since otherwise hit-and-run entry will not be possible. Indeed, 
there seems to be little scope for tangible product differentiation in banking or 
insurance services, as products and services are highly substitutable and any 
product innovation can be easily and instantly replicated due to the absence of 
patent protection in services. As was discussed above, however, services may 
be differentiated due to reputation, distinguishing a year-long service 
relationship from a newly established relation. In addition, switching costs 
constitute a substantial barrier to entry which may lead to cost disadvantages 
for a potential entrant. Thus, the assumption of a complete lack of entry 
barriers does not seem to be fulfilled for retail financial services.
Secondly, the assumption of no strategic interaction between incumbent 
and entrant seems fairly unrealistic, since an incumbent would clearly have 
an incentive to respond to entry to avoid losing market share to the new 
entrant.
Finally, the assumption of zero sunk costs is hardly ever fulfilled, as 
new entry almost always requires expert skills or corporate involvement 
which cannot be sold or transferred costlessly.95 It is hard to imagine a firm 
entering a new market without acquiring at least some kind of information 
about market conditions in the form of a market research survey, for 
instance. Additionally, corporate management will invest some time in 
planning market strategies and the firm thus incurs an opportunity cost in 
terms of lost managerial time spent on alternative projects. Both of these 
examples show that a firm when leaving the market will not be able to 
recover the whole investment outlay. Nevertheless, sunk costs may be lower 
in retail financial services than in most other industries, as comparatively 
little investment in non-recoverable specific assets needs to be made.96
normal profits) constitutes an invitation to entry. Another firm could come in, produce the same 
ou tput at lower costs, sell it a t the same price and earn a profit. Third, price has to equal 
marginal costs. It cannot be less than marginal costs because a firm could reduce output and earn 
a positive profit. On the other hand, price cannot exceed marginal costs if there are at least 
two firms in the market. If price were greater than marginal costs it would pay another firm to 
come in and produce a slightly greater output than the incumbent, charge slightly less, thus 
taking away business from the incumbent, and earn a supra-normal profit
95 Martin (1989) shows that even the slightest deviation from the zero sunk costs assumption 
leads to the breakdown of the possibility of hit-and-run entry.
96 Investment in fixed costs such as equipment and offices is likely to be recoverable at market- 
going prices and therefore not sunk (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, p.307-8 for the distinction 
between fixed and sunk costs). Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1983, p.494) stress the salvage value 
of assets as the distinguishing characteristic of sunk costs. The degree of sunkness varies from 
complete (no salvage value) to zero (where assets can be sold at the purchase price).
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In summary, in the retail financial services market significant entry 
barriers preclude the welfare properties of the contestable market model to 
hold. It would therefore be premature to conclude that potential competition 
alone suffices to attain a near-competitive outcome. On the other hand, one 
should not underestimate the important role which may be played by 
potential competition. It has been argued, for instance, that the threat of 
foreign entry in a liberalised European financial market has by itself sufficed 
to induce a restructuring in the Spanish banking market (see Vives, 1990). 
This issue is quite distinct, however, from the set of welfare properties 
associated with contestable market theory, as domestic banks may act to raise 
barriers to foreign entry through tighter tadt collusion or by raising domestic 
concentration, as a 'preparation' for 1992. A more concentrated domestic 
industry makes foreign entry less likely, as retaliation can be expected to be 
more tightly coordinated (see above). Thus, the mere threat of potential 
foreign entry may achieve exactly the opposite of what contestability theory 
would predict: a further departure from a competitive market outcome. In 
retail financial services, it may therefore require actual rather than potential 
entry to break into domestic oligopolies and move closer to a more 
competitive market.
3. Conclusions
In order to assess the likelihood of entry, I undertook an analysis of barriers to 
cross-border entry in retail financial services. Two main sources of entry 
barriers were identified: first, barriers arising from the regulatory 
environment which are attacked by the EC internal market programme. 
Second, entry barriers which I called 'market-inherent' arising from the 
particular market structure or product characteristics. These are likely to 
persist - though becoming less severe - even after the integration of European 
financial markets.
While official regulatory barriers are continuously being dismantled, 
covert restrictions may continue to apply as domestic regulations usually 
allow a substantial degree of discretion to be exercised by the public 
authorities. Regulatory resistance to takeovers of domestic firms by foreign 
institutions is greater in banking than in insurance, as the banking sector is 
considered to have a strategic role for domestic economic policy.
The lack of a corporate control market in the EC may be especially severe 
in the banking sector. In addition to the lack of a level playing field for cross- 
border takeovers, the large extent of public ownership in some EC countries 
prevents the establishment of an effective market for corporate control.
A number of factors which may lead to market-inherent barriers to entry 
were discussed. Size economies do not appear to be significant in most areas 
of financial services. An analysis of a possible correlation between size and 
profitability of the largest 173 EC banks suggests that greater size does not lead
Barriers to Cross-Border Entry
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to greater profitability. Size economies do not seem to pose a barrier to cross- 
border entry in financial services.
In contrast, incumbency advantages arising from firm reputation and 
switching costs may constitute the most significant barriers to entry in the 
retail financial services sector. Thus, price differentials do not necessarily 
induce a switch from one supplier to another. This allows incumbents to 
exercise a certain degree of market power. In addition, price reductions may 
only be temporary, as they are aimed at locking in new customers. Barriers to 
entry arising from switching costs are likely to be greater in banking than in 
insurance which is partly due to the fact that the latter industry is 
characterised by less-frequent interaction. In addition, reputational factors 
may be less significant in insurance than in banking. Finally, there are fewer 
joint products in insurance such that individual products are separable. This 
further facilitates entry in insurance where a foreign firm can enter only one 
particular product market. In banking, however, there are fewer stand alone 
products. These include in particular card-based services but not the general 
product bundle of payment and deposit services.
Faced with the threat of increased foreign entry, domestic regulators and 
institutions may attempt to implement entry-deterring strategies. These 
include especially domestic consolidation which is supposed to make 
indigenous institutions more competitive but may only have the effect of 
increasing domestic market power. It was shown that domestic consolidation 
has increased significantly in some EC countries. Further, domestic banks 
may attempt to exclude foreign banks from domestic networks such as ATMs 
or clearing systems. Such entry-deterring collusion on the part of indigenous 
institutions is likely to be unstable, however, as individual banks may have 
little to lose but much to gain when being 'bribed' by a foreign bank. Finally, 
branch proliferation by domestic banks may have the objective of closing 
potentially profitable locational niches to foreign entrants.
In sum m ary, it therefore appears that the insurance sector is 
characterised by fewer barriers to foreign entry than retail banking. We would 
therefore expect a greater degree of foreign penetration in insurance than in 
retail banking. ,
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Chapter Five: 
The Potential Impact of Foreign Entry on 
Domestic Competition
The 1988 Price Waterhouse study employs the assumption that as barriers to 
foreign entry are reduced, domestic markets will become more competitive due to 
the threat of potential or actual foreign entry. I first develop some theoretical 
notions about the potential impact of cross-border entry on domestic market 
structure, conduct and performance in retail financial services in the first section. 
The second section then presents empirical data on the possible and actual effect of 
cross-border entry and discusses the extent and possible reasons for price 
differences of financial products across EC markets.
1. Competition in retail banking with cross-border entry: theoretical 
concepts
1.1. Cross-border entry can increase price competition: the example of the deposit 
market
I first consider a simple model of banking competition in the deposit market to 
analyse the potential impact of foreign entry on domestic market structure, 
equilibrium prices, quantities and social welfare. A very similar model can easily 
be constructed for the insurance sector where firms compete on premiums rather 
than on deposit rates.
Analysing the liability and asset side of the bank separately is justified by the 
Klein-Monti model (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972).1 The essence of this separation 
theorem can be easily illustrated. Assume that refinancing and opportunity costs 
are exogenuously given by the interbank rate and the rate on government 
securities respectively. To maximise profits, banks will then equalise the marginal 
cost of deposit collection with the interbank rate and further equalise the marginal 
return on assets with the riskless rate on government paper. In other words, in 
such a stylised setting decisions taken on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet 
are completely independent of the liability side. While real resource costs are a 
common input to both asset and liability activities and thus create some degree of
1 See Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984) for thorough reviews of banking models.
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interdependence, the basic thrust of the model seems a reasonable approximation 
of banks' actual decision-making processes.2
In contrast to the Klein-Monti model, however, I assume an oligopolistic 
domestic market characterised by Cournot competition.3 The assumption that 
banks determine the quantity rather than the 'price' (i.e. the interest rate) of 
liability products may be justified by the empirical observation that banks 
determine the composition of refinancing at the beginning of each period and 
adjust prices, i.e. deposit interest rates accordingly. For example, a bank may decide 
at the beginning of the year on a total target quantity of retail deposits as a 
proportion of total funds. Retail branches are then given individual target 
quantities of retail deposits. Headquarters can adjust the deposit interest rate after 
observing the residual demand curve. Thus, the assumption of quantity 
competition may not be unjustified in banking deposit markets.
Denote n  as the interest rate paid on deposits, D; as the quantity of deposits 
chosen by bank ; and n as the refinancing rate or the rate on a government security 
which are assumed equal and exogenous.
To simplify the exposition we use a simple linear example for a case of 
duopoly. The results also obtain for more general cost and demand functions and 
for an n-firm oligopoly, however (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, p.219-20). The 
inverse deposit demand function takes a simple linear form and is given by:
(1) rd = a + ri+bD 
<=> (n -n )  = - a -bD
Note that the quantity of deposits demanded increases with the deposit interest 
rate and that a is negative. The symmetric cost function is also linear with 
constant returns to scale and no fixed costs:
(2) C(D,) = cD,
where c is the marginal real resource cost of servicing deposits (e.g. labour costs). 
In a perfectly competitive market the difference between the deposit interest rate 
and the interbank rate has to equal the real resource marginal costs of servicing 
deposits, i.e. n - n - c  . Thus, symmetric equilibrium output is given by S = (-  c - a) /
b.
2 In particular, banks' management accounting systems calculate individual margins for each product 
or service given by the interest rate differential betw een the cost of refinancing (mostly 
approxim ated by the interbank rate) and the rates paid or earned. Operating costs are frequently 
allocated according to time and motion studies.
3 In the notation and the oligopoly problem I follow Martin (1992).
156
The Impact on Domestic Competition
Period 1: Domestic Cournot Duopoly: Consider now the familiar Cournot 
duopoly. The residual demand curve for bank 1 is given by
(3) rd = a + r > + bDi + bDi 
The optimisation problem is therefore:
(4) max it, = (n - rd)Di - C(Di)
-  -a Eh - b(Di)2 - bDiDi - cDi
Thus, the first order condition is:
(5) Biti / dDi -  -a - 2bLh- bDi - c - 0  
The reaction function for bank 1 is therefore:
(6) Di = 2/2 (S - Lh)
with S being the equilibrium output in a perfectly competitive market, as defined 
above. Analogously, the reaction curve for bank 2 can be derived as
(7) Di = 1/2 (S - Di)
Deposit levels and the equilibrium interest rate are given by
(8) Di = D2 = 1/3S; rd = lf3a + n - 2/3 c
Bank profits are given by
(9) m =( -1J3 a- l f 3  c)Di
Consumer surplus is given by
2/3S
(10) CS = J  (n+ a + bD,) dD,
which can be solved to get
(11) CS = 2/3 bS
Cross-Border Acquisition: We now assume that there is a second period in which 
foreign entry is permitted. As was argued in chapter three, entrants need some 
competitive advantage to compensate for operating at a distance and in a foreign 
environment. I assume here that such a competitive advantage results in greater 
efficiency and therefore lower marginal resource costs. A star (*) will denote the
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foreign bank. We continue to have a Cournot duopoly, but bank 2 has been 
acquired by a foreign firm and has been made more efficient (e.g. due to 
knowledge transfer, increased investment). The 'foreign' bank therefore has a cost 
function
(12) c*(Di) = c*D2
where c* < c. The reaction curves are given by
(13) Di = 1/2 (Si - Di); Di = 2/2 (Si - Di)
with Si = (- c - a) /  b and S2 = (- c* - a) /  b. Solving for equilibrium outputs,
(14) Di = 2/3 (Si + (c* - c) ¡b)
Di = 1/3 (S2 - (c*-c) lb)
Thus, the more efficient foreign bank is able to increase its market share. The 
equilibrium deposit rate is given by
(15) n  = 1/3 a+ r>-1/3 (c* + c)
This establishes our first proposition:
Proposition 1: With Cournot competition a cross-border acquisition which makes 
the acquired bank more efficient always leads to an increase in the deposit rate and 
thus to a rise in consumer surplus.
Proof: Compare the equilibrium deposit rates in equations (8) and (15). As they 
only differ in the third terms, we can perform a simple reductio ad absurdum: 
Suppose
-2/3 c Z - 1/3 ( c* + c)
which is equivalent to c <c* but contradicts our initial assumption c > c*. Thus, 
we must have
- 2/3 c < -1/3 (c* + c)
and therefore the domestic duopoly equilibrium deposit rate is lower than the 
post-acquisition deposit rate. To show that consumer surplus rises as the deposit 
rate increases is trivial. Q.E.D.
To determine the impact of foreign entry on domestic social welfare we need 
to specify the exact form of the social welfare function, as the effects on consumer
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surplus (CS) and domestic producer surplus (PS) may be of opposite signs.4 We 
assume here a simple additive relationship of the form SW = CS + PS. One could 
also consider a weighted welfare function if it is assumed that CS should be given 
greater importance than PS. It is obvious that consumer surplus will increase if 
foreign entry leads to a higher deposit rate. Domestic producer surplus, however, 
will decrease as domestic banks lose market share to foreign entrants. Thus 
domestic social welfare will decrease overall if the latter affect dominates the 
former. Foreign entry may therefore lead to lower domestic social welfare, as rises 
in consumer surplus may be outweighed by losses in domestic producer surplus.
It is obvious that as the weight of consumer surplus in the social welfare 
function rises, the detrimental effect of the reduction in domestic producer 
surplus becomes less significant until in the limiting case of SW = CS foreign entry 
inducing a rise in the deposit rate is always welfare-improving.
To summarise, I have shown in this section that for a simple example in the 
deposit market foreign entry increases the deposit rate and thus leads to a rise in 
consumer surplus. As domestic banks are likely to lose market share, however, 
producer surplus decreases as domestic profits fall. This potential loss in producer 
surplus is one of the main arguments for protecting the domestic financial 
services sector from foreign competition in many countries.
De novo entry: Consider next de novo entry of foreign firms into the domestic 
market. It is a standard characteristic of Cournot models that prices and profits fall, 
as the number of firms increases.5 This can easily be illustrated for a simple linear 
example. Let Q be defined as aggregate output, i.e. 
n
Q = ^  qi. where qi is the output of firm i. Assume a linear demand and cost
¿=1
structure with the demand function given by P(Q) = 1 - Q and the cost function 
given by Ci(qi) = cqi for all firms. Firms' profit-maximising condition is given by:
(16) 1 - Q - q i - c = 0
Since we have a symmetric equilibrium, we have Q = nq and therefore individual 
output is given by
(17) q = (1 - c) / (n + 1)
The price for the product is therefore
4 Unlike most other studies of banking integration, I explicitly model the impact on producer surplus. 
Neven (1990, p.176), for example, only notices in a footnote that "one should ideally also take into 
account the change in producer surplus".
5 See, for example, Urole (1988, p. 221).
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(18) p = 1 - nq = c + (1 - c) / (n + 1)
Individual firm profit is given by
(19) m = (1 - c)2 / (n+l)2
It is is easy to see that as the number of suppliers in the market increases, prices 
and profits fall until in the limiting case the market becomes perfectly competitive. 
Consumer surplus increases, whereas domestic producer surplus falls. Of course, it 
would be too simplifying to transfer this prediction to the financial services market 
with its characteristics of significant product differentiation, switching costs and 
quality competition. Nevertheless, the Cournot model provides a useful starting 
point to analyse the effects of cross-border entry on prices.
1.2. Cross-border entry can reduce X-ineffidency
Lack of competition in the domestic finandal services market may not only lead to 
higher prices for consumers but also to reduced effidency of indigenous finandal 
services firms. The notion that lack of competition may lead to failure of 
minimising costs inside the firm was pointed out in several contributions by 
Leibenstein (e.g. 1966, 1975, 1987), which he referred to as X-inefficiency. 
Intuitively, X-ineffidency refers to the fact that as competition increases, firms are 
forced to organise production more effidently to reduce costs and become more 
competitive. Leibenstein stresses that market structure has not merely effects on 
the pridng dedsions of market partidpants but also on the internal structure of 
the firm. In the extreme case of monopoly, he notes that one observes a significant 
degree of internal ineffidency which needs to be taken into account when 
determining the overall allocative effidency of a certain market structure.
This intuition is formalised by Selten (1986) who builds a model where X- 
inefficiency decreases, as the number of firms increases. In Selten's model the 
degree of X-inefficiency is exogenous, however. Willig (1987) builds a model 
where entry increases competition such that the price elasticity of demand 
increases. At the same time, entry shifts the residual demand curve fadng each 
individual firm inward which tends to 'reduce firm efficiency. Martin (1992b) 
shows that in a Cournot principal-agent setting the latter effect dominates the 
former, as a greater number of firms leads to lower marginal revenue for the 
individual firm and therefore a lower incentive for the principal to induce the 
agent to minimise costs.
In general, however, one may expect that as foreign firms enter the national 
market and increase the level of competition, domestic institutions are forced to 
become more efficient and place greater emphasis on cost-effective provision of 
services. Thus, in countries where domestic firms have had scope for not 
minimising costs due to lack of domestic competitive pressures, for example by 
maintaining an excessive labour force, we expect significant pressure to streamline
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the organisational structure, since otherwise foreign entrants will be able to offer 
products and services at lower prices than domestic firms without having to cut 
their margins.
1.3. Cross-border entry can spoil collusive domestic equilibria
Many national financial services markets have for a long time been characterised 
by tacit or even explicit collusive agreements between national players. Such 
agreements not only concern pricing arrangements but also the non-introduction 
of new, less profitable products, replacing existing profitable products or the tacit 
agreement to refrain from entering each other's lines of business. Such collusive 
equilibria were frequently tolerated and sometimes even encouraged and imposed 
by the regulatory authorities which legitimated such an approach by the need to 
prevent against excessive competition. In many EC insurance markets, for 
example, firms explicitly collude in the setting of key parameters which determine 
the setting of premiums. Clearly, in a more integrated European market with 
increased cross-border entry of non-domestic financial services firms which do not 
belong to the national collusive groups, the stability of such collusive equilibria 
will likely break down, as foreign firms do not participate in the collusive 
agreement. As an example, I discuss interest rates on demand and time deposits.
In chapter two, regulatory restrictions on paying interest on current and 
savings accounts were discussed and it was argued that these are likely to 
disappear when foreign banks are able to circumvent such restrictions through the 
home country rule. Government regulation is not solely responsible for the 
national differences in current and savings account interest rates, however. No 
restrictions on such activities exist in Germany, the UK and since March 1987 in 
Spain. But while competitive forces have led to the introduction of interest- 
bearing current accounts in both the UK and Spain, no interest is paid on demand 
deposits in Germany and savings deposits are rewarded at significantly below 
money market rates.
Whether any individual bank has an incentive to introduce interest-bearing 
current accounts depends on its perception of the short-term benefit of cheating on 
a possible collusive equilibrium.6 The benefit from introducing interest-bearing 
current accounts by gaining market share depends largely on the speed of 
replication by other players. If the 'aggressive' bank expects competitors to respond 
instantly by matching its terms, then little to no benefit can be expected. If, 
however, the aggressor expects other players not to replicate its moves 
instantaneously then it may be able to lock in new customers. Other firms are 
unlikely not to respond to the aggressor's move, however, especially if they have 
much to lose by sticking to the collusive equilibrium and threaten to engage in a
6 The idea of cheating on a collusive equilibrium was introduced by Stigler (1964) and more recently 
incorporated into a supergame framework (e.g. Rees, 1985).
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costly interest rate war.7 If this is the case then the threat of retaliation is credible, 
deterring players to deviate from the cooperative equilibrium. Players can 
influence each other's expectations by building up a reputation for severely 
punishing any deviation from the collusive equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). In addition, multimarket contact between players, as 
is very common in financial services, can increase the credibility and severity of a 
retaliatory move, since cheating in one market can be punished in a range of other 
markets in which the players operate (Bemheim and Whinston, 1990).
As in any collusive equilibrium, players therefore compare the short-term 
benefits of cheating with the discounted value of future losses from reverting to a 
non-cooperative equilibrium.8 Long-term losses from competition in interest rates 
are likely to be significant: margins on sight deposits are the largest single 
contributor to banks' profits averaging up to 80%,9 and thus any reduction in 
margins is likely to severely impact profits. Considering the significance of retail 
deposits as a relatively cheap source of funds, it therefore appears that domestic 
banks have little to gain but much to lose from introducing interest on sight 
deposits.
For foreign banks the strategic considerations of introducing competitive 
interest rates may be rather different. Suppose that foreign banks have a 
comparatively small market share and that they estimate the probability that 
domestic incumbents will retaliate to be fairly low. If domestic banks emulate the 
in troduction of interest-bearing accounts by foreign banks, they lose 
proportionately more, since they have a significantly higher market share.10 Thus, 
if the expected loss from introducing interest-bearing current accounts exceeds that 
of losing market share to foreign banks domestic banks will not respond by 
emulating foreign banks' strategies. The loss from a reduction in market share is 
likely to be small, due to the presence of significant 'lock-in effects' in retail 
banking. The loss from the introduction of interest-bearing current accounts, on 
the other hand, is likely to be significant, as was shown above. Thus, it may be 
rational to expect that domestic banks will not or only partially respond to the
7 Slade (1989) develops a model where such interest rate wars are equilibrium strategies of a 
supergame, rather than being the result of one bank cheating on a collusive equilibrium. This results 
from shifts in the demand function which require players to calculate new equilibrium prices through 
trial and error by changing prices and thus has the appearance of a price war.
® The author had the opportunity to witness a discussion in the Board of Directors meeting in a large 
German bank on whether or not to introduce interest-bearing current accounts in the retail market 
which exactly followed this game-theoretic reasoning.
9 A study by McKinsey of the profit and cost structure of banks in the largest six EC economies reveals 
that in 1987 sight and savings deposits margins accounted for 76% of positive revenues in the 
personal customer market and for 82% in the corporate market (see Faßbender and Leichtfuß, 1990).
10 Similar to McGee's argument on predatory pricing (1980, p.296): {Cutting the price) w ill... cost the 
predator more than the prey".
162
The Impact on Domestic Competition
introduction of high-yield accounts. In this situation, a foreign bank may choose to 
introduce such accounts, as it is likely to gain market share since domestic banks 
do not follow. In practise, we indeed find that foreign banks frequently choose 
such a strategy in countries where domestic banks pay little or no interest on 
current accounts.11
The decision of whether or not to introduce interest rates on the current 
account additionally depends to a large extent on the type of funding which the 
bank uses. If retail deposits are an important source of funding, the loss associated 
with introducing competitive rates will obviously be large. If, however, the bank 
funds itself mainly in the interbank market, it has little to lose but much to gain by 
introducing competitive rates. As foreign banks may be more likely to fund 
themselves in the interbank market due to their restricted access to retail deposits, 
they are more likely to introduce competitive rates than domestic institutions.
1.4. Cross-border entry can increase quality and variety of services
Financial services firms compete not only on prices but also on the quality level of 
services provided. Quality of services, for example, include product variety, the 
qualification and quality of advice given by employees, the reliability of services, 
the number and appearance of branches or the convenience of delivery systems 
(e.g. possibility of home banking, accessability of insurer's sales force, opening 
hours of branches).
Foreign financial services firms can enter the domestic market and decide to 
compete on the quality level of services provided in addition to or instead of 
competing on prices. For example, if domestic firms do not invest sufficiently in 
the training of employees such that the quality and service level is low, a foreign 
firm may invest significantly in training in order to be able to offer better services 
to customers.
Foreign financial services firms may not only compete on the quality level 
but may decide to introduce new products in the domestic market which domestic 
firms were too slow to introduce. Foreign financial services firms frequently lead 
the way of introducing new products.12 Examples in banking include money 
market funds where there may be a (tacitly) collusive agreement between domestic 
banks not to introduce these products, as they constitute a highly effective 
substitute for demand and savings deposits but are usually more costly to the bank
11 This was the case in Spain (Citibank and Barclays Bank) and Germany where foreign-owned 
banks (KKB-Bank owned by Citicorp and CC-Bank owned jointly by Banco Santander and Royal 
Bank of Scotland) introduced current accounts with significantly positive rates, whereas domestic 
banks pay little or no interest (see the case studies in chapter seven).
12 For die case of Spain, for example, Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990) note that "foreign banks have 
led the way in introducing new financial products."
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than the traditional liability products due to higher interest rate costs and 
management fees. However, if a foreign bank decides to introduce such products 
domestic banks are quickly forced to follow suit, as has occurred in Spain, where 
money market funds were introduced by Barclays Bank and Citibank, and 
Germany where the large Swiss banks were the first to introduce this innovative 
product, forcing German banks to offer similar products only one year after the 
initial introduction by the Swiss banks. This example illustrates that new products 
are not a likely source of a continuous competitive advantage for foreign firms, as 
they are easily replicated by domestic firms, in particular if the newly introduced 
products turn out to be successful. I will discuss examples of new product and 
process introductions of foreign banks and insurers in more detail in chapters 
seven and eight.
Even if a competitve advantage arising from introducing new products or 
competing on the quality level may not last long for the foreign firm which may 
even withdraw again from the market, as many of the innovative US banks have 
in Europe, the consumer is likely to have benefited by having gained access to an 
increased choice of products and service level varieties which are now offered also 
by domestic firms. This stems from the fact that once domestic firms have 
incorporated new products into their product line, they are unlikely to drop them 
again due to likely resistance from customers.
2. The potential impact of cross-border entry: empirical data
2.1. The Price Waterhouse study on financial services: a critical assessment
The Price Waterhouse (PW) study on the "costs of non-Europe" in EC financial 
services (1988) attempts to quantify the likely effects of European market 
integration on prices of financial products. The study employs the following 
methodology: a sample of seven banking, four brokerage and five insurance 
products was selected and current prices or margins in eight EC countries 
identified. The average of the four lowest observations was calculated for each 
product and this measure was taken as a benchmark for the maximum possible 
price reductions after financial integration. To account for continued national 
divergences even after complete integration, these potential price reductions were 
adjusted downwards by one-half. The resulting margins are presented in figure
5.1. While the PW study differentiates between banking and brokerage services, I 
have included the two retail brokerage products in the banking data.
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Figure 5.1: Potential price reductions in financial services according to the PW 
study
Theoretical price 
reductions (in%)
Source: Price Waterhouse (1988, p.22/23)
For banking services, the largest price reductions are expected to occur in 
Spain, Germany and France. While in Spain all nine sample products are more 
expensive than the EC 8 average, with foreign exchange and mortgages being most 
expensive in Europe, it is consumer credit which contributes most significantly to 
the top positions of Germany, France and the UK.
It is apparent that prices for insurance and banking services are not 
necessarily correlated: Luxembourg, for example, which has a very open banking 
system with the lowest prices in the surveyed countries, has at the same time the 
second-highest premiums for insurance. This suggests that prices vary not only 
between countries, but also across sectors within the same country.
Prices for insurance products are notoriously difficult to compare across 
different countries. This stems from differing underlying risk and loss 
distributions which justify different premiums. Finsinger (1986, p.154) accounts for 
differences in underlying risk when comparing life insurance premiums in the 
highly regulated German market and the less tightly regulated British market and 
finds that the most expensive British firms charge 25 percent less than the 
cheapest German firms. He concludes that "regulation should be held responsible 
for the relatively high German net premiums". Finsinger's price data are 
confirmed by the PW-study (1988, p.113). Thus, despite the difficulties of 
international price differences in the insurance sector there seems to be substantial 
evidence that price levels vary significantly across European countries, at least 
partly due to different regulatory regimes.
165
Chapter 5
Since the estimates of the Price Waterhouse study constitute the basic input 
for the welfare calculations of the Cecchini report, it is worthwhile to take a closer 
look at the method of data collection in order to understand its limitations. While 
there has been some criticism of the conclusions drawn by the authors of the 
Cecchini report about the predictions concerning the persistence of price 
differences after 1992 (e.g. Melitz, 1989, p.401), our main criticism is more 
fundamental: a thorough examination of the Price Waterhouse approach to 
collecting data on price differences reveals crass methodological and statistical 
weaknesses, especially for the banking sector: for example, for two of the selected 
seven banking products, commercial drafts and traveller cheques, only one 
multinational bank with retail branches in all surveyed EC countries was included 
in the sample. This leads to a significant lack of representativeness of the price 
estimates for these products as the (foreign) bank whose prices were surveyed may 
pursue different pricing strategies than other domestic banks. In addition, for 
some other banking products the sample for each country includes only two banks 
which may lead to significant distortions and the inclusion of random price 
differences. The sample size for the banking data therefore appears too small to 
draw statistically valid inferences about the population. In the insurance sector, 
however, the sample size was higher with six to twelve companies surveyed in 
each country such that the insurance data appear more reliable.
Apart from this lack of statistical representativeness in the banking sector, the 
methodology employed in the PW study can be criticised for an even more 
important reason: it takes only insufficient account of joint products in banking 
and the resulting possibilities of cross-subsidisation. As a German banker noted in 
a personal interview:
"there is no point to compare prices for individual products, due to 
cross-subsidisation. When banks make their pricing decisions, they 
look at the whole product bundle and make sure the whole customer 
relationship is profitable, rather than performing cost-price analyses for 
individual products. It is well-known, for example, that some payment 
services are priced below costs, while losses in this area are more than 
compensated by the margins in demand and savings deposits."
The PW study, however, does not take account of such a possibility of cross­
subsidisation in the banking sector and therefore its price comparisons for selected 
products across European countries are likely to convey a distorted picture of 
actual price differences. Joint products are less common in the insurance sector 
where customers frequently maintain relationships with several insurers.
For these reasons, the Price Waterhouse banking price data which constitute 
the input for the welfare simulations lack representativeness and may therefore 
seriously flaw the calculations which are based on these data. Due to the 
methodological weaknesses of the PW study in the banking sector, I have chosen 
to repeat the price survey for six EC countries for the area of retail banking.
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2.2. Price and margin differences in retail banking: new international data for the 
EC
2.2.2. Methodology
Since data on price differences are crucial for predicting the competitive and 
welfare effects of increased foreign entry, I decided to collect new international 
data to get an idea of price differences across European countries. Prices in retail 
banking are easiest to compare, as public regulations in most EC countries require 
banks to publish their prices charged to personal customers. Published prices in 
retail banking, as usually posted in branches, do not always reflect actual prices, 
however: while in Germany or the UK posted and actual prices are identical,13 
there is a possibly significant divergence in Italy, for example. This results from 
discretion on the part of bank managers to determine freely the rates which are 
actually charged for retail services, whereas such price discrimination is legally 
prohibited in Germany and the UK. Nevertheless, posted prices convey an 
impression of the prices charged to most customers and in the actual price survey 
varying prices were taken into account by asking the bank managers to give an 
estimate of the range and most common prices charged.
In contrast, prices in the market for small-to-medium enterprises are 
virtually non-comparable, since there is considerable price discrimination both 
between customers and regions. It is quite common to find the same bank 
charging different prices for the same services in cities and rural areas or price 
discrimination between customers. Much depends on the level of regional and 
even local competition and the perceived attractiveness of the customer. Prices in 
this market are frequently negotiated rather than set at a fixed level. I therefore 
decided not to collect any data for this market segment, since they would most 
likely be distorted and convey a false picture of reality.
One observation which was made in the course of collecting price data in 
several EC countries was the lack of price transparency even in the retail banking 
area. This was especially the case, of course, in countries where prices are de facto 
negotiable rather than being set at a fixed level. But even in countries where prices 
are standardised and all customers are charged the same rates, price transparency is 
reduced by several factors: frequently, banks reduce transparency by offering 
'package' solutions where a basic price is paid for a package of bank transactions 
which include, for example, a credit card, current account, free cheques and giro 
transfers. Each bank offers its own individual package with a different content. 
Thus, while bank A's package may include free cash withdrawals, bank B may 
offer a package with free ATM transactions.
13 With very limited scope for branch managers to offer better conditions to their best customers.
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In order to be able to compare prices in such circumstances, a customer 
therefore needs to know exactly the quantities of transactions which she 
undertakes. A typical retail customer uses around ten to fifteen bank products qi, 
..., q„ per year. These are charged prices p i , ..., p». The relevant total cost for the 
consumer is therefore C(q, p) = Eqipi. Thus, a consumer first needs to know the 
exact quantities of each product which she uses. However, to determine such a 
'frequency distribution' of monthly or annual banking transactions requires not 
only considerable effort but bounded rationality may also impose inherent limits 
on such calculations.14 Consider now a customer who has nevertheless 
determined her average usage quantities q i , ..., qn. and calculates the total cost C(q, 
p) of the product bundles of two banks A and B, i.e. compares
In order to determine the cost of the two product bundles it is, of course, necessary 
to know individual prices for each of the products used. One may have doubts, 
however, whether consumers will actually undertake such a fairly complicated 
procedure for several banks.15
In order to take account of the problem of cross-subsidisation discussed 
above, it was decided to develop a typical customer profile drawing on a customer 
database of 115,000 personal customers of a large German bank.16 I performed a 
statistical analysis to determine the products which are used most frequently by 
personal customers and to get an insight into the average number of transactions 
for each product. The result of this analysis was a 'typical' product bundle of a 
personal customer on an annual basis. The products are shown in table 5.1.
14 Such an analysis may be aided by the monthly or quarterly bank statements, however, if these 
include all relevant transactions.
See the discussion of switching costs in chapterb four. In addition, there may be considerable 
irrationality and price insensitivity in the banking market: Ausubel (1991, p.70-72), for example, 
presents impressive evidence on consumer irrationality in the credit card market. US consumers 
borrow at extremely high interest rates on their credit cards despite the availability of much 
cheaper loan facilities from their bank.
This work was done while I was working as a summer associate for a consulting firm.
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Table 5.1: Typical product bundle and prices surveyed for personal customers
Prices surveyed
Current account Basic price (p.a.) with 200 transactions, 
interest rate on sight deposits
Savings account Interest rate on 6-months deposits (CDs)
Money market account Interest rate
Giro transfer Price per transaction;
Cash
deposit/withdrawal
Price per transaction;
ATM transaction Price per transaction;
Cheques/Eurocheques Price per cheque
Purchase/sale of shares Price per transaction of ECU 2,500;
Securities account Basic price p.a. for keeping 10,000 ECU account
Purchase/sale of bonds Price per transaction of ECU 2,500;
Traveller cheque Commission for $500 traveller cheques
Foreign exchange 
transaction
Margin above spot rate for $US and basket of 
four major EC currencies
Credit cards Basic Price (p.a.), interest rate for overdraft
Consumer credit Interest for current account overdraft, interest 
for loan of ECU 15,000 paid back over 5 years
Source: Own analysis drawing on database of large German bank.
Of course, it must be recognised that banking habits vary between European 
countries. For example, while ATM transactions are very common in the UK and 
Spain where ATMs have the greatest density, these may still be relatively rare in 
other EC countries. While Germans still deposit around fifty percent of their assets 
in simple low-yielding savings accounts, the French make much more use of 
money-market funds. The British use cheques to make ninety percent of domestic 
payments, while Germans use giro transfers, Eurocheques and automatic debit 
notes in about equal proportions. Thus, the product bundle needs be adapted to 
the country-specific banking habits to convey a true picture of the domestic price 
structure. Ideally, one would like to have a typical product bundle for each 
country. As this was unavailable, however, I constructed a typical product bundle 
on a heuristic basis in cooperation with bank officials in the other EC States.
For these product bundles in the personal customer sector, I surveyed prices 
in six European countries. These countries are Germany,17 the UK,18 Italy,19
17 jjj Germany these banks are Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, KKB Bank, BfG Bank, 
Sparkasse, Volks-und Raiffeisenbank, Norisbank, Bayrische Vereinsbank, Hypobank.
18 Barclays Bank, National Westminster, Midland, Lloyds, Abbey National, TSB, Royal Bank of 
Scotland.
169
Chapter 5
Belgium,20 the Netherlands,21 and France22. For each of these countries, the cost of 
a typical product bundle was determined and price differences are analysed.
2.22. The data
After I collected the data, prices were converted into ECU. In order to calculate and 
compare margins across the EC countries, the opportunity costs of funds needed to 
be determined for banks in each individual country. While the cost of funds 
obviously differ between banks depending on the structure of liabilities, an 
approximation is given by the money market rate (maturing of three months) 
which was decided to be taken as a yardstick against which margins were 
calculated. These were taken from the The Economist for the week in which the 
data were collected.
As an example of the calculations which were performed for each of the six 
EC countries, I analyse the case of Germany. The price structure of German retail 
banks is illustrated in table 5.2. It is evident that prices vary substantially for some 
individual products. In particular, the prices for the current account vary 
substantially between banks, while prices for products where price transparency is 
high such as credit cards or share and bond commissions are almost equal for all 
banks.
19 In Italy data were collected for Banco di Roma, Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Banca Toscana), 
Banco di Napoli, Banca Populare Novara, Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura, Banco Ambrosiano 
Veneto, Banca Nazionale delle Communicazioni, Banca d'America e d'Italia.
20 Generale Bank, Bank Brussels Lambert, Kredietbank, Credit Communal de Belgique, Bacob 
Savings Bank
21 ABN-AMRO Bank, Rabobank, NMB Postbank, Verenigde Spaarbank.
22 Credit Agricole, Credit Lyonnais, BNP, Societe Generale,
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Table 5.2: Price differences in German retail banking
Spread Mean
Interest on current account 0 - 2.5% 0.5%
Interest on savings account 25 - 3.5% 2.8%
Interest for consumer credit 13.2 -16. 2% 14.6%
Interest for negotiated 
overdraft
12.75 - 14.9% 14.2%
Cost of credit card p.a. 19.5-293 ECU 22 ECU
Cost of current account 
package
21-75 ECU 62 ECU
Eurocheque card pa. 4.8-9.8 ECU 5.4 ECU
Cost per cheque 0-0.07 ECU 02 ECU
Commission per share 
transaction
1% 1%
Commission per bond 
transaction
0.5% 0.5%
Cost p.a. of share/bond 
account
0.2 -1.71% 1.2%
Traveller cheques 1% 1%
Margin on foreign exchange 2.3 - 4.2% 3.2%
Source: Own price survey 1992.
Table 5.3 illustrates the basic findings of the price survey for the six EC 
countries.
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Table 5.3: Comparison of price and margin differences in retail banking for six EC 
countries
Prices are in ECU
FRG UK Italy Belg. Neth. France
Margin on curr. acc. +8.85% +8.8% +5.5% +9.1% +8.2% +9.97%
Margin on savings acc. +6.55% +3.65% +0.8% +2.7% +5.2% +5.5%
Margin on cons, credit +5.25% +12.3% +7.8% +6.2% +5.3% +5.1%
Cost pa. of curr. acc. 62 0 260 84 0 0
Cost of credit card p.a. 22 15 26 19 20 27
Commission per share 
transaction
1% 1.6% 0.7% 6% 1% 1.2%
Commission per bond 
transaction
1% 1.2% 0.5% 4% 1% 0.9%
Cost pa. of security 
account
50 0 35 0 35 34
Commission for $500 
traveller cheques
4 5 10 6 6 4
Margin on foreign 
exchange
3.2% 4.5% 4.2% 3.5% 4.5% 3.9%
Source: Own price survey 1992.
The data collected indicate significant differences in the pricing structure 
between the EC countries. In the UK, France and the Netherlands, for example, 
banks do not charge transaction costs on current accounts and therefore need to 
cross-subsidise the losses made in this area by charging high prices in other areas. 
The main area which is used for the purpose of cross-subsidisation seems to be 
consumer credit where UK banks charge more than twice than German banks. 
Brokerage transactions are particularly expensive in Belgium, even though no 
annual security account maintenance costs are charged. In France there is also a 
significant degree of cross-subsidisation but margins on intermediation services 
are lower than in the UK.23
2.2.3. Possible reasons for international price differences
From the collected data, it appears that price differences are significant across the 
EC countries. The Price Waterhouse study employs a simple mono-causal 
explanation. It states that "at present, in the non-integrated Europe the various 
barriers to the completion of the internal market in financial services result in
23 De Boisseu (1990b) notes that "French banks systematically overcharged intermediation 
operations" due to "underpricing of numerous ancillary and payments services".
172
The Impact on Domestic Competition
different prices being charged in different countries" (p.180). Price differentiation 
may be the result of a variety of other factors, however, only one of which are 
barriers to European market integration. Generally, one can identify four main 
reasons why prices for financial products may vary in different countries 
(Llewellyn, 1992):
• differences in the underlying cost, demand and technological conditions;
• differences in industry structure and conduct which lead to cost and price 
differentials (e.g. cross-subsidisation of different products);
• varying degrees of openness to foreign entry, resulting in different levels of 
intensity of domestic competition (e.g. high entry barriers facilitating 
collusion between domestic suppliers and thus leading to higher prices);
• regulatory differences, imposing different cost and pricing structures (e.g. 
reserve requirements).
Thus, whether price differences will persist even in a fully integrated European 
financial services market free of regulatory restrictions, is not only a question of 
reducing barriers to foreign entry, but depends on a variety of other factors.
2.2.4. Do higher prices lead to greater profits?
Banks enjoy widely varying degrees of profitability across the EC countries. Table 
5.4 reports a profitability measure, the return on assets (ROA) for nine EC 
countries.24 Since annual reported profits may vary significantly from year to year, 
especially due to the high write-offs on LDC loans which all banks spread 
differently over the reporting periods, an average figure for the four-year period 
from 1986 to 1989 is reported in order to even out such fluctuations. In addition, a 
net income figure is reported which in the OECD accounts is defined as profits 
before bad debt provisions and taxes. This figure is less biased by provisions for 
LDC loans. Data were taken from the latest OECD report on bank profitability 
(1991).
24 No data for Ireland and Greece were available. Luxembourg was excluded due to the high number 
of foreign banks which do not operate in domestic commercial banking.
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Table 5.4: Return on assets for EC commerical banks from 1986 to 1989
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Source: own calculation from data in OECD (1991).
A comparative analysis of accounting measures encounters well-known 
problem s stem m ing from different accounting, legal and regulatory  
environments, and therefore has to be pursued cautiously. Spanish banks, for 
example, provide fairly high bad debt provisions, reducing reported operating 
profits, while German banks and insurers may have large hidden reserves which 
do not appear in published accounts. Danish banks, on the other hand, are 
required to value security holdings at current market prices at the end of each 
financial year which leads to high fluctuations in operating profits.
Despite these differences in accounting conventions which make cross­
country comparisons more difficult, it seems fairly clear that banks enjoy the 
highest profitability in Spain and Italy for the period 1986 to 1989. UK banks had 
particularly high provisions for bad loans and therefore after-tax profits were 
significantly lower than net income.
Table 5.5 presents performance measures for the non-life sector in five EC 
countries which were averaged out over the time period from 1985 to 1989. 
Unfortunately, data for other EC countries were not available.
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Table 5.5 Operating results of non-life insurers in five EC countries over 1985 to 
1989 time period
Return on assets Return on equity
underwriting 
results (in % of 
premia)
investment income 
(in % of premia)
Germany 2.5 16.6 1.3 9.1
France 1.1 8.5 -11.1 14.2
Italy 1.1 7.5 -12.5 16.3
UK* n.a. n.a. -11.8 15.1
Netherl. 2.1 7.7 -55 11.1
* data for the UK are for 1982 to 1986
Source: own calculation from data in Sigma 3/1988; 6/1991.
It becomes apparent that insurers in Germany achieved the highest 
profitability both in terms of return on assets and return on equity. This results 
primarily from positive underwriting results which contrasted with negative 
results in the other four EC countries. Underwriting losses in these countries 
were more than compensated by higher investment income, however, such that 
the overall results were positive in all countries during all years.
2.3. Differing efficiency levels in European financial services: the example of 
labour productivity
In order to measure internal efficiency in banking I report some data on labour 
productivity in table 5.6. W represents remuneration per employee in banking 
divided by the national average for all industries and provides an indicator of the 
wage level in banking relative to other sectors. L represents bank assets (in 
thousand ECUs) divided by the number of employees in banking and constitutes 
an approximation of labour productivity. P represents personnel costs as a 
percentage of total banking assets in 1989.
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Table 5.6: Wage levels and productivity in banking in 10 EC countries
W L P
Italy 2.1 940 2.2
UK 2.0 1,387 1.0
Belgium 1.9 917 0.9
Luxemb. 1.9 3,701 0.3
Greece 1.8 874 1.8
Spain 1.7 822 2.2
France 1.6 788 1.2
Denmark 1.3 750 1.3
Netherl. 1.2 1,035 1.2
Germany 1.1 1,022 1.4
Source: Neven (1990, p.173) and own calculation from data in OECD (1991).
Wages in banking seem to be particularly high in Italy, compared to the 
industry average. Even though the UK, Belgium and Luxembourg have similarly 
high levels as Italy, one has to take into account that wage levels are naturally 
higher in these countries due to the fact that they host major financial centres and 
thus include a relatively greater proportion of high salaries of investment banking 
employees.
High wage levels and personnel costs in Italy, Spain and Greece are combined 
with low labour productivity. This seems to suggest that there may be a significant 
degree of X-inefficiency in these countries, as domestic banks fail to minimise 
costs.
2.4. Collusive equilibria in banking: the example of deposit interest rates
Table 5.7 reports average margins on demand and savings deposits for 1991 in six 
EC countries and compares these with the margins for the period from 1980 to 
1985. These are calculated as the three-months money market rate rate less the 
average interest rate paid on 3 to 6-months retail deposits.
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Table 5.7: Average margins for demand and savings deposits in 1991
Margin on demand dep. Margin on savings dep.
1980-85 1992 1980-85 1992
Germany 6.5 8.85 2.8 6.55
UK 10.8 8.80 2.5 3.65
Italy 4.3 5.50 3.4 0.80
Netherl. 5.6 8.20 2.8 5.20
France 11.7 9.97 4.3 5.50
Belgium 11.2 9.10 5.6 2.70
Source: 1980-85: Baltensperger and Dermine (1990); 1992: own price survey.
It appears that margins have not decreased significantly even though 
competition in the area of interest rates has markedly increased in some countries 
such as the UK. Despite the arguments in favour of sticking to a collusive 
agreement on paying low deposit interest rates reviewed in section 1.3, some 
players cheated by introducing interest-bearing deposit accounts and thus spoiled 
the cooperative equilibrium, instigating a costly 'interest rate' war. In the UK, 
building societies were the first to introduce such accounts prompting first 
Midland and Lloyds and then also Barclays and Nat West to follow suit in 1989.
In the UK, building societies were quite successful in capturing market share 
after introducing interest-bearing current accounts (Llewellyn, 1990). This was 
mainly due to the rather lagged response of the clearing banks which were slow to 
recognise the jeopardy of losing customers to the new entrants. It seems that by 
1991, however, the 'interest rate war' has settled down with margins having 
increased back to the level of the beginning of the 1980s.
2.5. Quality levels in retail banking
Quality levels in banking are hard to quantify, since one cannot put a price on the 
quality of advice given by employees. As an example of the convenience of the 
delivery system I look at opening hours of retail branches in the European 
countries. Table 5.8 illustrates these for eight EC countries.
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Table 5.8: Opening hours of retail branches in eight EC countries in 1992
Opening hours Total per week
UK weekdays: 9.00 - 17.00, Saturdays: 9.00 - 12.00 43 hours
Germany only weekdays: 8.30 - 16.00(Thursdays: 18.00, 
Fridays: 15.30), smaller branches close for 
lunch for one hour,
39 hours
Italy only weekdays: 8.20 - 13.20; 14.45 -15.45 30 hours
Belgium only weekdays: 9.00 - 12.30,13.30-16.00, large 
branches do not close for lunch
30 hours
Greece Mon. - Thursd.: 8.00 - 14.00; Fridays: 8.00 - 
13.30
275 hours
France 9.00 -12.00; 14.00 -16.00; large branches do not 
close for lunch
25 hours
Spain 9.00 -14.00; in winter also Saturdays 9.00-13.00 25 hours
Portugal only weekdays: 8.30 -11.45; 13.00 - 14.45 25 hours
Source: Own survey.
Table 5.8 shows that there are significant differences in the accessability of 
branches to customers ranging from 43 hours in the UK to only 25 hours in 
Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal. While opening hours are at least partly 
related to labour laws and the power of labour unions in a particular country, they 
are also a result of the degree of competition. This becomes apparent looking at the 
example of the UK where over recent years opening hours were expanded to 
include Saturday openings which were first introduced by Lloyds in 1987, forcing 
the other major clearing banks to follow suit. One may expect that as competition 
increases, banks will be be forced to make more efficient use of their main delivery 
channel, increasing the accessability of bank branches to their retail customers.
3. Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the potential impact of foreign entry on domestic 
competition in retail financial services. It was shown that for the simple case of 
Cournot competition in deposit markets both cross-border acquisitions and de 
novo entry lead to higher deposit rates and thus to an increase in consumer 
surplus. As domestic firms lose market share to foreign entrants, however, 
domestic producer surplus decreases and this decrease may outweigh the increase 
in consumer surplus.
In addition to stimulating price competition, cross-border entry may spoil 
domestic collusive equilibria such as (tacit) agreements not to compete on deposit 
rates or agreements to fix insurance premiums. Further, foreign financial services 
firms can bring new expertise to the market in the form of introducing new
178
The Impact on Domestic Competition
products or may increase quality competition by offering existing products at a 
higher quality level. Finally, if foreign entrants are more cost-efficient than 
domestic firms this may induce a restructuring of domestic firms and reduce X- 
inefficiency.
A close analysis of the Price Waterhouse study reveals that there are some 
insufficiencies concerning statistical sampling in particular in the banking sector 
and it was therefore decided to gather additional data on price differences in retail 
banking across six EC countries. It became obvious that there are significant 
differences in the pricing structure of retail products across the EC countries. The 
degree of cross-subsidisation is particularly high in the UK, France and the 
Netherlands where banks charge no transaction costs on the current account. 
Losses in this area are subsidised by high margins in the area of consumer credit, 
especially in the UK.
In order to examine the degree of X-inefficiency, an analysis of wage and 
productivity levels in banking was undertaken. It was shown that wage and 
personnel expenses were high and labour productivity low in Italy, Spain and 
Greece which provides evidence for some inefficiencies in these countries.
As an example of the quality level in retail banking opening hours of retail 
branches were compared across the EC countries and it was shown that there are 
substantial differences in the accessability of branches. As competition increases, 
one may expect banks to make more efficient use of their main delivery channel.
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Chapter Six:
The Scale of Cross-Border Entry 
in EC Financial Services: 
an Aggregate Analysis
This chapter provides an aggregate overview of cross-border trade activities, 
majority and minority acquisitions, joint ventures, strategic alliances and de 
novo entry for the EC as a whole, as well as analysing trends for different EC 
countries. In order to evaluate the relative importance of cross-border entry 
activities in European financial services, these have to be assessed in a time- 
series and comparative perspective. In this chapter I therefore present and 
analyse existing and newly collected statistical data and thereby deal with the 
following questions:
• has there been an increase in cross-border entry activity in the most 
recent past and which form of entry has increased most significantly?
• can we distinguish significantly different trends in cross-border 
transactions for different EC countries?
• which countries are the main targets of foreign entry activity and 
which are the main acquirers?
• what is the preferred mode of cross-border entry?
• are there significantly diverging trends in entry activity by EC and non- 
EC institutions?
In the next section I analyse intra-EC cross-border entry activities, 
whereas section two I examine entry into the EC by non-EC banks and 
insurers. As there is currently no comprehensive database for cross-border 
entry in EC financial services, data from various private and public sources 
needed to be compiled, analysed and synthesised into a database listed in the 
appendices.
1. The extent of cross-border entry in EC financial services: intra-EC 
activities
To ensure international comparability of cross-border entry data, it is 
imperative to define clearly what constitutes cross-border entry in the 
different EC countries for the purposes of the study.1 I follow the definitions
1 Concerning cross-border acquisitions, for example, Franks and Mayer (1990, p.198), note "how 
sensitive international comparisons of acquisition activity are to definitions of a takeover".
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given in chapter one, concerning exports, acquisitions, joint ventures, 
strategic alliances and de novo entry.
1.1. International trade in financial services
I first look at the development of exporting and importing of financial 
services over the past decade. Table 6.1 shows data on the development of 
intra-EC trade in financial services which were derived from the 1991 foreign 
trade statistics data of Eurostat. Intra-EC trade is hereby defined as cross-border 
provision of services between any two EC countries. Credits are exports to 
another EC country and debits are imports. As is apparent from the table, 
exports have increased more significantly than imports both in absolute terms 
as well as expressed as a percentage of international trade in all services. Total 
services' include the three categories transport, travel and 'other services' such 
as advertising and business services. Intra-EC trade in financial services 
accounts only for a small proportion of total intra-EC services trade, however. 
This reflects the difficulty of exporting or importing financial services in 
particular in mass retail services. Those services which are traded are mainly 
large-scale international loans for governments or multinational firms and 
reinsurance activities.
Table 6.1: Intra-EC trade in financial services 
(in million ECU)
Credits
Banking
in % of
total
services
Debits
Banking
in % of
total
services
Credits
Insurance
in % of
total
services
Debits
Insurance
in % of
total
services
1980 918 1.6% 902 1.6% 947 1.6% 1,051 1.9%
1982 1300 1.8% 1,373 2.1% 1,370 1.9% 1,302 2.0%
1984 1,700 2.1% 1305 2.0% 1,772 2.1% 1,879 2.5%
1986 2,238 2.5% 1,836 2.1% 3,320 3.7% 2.238 2.6%
1988 3,064 3.0% 2,456 2.4% 2,592 2.5% 2,342 2.3%
CAGR +16.2 % +13.3 % +13.4% +10.5%
Total services include travel, transport and other services (e.g. advertising, business services)
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate
Source: own compilation from Eurostat, International Trade in Services, 1991; Series 6D.
From table 6.1 it is also apparent that intra-EC trade is approximately of 
the same magnitude in insurance and banking services. Table 6.2 presents the 
same type of data for extra-EC trade. This concerns trade of EC countries with 
non-EC nations. In absolute terms extra-EC is clearly more significant than 
intra-EC trade. In 1988 both credits and debits were more than twice as large 
for extra-EC trade than for intra-EC trade. As a percentage of total services 
extra-EC trade also plays a limited overall role, however. Exports have 
increased by more than imports with the EC being a net exporter of both 
banking and insurance services. Thus, free trade in financial services enables
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the EC countries to succesfully penetrate non-Member states which should be 
borne in mind in the current GATT-negotiations over services trade 
liberalisation.
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Table 6.2: Extra-EC trade in financial services
(in million ECU)
Credits
Banking
in % of
total
services
Debits
Banking
in % of
total
services
Credits
Insurance
in % of
total
services
Debits
Insurance
in % of
total
services
1980 2,440 1.9% 2,132 1.8% 2310 1.8% 2,299 1.9%
1982 3,628 2.2% 3,643 2.4% 3,404 2.0% 2,872 1.9%
1984 4,591 2.3% 3,132 1.8% 4334 2.2% 4,069 2.4%
1986 5,863 2.9% 3,749 2.1% 7331 3.6% 4,205 2.3%
1988 7,536 3.4% 5,082 2.4% 6,175 2.8% 4,721 2.2%
CAGR + 15.1 % +11.5 % +13.1% +9.4%
Total services include travel, transport and other services (e.g. advertising, business services)
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate
Source: own compilation from Eurostat, International Trade in Services, 1991; 6D.
From figure 6.1 which shows trade in financial services in 1988 it is 
evident that the significance of trade varies greatly between the EC countries. 
Especially the UK and to a lesser extent France are net exporters of both 
banking and insurance services. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and especially 
Germany are are all net importers of insurance, while being net exporters of 
banking services.
Table 6.3 shows trade in banking services for the EC countries. The data 
refer to loans and deposits to non-banks and are therefore not distorted by the 
international interbank market. The first two columns represent imports and 
exports of credits, i.e. loans to residents. Imports therefore represent loans by 
foreign banks to domestic residents, whereas exports refer to international 
loans by domestic banks to residents in foreign countries. The biggest 
importers of bank credits are Germany and Italy. This seems somewhat 
surprising considering the low penetration of foreign banks of these markets. 
Less su rp ris in g ly , the biggest exporters of bank cred it are 
Belgium/Luxembourg with the latter country being a booking centre for loans 
due to its favourable regulatory and tax system and the UK which is home to 
the world's most internationalised financial centre.
The next two columns refer to cross-border deposits. Imports thus 
represent deposits of non-residents (both firms and individuals) at domestic 
banks, whereas exports stand for deposits of domestic residents at foreign 
banks abroad. The biggest importer of deposits is the UK, followed by 
Belgium/Luxembourg and France. Germany has the biggest flow of deposits 
into foreign countries.
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Figure 6.1: Net trade of 9 EC countries with world in financial services in 1988 
millions ECU
3000 «I»
Source: own compilation from Eurostat, International Trade in Services, 1991; 6D.
Table 6.3: Trade in banking services in 1990 
In $ billion
Imports of 
credits
Exports of 
credits
Net
exports
Imports of 
deposits
Exports of 
deposits
Net
exports
Denmark 33.7 6.4 -27.3 2.5 3.6 +1.1
Portugal 8.1 0 -8.1 0.4 4.7 +4.3
Netherl. 53.9 49.3 -4.6 59.0 53.1 -5.9
Italy* 72.8 0 -72.8 31.3 0 -31.1
Belg/Lux 27.8 185.8 + 158 188.7 39.6 - 149.1
Germany 83.6 112.1 + 28.5 61.7 122.1 + 60.4
Spain 17.8 13.6 -4.2 26.5 13.7 -12.8
France 29.4 141.9 + 1125 127 44.5 -82.5
UK 55.4 259.4 + 204.0 322.4 67.4 -255.0
* Data for are for 1988
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, 1992.
As part of aggregate banking output, cross-border provision of financial 
services as a form of 'exporting' is still of limited overall significance, 
however. Neven (1990, p.157) calculates export/output ratios for the EC 
countries. The biggest exporter is the UK but even here exports as part of total 
banking output do not exceed 9.7 percent.
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1.2. Cross-border acquisitions
Figure 6.2 lists the number and value of cross-border majority acquisitions for 
the main EC industries in 1989. It is obvious that cross-border activity has 
been highest in financial services, both in terms of disclosed value of deals 
and also concerning the absolute number of transactions. This underlines 
that cross-border acquisitions in financial services constitute a significant 
means of cross-border entry even when comparing it to other industries such 
as chemicals and food&beverages which traditionally have been characterised 
by high merger and acquisition activities.
Figure 6.2: Number and value of cross-border majority acquisitions in 
European industries in 1989
Disclosed value in $ billion
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Source: Translink as quoted in M&A Europe, 1/1990.
184
The most consistent data on acquisition activity in the financial services 
sector are those provided by the Commission of the European Communities. 
Figure 6.3 gives an overview of acquisitions (both national and cross-border) 
in the financial services sector in the EC since 1975, as surveyed by the 
Directorate General for Competition in its annual reports on competition 
policy. No data were collected between 1981 and 1983 resulting in a structural 
break and hindering direct comparison of the two time series from 1975 to 
1981 and 1984 to 1991.
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Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that there has been a significant 
increase in acquisition activity over the past decade. In the second part of the 
1970s, acquisition activity stayed relatively constant with few fluctuations. 
The 1980s, however, have witnessed a dramatic expansion of acquisition 
activities, especially since 1986 but levelling off again in 1990/91. Whether the 
increase in acquisition activity is due to the vision of a single European 
financial market cannot be ascertained at this stage, without undertaking a 
more detailed analysis of the motives of these transactions. Yet, the increase 
in M&A activity is not unique to financial services: other industries have 
witnessed a similar increase in acquisition activity. Nevertheless, the increase 
in financial services acquisition activities seems to have been particularly 
pronounced.
Figure 6.3: Number of acquisitions in EC financial services from 1975 to 1991
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Note: 1980/81 indudes business services, renting leasing and hiring; index is re-based in 1984/85
Source: own compilation from various issues of the annual reports on competition policy, 
Commission of the EC, 1976-1992.
The Commission of the EC in its annual reports on competition policy 
has published separate data on majority and minority acquisitions in EC 
financial services only since 1984/85. It has thereby differentiated between 
two types of cross-border transactions: those where EC companies from 
different member states are involved ('EC mergers'), and transactions
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between EC firms and companies from outside the Community with "effects 
on the Community market" ('international mergers').
Figure 6.4 reports the development of majority acquisitions in EC 
banking and insurance since 1984/85. International acquisitions have been 
rising steadily over the past five years with a compound annual growth rate 
of sixty percent. Intra-EC acquisitions experienced a negative trend until 1986, 
but increased substantially since then.
Minority acquisitions have also risen continuously from 1984/85 to 
1989/90. Again, international transactions outnumber intra-EC deals with an 
annual growth rate of almost forty-five percent, compared to twenty-eight 
percent for EC acquisitions. This illustrates the desire of non-EC institutions 
to gain a foothold in the EC market by acquiring an interest in EC institutions. 
A comparison of figures 6.4 and 6.5 shows that the number of minority 
acquisitions exceeds that of majority stakes. This is quite distinct from the 
situation in other industries, where majority deals by far outnum ber 
minority transactions2 and may result from the larger capital requirements 
necessary for taking over a financial institution, as compared to an industrial 
firm,3 as well as the lack of suitable targets for majority acquisitions in most 
EC countries.
The decline in both majority and minority acquisitions in 1990/91, only 
one year before the target date for the European internal market, seems to 
indicate that most financial services firms have already carried out their 
European cross-border acquisitions in the years before.4 Since firms have 
anticipated the '1992' date in their strategic planning since 1987, one may 
expect that the number of cross-border acquisitions has peaked in 1989/90.
Scale of Cross-Border Entry
2 See EC (1991, p.228-30).
3 It has been estimated that acquiring a European bank requires a premium of 30-40% over net 
asset value (see 'Against the urge to merge', The Banker, p.192, July 1990).
4 This became also apparent in the personal interviews which are reported in the next 
chapters.
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Figure 6.4: Majority acquisitions in EC financial services
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Source: Report on Competition Policy, EC (1992).
Figure 6.5: Minority acquisitions in EC financial services
ill extra-EC 
insurance
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insurance
I  extra-EC banking
I  intra-EC banking
Source: Report on Competition Policy, EC (1992).
The data published by the EC Commission are strictly on an industry 
level and do not allow firm-level disaggregation. Thus, no additional 
analyses besides those listed in the report on competition policy can be 
undertaken. Furthermore, the Commission does not collect data on de novo 
entries and strategic alliances.
To remedy this situation I decided to build up a comprehensive firm- 
level database of EC acquisitions. Rather than collecting data on a random 
basis, I decided to proceed systematically by first identifying the largest EC
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banks and insurers from the annual listing of the world's 1,000 largest banks 
in the magazine The Banker and the Financial Times listing of the largest EC 
firms and then surveying various public sources on cross-border acquisitions 
and other entry activities. This was supplemented by a systematic analysis of 
press clippings and annual reports. I found that for banks there was a 'natural' 
cut-off point for the sample around EC rank 60 of the Banker's annual listing, 
as smaller banks are characterised by very few cross-border entry activities. 
Thus, banks ranked between places 60 and 100 usually pursue few cross- 
border entry activities, while banks on places 100 and above almost 
exclusively operate in domestic markets. This finding corresponds to the 
prevalent notion among practitioners that only the biggest banks are 
significant players in cross-border operations.5 Similarly, in insurance the 
largest forty EC firms are by far the most active as far as cross-border entry 
activities are concerned. The database therefore includes the largest sixty EC 
banks and the largest forty EC insurers, both ranked in terms of their capital.
The second decision which needed to be made before constructing the 
database was the time period covered. Since the focus of the study is on the 
impact of the internal market on the financial services sector, I decided that 
1986 would be the best base year, as the Single European Act was passed at the 
beginning of that year. The resulting database therefore covers cross-border 
entry activities from January 1986 to the beginning of 1992.
Concerning cross-border acquisitions, the database includes 243 intra-EC 
majority and minority acquisitions, which are listed individually in 
appendices one and two. Table 6.4 provides a list of the biggest cross-border 
majority acquisitions between 1986 and 1992. These are valued in ECU at the 
time of the transaction. Since the actual price paid for the acquisition is not 
always revealed, the transaction value had to be approximated by the size of 
the acquired firm's capital multiplied by the acquired percentage stake. Thus, 
the absolute figure does not necessarily conyey a true picture of the actual 
transaction value but is likely to understate the actual price paid, as 
substantial premiums over capital size are not uncommon especially in 
banking acquisitions. For example, Deutsche Bank actually paid $603 million 
for Banca d'America e d'ltalia, almost twice its size of capital. As the actual 
price of most of the other acquisitions is not revealed, however, I decided to 
stick with the approximation even for cases where the purchase price is 
known in order to facilitate comparisons. Transaction values in the database 
thus convey an impression of the relative value of the acquisition rather 
than providing an accurate account of the actual size of the deal.6
5 In France, for example, the biggest three banks accounted for two thirds of the foreign direct 
investment of French banks, while the largest seven institutions claim 98.2 percent of banks' 
FDI (see Commission Bancaire, Rapport Annuel 1986). Our sample of the largest 60 EC banks 
includes the largest ten French banks and therefore captures the vast majority of cross-border 
entry activities. Similar data can be reported for other European countries.
* An alternative approach would have been to calculate the average difference between 
capital size and purchase price and apply it to those transactions where the purchase price is 
unknown. Since the purchase price is usually known for only the largest transactions and the
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Table 6.4 The biggest intra-EC cross-border majority acquisitions between 1986 
and 1992
Banking:
Acquiror Acquired bank Year of 
transaction
Approximated 
value of 
transaction
Deutsche Bank Morgan Grenfell, UK 1989 ECU 500 million
Credit Lyonnais Slavenburg's Bank, Netherl. 1987 ECU 416 million
Deutsche Bank Banca d'America e d'ltalia, Italy 1986 ECU 293 million
Credit Lyonnais Banco Comercial Espanol, Spain 1990/91 ECU 250 million
Barclays Bank L'Europenne de Banque, France 1990 ECU 245 million
Barclays Bank Merck Fink, Germany 1990 ECU 160 million
National Westminster Banque de L'Union Europenne, France 1988 ECU 123million
Amro Bank Frankfurter Kreditbank, Germany 1990 ECU 97 million
National Westminster Banco Nat West March, Spain 1985/89 ECU 84 million
Insurance:
Acquiror Acquired insurer Year of 
transaction
Acquisition
price
Victoire (Suez) Colonia, Germany 1989 ECU 2 billion*
Allianz Rhin et Moselle, France 1989 ECU 930 million
UAP/Liberty Life Sun Life, UK 1989/91 ECU 771 million
Axa Equity and Law, UK 1987 ECU 675 million
Allianz RAS, Italy 1987 ECU 560 million
Allianz Comhill Insurance, UK 1986 ECU 450 million
Victoire (Suez) Niew Rotterdam, Netherl. 1989 ECU 350 million
* estimated
Source: Appendices 1 and 2.
With Deutsche Bank's acquisition of Morgan Grenfell, the largest 
transaction in banking so far has been in the area of investment rather than 
retail banking. The other banking acquisitions, however, were broadly in the 
area of retail banking with some of the acquired banks being specialists in 
particular areas of banking, such as Merck, Fink & Co. focusing on private 
banking. It is further obvious and not surprising that the largest cross-border 
acquisitions are undertaken by the largest European banks. No clear country 
focus can be identified with the largest acquisitions being evenly distributed 
across the largest EC economies. Both in absolute and relative terms, 
Germany's Deutsche Bank has so far been the biggest acquiror, followed by 
Credit Lyonnais, Barclays and National Westminster.
premium may be higher for these transactions, there is a danger of overestimating the 
purchase price for smaller transactions. I therefore decided to stick with objectively verifiable 
data.
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In insurance it is also the largest firms which have so far undertaken the 
biggest acquisitions. The most active acquiror has been Allianz which has 
followed an expansionary internationalisation strategy (see chapter eight). 
Allianz is followed by Suez (Victoire) which has undertaken the largest cross- 
border transaction so far, acquiring 52 percent of Germany's Colonia, the 
second-largest insurer in the country for an estimated price of more than 
ECU2 billion.
Can we identify a clearer trend of the target countries of majority 
acquisitions when including the whole sample of transactions between 1986 
and 1992? On a more aggregated level, figure 6.6 provides an analysis of target 
countries both in terms of number of transactions and in terms of estimated 
transaction value for 51 majority acquisitions of the largest 60 banks.
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Figure 6.6: Target countries by number and transaction value in EC banking 
majority acquisitions
By number of By estimated value
transactions of transactions
6%
2.8%
Basis: 51 majority acquisitions between 1986 and 1992 with an estimated total transaction value 
of ECU 2,869 million.
Source: Appendix 1. *
Cross-border entry by means of majority acquisitions has been most 
significant in France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, in that order. 
France and Germany are naturally attractive, since they are the largest 
economies in the EC. Spain has been the target of frequent cross-border 
acquisitions as it is perceived to have significant market potential and 
domestic banks were long considered to be complacent. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the regulatory barriers to cross-border entry which existed 
in Spain until 1989 have apparently not lead to a reduction in the number of 
inward acquisitions. It is also interesting to see that in the UK with its 
complete absence of regulatory entry barriers there have been very few 
acquisitions by other EC banks in the commercial banking field which
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contrasts with a large number of acquisitions in the investment banking and 
brokerage field (see below).
Figure 6.7 presents the same analysis for the insurance sector. As data on 
the transaction value of the acquisitions were scarcely available, target 
countries had to be analysed by the number of inward acquisitions only.
Figure 6.7: Target countries by number in EC insurance majority acquisitions
3.3%
Germany14.7%
18%
14.7%
19.7%
6.6%
Netheri.
4.9%
Basis: 61 majority acquisitions between 1986 and 1992 
Source: Appendix 2.
From figure 6.7 it becomes apparent that the largest number of inward 
acquisitions has so far taken place in the UK, Italy and Spain. Italy and Spain 
in particular are perceived to have significant market potential, as they are 
currently underdeveloped in terms of insurance coverage. Germany in 
contrast has witnessed very few inward acquisitions despite the fact that it is 
the largest insurance market in Europe. This is likely to be a result of the 
significant regulatory entry barriers which make foreign entry in Germany 
more difficult.
Is there a significant difference between the target countries of majority 
and minority acquisitions? Figure 6.8 presents an analysis of the target 
countries of minority acquisitions for both banking and insurance.
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Figure 6.8: Target countries in EC banking and insurance minority 
acquisitions
Insurance Banking
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Basis: 66 minority acquisitions between 1986 and 1992 
Source: Appendices 1 and 2.
In banking, Italy and France are the countries with the most minority 
acquisitions, followed by Spain and the UK. In the insurance sector, France 
and Spain followed by Italy and Germany hold the lead positions. Minority 
acquisitions may reflect a cautious approach on the part of foreign firms 
when entering these markets. Rather than taking the risk of fully acquiring a 
firm, entrants prefer first to gain experience in the target market by setting up 
a minority stake in a foreign bank or insurer, sometimes accompanied by a 
cooperative agreement or alliance, with the option of expanding it later into a 
majority stake.
In the database a classification was undertaken into the areas of retail or 
commercial banking on the one hand and brokerage and investment banking 
on the other. While this differentiation is at odds with our broad definition 
of universal banking, it allows a better analysis of the latter category. In figure
6.9 an analysis of the target countries of both majority and minority 
acquisitions is given.
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Figure 6.9: Target countries of majority and minority acquisitions in 
brokerage and investment banking
Majority Acquisitions Minority Acquisitions
Basis: 17 majority and 23 minority acquisitions between 1986 and 1991 
Source: Appendix 1.
It is obvious that the UK with London as Europe's leading financial 
centre attracts the greatest entry activity in the area of brokerage, fund 
management and investment banking. The leading position of the UK is 
much more pronounced in majority than minority acquisitions which may 
reflect the requirement for most big European banks to maintain or acquire a 
definite presence in London. Minority acquisitions are significant in Spain 
which may reflect the cautious strategy of foreign entrants.
Finally, one can observe the conspicuous absence of countries with 
universal bank systems such as Germany from the list of target countries.7 
Thus, foreign entrants who want to enter brokerage or investment banking 
services in these countries have to choose de novo entry, since there are few 
specialised firms which could be acquired in these countries.
7 Entry into the German market is made even more difficult by German company law which 
proffers the option of limiting voting rights, as was illustrated in the legal battle between 
German Aachener& Miinchner Insurance and French AGF which held a 25 percent stake but was 
denied appropriate voting rights for a considerable period of time.
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1.3. Joint Ventures
Cross-border joint ventures in European financial services play a less 
significant role in cross-border activities than cross-border acquisitions. Figure
6.10 reports the number of joint ventures from 1984 to 1991.
Figure 6.10: Cross-border joint ventures in EC financial services from 1984 to
8 4 / 8 5  8 5 / 8 6  8 6 / 8 7  8 7 / 8 8  8 8 / 8 9  8 9 / 9 0  9 0 / 91  
Source: EC Competition Policy Reports, 1987 and 1992.
Nevertheless, the number of joint ventures in financial services is not 
significantly lower than in other industries. This may be surprising at first 
sight, since most industrial joint ventures are in the area of R&D, which 
plays only a minor role in financial services. Similar to cross-border 
acquisitions, there was a greater number of JVs in the banking sector than in 
the insurance sector.
The database listed in appendix one contains 34 joint ventures of the 60 
largest European banks between 1986 and 1991. A classification of the main 
area of the banking JVs is shown in figure 6.11. It illustrates that the greatest 
number of JVs are in the area of corporate finance including merger and 
acquisition services and buy-outs. A qualitative analysis of the JVs reveals 
that of the seven banking joint ventures, six are in non-EC countries, more 
recently particularly in Eastern European countries.8 This seems to suggest
8 Examples are the 1991 JV between Dresdner Bank and BNP which cooperate with Hungary's 
OKHB bank to provide trade and project finance in Hungary or the International Moscow Bank,
1991
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that banks preferably engage in general banking JVs to enter markets where 
they have not been present before, as this allows them to share the entry risk 
and to draw from common expertise.
Figure 6.11: Classification of joint ventures
Number 
of JVs
corporate banking mortgages, fund credit investment leasing,
finance ^  management cards company factoring
Source: Appendix 1
Another popular area of cross-border banking joint ventures is credit 
cards where one bank may own a card logo and establishes a joint venture 
with other foreign banks to distribute the card and establish the processing 
facilities. Also the development of supra-national means of payments such as 
the Eurocheque system and ATM machines compatible to the EC-card are 
examples of joint ventures. One of the most widely used credit cards in 
Europe, the 'Eurocard' (Access in the UK) is also organised as a joint venture 
in some EC countries. In Germany, for example, a credit card company (GZS) 
was set up as a joint venture of the main German banks which each own a 
stake in the firm. This company was responsible for the marketing, 
distribution and processing of the Eurocard. Most recently, however, as the 
Eurocard has increasingly come under pressure from other credit cards both 
marketing and distribution were decentralised with each bank now selling 
their own version of the Eurocard. Processing, on the other hand, where 
significant scale economies are likely to favour centralisation is continued to 
be handled by the JV firm.
Concerning the number of participants, we find that a surprisingly high 
number of JVs have more than two stake-holders: 41 percent of JVs have 
three or more participants. This shows that banks are not deterred from 
entering agreements where ownership is not clearly defined and business 
policy always needs to be determined in cooperation with two or more 
partners in the JV.
a JV between Bayrische Vereinsbank, Credit Lyonnais, Banca Commerciale Italiana and other 
Western banks.
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In the insurance sector there are 19 joint ventures recorded for the 
largest forty EC insurers. The vast majority of these JVs are in Italy or Spain 
and are between domestic banks in these countries and large insurers from 
the UK, France and Germany. I discuss an example of such a distribution 
alliance in chapter eight.
1.4. Strategic alliances and cooperations
Strategic alliances play a significant role in European banking, whereas they 
seem to play a smaller role in the insurance sector. In the insurance field we 
find a larger number of cross-shareholdings between the large European 
firms which may play a similar role to the alliances in the banking sector. 
Most cross-shareholdings are not accompanied by explicit alliance 
agreements, however, and are therefore difficult to evaluate.
Alliances in the banking sector are not recent innovations: the first 
European 'interest group' was established as early as 1968 with the aim of 
prom oting international expansionary activities. Table 6.5 reports the 
member banks which are part of the three major co-operation groups in the 
EC. As is apparent from the table, these groups include most of the largest 
European banks.
Table 6.5: Member banks of European co-operation groups
ABECOR EBIC Europartners
• ABN
• BBL
• Barclays
• B. International
• BNP
• Hypo Bank
• Dresdner Bank
• Österreich. Land. Bank
• Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
• Amro
• B. Commerciale Italiana
• Creditanstalt Bankverein
• Deutsche Bank
• Generale Bank
• Midland Bank
• Société Generale
• Commerzbank
• BancoHispano
• Credit Lyonnais
• Banco di Roma
Source: company reports, press clippings
The first co-operation group formed among European banks was EBIC in 
1968. Its stated purpose was to help members expand internationally by 
forming five consortium banks in key geographic areas. Members also agreed 
never to compete in domestic retail banking against each other.9 From the 
1970s to 1982 the group established own operations in London, New York and
9 This clause needed to be cancelled due to an order by the EC Commission on competition policy 
grounds.
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the Pacific area. From 1983 onwards, however, various partners withdrew 
from the consortium banks to pursue their own activities, rather than 
continuing the joint efforts.10 The consortium banks therefore fulfilled the 
purpose of pooling risk in international expansion and gaining experience in 
new markets. As soon as individual banks discovered profit opportunities, 
however, they preferred to pursue non-cooperative strategies, competing 
directly in the new markets rather than continuing to collude in the form of 
the consortium banks. The consortium banks thus served a useful purpose in 
introducing member banks to new geographic markets, but outlived their 
usefulness as partners were able to set up their own operations based on the 
knowledge base acquired from the joint venture.
The ABECOR group was formed in 1974 as "a forum to study matters of 
mutual interests" to its partners. Activities have so far included working 
parties on country analysis, finance of international trade, computer systems 
and a joint training center.11 The group has established joint branches in 
Tokyo, Singapore, Teheran and Hongkong. In addition, co-operation at the 
top management level has led to closer ties between individual members 
such as BNP and Dresdner which has led to share swaps and co-ordination of 
strategies (such as their joint failed bid for Yorkshire Bank).
The Europartner group which was formed in 1971, comprises two 
publicly owned banks (CL and Banco di Roma) and two privately owned 
banks (Commerz and Hispano Americano) which makes multilateral 
shareholdings difficult to achieve.12 It established joint branches in Tokyo, 
Singapore, Sydney, Johannesburg and Mexico.13
These multilateral cooperation groups were mostly targeted at pooling 
resources to enter markets outside Europe. As soon as member banks 
discovered that they had accumulated sufficient know-how to pursue an
10 For example, Midland withdrew from European American Bank suffering from poor results in 
1985, as a result of its Crocker acquisition; Deutsche left in 1989 and Generale in 1990, leaving 
Amro as majority shareholder. Amro also took over the European Banking Company in 1985 
from its other partners. The European Arab Bank, suffering from poor results, was terminated in 
1985. Midland, Italiana and Societe Generale withdrew from European Asian Bank which 
then sold out to Deutsche in 1987. Finally, Fuji acquired the European Pacific Finance 
Corporation.
11 Recently, member banks together with EBIC members, three US banks, Credito ltaliano and 
SE Banken have agreed to set up a European Clearing House in London to net foreign exchange 
contracts on a multilateral basis.
12 Credit Lyonnais' offer to swap 4% of its capital for 20% of Hispano Americano was rejected 
by Hispano on the grounds that CL was interested in a takeover rather than in co-operation. 
The rejection prompted CL to acquire 83% of Banco Commercial Espagnol from Banco Santander.
13 Other groups include the Interalpha group including among others National Westminster, 
San Paolo di Torino and Kredietbank and the 1990 cooperation agreement between the 
European savings banks.
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independent strategy, they withdrew from the alliance. Nevertheless, the 
multilateral agreements formed the basis for the successive type of alliance 
which are mostly bilateral. For example, Dresdner Bank and BNP and 
Commerzbank and Hispano Americano formed bilateral alliances which had 
their roots in the multilateral cooperation groups.
Another significant change from the multilateral groups is that today's 
alliances are no longer exclusively focused at markets outside Europe. In 
contrast, they frequently concern the countries of the contracting partners 
directly such as in distribution alliances.
The database lists 34 cooperative agreements between the largest sixty EC 
banks in the time period from 1986 to 1992. Of these, 35 percent were general 
strategic alliances often accompanied by share swaps or mutual stakeholdings. 
41 percent of these cooperative agreements concerned only a specific area 
such as mortgages or M&A services. Finally, 24 percent of cooperative 
agreements are aimed at providing reciprocal assistance to clients, for 
example, by enabling customers to use the branch network of the cooperating 
bank in the foreign country or by assisting corporate clients in providing 
information about the foreign market.
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1.5. De novo entry
Direct representation in a foreign country through opening a representative 
office, branch or subsidiary still constitutes a significant route of entry. The 
database lists 59 new openings and 5 upgrades from representative office to 
branch or from branch to subsidiary for the sixty largest EC banks from 1986 
to 1992. However, almost none of these de novo entries were in the area of 
retail banking, but most were in the area of corporate or investment banking. 
From the data collected for the insurance sector it appears that de novo entry 
was a lot less common in insurance than in banking over the respective time 
period. Nevertheless, those de novo activities taking place in the insurance 
sector were frequently in the retail sector. Figure 6.12 analyses the distribution 
of target countries of the banking de novo entry activities.
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Figure 6.12: Target countries of de novo entry actvities of EC banks
13%
Source: Appendix 1
The figure shows that Germany and Luxembourg lead the ranking. This 
needs to be assessed in relation to acquisition activity. Cross-border 
acquisitions into Germany are relatively rare in the corporate and 
investment banking sector due to lack of suitable targets and barriers to entry 
resulting from the universal banking system. Nevertheless, as Germany is 
the largest economic power in the EC, representation in this market is 
im portant and de novo entry is a more feasible route of entry than 
acquisition. Luxembourg, on the other hand, provides a particularly 
favourable regulatory and tax environment and it is therefore significant to 
have a subsidiary in this country. Spain which only recently relaxed entry 
barriers has been subject to much de novo entry activity as foreign bank 
representation had been comparatively low before 1986.
2. Cross-Border entry activities into the EC by non-EC firms
2.1. Entry into the EC by US financial services firms
US banks were the first to enter the European countries and induce the 
process of multinationalisation of the banking industry in the 1960s. The 
large US commercial banks differed in their selection of entry approaches to 
the European market. The biggest bank Citicorp operated largely through 
greenfield entry in the wholesale area and through acquisition in the retail 
area. In the words of a Citibank official (Huertas, 1990, p.255):
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"Citicorp's expansion into foreign markets took the form of 
wholly-owned branches or subsidiaries. Few joint ventures were 
tried. Nor did the company take significant minority positions in 
many foreign banks. The clear preference was for complete 
control, and the exceptions to that rule tended to end in failure 
(from Citicop's point of view)."
This strategy which is similar to the current EC strategies of Deutsche Bank 
and Barclays Bank (see next chapter) contrasted with that of the second-largest 
US bank, Chase Manhattan. This bank primarily engaged in joint ventures 
with local banks in Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, while 
pursuing greenfield entry in Greece and Italy (Wilson, 1986).
In general, European retail operations of US banks were mostly 
unsuccessful, while these banks play a much more significant role in 
wholesale and investment banking. Attempts to penetrate the UK retail 
market through greenfield entry by opening so-called money centre 
boutiques in the 1970s ended in failure as domestic banks were quick to 
emulate the American banks product and service strategies. Ever since, this 
example seems to have deterred not only American banks but also other 
multinational banks to try to enter mass retail banking through de novo 
entry.
Despite the emerging vision of the internal European market, US banks 
have recently engaged in substantial divestment or withdrawal in their 
European operations in the second half of the 1980s. While this was partly 
motivated by lack of success, it was primarily the need to raise capital which 
induced the US banks to sell off some of their (successful) European 
operations (Bank of America's sale of Banca d'America e d'ltalia to Deutsche 
Bank or Chase's sale of its Belgian operations to Credit Lyonnais). In 
conclusion, considering the substantial difficulties of the large US banks in 
their home market, it seems that they will play a less significant role in the 
Europe of the 1990s than they have done in the previous three decades.
US insurers have also played only a marginal role in the European 
countries. Life insurers have traditionally been inward looking and have 
virtually no presence in Europe. The only exception is Metropolitan Life of 
New York, the second-largest US life company, which set up a joint venture 
with Spanish Banco Santander in 1987. The joint venture, Seguros Genesis, 
which distributes life insurance products through the Santander's branch 
network has grown substantially and now belongs to the largest ten life 
insurers in the Spanish market. In addition to this joint venture, Met Life 
acquired the UK insurer Albany Life in 1985. Since acquisition, revenues 
have risen by 90 percent and assets under management have doubled to $2 
billion in 1990.14
Scale of Cross-Border Entry
14 The fourth-largest US life insurer, New York Life also acquired a small UK insurer, 
Windsor Group which comprises Windsor Home Loans and a life insurance subsidiary with 
total assets of £150 million. Other acquisitions of major US insurers have so far not taken place.
200
Chapter 6
Non-life US insurers have entered the European market only on a 
slightly more significant scale.15 Still, the extent of the European presence is 
in no way comparable to the presence of US banks in investment banking. 
The 'follow the customer' movement was at lot less pronounced in in 
insurance than in the area of corporate banking.16 Among the companies 
represented in Europe are the American Insurance Group (AIG) which has by 
far the largest presence and the most explicit expansion plans in Europe. The 
group has set up a central European subsidiary called UNAT in Paris to 
coordinate its European strategy. Its strategic focus is on commercial clients in 
Europe, in particular on multinationals where the group believes to have a 
competitive advantage due to its wide international presence. In the UK, AIG 
is also active in the middle corporate market through its ten regional 
branches which serve brokerage firms. The life insurance susidiary of AIG, 
the American Life Insurance Company (ALICO) has centralised its activities 
in Paris and plans to expand across the EC after having obtained licenses for 
most European countries. In Greece, ALICO is the largest international life 
insurer. Most other US insurers do not have a European presence and 
currently do not seem to have plans to enter the EC markets.
2.2. Entry into the EC by Japanese financial services firms
Japanese banks were the latest entrants into the European markets. Their 
entry activities are almost exclusively focused on non-retail financial 
services, however. The late entry resulted from the regulatory restrictions 
which the Ministry of Finance imposed on domestic banks until 1971. With 
the exception of the Bank of Tokyo, domestic banks were not allowed to open 
branches or subsidiaries in overseas markets. As these restrictions were lifted, 
the Japanese banks began an unparalleled expansion into foreign wholesale 
markets. In Europe the main target countries were the UK, being the host of 
Europe's biggest financial centre and the target of significant Japanese FDI, 
and Germany where Japanese multinationals have significant export 
business and also undertook substantial investment. The reasons for entry 
into these two countries differed, however. While Japanese banks mainly 
serve Japanese corporate customers in Germany, they additionally attempt to 
penetrate the local market for medium-sized firms in the UK. For this 
purpose, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Sanwa have opened representative 
offices in UK cities besides London.
15 US insurers were some of the earliest entrants into Europe,: in 1889 four US insurers accounted 
for more than 20 percent in the growth rate of the German life insurance market, for example. 
These firms had to cease trading in 1894/95. however, as they could not satisfy regulatory 
requirements laid down by the German authorities (see Kuerble, 1990).
16 Schroath and Korth (1989, p.632), for example, conclude that "a notable exception to those 
US service industries following their domestic customers abroad was the US property and 
liability insurance industry."
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It is noteworthy that the Japanese banks almost exclusively entered by 
greenfield entry in Europe rather than through acquisition, joint venture or 
alliance. This can partly be explained by the preference of Japanese companies 
to enter through internal growth rather than acquisitions (see Odagiri and 
Hase, 1989). When analysing entry of Japanese banks into the UK securities 
industry, for example, Dueser (1990, p.120) notes that "... instead of buying 
into well-established broker and jobber firms (they certainly had the financial 
resources for it and many of their US and European competitors did buy 
British firms) they increased the capitalisation of their subsidiaries, took on 
new staff and widened their scope of financial instruments."
When entering international banking in Europe, Japanese banks 
followed a simple approach to create a competitive advantage: they operated 
with lower margins than their European and American competitors and cut 
prices to what some Western bankers have charged to be dumping levels.
So far, Japanese banks have completely abstained from entering 
European retail business. The only exception so far is the UK corporate 
market for medium and even small firms. Between 1977 and 1983 Japanese 
banks doubled their market share of UK domestic lending, but did not 
manage to further increase their share until 1987 (Dueser, 1990, p.121).
Germany has been the second most important target country of Japanese 
banks. In contrast to the UK, however, they have so far not been able to 
penetrate the local market to a significant degree. More than 60 percent of 
customers come from Japan, and only an estimated 5 percent of big German 
companies maintain a banking relation with a Japanese bank.
As Dueser (1990, p. 166) comments "Japanese banks' chances in the 
market segment of small- and medium-sized Western European companies 
seem slim...". Interviews with Japanese bank officials revealed no intentions 
to enter European retail markets in the foreseeable future. More recently, the 
difficulties of the Japanese banks to meet the BIS guidelines on capital 
adequacy, which were at least partly designed to eliminate the competitive 
advantage of the Japanese banks due to their lower required capital ratios,17 as 
well as the dramatic decline in the Japanese stock market have led to a more 
restrictive approach to international expansion.
In the insurance sector Japanese firms have so far only followed their 
commercial customers into European markets but have not been active in 
the retail segment. Similar to the banking sector, the Japanese insurers have 
entered mainly by setting up branches or representative offices in the EC 
countries rather than by acquiring domestic firms. The penetration process of 
the European insurance markets of Japanese insurers is less advanced than 
for the banking sector, however, as they serve almost exclusively Japanese
17 A significant motive of the harmonistion measure was "... to remove an important source of 
competitive inequality" (BIS, 1987, p.l) which is most likely to refer to the Japanese banks.
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clients from their home markets and have not started acquiring domestic 
customers in their host countries.
2.3. Entry into the EC by other non-EC financial services firms
Among the other firms which have entered the EC market on a significant 
scale are the Swiss banks and insurers. While the 'big three' Swiss banks 
operate primarily in the corporate sector, the Swiss insurers have actively 
penetrated the retail sector in other EC countries. Winterthur, for example, 
holds a strong position in Spain where it is the fourth-largest non-life and 
life insurer in terms of premia and the largest foreign insurance company. 
Similarly, Zurich insurance is among the largest fifteen non-life insurers in 
the Italian market. In the German market, the Swiss insurers have a market 
share of 8.7 percent in life and non-life business.
Two of the largest acquisitions in the UK market were undertaken by 
Australian firms: Australian National Bank acquired Yorkshire Bank in 1990 
for a purchase price of £976 million. Yorkshire Bank has 247 branches and 
assets of £3.2 billion. The acquisition makes Australia National the largest 
foreign retail bank in the UK, as it had already purchased Clydesdale Bank 
and Northern Bank which when merged with Yorkshire results in a branch 
network of more than 700 branches and is thus the seventh-largest bank in 
the UK overall. Australian Mutual Provident, by far the largest insurance 
group in Australia and New Zealand with a domestic market share of more 
than 30 percent, purchased the Pearl Group for £1.24 billion in 1989 which 
has a market share of 3 percent in the UK market. When merged with 
London Life, an earlier acquisition of the Australian group, it will command 
a total market share of 5 percent in the UK market.
3. Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided an aggregate overview of cross-border entry 
activities in the EC. Concerning the role of cross-border provision of services, 
I have shown that exporting constitutes only a fairly insignificant amount of 
total services trade, where extra-EC trade plays a slightly more significant role 
than intra-EC trade. These data show that exporting, of financial, services will 
play a limited role gymirrTuIIyTiberaUsed. intemal market. This is likely to 
stem from the fact that close supplier-buyer interaction is required in 
financial services in particular in the retail sector which is still difficult to 
achieve across national frontiers.
Most of the succeeding analysis on acquisitions, alliances, joint ventures 
and de novo entry was based on an original database collected for the largest 
sixty European banks and the largest forty insurers for the period from 1986 to 
the beginning of 1992. A comparison of cross-border acquisition activity in 
financial services with that of other industries in the EC reveals that the
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financial services industry is particularly active in this area with the number 
and disclosed value of transactions exceeding those in other industries.
An analysis of acquisitions in EC financial services since 1975 suggests 
that there has been a significant increase in transactions, especially since 1986. 
Whether this rise is due to the plans of establishing a single European market 
in financial services remains a hypothesis to be tested in the next chapter, 
however, where firm-level data provide an insight into the motives for 
cross-border entry strategies. The number of minority acquisitions exceeds 
those of majority acquisitions both in banking and insurance. The most 
recent decrease in cross-border acquisitions seems to suggest that most firms 
have already undertaken their European expansion plans in preparation of 
the internal market, however. The recent decrease in cross-border 
transactions just one year before the scheduled completion of the internal 
market seems to suggest that much of the '1992'-induced activities have been 
completed and one is therefore unlikely to expect a significant increase in 
activities in the next year.
Joint ventures play a less significant role than cross-border acquisitions 
but account for a similar proportion of total cross-border entry activities as in 
other industries. JVs in the banking sector are mostly in the corporate finance 
sector, while in insurance there are a number of distribution ventures where 
a firm from a Northern European country uses the retail network of a bank 
in a Southern European country to distribute insurance products.
Strategic alliances have been a common form of cross-border 
cooperation for some time, especially in the banking sector. Recent evidence 
suggests that such agreements have become increasingly popular, as a less 
costly alternative to a majority acquisition. In particular, m ultilateral 
alliances have been replaced more and more by bilateral alliances. In the 
insurance sector, strategic alliances are mostly in the area of distribution.
Finally, de novo entry activities still account for a large number of cross- 
border entry activities of European banks but almost exclusively in the area of 
corporate and investment banking, while being less common in insurance. 
Those de novo entries taking place in insurance are also in the area of the 
retail sector, however.
Entry by non-EC institutions has so far been targeted mostly at the 
market for large corporates and institutions. This process has been much 
more advanced in banking than in the insurance sector where US and 
Japanese firms play only a marginal role. US banks which were the first to 
start a significant cross-border penetration move in Europe are now 
frequently divesting partly due to significant problems in their home market 
and partly due to lack of success in European markets. Of the large US banks 
only Citibank retains a conspicuous presence in European retail banking and 
this bank's strategy will be discussed in the next chapter. The Japanese banks 
have so far not made attempts to penetrate European retail banking with the 
only exception of the UK market where they have entered the small and
Scale of Cross-Border Entry
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medium-sized corporates market. It is noteworthy that they have entered 
almost exclusively through de novo entry rather than acquisitions. Neither 
US nor Japanese firms are likely to play a significant role in European retail 
financial services in the foreseeable future, however.
Chapter 6
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Chapter Seven: 
Cross-Border Entry in 
European Retail Banking: 
Interview Evidence and Case Studies
There are several conceivable approaches to collecting empirical evidence on 
the determinants and effects of cross-border entry in financial services in 
order to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding chapters. For the case 
of acquisitions, for example, one such approach would be to collect data of a 
random sample of cross-border transactions and pursue a statistical analysis 
of characteristics of acquiror and acquired firm over time. Considering the 
relatively low number of cross-border aquisitions in particular in retail 
financial services, however, the population size would most likely not be 
sufficient to draw statistically valid inferences. In addition, a purely statistical 
approach would miss out on many of the details which can only be 
insufficiently captured by an exclusively quantitative approach.
Therefore, the approach chosen in this chapter to test the hypotheses 
developed in the theoretical section is two-fold: first, I undertook a series of 
interviews with a sample of the largest EC banks, in particular with those 
banks which are actively engaged in cross-border entry activities in the retail 
area. The results of these interviews are presented in the next section.
Next, I identified the most important cases of cross-border entry in the 
form of cross-border acquisitions and alliances. These were then analysed in 
greater detail through firm-level interviews and are reported on in the form 
of case studies. As Tirole (1988, p.4) notes:
"industria l organisation theorists have often felt more 
comfortable with case studies* than with statistical analysis - 
perhaps because it may be easier to recover the industry's basic 
conditions and behavior from rich case studies than from 
selective statistics
In view of the complexity of strategies and impact of cross-border entry 
activities, such a case-study approach indeed seems to be the most suitable 
method to uncover the internal events of the banks involved.
Banking: Interview Evidence and Case Studies
1. Cross-border entry in the EC: evidence from focus interviews
1.1. A note on research methodology
In the previous chapter data on the cross-border entry activities of the largest 
sixty EC banks were collected which formed the basis for aggregate analyses. 
Clearly, such an aggregate view encounters limits when attempting to gain 
an insight into the basic determinants and the impact of cross-border 
strategies of banks. I therefore decided to undertake an in-depth firm-level 
analysis to gain additional information on the basic determinants of cross- 
border entry activities.
While the next section contains detailed case study analyses, this section 
presents evidence from a range of interviews which were undertaken with a 
sample of the largest EC banks. While interviews are a common method of 
undertaking empirical research in many of the social sciences, they are still 
fairly uncommon in economics. In economic science, the most common 
approach is to translate a theory into a statistically testable form and subject 
the data to econometric scrutiny. For our purposes, such an approach seems 
unsuitable for two reasons, however: first, most of the hypotheses which are 
to be tested are difficult to formulate in purely quantitative terms. For 
example, if foreign banks offer higher quality services this is hard to quantify. 
Second, the population of banks which engage in cross-border activities 
especially in retail banking is too small to make sophisticated statistical 
analysis worthwhile. For these reasons, it was decided to undertake a range 
of interviews to get a richer understanding of the complex determinants of 
cross-border entry activities.
The interview method, however, is viewed with some suspicion in the 
economics profession. Blinder (1991, p.90), for example, notes that 
"economists are skeptical that you can learn much by asking people". This 
skepticism is best exemplified by the 'billiard player' analogy of Friedman 
(1953) who argued that a theoretical phycisist is able to explain better the 
nature of the billiard game than the player. As Shiller (1991, p.97) notes, 
however, the "overliteral interpretation" of this analogy has led many 
scientists to repudiate the approach of ever asking economic agents directly 
about their behaviour. In contrast, Shiller (1991, p. 97) holds that
"it would be a disastrous mistake to ask a physicist to model the 
behavior of a billard player without allowing the physicist to get the 
player's help in the modeling process. The physicist will not 
understand the strategy of the game, will not know what the 
player's short-run objectives would be on a given shot, and will 
likely omit considerations ... that may be difficult to theorize about 
or about which the physicist does not have full information."
The most important objection to interviews is that economic agents in 
interview situations may not tell the truth or reveal their true objectives. 
This problem appears especially severe in situations where agents have an
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incentive to hide their true intentions. It is hardly conceivable, for instance, 
to try to explore the area of predatory pricing by directly asking firms whether 
they price below costs to squeeze out other firms in the market. Equally 
hopeless would be the attempt to discriminate between mergers for market 
power and efficiency by directly asking the companies concerned, since they 
have every incentive to conceal a market power strategy in the presence of 
anti-trust laws.
For the area of cross-border penetration in financial services, however, 
firms have no particular incentive to conceal their true strategic objectives, 
since the questions asked do not concern areas where firms would have to 
fear anti-trust scrutiny. In addition, none of the questions asked related to 
secret or sensitive areas of firms' strategy. Blinder (1991, p.90) addresses this 
issue when justifying his own research approach to collecting empirical 
evidence on price stickiness and notes that "as long as people are not 
pathological liars, interviews may elicit useful information". And further he 
notes that:
'The imperfect knowledge we can pick up from interviews and 
questionnaires should not be compared to some epistemological 
ideal, but to the imperfect knowledge that nonexperimental 
scientists can deduce theoretically or glean from econometric 
studies. By this more reasonable standard of evidence, data culled 
from interviews certainly look admissible."
Once the interview approach was decided upon, it was necessary to 
decide between formal and semi-structured interviews. Formal interviews 
are characterised by the fact that the wording and sequence of questions asked 
are standardised and that the interviews are conducted in a uniform way. 
Formal interviews have the advantage that they reduce interviewer's bias 
which may occur in informal interviews where different interviewers 
phrase questions in different ways and stress different points. Since I did all 
the interviews myself, such interviewer bias in informal interviews was 
reduced anyway, however, and therefore one of the main advantages of 
formal interviewing would not obtain. In addition, considering the 
complexity of the topic under scrutiny which requires a significant degree of 
probing, pre-set questions in a pre-determined order seemed too inflexible an 
approach.
At the other extreme, non-directive interviews are characterised by a 
lack of set questions and there is no pre-determined schedule of asking or 
recording questions. While such an interview approach allows maximum 
flexibility, it has the major drawback that the answers of the respondents are 
hardly comparable due to differing question sets. Thus, non-directive 
interviews may provide useful background information for the study but do 
not permit a comparative analysis of the collected information.
To give the interviews a basic structure and to ensure that all 
respondents were asked the same core set of questions, I decided that the
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'focus' interview is the most suitable approach. Focus interviews are a 
compromise solution between formal and non-directive interviews. They 
have a semi-structured form, characterised by a degree of standardisation 
where a number of pre-set questions are asked in exactly the same way and 
order (see, for example, Moser and Kalton, 1979). In addition, there is a list of 
topics which need to be covered and which are in the form of open questions 
whose order can be adapted by the interviewer. Finally, and most 
importantly, the interview is interactive such that the interviewer has 
complete freedom to probe further, ask supplementary questions and focus 
on points which the respondent mentions or neglects in her answer. Thus, 
the interview takes the form of a dialogue, rather than being a rigid 
question-answer exercise. As Moser and Kalton (1979, p.298) note, a focus 
interview has the advantage that it "gets away from the inflexibility of 
formal methods, yet gives the interview a set form and ensures that all the 
relevant topics are discussed". In addition, semi-structured interviews "can 
'dig deeper' and get a richer understanding than the formal interview" and 
result "in a fuller and more rounded picture than is attainable by formal 
methods" (Moser and Kalton, 1979, p.299/300).
The obvious drawback of focus interviews is the difficulty of analysing 
and quantifying the obtained data. These difficulties result from the fact that 
the answers are not necessarily comparable and that the type of questions 
asked does not easily lend itself to statistical analysis. Nevertheless, these 
objections do not disqualify the approach, since it is exactly the intention of 
focus interviews to dig deeper where statistical analysis reaches its limits. As 
Moser and Kalton (1979, p.301) note "if this gain {of informal interviews) is 
not to be sacrificed, the analysis must retain a fair amount of detail and not 
merely be compressed into a series of statistical tables".
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the population of banks 
which actively consider undertaking cross-border entry in retail services is 
limited to approximately the largest sixty EC institutions. Our sample is by 
no means statistically representative of this population, as it is limited to the 
largest banks in Germany, the UK and France. However, as it is almost 
exclusively banks from these countries which are expected to make a 
significant impact in the EC, the interviews cover the most significant actors 
in the area of cross-border activities. They aim to convey an impression of 
the general view among bankers about the impact of regulatory changes in 
the context of the internal market programme and in particular about the 
significance of cross-border entry and the current and potential future role of 
foreign banks.
Rather surprisingly, the response rate of banks turned out to be 100 
percent. None of the banks which were addressed refused to grant an 
interview.
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The first set of questions addresses the expected impact of the internal 
market programme on the banking industry. It was unanimously agreed that 
the '1992' programme has little to no impact in the market for large 
corporates, multinational firms and financial institutions, as this sector is 
already characterised by intense competition on an international scale. A 
National Westminster official is representative of the general opinion when 
stating that "in this market everything concerning internationalisation has 
already taken place. It can easily be described as one of the most international 
markets in the world". Several bankers explained that as an orientation the 
biggest 500 companies in each country are targeted as potential customers for 
its foreign branches. All bankers noted that the largest firms and institutions 
in each country maintain relationships with several domestic and foreign 
banks and that they operate in international wholesale markets which are 
already largely unrestricted by national boundaries. This confirms our 
decision not to analyse this market, as it is largely internationalised already.
In the markets for small and medium-sized corporates the impact of 
internationalisation is viewed to be more significant. This stems in 
particular from the fact that this market has so far been largely untouched by 
foreign banks due to the lack of an adequate distribution network and a 
higher perceived risk. In addition, these corporates may be most affected by 
European market integration, as those firms which have so far been largely 
domestic operators may go through a transformation process by expanding 
business coverage to other European countries. For such an 
internationalisation process they require banks' assistance when entering 
foreign markets which opens market opportunities for both domestic players 
which can provide foreign services as well as foreign banks from the 
countries which are to be entered. Thus, bankers expect to some extent a 
repetition of the internationalisation movement which has already taken 
place for the largest corporates. Even though the middle market is therefore 
perceived as offering significant profit opportunities, foreign banks are 
frequently deterred by lack of know-how. A Commerzbank official explains:
"the middle market has significantly higher margins, but at the 
same time the associated risk is substantially higher as well, since 
foreign banks mostly lack intimate knowledge of the local 
market."
In order to penetrate this market successfully it is therefore seen as vital 
to acquire the necessary know-how either by recruiting experienced 
personnel in the host market or by acquiring indigenous institutions which 
are experienced in the target sector.
Concerning the mass retail market there is also perceived to be 
significant potential for increased cross-border penetration. At the same time, 
however, bankers acknowledged significant barriers to entry stemming 
primarily from the difficult of obtaining the right distribution channels due
Chapter 7
1.2. Interview results: summary and analysis
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to lack of suitable acquisition targets and the limited suitability of cross-border 
provision of services in most retail services. Increased cross-border 
penetration was thought to be more likely for those products which are to 
some extent separable from the banking product bundle such as card-based 
products and also mortgages. It was estimated that by the year 2,000 increased 
cross-border penetration in retail banking will play a more significant role 
with a few of the largest European banks having established a presence in the 
most important regions. To guard against these major European players mid­
sized banks will enter an increasing number of cross-border alliances, as they 
lack the financial resources to pursue acquisitions on a large scale. It was also 
seen as likely that once the European corporate law framework is in place, 
there may a range of cross-border mergers between mid-sized institutions.
Countries which were judged to be especially interesting for cross- 
border entry activities were Spain, Italy and France. Bankers from the UK 
and Germany expected little increase in competition in their home market 
from increased cross-border entry activities, especially since the two markets 
are already characterised by free capital flows and no explicit regulatory 
barriers to cross-border entry by foreign institutions. Thus, foreign banks 
which want to enter these countries have probably done so already, as entry 
has been largely unrestricted.
Banks use different criteria when assessing the 'attractiveness' of a 
foreign market in the retail banking area. High margins were mentioned 
most frequently as being the main criterion for evaluating cross-border entry 
opportunities. Nevertheless, additional criteria come into play. As a 
Dresdner Bank official explains:
"High margins alone do not make a market attractive. If you base 
your entry decisions only on the level of margins, you may be 
stuck in a market with little potential, once these high margins are 
competed away. Thus, high margins represent short-term 
phenomena, whereas a bank should base its cross-border entry 
decision on long-term criteria"
This statement has as an implicit assumption that 'hit-and-run entry7 in 
retail banking is not possible due to significant sunk costs. This confirms the 
view that retail banking can hardly be considered to be a contestable market.
The procedure followed at Dresdner Bank, for example, to determine 
attractive foreign markets for cross-border entry activities in the retail sector 
includes an analysis of GNP, income and savings level per head on a 
regional rather than a country basis. All regions which have at least the level 
of the lowest regional per head income in Germany are considered potential 
candidates for cross-border entry. Such an analysis leads to a map of
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'interesting' European regions, stretching from the Scandinavian countries 
over the UK, Germany and France to northern Italy.1
While most bankers were aware of the general principle of the home 
country rule, only few were familiar with its legal details, in particular 
concerning the possibility of offering products in other EC countries under 
the home country regulatory regime. None of the banks have (yet) 
developed specific plans for incorporating extended product and branching 
possibilities in their strategic planning in order to exploit the opportunities 
offered by the home-country rule.
Chapter 7
2. Case studies of cross-border majority acquisitions
The starting point for the empirical analysis of cross-border majority 
acquisitions is Williamson's query (1975, 1985) if it is possible to merge two 
firms and improve performance by operating them as before except for 
selective intervention in areas where integration is likely to be profit- 
enhancing. The frequently disappointing results of industrial mergers and 
acquisitions seem to suggest that such a simple procedure is not always 
feasible.2 This may be the result of limits to firm size which makes intra-firm 
organisation increasingly costly, due to dimishing returns on management. 
Alternatively, there may be problems in combining two different corporate 
cultures which hinder a strategy of selective intervention.
In addition to this problem of selective intervention, the case studies 
focus on the following four main questions:
• generally, what are the main motives for cross-border entry in 
banking?
- more specifically, does entry occur to quickly gain a foothold and 
acquire market share in foreign markets, reap the benefits of size 
economies, or exploit profit opportunities in inefficient markets?
- or are such transactions aimed at acquiring foreign competitors, 
strike a pre-emptive position against takeover attempts or reduce 
competition through collusive agreements?
• are cross-border transactions 'successful' in the sense of achieving the 
main motives (e.g. synergy benefits, gain market share in foreign 
market) for which they were pursued?
1 In terms of this analysis, Spain would not be an interesting market for cross-border entry. 
Nevertheless, as the Spanish economy has significant growth potential, it is usually included 
in the category of target countries.
2 See, for example, Meeks (1977) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) for empirical 
evidence on the frequently disappointing results of industrial mergers.
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• in which areas lie the main problems of these combinations (e.g. 
different corporate cultures which need to be reconciled)?
• what is the impact, if any, on competition, structure and conduct in 
the domestic market?
When approaching these questions a first step was to assemble publicly 
available data on the transactions from business papers and industry reports. 
A second step then consisted of contacting the banks directly and acquiring 
information through company documents (e.g. annual reports) and, as the 
final step, interviews at the corporate level with the institutions involved.
Such an analysis goes further than most previous empirical studies 
which mainly rely on financial data to assess the success of acquisitions3 and 
are almost exclusively focused on industrial rather than service sectors. 
Financial studies are unable to reveal the actual motives and causes of cross- 
border entry, however, since they do not uncover the internal firm processes 
and strategies which have preceded and followed the transaction.4 The 
following empirical research is intended to be a contribution towards 
elucidating these internal events of the bank.
2.1. Deutsche Bank's acquisitions in Italy and Spain
2.1.3. Deutsche Bank's European strategy
Deutsche Bank (DB) is the largest and most profitable German bank and the 
eleventh-largest bank world-wide in terms of capital in 1990. It is the classic 
example of a German universal bank with its line of business ranging from 
standard retail banking, with more than 1,000 domestic branches, over 
wholesale and merchant banking, such as underwriting and stocktrading 
which constitutes half of its activities, to life insurance which the bank 
entered as the first of the three large German commercial banks in 1989.
DB is the biggest retail bank in Germany with the greatest amount of 
saving deposits and mortgages. Nevertheless, due to the significant role 
played by savings and cooperative banks its market share in retail banking is 
only about five percent. However, DB plays an important role in security 
transactions where it accounts for approximately 20 percent of settlements 
and foreign trade finance where it is estimated that it settles almost a quarter 
of all of Germany's international trade activities. Moreover, DB has 
significant influence in German industry through direct equity participations
3 Notable exceptions are the studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Cowling et al. 
(1980).
4 Caves (1989) provides the most recent summary of the existing financial evidence and tries to 
explain why ex ante excess return studies come to more optimistic conclusions concerning value 
creation in acquisitions than ex post profitability studies.
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(e.g. 28 percent stake in Daimler-Benz), representation on more than 400 
supervisory boards and the Depotstimmrecht where individual security 
holders delegate to their bank the right to represent them in the annual 
meeting.
Originally founded in 1870 to provide an alternative to the dominant 
British overseas banks (see Hertner, 1990, p.102), DB today has around 300 
offices in 60 countries and 20 percent of its total work force of 67,000 
employees work abroad. Foreign operations account for almost 40 percent of 
assets and contribute 33 percent of revenues.
DB has pursued an extensive internationalisation process in the past six 
years. In 1986 it acquired Banca d'America e d'ltalia from Bank of America 
and in 1989 it purchased Banco Comercial Transatlantico in Spain and 
Morgan Grenfell in the UK. I focus here on the former two acquisitions as 
they are in the area of retail banking, whereas Morgan Grenfell is exclusively 
engaged in investment and merchant banking activities.
With its aggressive expansion strategy in Europe, DB has taken the lead 
not only among its German competitors of which none have engaged in any 
significant foreign acquisitions, but also among European banks: it is 
estimated that DB has spent the most resources of all European banks for its 
expansion activities in Europe.
The main strategic objective of DB for entering other European markets 
is to defend its position in Germany as well as reducing the variability of 
income through diversification. The strategic rationale of DB is summarised 
by the speaker of its Board of Directors, Hilmar Kopper (1989) who states that 
"the more national your business today, the bigger the danger ... so anyone 
who wants to maintain his home market position in the long run must 
expand into the European internal market". DB has set the objective to 
operate in all European wholesale markets with special emphasis on 
investment banking and corporate finance services. In addition, it enters the 
retail banking sector "in countries with strong potential" which are mainly 
Italy and Spain where acquisitions were already made and France where the 
bank is still searching for an adequate acquisition target.
Deutsche's preferred mode of entry is clearly through acquisition. As 
Kopper explains: "we understand acquisitions as a chance to build up 
positioning advantages which the competition cannot match in the short 
term". In a personal interview, a Deutsche Bank official further explains that 
alternative means of cross-border entry and in particular joint ventures and 
strategic alliances are unlikely to be employed. The distaste for joint ventures 
stems at least partly from "frustrating experiences" in the previous JVs in 
which Deutsche Bank was previously involved. These were the European- 
American Bank & Trust Company and the European Asian Bank where DB 
finally decided to buy out the other JV members due to "perpetual in-house 
quarreling". One particular problem mentioned was the difficulty of 
apportioning the customer base after the joint venture runs out. Strategic
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alliances are repudiated by Deutsche due to their low profit potential and 
perceived difficulties of cooperation. As Kopper (1990, p.69) explains: 
"according to our experiences, there is little inclination to cooperate closely 
in multilateral alliances".
Economies of scale and scope feature prominently in the strategic 
vision of Deutsche. It aims to pursue a strategy of "pan-European marketing" 
which refers not only to the organisational centralisation of research and 
product developm ent, but in the words of Kopper also concerns 
"supranational development of selected customer and product groups 
through European brands with central production". Additionally, "the 
adaptation of diverse EDP systems in the larger market and the joint 
European development and use of know-how" are expected to lead to 
"higher efficiency, cost digression and ultimately lower prices". DB identifies 
the "upmarket services sector" as having a particular potential for size effects 
on a European scale. Examples of this market include money and asset 
management and M&A services. Evaluating this strategic approach, it seems 
doubtful whether these projected scale effects will ever play a significant role 
in mass retail banking. As new product development is comparatively scarce 
in retail operations, the beneficial effects of "central production and R&D" 
are likely to be negligible. We have seen in chapter five that the empirical 
evidence does not seem to confirm the significance of scale economies. In 
addition, potential synergy effects in the area of retail banking seem 
minimal. Thus, they do not constitute sufficient economic justification for 
large-scale European acquisitions. The expected benefits of scale economies 
in Deutsche Bank's European strategy may therefore likely turn out to be 
elusive.
2.2.2. Banco Comercial Transatlantico
In 1989 DB increased its stake in Spain's Banco Comercial Transatlantico 
(BCT) from 39 percent to 67.2 percent and further to 96.9 percent in 1990. BCT 
is mainly a retail bank with 106 branches and 1,800 employees. BCT had 
originally been founded and was fully owned by Deutsche Bank before the 
Second World War but was then confiscated by the Franco regime after the 
war. DB had made repeated attempts to increase its stake in BCT to a 
majority holding but until March 1989 was frustrated by the Bank of Spain 
and the Economics Ministry which viewed any acquisition of domestic 
institutions by foreign banks as a threat to the other indigenous banks.
Soon after its acquisition DB began to implement a programme for BCT 
which is supposed to fundamentally reform some areas of the bank over a 
three-year period. The strategic vision for BCT is that of a universal bank 
structured similar to the German paradigm. Following this concept, new 
subsidiaries were founded which include an insurance company and a 
consulting firm. In addition, a financial institutions group was established in 
close cooperation and with know-how transfer of DB headquarters to 
provide specialised services to these institutions. The whole group now
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offers a range of financial services from the traditional banking services over 
real estate to leasing and corporate banking.
Concerning the integration of BCT into the Deutsche Bank group, the 
degree of internationalisation of BCT is planned to be increased significantly. 
This has already had some effect on the bank's balance sheet. Loans to 
foreign entities increased from PT156 million in 1988 to PT 2.8 billion in
1990, while liabilities to foreigners rose from PT28 billion to PT 67 billion in 
1990.5 Not surprisingly, particularly direct and portfolio investment in 
Germany has risen substantially due to the new links between BCT and its 
mother company.
In addition to a broadening of the product range and refocusing 
international business, substantial investments were made in updating the 
bank's technological position with the aim of reducing operating costs. As 
Hilmar Kopper (1990, p.71) explains: "Considering the increasing level of 
competition and resulting lower prices, the relative cost position of a bank 
becomes more and more im portant". In particular, investm ents in 
information technology were made with the aim of a "nearly complete 
renewal of the current technology". These include purchase of personal 
computers for branches, the development of a customer database and the 
expansion of the ATM network (only eight machines were in operation in
1989 even though Spain has the highest density of ATMs per person in the 
EC).
This strategy of investing heavily in technology provides some 
evidence that a formerly relatively inefficient bank is being made more 
efficient through capital inflow by the acquirer as well as knowledge transfer 
in selected areas. In the medium run, this strategy should be expected to 
result in increased profits and/or greater efficiency through lower costs. An 
analysis of the bank's balance sheet and profit and loss account is shown in 
table 7.1. 1988 can be considered the pre-acquisition year, whereas 1989 and
1990 are the first two post-acquisition years. When assessing the general 
profitability of the bank, one needs to take into account that funding costs 
have increased continuously since 1988 due to the high-yielding savings and 
current accounts first introduced by Barclays and Citibank in the Spanish 
market which forced other Spanish banks including BCT to offer similar 
accounts. The average interest paid on deposits increased to 9.4 percent 
compared to 7.9 percent in the previous year, resulting in a lower deposit 
rate margin.
 ^The 1990 figures include the former Madrid branch of DB which was integrated into BCT in 
1990.
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Table 7.1: Analysis of BancoTrans financial statements 
In ECU million
1988 1989 1990 CAGR
profits (before tax) 14.96 18.60 21.24 20.5%
operating costs 58.91 68.99 84.41 21.5%
revenues from financing 
activities
118.44 182.86 237.75 50.1%
Source: Annual reports.
Against this difficult operating background, BCT managed to increase 
its profits significantly. On an inflation-adjusted basis profits before tax 
increased by 16.3 percent in 1989 and by 7.2 percent in 1990. Operating costs 
increased by almost the same percentage as profits. Thus, the increases in 
operating profitability do not stem from a cost reduction programme or a 
sheding of staff. Rather they result from a significant increase in revenues, 
particularly from an expansion of loan activity to firms and private 
customers which more than doubled between 1988 and 1990.
The increase in operating profits at constant operating costs provides 
some evidence that BCT managed to expand its market position, although 
no detailed market share data exist to substantiate this observation. BCT 
attempts to gain a competitive edge by heavily investing in information 
technology and by expanding its international business activities. However, 
as DB officials stress it does not follow a policy of undercutting competitors 
on prices. Nevertheless, it may play a role in stimulating competition, 
especially in the Catalan area where it has a particularly strong presence, 
since its significant investments in automation and technology are likely to 
force competitors to follow suit.
2.2.3. Banca d‘America e d'ltalia
In December 1986 DB acquired the Italian retail bank Banca d'America e 
d'ltalia (BAI) from Bank of America for a purchase price of $603 million. The 
bank was founded in 1918 as the Banca dell'Italia Meridionale and acquired 
by Bank of America. Since its inception it was therefore always a foreign- 
owned bank which initially focused on the many Italians who worked in the 
US but maintained accounts in Italy. This historical link also determined the 
distribution of the branch network which though covering the whole 
country is more concentrated in the regions of Liguria, Campania and Puglia. 
BAI today has 120 branches and employed 3,105 people in 1990. After the 
phasing out of restrictions on free branch openings in 1989 by the Bank of 
Italy, most Italian banks have engaged in new branch openings. BAI also 
follows an aggressive expansion strategy with the opening of 27 branches in 
1990/91, an increase of almost 30 percent. Rather than opening branches in 
places where it has not been present hitherto, the bank decided to
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concentrate the new openings in the areas and cities where it is already 
present in order to expand the local coverage.
The bank focuses on the personal customer market and the market for 
small-and-medium sized enterprises. A DB official explains that the middle 
corporate market in Italy has a significant growth potential, as it is currently 
not given full attention by the Italian banks. The strategic objective is 
therefore to continue to develop this market. In addition, investment 
banking services are to be expanded and to be integrated into the worldwide 
network of Deutsche Bank group. The possibility to draw on this 
international network gives BAI a significant potential competitive 
advantage even over the big Italian banks which have a comparatively low 
degree of international representation.
DB has followed a decentralised approach to post-acquisition integration 
of BAI. According to BAI officials there has been little direct management 
influence at BAI which was already profitable when acquired. Rather than 
interfering directly in the business policy of BAI, Deutsche Bank sets an 
annual return on investment target for BAI, but leaves it entirely to local 
management how to achieve this goal. As a DB official explains: "local 
management knows their market much better than we do. It would be 
unwise to interfere in their strategic decisions". This policy of restraint on 
part of Deutsche Bank can be explained by the fact that the main reason for 
Bank of America's sale of BAI were capital needs rather than dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the Italian subsidiary. Thus, the acquisition was not 
a case of a takeover for 'corporate control' reasons where an inefficient bank 
is taken over, its management is replaced and performance improves in the 
post-acquisition years. This is documented among other things in the fact 
that top management was not replaced in the aftermath of the acquisition 
and the President continues to be Italian. In addition, only three of the 15 
members of the Board of Directors are from Deutsche Bank. This documents 
the considerable autonomy which BAI preserves for itself.
BAI is primarily a retail bank for personal customers and small 
businesses. In 1990 seventy-seven percent of its business were accounted for 
by the personal customer segment. Deposits by personal customers accounted 
for 86 percent of total deposits, while deposits by firms only constituted 13.1 
percent. In the consumer credit segment BAI is at times the market leader 
among Italian banks. BAI was the first Italian bank to introduce a credit card, 
the 'Bancamericard'. Until 1985 this was virtually the only credit card in the 
Italian m arket and thus had a market share of almost 100 percent, 
guaranteeing high profits. In 1985, however, the Italian banks founded a 
joint venture to provide an alternative with the 'Carta Si' card. Since then 
competition has increased significantly and commissions from dealers 
decreased from 5 percent to 2-3 percent.
A BAI official notes that in retail banking there have been next to no 
changes after the acquisition of DB. Thus, the strategic vision of a 'European' 
bank in the retail sector has so far not been realised. This is documented by
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the fact that personal customers from Deutsche Bank enjoy no special 
benefits when transacting with BAI (e.g. when being on holiday or business 
trips). The same holds for BAI personal customers who deal with the mother 
bank in Germany.
Concerning the pricing strategy of BAI, it offers some 'promotional' 
services cheaper than other Italian banks. For example, it offers free giro 
transfers to pay for gas, water or electricity for which other Italian banks 
charge up to two ECU. BAI was also the only bank which did not charge for 
the use of ATMs of other banks in contrast to competitors which charge an 
average 1.3 ECU per transaction. This practice was abandoned at the end of
1991, however, since it turned out to be "too costly" and a service charge 
similar to the average market rate was introduced. A comparison of prices 
and interest rates of BAI as compared to the average of the ten largest Italian 
retail banks is provided in table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Analysis of BAI's pricing strategy
In Lit
BAI
Average of 
largest Italian 
banks
Charge for current account 
p.a. 50,000 45,000
Charge per account 
transaction 1,950 1,800
Interest rate on current 
account 6-7% 4.5%
Cost of credit card p.a. 70,000 40,000
Interest rate for consumer 
credit 165 -17.5% 18%
Share transaction 0.2% 0.7%
Charge for securities account 
p.a. 50,000 50,000
Bond transaction 0.3% 0.5%
Source: Price survey chapter five.
It becomes obvious that BAI by no means follows a price strategy of 
undercutting the indigenous Italian banks. In contrast, it actually charges 
higher prices for some of the basic banking services, while paying a slightly 
higher rate on deposits and charging less for consumer credit. From these 
price data it does not appear that BAI pursues a strategy of consistently 
undercutting domestic banks on prices.
The strategic focus of BAI has been broadened under the new 
ownership, however. A BAI official explains that while Bank of America 
intended BAI to be a retail bank for personal and small business customers,
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Deutsche Bank places greater emphasis on corporate banking also for mid­
sized and large firms. Accordingly, the change after the acquisition was 
greatest in the area of international and investment banking activities. DB 
has encouraged the development of investment banking activities in 
cooperation with DB headquarters and the worldwide network of DB 
branches and subsidiaries. A capital markets department was built from 
scratch over the past five years and BAI has acted as lead manager of Euro- 
Lire issues together with DB's London capital markets subsidiary. It has 
concentrated efforts on certain niche markets such as commercial paper, 
where it managed to increase significantly its business. The main share of 
bilateral employee exchanges between BAI and other members of the DB 
group also takes place in the area of investment banking where knowledge 
transfer is most active. Due to this expansion in activities BAI managed to 
enter the market of bigger firms and even multinationals.
A natural competitive advantage of BAI lies in im port/export trade 
with Germany where it is is able to provide advice and fast and efficient 
transactions. Another competitive advantage of BAI which arises from its 
smaller size lies in the fact that as compared to the publicly-owned banks, its 
organisational structure is more efficient. A BAI official asserts that "whereas 
the more bureaucratic publicly-owned banks may need two to three weeks to 
reach a decision on a loan arrangement, for example, we can make such a 
decision in a single day."
Another area where there are potential synergy effects is that of M&A 
services where BAI can provide advice to Italian customers who want to 
acquire in Germany, in particular after the integration of the Morgan 
Grenfell group into DB's European network.
An analysis of BAI's financial statements for the past seven years is 
shown in table 7.3. All figures are inflation-adjusted. As BAI was acquired in 
December 1986,1987 is the first post-acquisition year. Pre-tax operating profits 
rose by 37.6 percent between 1987 and 1990. The slump in the pre-acquisition 
year 1986 can be explained by extraordinary bad loan provisions and did not 
result from a reduction in the gross intermediation margin. Overheads on 
average have increased slightly more (by 0.75%) than the gross 
intermediation margin. Particularly noticeable is the most recent increase in 
net income from commisssions. Partly, this resulted from an increase in 
foreign exchange trading where commissions increased by almost 500 
percent in 1990. The annual report attributes this to "the close cooperation 
with the Foreign Exchange Department of Deutsche Bank" where significant 
synergy effects were achieved. In particular, in DM/Lire foreign exchange 
BAI has achieved a leading position.
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Table 7.3: Analysis of Banca d'America's financial statements
In ECU millions (inflation-adjusted)
Pre-tax
operating
profits
%
change
Gross inter­
mediation 
margin
%
change
Net income 
from
commissions
%
change
Over­
heads
%
change
1984 52.22 - 154.83 - 60.03 - 149.64 -
1985 56.13 +7.4 160.36 +3.6 66.37 +10.6 158.41 +5.9
1986 28.96 -48.1 186.40 +16.2 61.97 -6.4 182.41 +15.1
1987 49.27 +70.2 208.24 +11.7 66.28 +6.9 197.19 +8.1
1988 53.48 +8 5 229.28 +10.1 79.25 +19.5 227.11 +15.2
1989 63.59 +18.9 264.79 +15.5 87.75 +10.7 253.56 +11.6
1990 67.79 +6.6 284.04 +7.2 135.46 +54.4 286.03 +12.8
Source: Financial Statements BAI 1984-90.
The area where the impact of the acquisition was greatest is that of 
international banking. Under the ownership of Bank of America, BAI was 
engaged in third world lending and had to make substantial bad debt 
provisions for these loans in 1986 on the initiative of its new owner 
Deutsche Bank, which proscribed high write-offs on third world loans. After 
years of declining business in international banking, a new strategy was 
enacted in 1987 under the new ownership which focused attention on the 
less risky European market. This re-orientation proved to be successful. 
Table 7.4 illustrates the significant increase in international banking 
activities.
Table 7.4: International banking activities of BAI since 1987 
In ECU million
International
Commercial
Transactions
Percent
change
Percentage 
change in 
Italy's total 
net trade
N on-commercial 
international 
banking services
Percent
change
1988 2.33 +16% +11% 1.76 +23%
1989 3.83 +64% +16% 3.19 +81%
1990 4.20 +10% +5% 5.18 +63%
Source: Annual reports, BAI; Banca d'ltalia
It is apparent that BAI managed to increase its proportional share of 
commercial trade financing as well as substantially expanding its invisible 
trade transactions. These increases need to be assessed against a previous 
period of contraction in BAI's international banking business. This 
illustrates that under the new ownership, international banking is the area 
which has been most affected in the post-acquisition years.
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In summary, BAI seems to be an example of a cross-border acquisition 
where selective intervention in the sense of Williamson (1975, 1985) has 
worked to improve overall performance. Most notably perhaps, the 
acquisition had no impact at all on retail banking strategy where synergy 
effects or knowledge transfers from Deutsche Bank to BAI are non-existent. 
From the collected price data it seems that BAI as a foreign-owned bank does 
not attempt to undercut indigenous banks on prices or conditions. There is 
also no evidence that efficiency in the form of labour productivity has 
increased significantly.
This picture is different for the area of corporate and investment 
banking where the impact of the cooperation with DB's headquarters has 
been more substantial. This illustrates that synergy effects in cross-border 
acquisitions are easier to obtain in the area of corporate and investment 
banking.
DB officials note that both BAI and BCT achieve among the highest 
returns on investment in the Deutsche Bank group. This shows that banks 
in these two countries still enjoy relatively high profitabilities. Rather than 
attempting to undercut competitors on prices and thus jeopardising these 
handsome profits, however, both banks participate in the high margins.
2.2. Barclays Bank's European retail strategy
Barclays Bank is the largest and most profitable British bank and the eighth- 
largest in the world in 1990 in terms of capital. In 1990 it suffered from a 
significant reduction in operating profits which was mainly caused by the 
recession in the UK economy.
Barclays has traditionally been a bank with a wide international 
presence, stemming from its significant involvement in overseas banking. 
In contrast to most other European banks, Barclays' international presence 
historically involved not only corporate banking services but also retail 
services. In fact, international banking as pioneered by the British overseas 
banks had its origins focusing on the retail rather than the corporate sector. 
Thus, Barclays has accumulated considerable experience in international 
retail financial services.
While Barclays had a wide international retail presence in many non- 
EC countries, its presence in the EC retail banking sector was fairly 
insignificant until 1988. In mid-1988, the Board of Directors therefore set up 
an internal strategy team to assess the market potential of the Continental EC 
markets and formulate a response to the 1992 programme. The internal 
market programme seems primarily to have provided a psychological 
stimulus to take a closer look at the European markets. The internal strategy 
team was split up into two groups which looked separately at the personal 
and corporate sector and these units remain organisationally and 
gegraphically separated ('Corporate' being in London, and 'Personal' in
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Northampton). Barclays sees the greatest market potential in other EC 
economies in the sector which it refers to as "local quality private banking". 
This refers to personal customers in the medium to higher income bracket. 
As a Barclays Director formulates: "if there is blood to be spilt in the post- 
1992 market for financial services, this is the sector where some of the biggest 
battles will be fought". The bank sees this market as being most easily 
accessible to cross-border entry, since delivery channels are such that there is 
an increasing reliance on non-branch based distribution methods such as 
plastic cards, ATMs, telephone and home banking. The following sections 
focus on Barclays' country strategies in the personal sector.
In the personal sector, Barclays was present in 1988 only in Spain and 
France. It had been the first bank to acquire a domestic bank in Spain in 1981 
after the restrictions on foreign bank entry were reduced in 1978. Similar to 
Citibank it acquired a failed institution, Banco de Valladolid, from the 
Spanish government which had taken over the bank. In France, Barclays has 
been present since the turn of the century and had 34 branches serving 
around 30,000 personal customers in 1988.
The internal review on European retail operations resulted in a clear 
strategic focus on the four biggest Continental countries Spain, Italy, 
Germany and France. In these countries the strategic objective is to gain a 
market share of 2 to 3 percent of the total personal customer market and 
around 7 percent of the higher income personal customer market. Other EC 
countries are largely disregarded concerning the personal customer market, 
since the expected revenue potential is considered to be too low to merit the 
extensive investment required to obtain a sufficient return on capital.
Barclays distinguishes two basic distribution channels in its European 
retail financial services strategy: the traditional branch-based channel and a 
"central delivery" approach which is mainly characterised by direct selling 
through credit cards. The bank views itself as having a significant 
competitive advantage in the central delivery area due to its long-standing 
experience with 'Barclaycard', first introduced in 1966. Barclaycard has a 
market share of around 40 percent in the UK market with eight million 
cardholders. In 1988 it earned a profit of £99 million in its credit card 
division or just under 7 percent of total group profits and boasted a return on 
capital employed of more than 40 percent over the period from 1984 to 1988, 
by far the highest of the UK commercial banks. Since the UK is by far the 
largest European credit card market, Barclays is at the same time the largest 
bank issuer of credit cards in Europe. It is in this sector in which it expects 
significant cross-border entry opportunities in the Continental EC countries. 
A Barclays official notes that in the area of card-based products the bank has a 
"significant know-how advantage which can be transferred to other 
European markets and which gives us an edge over competitors in those 
countries".
In addition to boasting significant profit potential as a stand-alone 
product, credit cards are also considered an entry product for delivering
223
Chapter 7
additional financial products. Thus, once a customer relationship is 
established the bank plans to offer additional financial products such as 
insurance services, other payment services and loan facilities. The advantage 
of a central delivery approach is obviously the lower entry costs, compared to 
the traditional branch-based channel. A Barclays official notes, however, that 
the central delivery approach does not always suit the cultural habits of other 
EC countries. While German customers may be used to maintaining 
business and banking relationships through telephone or mail and thus 
make a central delivery approach feasible, Italian and Spanish markets 
require a branch-based presence.
In Italy, the bank has sold off its consumer credit unit BAFIDO to 
French Societe Generale in 1990. A Barclays official noted in a personal 
interview that the divestment resulted from the need to realise assets in the 
Italian market due to the dismal results in corporate banking services, rather 
than from a lack of success of the consumer services unit. Despite the 
divestment the Italian personal customer market remains on the priority list 
of Barcalys over the next five years.
Entry into the German market was given the top priority of European 
cross-border entry activities. A Barclays official remarks that "a presence in 
the German market is an absolute must for any bank which considers itself 
European". In 1990 Barclays acquired the German Merck Finck Bank, a 
Munich-based private bank specialised in the market for high net-worth 
individuals. In addition, it purchased a venture capital credit card processing 
company, CFS Finanzsysteme, from Berliner Bank in 1988 which constituted 
the base for entering the German credit card market in 1991. More 
importantly than just giving Barclays a small market share, the acquisition 
of CFS provided Barclays with credibility in the German market. A Barclays 
official notes that "once we had acquired CFS, suddenly German banks 
started taking us seriously. However, if they had known that we were 
interested in buying CFS they would have made sure to snap it up to prevent 
our entry". Prior to acquiring the processing firm, Barclays had made several 
attempts to penetrate the German credit card market but faced significant 
resistance from the large German banks. As a Barclays official notes, "the 
German banking system has a highly cartelised structure which makes it 
very difficult for foreign banks to enter the market". For the specific case of 
credit cards, processing, issue and marketing of cards was for a long time 
undertaken by a joint venture firm of the largest German banks, the 
Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme (GZS) which was able to successfully 
exclude foreign banks. Only after Barclays complained to the German Federal 
Cartel Office did the GZS admit Barclays.
The central delivery approach to the German market is triangular: first, 
CFS Finanzsysteme offers a store debit card in cooperation with several 
retailers and has so far issued 140,000 cards. After acquiring CFS, Barclays 
started a joint venture with the retail department store Hertie to provide a 
store credit card with loan facilities which by now has 450,000 customers. In 
addition to this credit card the joint venture 'Optimus Bank' of which
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Barclays owns 49 percent also offers insurance and other bank services to its 
Hertie customers and thus the store card constitutes a typical entry product to 
cross-selling other financial products. In 1991, Barclays also entered the 
standard credit card market directly. Similar to its UK credit card strategy 
Barclays offers both Eurocard and VISA as a 'package' in the German market. 
It currently offers no current account or payment facilities besides a credit 
card account. Payment facilities are to be introduced in the near future, 
however, to make the range of services comparable to that of regular bank 
account. To make such an account attractive it offers a 4 percent interest rate 
on sight deposits (September 1991) and also offers a revolving credit facility 
which is a novelty in the German credit card market where credit card bills 
need to be paid in full at the end of each month. With an interest rate of 14.7 
percent in September 1991, Barclays was in the range of negotiated current 
account overdraft loans by other German banks. Barclays advertises its credit 
cards as being offered by "Britain's largest credit card issuer" stressing its 
experience advantage in the handling of credit card facilities. In September
1991 Barclays had acquired 30,000 new customers for this product.
In France, Barclays has been present since 1917 when the first branch 
was founded which transformed to a subsidiary in 1968. Barclays Bank S.A. is 
active in both the retail and corporate sector belonging to the largest 25 banks 
in the country. In the retail sector it is the largest foreign bank with a branch 
network of 34 offices spread across the country. In the personal sector it 
mainly targets the high-income group with a strategy of being at the 
forefront of new product developments. These include, for example, the 
"Compte Permanent" which is the first direct marketing bank account with a 
revolving credit facility where all transactions are undertaken over the 
phone or by mail. Direct mail solicitations were sent out to more than one 
million households over a one-year period alone. Barclays, S.A. made net 
profits of ECU25.5 million in 1990 (1989: 18.2 million; 1988: 13.8 million).
In order to further enforce its market position in France, Barclays 
acquired the French retail bank Compagnie L'Européene de Banque from 
Crédit Commercial de France in November 1990. The latter bank had been 
dealt as one of the few potential acquisition targets in France and was under 
repeated scrutiny by other potential acquirors, among them National 
Westminster Bank. L'Européene de Banque with total assets of ECU1.97 
billion in 1990 together with its subsidiaries has thirty-seven branches and 
sales offices in France and had around 1,000 employees in 1990. It made an 
after-tax profit of ECU1.26 in 1990 (1989: 9.6 million; 1988: 5.8 million). Its 
branch network is currently being merged with Barclays' French branch 
network to form a single network of around 70 branches and offices. In 
addition, L'Européene de Banque owns Laffite Investissement which has the 
second-largest sales agent network in France and distributes a whole range of 
investment fund products including life insurance. After the takeover by 
Barclays eleven of the thirteen members of the Board of Directors were 
replaced by members of the French Barclays subsidiary. A Barclays official 
notes that "there is still a lot of work to be done in France. There is no central 
delivery system in place yet and we are in the middle of a painful merger
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process". In 1989 Barclays Bank S.A. achieved a return on assets of 0.4 percent 
which was significantly below the average for French banks of 0.97 percent 
over the 1986-89 period.
Table 7.5 provides an analysis of Barclays pricing strategy in the French 
retail market.
Table 7.5: Analysis of Barclays' pricing strategy in France
In ECU
Barclays
Average of 
largest French 
banks
Charge for current account 
P-a. 0 0
Margin on foreign exchange 2.0% 3.9%
Interest rate on savings 
account (6-months deposits) 4.5% 4.5%
Cost of credit card p.a. 23.1 27
Interest rate for consumer 
credit 14% 15%
Share transaction 1% 1.2%
Source: Price survey chapter five.
It appears that Barclays provides most services at least at slightly lower 
prices than the average of the largest French banks.
Of all European countries, Barclays has had the biggest impact in the 
Spanish market. In 1988 it had a branch network of around 100 branches in 
Spain. In Spain it now has a retail network of around 225 branches. It was the 
pioneering bank to introduce the 'small-branch' concept, i.e. branches with 
only few employees which are mainly aimed at collecting deposits. The 
small branches are linked to a regional 'hub', which is a larger branch 
providing the more advanced services to the smaller branches. This 
centralisation of administrative services allowed a ratio of 70 percent front 
office and 30 percent back office activities in the smaller branches which was 
exactly the opposite ratio of most established Spanish banks and permited a 
greater orientation towards customer services. The small branches have 
lower fixed costs and therefore allow the opening of a greater number of 
retail outlets and permit a quicker geographic expansion process. While 
Barclays has the highest number of branches in Spain of all the foreign 
banks, it is still small compared to the large Spanish banks which have up to
2,000 branches. Despite its comparatively small size in terms of branches, 
Barclays was able to make a tangible impact on competition in the Spanish 
banking market. In particular it was the first bank together with Citibank to 
introduce significantly positive interest rates on the current account and is
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frequently referred to as having started the deposit rate war by forcing 
domestic banks such as Santander to follow suit. A Barclays official explains 
the significant growth of Barclays in Spain by its aggressive deposit rate 
policy: "when we started our deposit interest rate strategy we were too small 
to disturb the large indigenous banks. It was only after we started to tangibly 
hurt the big banks by taking away customers when they were forced to 
respond by offering equally competitive deposit rates. "
In addition to pursuing an aggressive price strategy, Barclays introduced 
an innovative personnel policy by recruiting university graduates and 
placing them on an 18 months training programme after which they were 
placed in charge of a small branch. This practice was fairly uncommon in the 
Spanish banking sector which for a long time had a very low proportion of 
university graduates. Barclays' personnel policy was also emulated by other 
Spanish banks.
Barclays' Spanish subsidiary made profits before tax of ECU52 million 
and paid out ECU13.3 million to its shareholders. Profits before tax have 
increased by 52 percent in comparison with 1989. The return on assets was 0.9 
percent which was below the Spanish average of 1.8 percent.
In summary, Barclays' European cross-border entry activities have so far 
had the most significant impact in the Spanish market. Barclays' Spanish 
subsidiary is probably the best existing example of a foreign entry activity 
which had a significant impact on competition in the domestic retail 
banking market.
2.3. National Westminster's European retail strategy
2.3.1. Nat West's approach to expansion in European retail banking
National Westminster Bank which is the second-biggest British bank in 
terms of capital has actively pursued cross-border entry activities in the EC 
countries over the past decade even though to a lesser extent than its 
domestic competitor Barclays Bank. It currently has a presence in all EC 
countries except Portugal and Denmark although its involvement in retail 
banking differs significantly across the EC countries. Spain is by far the most 
important market for Nat West in terms of a retail presence with two major 
acquisitions in 1985 and 1987. The Spanish acquisitions are discussed in 
greater detail in the next section.
N at West identifies the high net worth individuals market and the 
mid-sized corporate market as most likely to be affected by increased 
Europeanisation. In particular, in asset management it perceives scope for 
scale economies across the Nat West group with Nat West being world-wide 
market leader in custody management. In addition, it sees spin-off effects 
from wholesale into retail banking such as in areas of foreign exchange
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management and treasury-linked products which it aims to exploit through 
cross-functional know-how transfer.
Cross-border entry is viewed as being primarily about finding the right 
distribution vehicle. Even though Nat West has so far chosen mostly 
acquisition and de novo entry it does not principally repudiate alliances and 
joint ventrures. It therefore does not necessarily follow a 'stand alone' 
approach like Deutsche Bank or Barclays Bank.
Apart from Spain, Nat West has a notable retail presence in the 
Netherlands where it acquired a 40 percent stake in Van Lanschot Bankiers 
in 1986 which is the seventh-largest bank in the country in terms of capital 
in 1990. This stake was further increased to 80 percent in 1990 by buying out 
Rabobank. Van Lanschot is primarily a private bank which currently has 21 
domestic retail branches and operates in the markets for medium to large 
corporate, institutional investors and high net-worth individuals. In 
addition, it maintains a subsidiary in Luxembourg which at the same time 
serves as the local base for the whole Nat West group. Van Lanschot is 
clearly no case of a takeover for corporate control, as it was highly profitable 
even before the acquisition. It is to retain its name and independence, while 
increasing cooperation with the Nat West group in selected areas such as 
asset management where know-how and labour transfer inside the group is 
to be promoted. In 1990 Van Lanschot made a net profit of Dfl 27 million 
down from Dfl 29 million in the previous two years but is still the most 
profitable European subsidiary of the Nat West group. Accordingly, there is 
no perceived need to engage in significant restructuring measures.
In contrast, the French subsidiary of Nat West has fared less 
successfully. In 1988 Nat West acquired the five branches of Banque de 
L'Union Europeenne which were then merged with the existing network of 
Nat West's five branches in France. The ten branches have no clear regional 
focus but are evenly spread over the largest French cities. Activities are 
predominantly targeted at five sub-markets in the corporate banking sector, 
namely multinationals, UK corporates, the French middle market, project 
finance and the public sector. This focus on the corporate market in France 
has not been successful in profit terms, however. The bank lost FF 74 million 
in 1988 and 1989 and FF 44 million in 1990. Recently, it was therefore decided 
to enter the more profitable private banking market on a greater scale. In 
1989 Nat West acquired a brokerage firm, Sellier, which has a large retail 
clientele. As Nat West is currently too small to offer broad retail services in 
France, however, it plans to focus on the high-net market in the personal 
customer segment. In order to implement this strategy there are plans for 
considerable expansion of the branch network. This expansion is to be 
achieved through organic growth rather than further acquisitions.
In the German market, Nat West is only represented in the corporate 
market through Deutsche Westminster. This subsidiary is likely to be scaled 
down again to the legal status of branches of the Nat West group in order to 
evade the stricter regulatory rules such as separate endowment capital and
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separate solvency and liquidity ratios for the German subsidiary. In addition 
to serving the corporate market, there is also a strong interest to enter the 
German retail market, since it is perceived to be "the most important retail 
market in Europe, but also the most difficult to enter", as a Nat West official 
describes it. Unlike in some other European countries, German banks are 
perceived to be very efficient and high margins stem from perceived 
collusion among domestic banks. A Nat West official cites as an example of 
the "almost cartel-like situation in Germany" the life insurance sector where 
a foreign bank when introducing a new product needs to get approval from 
an authoritative body on which all the main domestic competitors are 
represented.
In Italy Nat West entered into a joint venture with Credito Italiano in 
1972 to form Banca Credit West with Nat West holding a 30 percent stake 
which was later diluted to 19% when Credito Vesuviano joined the JV. 
Credit West has 18 branches in the Lombardian region and operates in the 
personal customer and mid-sized corporates markets. It is currently viewed 
by Nat West as a profitable portfolio rather than a strategic investment. 
However, since Nat West considers cooperation with a strong local player to 
be the most suitable entry vehicle into the Italian market, there may very 
well be an increase in the stake in the JV.
In summary, Nat West has the most varied portfolio of entry 
approaches of the largest European banks, ranging from de novo over 
acquisitions to JVs. A Nat West official describes it as an "opportunistic" 
approach to cross-border entry where all possible entry vehicles are 
considered. Thus, unlike Barclays and Deutsche Bank which follow a 'stand­
alone' approach to cross-border entry which excludes most types of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances, Nat West is not principally opposed to these 
cooperative forms of cross-border entry.
2.3.2. The strategy in Spanish retail banking since 1985
Outside the UK, Nat West has the largest retail presence in Spain where it 
first opened a branch in 1917 which was later closed and not re-opened until 
1964 as a representative office which in 1979 was converted into a branch. In 
1985 Nat West decided to enter the Spanish market on a more significant 
scale by acquiring a minority stake of 49 percent in March Bank which was 
increased to 84 percent in 1989 and further to 99 percent in 1990. The acquired 
bank first changed its name to 'Nat West March' in 1985 and later to 'Nat 
West España' after a majority stake was acquired. In 1987 Nat West 
additionally acquired the regional bank Banco de Asturias which has a wide 
presence in the regions of Asturias and Galicia and is exclusively focusing on 
the personal customer market. The latter bank was organisationally 
integrated into the Banco Nat West group in 1990 by linking computer 
systems and subjecting it to management control through Banco Nat West 
headquarters. Over the past three years the number of branches of Banco Nat 
West increased significantly by 41 percent from 92 branches in 1988 to 130
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branches at the end of 1991. Banco Asturias increased its number of branches 
by 33 percent from 64 to 85 over the same period, so that Nat West had a total 
branch network of 189 offices in Spain. There are plans for continued 
significant expansion of the branch network over the next years. In 1990 the 
bank made a profit before tax of ECU30.7 million, achieving a return on 
equity employed of 15.4 percent and a return on assets of 1.3 percent which 
was below the average ROA for Spanish banks of 1.8 for the 1986-89 period. 
Profits increased by 35 percent in comparison to 1989. Profits had increased 
already by 20 percent in 1989 which illustrates the significant profit potential 
which still exists in the Spanish market.
The main reason for entering the personal customer segment in Spain 
was the perceived profit opportunities which were judged to be considerably 
higher than in most other EC countries. These resulted not only from high 
margins due to high prices but also from the perception that through service 
quality improvements customers could be lured away from the domestic 
banks. As a Nat West official describes it: "Spanish banks have a very low 
quality of services. We therefore perceived scope for a cross-border entry 
strategy which focuses on providing higher service levels than domestic 
banks, rather than trying to undercut domestic competitors on price". The 
focus on quality is reflected, for instance, in the bank's marketing positioning 
and advertising campaigns where it attempts to position itself as the "Grupo 
de la Calidad" (group of quality). The Nat West group does not attempt to 
compete with the domestic banks on the price variable. In contrast to 
Barclays and Citibank, Nat West was therefore not an active player in 
instigating the deposit rate war but was following rather than leading.
2.4. The strategy of a non-European bank: the example of Citibank
2.4.1. Citibank's European retail strategy
Citibank is the largest American bank and ranks twenty-first in the world in 
terms of capital in 1990. Since 1975 it has been organisationally separated into 
"Global Consumer Banking" and "Global Finance Business". In retail 
banking Citibank is active in 36 countries with 34.5 million customers and 
thus the most international retail bank in the world.
In a re-orientation of its corporate strategy for the 1990s and beyond, 
Citibank considers worldwide retail banking as the most important pillar of 
its business, planned to account for about seventy percent of total activities 
by mid-1990 as compared to the current fifty percent. The main reason for 
this shift in business focus stems from the high profitability of consumer 
banking as compared to the finance division: profits in retail banking 
increased continuously from $93 million in 1982 to $1 billion in 1990. These 
contrasted with losses of around $550 million in the global finance division 
(including bad debt provisions) where the bank was heavily involved in 
third world loans and was the first to make substantial write-offs and 
provisions for these loans.
230
Banking: Interview Evidence and Case Studies
One of the most important target areas in Citibank's worldwide retail 
strategy is the European market where Citibank has been present since 1963 
and is currently operating in eight countries. The strategic vision of Citibank 
is to become the first and possibly biggest truly 'European' retail bank with an 
extended presence across the EC countries. In addition, it wants to be part of 
the biggest five to ten domestic personal customer banks in the EC countries 
where it is present.
Citibank's strategy in European retail banking is based on three 
principles: European-wide presence, standardisation of products and services 
as far as feasible, and strong orientation towards electronic banking and 
product innovation. These three pillars shall be discussed in turn.
Concerning European-wide presence, Citibank is clearly only at the 
beginning of what would have to be a significant expansion process. It is 
currently in the process of significantly altering its business portfolio. While 
the European retail organisation consisted of 24 separate business units in 
1988, under the new European strategy only around ten to twelve units will 
be maintained with the others being sold off. The divested business units 
include auto finance firms in France, Belgium and Austria as well as Banco 
Centro Sud, the unsuccessful venture of Citibank into the Italian middle 
corporate market. The core business units are in the area of branch-based 
retail banking and credit card facilities including the VISA and Diner's Club 
franchises in some countries. Currently, it has a mentionable presence in 
branch-based retail activities only in Germany with 300 branches, Spain with 
100 branches, Belgium with 65 branches and Greece with 17 branches. It is 
planned, however, to expand coverage of the Italian, French, British and 
Dutch markets at the rate of one new country per year over the next five 
years. Concerning the choice of the entry vehicle, Citibank considers de novo 
entry as a feasible alternative to acquisitions after some disappointing 
experiences with the acquisition approach in Europe. In contrast to Deutsche 
Bank, for example, Citibank has mostly acquired 'turnaround' banks such as 
Banco del Levante in Spain which was a failed bank taken over by the 
regulatory authorities. Citibank has so far not been able to turn the acquired 
bank into a profitable operation. Similarly, in Italy Banco Centro Sud which 
was bought from Banco di Roma in 1985 had a significant asset portfolio 
problem with an extraordinarily high bad debt write-off rate and was 
divested again in 1991. These examples indicate the problems attached to the 
acquisition of 'problem' banks. Under the de novo approach it may take 
longer to establish a position in the market but it has the advantage that 
newly opened branches can be designed and located according to the 
European strategy of the bank, rather than having to invest a large amount 
to redesign and possibly relocate branches when a domestic bank is acquired 
which needs to be integrated into the European group strategy. Newly 
opened branches of Citibank are to be located in densely populated urban 
areas where "there is no prejudice against foreign banks", as a Citibank 
official explains.
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Citibank is probably the only bank which approaches the EC market 
with a unified strategy stressing similarities in consumer needs rather than 
current differences in habits across the European countries. A Citibank 
official explains that "despite different banking habits, the basic needs and 
fundamental processes in retail banking are identical such that eighty 
percent of the business activities are very similar". Accordingly, Citibank 
perceives synergy effects stemming primarily from know-how and labour 
transfer inside the Citibank group. As markets may be in different stages of 
development, know-how acquired in a mature market can be shifted to a 
market which is just developing. Thus, a competitive advantage may be 
secured through transferring expertise gained in one market to another 
market where domestic competitors have not progressed as far on the 
learning curve. An example of cross-border know-how transfer is the 
introduction of money market funds which are fairly novel in most 
European countries but where Citibank has gained significant experience 
over the past decade in the US market. Similarly, Citibank is one of the first 
banks to introduce aggressive marketing strategies such as direct mail and 
telephone solicitation which are a novelty in many European markets but 
have been standard practice in the US.6
All national group members are to lead the name "Citibank" in order to 
increase the recognition value throughout Europe. This implies that 
acquired banks in Europe have to change their name to be recognisable as 
part of the Citibank group. All European branches are to have a uniform 
design and outlay, offering a unified range of services with compatible and 
linked computer systems and ATM networks. A first example of such a 
'European' product which is distributed by all branches of Citibank in Europe 
is the investment fund 'CITINVEST' which consists of European assets and 
is centrally administered in Luxembourg.
Apart from the area of asset management which is an obvious 
candidate for centralisation, Citibank further perceives some centralisation 
potential and thus the opportunity to achieve economies of scale in the area 
of processing facilities. These include not only payment services and credit 
cards which are already centralised to a significant extent but also other 
technology-intensive areas such as phone-banking facilities which may be 
offered by a centralised European phone banking centre. The latter is also an 
example of how regulatory restrictions may be circumvented through a 
European-wide presence: since labour laws in Germany and Belgium do not 
allow Sunday work, Citibank decided to offer Sunday phone banking 
through its Spanish subsidiary. Thus, German or Belgian customers who 
undertake Sunday phone banking are connected to Citibank employees who 
work in the Spanish phone banking centre.7
6 Gtibank claims synergy effects in this area: for example, a direct mail solicitation concerning 
credit cards was undertaken in Spain and after it proved extraordinarily successful exactly the 
same solidation was used in Germany drawing on the experience gained in the Spanish market.
7 Telephone costs are reduced by the fact that Citibank owns its own PTTs.
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Citibank's strategy is further characterised by a strong focus on product 
and technological innovation and introducing new products into markets, 
rather than competing exclusively on price. For example, in Spain it was the 
first bank together with Barclays Bank to introduce interest-bearing current 
accounts and was later followed by Banco Santander. In addition, it was the 
first bank to introduce money market funds in Spain being again followed by 
the domestic banks but so far retaining its position as market leader. It is also 
the first bank to have introduced "24-hour banking" in the Spanish, German 
and Greek markets. These are instances of a foreign bank bringing new 
expertise to the domestic market, forcing domestic banks to follow suit by 
adapting their product and service range accordingly.
Concerning the organisational structure of Citibank's European retail 
operations, it is almost arch-typical of Williamson's M-form: a central 
headquarters in Brussels determines the general strategic guidelines 
regarding standardised branch outlay and design, for example. In addition, it 
sets return on capital goals for the different operating units and monitors 
and audits the different national subsidiaries. Each national subsidiary is run 
on a profit centre basis, however, and the implementation of the detailed 
business strategies is left to local management.
The European retail strategy shall be further illustrated with the 
German group member of Citibank: the former KKB Bank which according 
to Citibank officials serves as a role model for the process of European 
expansion.
2.4.2. Citibank's European acquisitions: the example of KKB Bank
KKB Bank was acquired as early as 1973 by Citibank, but significant 
managerial influence started to be exercised only in the mid-1980s when 
Citibank began to reorient its worldwide business focus towards consumer 
banking and realised the potential of a unified European market. Currently, 
the German subsidiary is by far the largest retail subsidiary of Citibank in 
Europe and outside the US. By the end of 1991 KKB Bank changed its name 
to Citibank Private Banking AG to be recognisable as Citibank's German 
subsidiary.
The bank focuses exclusively on the personal customer market and can 
therefore be considered a specialised bank in Germany with its universal 
bank system. It had 303 branches in Germany and 3,455 employees in 1990 
serving more than two million personal customers. Since 1985 it has 
significantly expanded its product range introducing life insurance, mortgage 
financing, credit cards and brokerage services.
Being a medium-sized bank in the personal customer segment, how 
does Citibank attempt to gain a competitive advantage over the big
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commercial banks on the one hand, and over the savings and mutual banks 
on the other hand which are especially strong in this market?
Citibank's market positioning can be summed up in two strategic 
objectives: technological leadership and market innovation. In response to a 
need for a new positioning to create a tangible edge over competitors, KKB 
Bank decided in 1988 in cooperation with Citibank on a new business 
strategy, the most important part of which is the focus on 'electronic 
banking'. Electronic banking, i.e. the automation and support of banking 
services by information systems can be split into the areas of 'back office' and 
'front office'. The former refers to the computer support of the internal 
organisation in the bank such as customer databases or system-supported 
communication and transactions. In the back office area, KKB was the first 
and is still the only German bank which operates an online-network 
between all its branches. In order to achieve this link, the bank invested DM 
60 million in the back office area. Automation and centralisation in the back 
office area allow employees to focus on know-how intensive advisory 
services, since they reduce the burden of routine operations.
In the front office area, the bank has recently introduced three 
innovations which have so far not been copied by other German banks and 
may therefore provide a potential competitive advantage: an expert system 
supporting investment decisions, telephone banking and "24-hour banking". 
First, the expert system RAMSES introduced in 1988 provides a tool for the 
customer in cooperation with the bank employee to devise an optimal 
investment strategy taking account of personal risk and return preferences. It 
is the first of its kind in the market and was apparently well-received by the 
customers.
Second, telephone banking introduced in May 1989 offers the possibility 
to undertake bank transactions such as giro transfers or payment services by 
telephone. This offers an alternative to visiting the branch and thus 
compensates for the lower number of branches compared to the large 
domestic competitors. In addition, it offers banking facilities outside the 
usual branch opening hours. Telephone banking thus replaces the earlier 
introduced form of 'homebanking' by videotext which was taken up by only
0.05 percent of German personal customers even though all banks offered 
this service.8
The third innovation of KKB is "24-hour banking": KKB was the first 
German bank to offer ATMs in all its branches. The ATM technology of the 
bank is an example of knowledge (or technology) transferral within the 
Citibank group: the ATMs employed in Germany were developed by TT1, a 
subsidiary of Citicorp in the US and tested by Citibank in the New York City
8 In stark contrast to the situation in France where the Minitel system enjoys widespread 
popularity. This difference in acceptance rates may result from the differing pricing policies of 
the national telecom firms since France Telecom has provided Minitel facilities at no charge.
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area where 1,100 machines were installed. As the machines were well- 
received, they were transferred to other Citibank group members.
The Citibank ATMs offer significantly more facilities than the standard 
machines currently in use by the other big German banks which offer 
exclusively cash withdrawal facilities. The Citibank machines are based on a 
user-friendly touch-screen technology and currently offer balance inquiries, 
cheque ordering, product information and money transferrals between 
Citibank accounts. These current services will soon be expanded to include 
the whole range of payment services including giro transfers and account 
information. The touch-screen technology of the Citibank ATMs allows 
expansion of ATM capabilities through software adjustments without the 
concurrent need to change the hardware as in conventional ATMs, thus 
allowing considerable flexibility in modifying the range of services offered by 
ATMs.
The installation of these new ATMs provides a potentially significant 
technological edge over other banks. If competitors were to match the 
technological state of the Citibank machines they would have to completely 
replace their current machines, a significant and unlikely investment, as 
they have only just introduced their machines and are still in the expansion 
process.
KKB was also the first bank to introduce the possibility to withdraw 
from ATMs with credit cards rather than only with Eurocheque or bank 
cards. Other banks were soon forced to follow suit and today all banks offer 
these facilities.
A final market innovation was the introduction of life insurance 
products in 1985 (similar to TSB Group in the UK) which set in motion a 
trend by the other banks to offer similar products. Deutsche Bank was the first 
of the big commercial banks to follow KKB's move and today virtually all 
banks offer a number of insurance products.
In view of these innovative moves, a Citibank official states that KKB 
has been charged by the other German banks as "breaking established rules of 
the game".
The bank also engages in an aggressive price strategy in selected areas. It 
was the first to reduce the annual price for its Visa card in 1988 and thus 
started a 'price war' in the credit card industry. With an average annual price 
of DM 120, KKB introduced its VISA card at a 'promotional' price of DM 45. 
This has led to various adjustments by other players in the market and by the 
end of 1991 the average price had decreased to DM 40 (KKB in the meantime 
has increased its price back to DM 60). KKB was also the first to introduce 
significantly positive interest rates on current accounts and above average 
rates on their savings accounts. Table 7.6 provides an analysis of the price 
strategy of Citibank in Germany.
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Table 7.6: Analysis of Citibank's pricing strategy in Germany
In DM
Citibank Average of 
German banks
Current Account* 86.40 112
Consumer credit 16.25% 14.6%
Cost of credit card p.a. 60 40
Interest on current account 2.5% 0.5%
Interest on savings account 3.5% 2.5%
Eurocheque card p.a. 20 10
Eurocheque per cheque 0.10 0.05
Annual costs of sec. acc 1.5% 1.2%
* with 200 transactions
Source: Price survey chapter five; data are for September 1991.
It is obvious that Citibank does not follow a consistent strategy of 
undercutting domestic competitors on prices. While it offers significantly 
higher interest rates on current and savings accounts, it also charges the 
highest rate for consumer credit among the surveyed German banks. In 
addition, it charges higher prices for Eurocheques which is the basic cheque 
used in many domestic transactions and for the annual costs of maintaining 
a securities account. Thus, while it offers better than average conditions in 
the deposit rate area which receives a lot of public attention, it recovers these 
higher funding costs in other areas.
Did the aggressive strategy of KKB Bank pay off in terms of profits? 
Table 7.7 analyses the financial statements of Citibank Germany over the 
period from 1986 to 1990 and compares these with the development the same 
data for all German banks as surveyed by the Bundesbank.
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Table 7.7: Analysis of KKB's financial statements from 1986 to 1990
After-tax
operating
profits*
Interest
rate
income
Com­
mission
surplus
Operating
expenses
KKB All banks KKB All banks KKB All banks KKB All banks
1987 +1.2% -7.7% +9.2% +0% +44.2% +9.1% +2.6% +5.1%
1988 -395% +10.1% +2.7% +2.9% +2.7% +17.2% +7.1% +4.4%
1989 +56.4% -1.4% +3.0% +0.8% +19.3% +16.0% +9.7% +4.3%
1990 +37.6% +12.1% +9.8% +6.2% +29.4% +12.9% +10.2% +8.3%
* Percentage figures in comparison to preceding year
Source: Own calculations from annual reports of KKB and Deutsche Bundesbank banking 
statistics.
It becomes apparent that KKB Bank managed to increase its operating 
profits substantially above the average of all German banks in the past two 
years. This resulted from an increase in both interest rate income and 
commissions which outpaced that of other German banks. The slump in 
after-tax profits in 1988 resulted from significant investment outlays in new 
branches and introducing new computer technology both in the back and 
front office areas. At the same time, however, operating expenses increased 
above average resulting from the significant investments in technology.
Citibank Germany is still one of the most profitable banks in Germany, 
however. In 1990 it had a return on assets of 0.6 percent as compared to an 
industry average of 0.21%. Profits on capital were also significantly above the 
industry average.
3. Case studies of cross-border strategic alliances
3.1. Banco Santander and Royal Bank of Scotland
3.1.2. Background and strategic objectives of the alliance
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the seventh-largest British bank, and Banco 
Santander, the fourth-largest Spanish bank, are both medium-sized banks in 
their home markets. Banco Santander had one of the highest profit on 
capital ratios of the large Spanish banks in 1990, whereas RBS's profit 
performance is only slightly above the UK average. Both have reasonably 
successful merchant bank subsidiaries and have been seeking to expand 
internationally, as their presence outside their home country was very 
limited.
In the 1980s RBS expanded significantly to grow from a largely regional 
bank to a major player in the UK market with a network of approximately
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850 branches after the absorption of its English subsidiary Williams and 
Glyn's. RBS has an approximate market share of 40 percent in the Scotish 
banking market, 15 to 20 percent of the North West of England and 4 to 5 
percent of the total UK market. Its international banking presence in Europe 
was basically non-existent up to 1988, however. Early in 1988 the bank 
therefore recognised the need to expand its European coverage. The three 
options considered were opening representative offices or branches, 
acquiring a foreign bank or engaging in a strategic alliance. Opening branches 
was excluded since it was judged as requiring too much time to establish a 
sufficient presence and thus this entry vehicle did not meet the requirement 
of quickly increasing international presence. A cross-border acquisition was 
excluded because of high costs and high goodwill write-offs which were seen 
as being difficult to justify to shareholders. It was therefore decided to pursue 
the third possible entry vehicle and in early 1988 RBS started searching for a 
European partner with whom it could engage into a broad strategic alliance. 
After an initial selection process there were five potential European banks 
which met the criteria of being roughly the same size as RBS in order to 
avoid a possible takeover and shared a similar interest in European 
expansion. Since Banco Santander had been going through a similar strategic 
evaluation process, it was decided by the two banks to set up a working 
committee in April 1988 to evaluate possible areas of cooperation.
Banco Santander was formed in 1857 also as a regional bank and has 
since grown to become the fourth-largest Spanish bank. It was the first bank 
to leave the 'gentleman's club' of Spanish banks by breaking explicit or tacit 
collusive agreements. An example of its aggressive strategy are the high- 
yield current accounts introduced by Santander which forced other banks to 
follow suit.9 Santander also follows the most determined international 
strategy of the large Spanish banks by having acquired a small Belgian and 
German bank and swapping 30 percent of its Italian subsidiary Banco Jover 
with 30 percent of Cariplo's Istituto Bancario Italiano.
In October 1988 both banks signed a co-operation agreement and 
exchanged cross-participations. These took the form of a share swap: 
Santander bought 10% of RBS with a total value of $89.6 million. RBS 
acquired 2.5% of Santander and purcKased 50% of the German CC Bank and 
Belgian Credit du Nord Beige, the other halves being owned by Santander. 
The agreement is supported by swaps of Board members and personnel and 
by a surveillance committee consisting of the chairmans and strategy 
directors who meet every six weeks. Moreover, the respective chairmans 
have been appointed to the allied bank's board and representatives of the 
partner bank work in the London and Madrid branches to monitor the local 
implementation of the alliance.
The co-operation agreement includes a 'non-aggression' pact which 
includes the agreement to service each other's clients in their respective
9 See chapter five.
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foreign markets and to jointly enter foreign markets. Thus, it precludes 
cross-border entry in the cooperating bank's home market. Considering this 
provision an RBS official notes in a personal interview that "everybody 
congratulated us on having 'entered' the highly profitable Spanish market. It 
turns out, however, that we have actually agreed not to enter ourselves but 
leave domestic business entirely to Santander".
In the personal customer market the alliance provides for mutual usage 
of the branch network. After the two mainframe computer systems were 
made compatible, Santander and RBS introduced the Interbank On-line 
system (IBOS) in November 1990. IBOS allows instantaneous and direct 
money transfer between all 850 RBS and 1,400 Santander branches and is 
thus the first on-line cross-border payment system with these facilities. These 
money transfers are provided at significantly lower costs than through 
regular clearing channels (0.2 percent with a minimum of £5 and a 
maximum of £10, as compared to at least £10 to £15 for regular transfers). In 
addition, standing orders can be carried out at a cost of £2.50 (end 1991) and 
personal customers can withdraw at any ATM or deal over the counter in 
any branch of the allied partner bank. Moreover, an RBS customer can open 
an account with Santander in any RBS branch and vice versa. The IBOS 
network is to be expanded to other European countries if suitable banks are 
found. In November 1991 the two banks announced that French Credit 
Commercial de France is to join the system.
Although the alliance has had important spin-off effects in the retail 
banking area, the original strategic rationale was clearly in the corporate 
banking sector. It was perceived that there was a significant danger of losing 
corporate customers to competitors unless both banks were able to provide 
indigenous facilities in European foreign markets. As stressed by an RBS 
official, the main strategic objective was thus to defend local corporate 
customers who consider expanding into Europe. The danger of losing 
customers to the cooperating bank in the host country is reduced by the fact 
that the latter bank is not able to provide services in the home country.
A joint venture was set up in Gibraltar to provide off-shore facilities 
and serve expatriates. In addition, a stake in a Gibraltar-based mortgage 
company was acquired which provides housing finance in Spanish market. 
Another joint venture includes a development capital company in the Spain 
(drawing on RBS's subsidiary Charterhouse expertise in this area), Vista 
Capital de Expansion with an initial funding of £32 million in 1990 and a 
joint acquisition of a Portugese bank, Banco de Comercio e Industria, whose 
branch network was increased from 25 to 80 branches since acquisition.
The possibility of a cross-border merger or a takeover of RBS by 
Santander is not excluded by RBS officials. The alliance agreement includes a 
condition that voting rights arising from the reciprocal shareholding shall 
only be exercised in accordance with the recommendation of the other 
group's board, any increase of share holdings needs approval of the other 
board and any disposed shares need first to be offered to the other group.
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These provisos guard against a hostile takeovers by the respective alliance 
partner. As RBS is still quite vulnerable to a takeover due to its widespread 
share ownership and Santander is very well-capitalised, it is not unlikely 
that the alliance between the two banks may eventually result in a merger. 
As an RBS official notes, this could happen if Santander jumps in as a white 
knight if some other predator makes a hostile bid for RBS.
3.1.2. A joint venture in Germany: the example of CC-Bank
The German joint venture of the two banks is CC-Bank which was first fully 
acquired by Santander in 1987. At the end of 1988, RBS acquired 50 percent of 
CC-Bank and thus the two banks are now shareholders with equal stakes. 
The German bank has around forty branches and had 738 employees in 1990 
with assets of around ECU 800 million.
No change in top management took place after the acquisition which 
seems to indicate that the takeover was not one for corporate control. The 
supervisory board consists of one member of RBS and two members of 
Santander which also appoints the current chairman. The top management 
(Vorstand), however, continues to consist only of German members.
CC-Bank operates exclusively in the personal customer market and 
offers the full range of banking services including credit cards, brokerage and 
insurance services. In order to create a competitive advantage in this market, 
CC-Bank offers what are probably the highest interest rates on deposit and 
current accounts in Germany: in 1990 these were 5 percent on current and 
credit card accounts compared to an average 0.25 percent of other banks, and 
7.5 percent on savings accounts compared to a mean of 2.8 percent paid by 
the biggest German banks. Due to these high interest rates, CC-Bank has been 
able to attract new deposits on current and savings accounts against the 
general trend of declining deposits on these accounts in German banking. 
Over the three-year period from 1987 to 1990 the bank managed to increase 
its deposits from private customers by more than 60 percent.
On its asset side, the bank focuses on a market niche which is somewhat 
neglected by the large German banks: it specialises on financial solutions for 
private customers of merchants such as electronics or car dealers. The 
market leader in this segment is another foreign-owned bank, Citibank 
Germany. In car leasing, for example, CC-Bank is among the biggest five 
financial services firms in Germany. CC-Bank maintains relations with 
more than 11,000 merchants and is called in by the dealer whenever a 
customer needs a loan or leasing arrangement, rather than paying for the 
good in full. Thus, it provides consumer credit through a 'retail' network of
11,000 dealers rather than relying only on its own branch network. This 
constitutes a clever way of compensating for the small branch network of the 
bank. Further, it helps customers economise on transaction costs: rather than 
requiring the potential purchaser to go to her bank first to get a loan 
arrangement, the merchant is able to offer a customised financial solution
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'on the spot' after around 10 to 15 minutes consultation with a service center 
of CC-Bank which has the same opening hours as the merchant. More than 
90 percent of such loan arrangements are in the range of less than ECU10,000. 
These low amounts help to reduce the risk of possible defaults.
With this business strategy CC-Bank managed to increase its business 
volume significantly over the past years. After-tax profits increased by 36 
percent from ECU1.9 million in 1989 to ECU2.6 million in 1990 which was 
paid out to the two main shareholders.
3.2. Commerzbank and Banco Hispano Americano
Commerzbank is the smallest among the Trig three' German universal 
banks. Hispano Americano is the sixth-largest Spanish bank with above 
average profitability. Both are members of the 'Europartner' network which 
was established in 1970/71 and additionally includes Banco di Roma and 
Credit Lyonnais. The Europartner group has been strained by the domestic 
mergers of Banco di Roma with Banco Santo Spirito and Hispano with 
Banco Central. Post-merger integration problems are most likely to distract 
these members from the European cooperation aspect for a while.10 In 
addition, Credit Lyonnais has pursued its own acquisition strategy in Spain 
with the FF 2,200 acquisition of Banco Commercial Espanol. This acquisition 
followed the offer by CL to engage in a mutual shareholdings agreement 
with Hispano which the latter bank declined, however, because it feared a 
takeover attempt by CL rather than a cooperation agreement. Since CL 
through its Spanish acquisition will be a direct competitor in the Spanish 
market, Hispano decided to withdraw from the alliance. Due to these strains 
the Europartner group was practically dissolved in July 1991 after other 
European cooperation groups such as ABECOR were already dissolved. Plans 
of Commerzbank and CL to engage in a share swap of 10 percent were 
abandoned in September 1991. This resulted mainly from CL's strategy of 
pursuing its own interests rather than cooperating with its Europartners. It 
bought banks in both Spain and Italy (Credito Bergamasco) and opened a 
branch in Germany, thus becoming a direct competitor to the other members 
of the alliance.
Commerzbank has held a 10 percent stake in Hispano since 1983. This 
stake was diluted to 4.5 percent by the pooling of equity in the merger with 
Banco Central. In July 1989 Hispano acquired a 5 percent stake in Commerz. 
In December 1991 the two banks announced that the mutual shareholding is 
going to be increased to 10 percent stakes for both groups.
The strategic alliance between Hispano and Commerz focuses on the 
retail banking area. As a Commerzbank official explains: "We have the
10 Another cross-border alliance failed due to a domestic merger: in August 1991 Banco de 
Bilbao sold its 7.3% stake in Hambros due to internal problems after its merger with Banco de 
Vizaya.
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vision of a linked branch network where any individual customer from each 
of the cooperating banks can use the branches of the other bank in the 
foreign country and be serviced just like a domestic customer." In contrast to 
the RBS/Santander alliance, however, progress in this direction has been 
much slower.
In retail banking the alliance between the two banks focuses on 
travellers, both private and business, who visit the country of the 
cooperating partner. For private customers each bank issues a so-called 
"Travel card" which serves as identification for the other bank. For business 
customers there is the analogue of the "Business Card" which enable the 
business traveller to use the branch network of the other bank which 
provides logistical support.
In contrast to the RBS/Santander alliance, banks can use the 
cooperating bank's branch network to distribute its own products. An 
example of this is the "Spain mortgage" which is a DM mortgage sold and 
monitored by a Hispano branch. It is aimed at the German investor who 
intends to buy property in Spain. Hispano provides support when searching, 
selecting and valuing a suitable object and aids with the legal side of the 
transaction. In return, it maintains the current account of the investor (e.g. 
pensions, water, electricity) and also funds for asset management. This 
points at one of the problems with the alliance: the cooperating bank has an 
incentive to entice away the customer should there be an opportunity.
The strategic alliance has not been free of problems. One Commerzbank 
official remarks that while the alliance is "theoretically an interesting and 
challenging concept", it is "extremely difficult to accomplish in practice, 
however". Among the problems cited are difficulties in disseminating 
information about the alliance in all concerned branches.
In addition to the current areas of cooperation, it is planned to offer 
joint cheque books, ATM cards and savings accounts and to establish a 
unified computer system, as well as closely co-ordinating treasury, capital 
market and M&A activities. Similar to the RBS/Santander alliance, both 
banks agreed not to open branches in the cooperating bank's home country. 
This, of course, has implications for the impact of alliances on competition. 
Instead of fostering price competition through own entry activities, allied 
banks leave the foreign market entirely to the cooperating bank. Even 
though the cooperating bank may distribute products and service customers 
of the partner, it is not induced to change its pricing strategy for domestic 
customers. Thus, the impact on domestic prices is likely to be negligible. 
Nevertheless, there may be enhanced product variety, as the range of 
products increases. Thus, through cooperative agreements banks can 
distribute products by the foreign partner which were previously unavailable 
in the domestic market or only available at higher costs.
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4. Conclusions
This chapter has first provided some evidence from a range of interviews 
with banks on the general impact of the regulatory changes in the context of 
the internal market programme. Most practitioners agree that the impact of
1992 is likely to be minimal in the market for large corporates and 
institutions. Retail banking is seen to be more affected but it may well take 
another ten years before greater cross-border penetration in this sector is 
achieved.
In addition, this chapter has presented a series of in-depth case studies 
which analyse the strategic objectives, the impact on competition and the 
implementation and success of cross-border entry activities in the retail 
banking area. The main cases of cross-border acquisitions and alliances were 
selected and followed up in the form of firm-level interviews.
For cross-border acquisitions it becomes apparent that post-acquisition 
strategies vary significantly for individual cases. While for some cases a 
hands-off approach is pursued by the acquirer, other acquisitions are actively 
integrated into the group following a unified European strategy. It appears 
that acquired banks do not follow a strategy of consistently undercutting 
indigenous institutions on prices. However, they frequently do offer better 
conditions on selected products such as deposit interest rates, like CC-Bank 
and Citibank in Germany or Barclays in Spain, or credit cards such as 
Citibank and Barclays in Germany and may therefore force domestic 
competitors to follow suit. In addition, it seems that foreign institutions 
frequently compete on quality and efficiency of services. Examples are 
Deutsche Bank in Italy whose decision-making process is a lot quicker than 
that of the large Italian banks or National Westminster in Spain which 
focuses its market positioning entirely on providing better service quality 
than indigenous banks. In addition, foreign banks are frequently forced to 
rely on technology-intensive distribution methods in order to compensate 
for the lower number of branches. Thus, they may introduce new 
distribution methods such as home banking and advanced ATMs, as 
Citibank has done in Germany, which may eventually be copied by domestic 
competitors. Thus, foreign banks are frequently competing on service quality 
and efficiency of distribution rather than merely on prices.
Does actual or potential foreign entry in retail banking place constraints 
on domestic firms and reduce their ability to exercise market power? I have 
argued that foreign entry can have several potential effects on domestic 
market conduct. First, it can break up domestic (tacitly) collusive equilibria, as 
foreign banks are 'outsiders' to the domestic banking community and may 
attem pt to gain business by offering existing services at lower prices. 
Alternatively, they can introduce new products or compete on quality of 
services rather than prices.
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Our emprical evidence seems to suggest that foreign banks in the retail 
area compete on the price level only in selected areas. This may concern the 
area of interest rates on deposit accounts, for example, where foreign banks 
are often the first banks to offer significantly positive or above average rates 
which in some cases induces domestic banks to increase their rates in 
response.
Possibly more importantly, foreign banks frequently compete on the 
quality and efficiency level. This means that foreign banks often invest 
heavily in technology to gain a competitive edge. Firstly, this probably results 
from the simple fact that price cuts can be immediately matched by domestic 
competitors, whereas a technological edge requires more time to be imitated 
by competitors. More importantly, foreign banks are to some extent forced to 
compete on efficiency, technology, and quality levels, as they cannot compete 
with domestic banks in terms of the extent of the retail branch network. They 
therefore have an incentive to probe into alternative distribution methods 
such as non-branch based methods. Innovations in the field of product- 
delivery methods may bring considerable benefits to the consumer, as they 
are likely to facilitate the communication and interaction with banks. In 
particular, new distribution methods introduced by foreign banks may be 
copied by domestic institutions.
In general, it seems clear, however, that in the retail area the impact of 
foreign banks on domestic competition is less than than in wholesale 
activities, since entry barriers are significantly greater in retail banking. Such 
entry barriers stem particularly from customer switching costs and the lack of 
suitable acquisition targets in most European countries. In contrast to 
investment banking, geographic expansion in the retail sector entails large 
fixed costs, as product delivery still necessitates a large number of distribution 
outlets. Only when communication technology has progressed so far as to 
make non-branch based distribution methods widely acceptable will foreign 
banks be able to make a greater impact on domestic competition in the retail 
banking sector.
The im pact of strategic alliances on com petition seems less 
conspicuous. Although they may in 'principle bring new products to the 
market, they are frequently of a defensive nature intended to provide 
internationalisation at low cost and low risk. As the example of Royal Bank 
of Scotland and Banco Santander shows, however, such an alliance can bring 
significant benefits in the retail area where technological cooperation 
between two large branch networks leads to a simplification of cross-border 
transactions. Most other alliances, however, have yet to produce real benefits 
for the participants and an impact on competition.
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Chapter Eight:
Cross-Border Entry 
in European Insurance:
Survey Evidence and Case Studies
Analogous to the preceding chapter, this chapter presents empirical 
evidence on the cross-border penetration process in European insurance. 
The first section reports on a questionnaire which was sent to the largest 
European banks and insurers, while the second section presents individual 
case study analyses of cross-border entry activities in the insurance sector.
1. Results from the questionnaire survey
1.1. A note on research methodology
In addition to undertaking personal interviews, I decided to undertake a 
questionnaire survey on cross-border entry among EC insurance companies. 
The objective is to compare the results of such a systematic study in the 
insurance sector with those in banking. The population was defined as all 
EC banks and insurers which may be affected by cross-border entry activities 
either in an active sense, i.e. by undertaking cross-border entry themselves, 
or in a passive sense by being affected by increased competition from foreign 
firms.
In the banking sector, the annual listing of the largest 1,000 banks 
worldwide was used to extract the largest EC banks in each country and 
addresses were compiled from The Banker's Almanac. In the final sample 
138 banks were included.
By far the the best sampling frame which covers the population of EC 
insurance companies is the annual Financial Times publication World 
Insurance which contains addresses and data for the largest insurers in each 
of the twelve EC countries. While it is not clear which criteria are applied for 
including an insurer into the publication, the annual covers all of the major 
European firms. For each of the EC countries all general insurers included in 
the latest edition were selected. Thus, firms which specialise in marine or 
industry insurance were not included in the final selection of addresses. The 
final distribution of firms across the twelve EC countries is shown in table
8.1.
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Table 8.1 Number of firms and response rates for individual EC countries for 
survey
Banking Insurance
Number of
firms
included
Number of 
responses
Response
rate
(in
percent)
Number of
firms
included
Number of 
responses
Response
rate
(in
percent)
Germany 24 11 46 20 10 50
France 26 8 31 26 11 42
UK 28 7 25 23 8 35
Italy 15 6 24 14 4 29
Belgium 7 3 43 12 3 25
Spain 9 3 33 8 2 25
Portugal 4 1 25 5 0 0
Ireland 5 1 20 5 0 0
Netherl. 6 2 33 7 2 33
Denmark 7 0 0 5 2 29
Greece 4 0 0 6 3 38
Luxemb. 3 1 33 3 1 33
Total 138 43 31 134 46 34
The questionnaire was sent out on March 16/17, 1992 with the request 
to have it returned by April 16,1992. Each questionnaire was accompanied by 
a letter which explained the purpose of the study. The letters were addressed 
to the public relations departments which were asked to forward the 
questionnaires to the responsible department. At the beginning of April, 
follow-up calls were undertaken to those firms which had not responded by 
that date. The final distribution of returned questionnaires by countries is 
also presented in table 8.1. It is obvious that the number of responses from 
some EC countries such as Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland was 
too low to draw any representative conclusions for the population of banks 
and insurers in these countries.
The overall response rate was 31 percent for banking and 34 percent for 
insurance. In the following section, I report some of the most interesting 
results for the aggregate sample. I generally do not differentiate by countries, 
as the number of responses per country was too low to draw any statistically 
representative conclusions.
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1.2. Results from questionnaire
In this section, I give a broad overview of the answers of the questionnaire 
and compare these between the two sectors. I focus on the most interesting 
issues, rather than providing a comprehensive question-by-question 
analysis. In particular, I compare the responses of the banking and insurance 
sectors. Many of the factual data which were derived from the questionnaire 
were incorporated into the appendices or are dted as examples in other parts 
of the thesis and are therefore not dealt with in this section.
Currently, 87 percent of insurance firms regard foreign firms to be 
competitors in at least one branch of insurance. This figure was even higher 
in the banking sector with 94 percent, but referred almost exclusively to the 
investment banking and multinational corporate markets. This confirms 
the notion that foreign banks currently play only a marginal role in retail 
banking. Foreign insurers were considered to be significant competitors in 
particular in property insurance (mentioned by 73 percent of respondents) 
followed by the life sector (with 55 percent). This response was largely 
similar for the different EC countries. In health insurance, there was a larger 
degree of divergence with the large majority of German firms stating that 
there are no significant foreign competitors, whereas foreign firms were 
considered to be more important competitors by Greek, French and Spanish 
respondents. This divergence results from different degrees of openess to 
foreign entry in the health insurance sector.
34 percent of respondents in insurance considered foreign firms to be 
"moderate" competitors in the personal customer market segment, another 
38 percent even regarded them to be "significant" competitors. This starkly 
contrasted with the banking sector where only 12 percent of respondents 
considered foreign banks to be strong or significant competitors in the retail 
banking sector. This percentage was significantly higher for the Spanish 
market where 45 percent considered foreign banks to be at least "moderate" 
competitors. This confirms that the Spanish market is more heavily 
penetrated by foreign banks in the retail sector, despite former official entry 
barriers discussed in chapter four. The percentages for the small and 
medium-sized corporate market segment were slightly higher both in 
banking and insurance, while 64 percent of insurers considered foreign 
firms to be strong competitors in the market for multinational firms. In 
banking, this figure was even higher with 93 percent. Foreign banks thus 
play the most important role in the more easily accessible wholesale banking 
market.
In insurance, firms expect the greatest impact of the internal market 
programme to occur in the retail sector. However, firms from the Southern 
European countries, in particular Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece also 
expect a significant increase in competition in the market for large 
corporates where multinational industrial coverage is expected to become of 
increasing importance. In the banking sector, 42 percent of banks expect a
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"sizeable" impact of the 1992 programme in the retail sector. 84 percent of 
respondents, however, expect that "no change" is taking place in the market 
for multinationals, since competition is on an international scale already. 
This confirms the conclusion from the interview evidence, reported in the 
previous chapter.
Concerning individual insurance sectors, the largest impact is expected 
to take place in the life sector where 92 percent of respondents expect a "big" 
or at least "sizeable" impact. This probably results from the fact that life 
insurance, in contrast to the non-life market, still offers high margins and 
has so far been a fairly protected industry in most EC countries. There was 
no differentiation according to countries. In other sectors, however, 
responses varied by covin tries. Health insurance, for example, is expected to 
be little affected in Germany and the UK, while being more likely to be 
affected in Spain, Portugal and Greece. In both motor and personal liability 
insurance, the internal market programme is expected to have less of an 
impact.
Spain, Germany and France are expected to be most affected by 
regulatory changes on the EC level in insurance. This conforms with the 
analysis in chapter two where it was noted that these countries follow the 
material control system of ex ante supervision which needs to be abandoned 
under the Third EC Insurance Directives. Spain also leads the ranking of the 
most attractive European countries for cross-border entry activities, closely 
followed by Italy and France. Germany, however, only ranks seventh, after 
the three countries already mentioned and Greece, Portugal and the UK. In 
banking, Spain is considered to be most attractive due to high margins, 
followed by France and the UK.
Only 58 percent of respondents currently take the single insurance 
passport into account in their strategic planning. This figure was slightly 
higher in the banking sector with 64 percent. However, this figure differed 
significantly between the large firms where the rate was more than 90 
percent, and the smaller largely domestic firms where only 15 percent 
incorporated the changes on the EC level into their strategic planning. 
Among the expected changes resulting from the single insurance passport, 
insurers m entioned increased direct marketing activities, increasing 
importance of brokers, increasing product variety and variance of premium 
levels, less transparency of products for consumers and, interestingly, 
deregulation followed by re-regulation in ten years.
64 percent of respondents in insurance could list an example of a 
product from the retail sector which was introduced by a foreign firm either 
at a lower price than domestic products or as a product innovation. 
Examples from the banking sector were all from the wholesale sector and 
referred mainly to derivative products and foreign exchange products. This 
confirms the more conspicuous role of foreign insurers in the retail sector
248
Insurance: Survey Evidence and Case Studies
compared to foreign banks which still concentrate their efforts on the 
wholesale sector.
Only a minority of insurers believe that foreign firms pursue an 
aggressive price strategy (42 percent), while 76 percent think that they follow 
mainly an innovative strategy. This is a result which is confirmed in the 
following case studies. In banking, a greater number of banks consider 
foreign banks to compete on the price level, especially in the wholesale 
sector. The vast majority of both insurers and banks expect an increase in 
foreign entry activities in their domestic market. 85 percent of respondents 
agreed with the view that such foreign entry will lead to downward pressure 
on domestic prices, due to increased competition.
Synergy effects deriving from operating Europe-wide were perceived to 
be significant by 85 percent of respondents and these concerned in particular 
the possibility of know-how transfer. Scale or scope economies were 
considered to be less important, confirming the empirical evidence analysed 
in chapter four.
Concerning the significance of regulatory barriers, it is interesting to 
observe that 82 percent of respondents considered regulatory barriers as "not 
so important" in insurance. In banking, regulatory barriers were perceived 
to be "important" or "very important" by 42 percent of banks. The most 
im portant barrier in insurance was perceived to be lack of the right 
distribution channel which 66 percent of insurers considered to be "very 
important". This was closely followed by 'lack of intimate knowledge of the 
foreign market" which 45 percent considered to be very important. In 
contrast, the lack of a level playing field is considered to be "not so 
important" by the majority of insurers. In banking, the "lack of suitable 
acquisition targets" figure more prominently which 61 percent of banks 
consider to be at least "important" as a barrier to cross-border entry. It is 
interesting to note that none of these barriers to entry are likely to be affected 
in any significant way by the internal market programme.
The major cost disadvantages which insurers perceive during the first 
phase of entering a foreign market are lack of local market know-how and 
insufficient distribution channels. Reputational disadvantages and the fact 
that one is a 'foreign' firm were considered to be less significant in 
insurance, while being more significant in banking where 54 percent of 
banks referred to these factors as being at least "important". It was noted 
several times that it takes at least three to five years to turn a foreign start-up 
into a profitable operation due to the high set-up costs which need to be 
amortised over several years.
Among the firm-level advantages which can be transferred to a foreign 
market and which may lead to a competitive advantage, the follow-the- 
customer explanation is the most frequently cited view in the banking sector
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where 78 percent of respondents consider this aspect to be "very important". 
In insurance, however, this explanation is less significant, whereas know­
how is viewed to be the most important source of competitive advantages at 
the firm level.
Concerning competitive advantages stemming from locational aspects, 
lower efficiency of insurance firms in the host country is considered to be 
"very im portant" by 55 percent, while diversification advantages are 
regarded as im portant or very important by 68 percent. In banking, 
locational advantages stemming from funding costs differences between the 
home and the host country were considered to be "important" by 62 percent 
of respondents. Similarly, regulatory factors were considered to be 
"important" or even "very important" by 53 percent of banks.
In insurance, 64 percent of respondents believe that successful entry in 
the personal customer market through de novo entry is possible, while only
19 percent considered exporting to be a feasible entry strategy. In banking, 
these figures were even lower: merely 12 percent regard de novo entry to be 
feasible, while 8 percent consider exporting to be feasible in the personal 
customer segment.
As the main disadvantages of both joint ventures and strategic 
alliances, respondents listed differences in management attitudes and the 
coordination of strategic planning. This was very similar in banking and 
insurance.
In summary, it emerges that respondents from the insurance sector 
expect a significantly greater impact of the internal market programme in 
the retail financial services sector than banks. At the same time one has to 
realise, however, that foreign insurers in the retail sector already play a 
more important role at the moment than foreign banks.
2. Case studies of cross-border entry strategies
2.1. Allianz’ European acquisitions
2.1.1. Allianz’ strategy of international expansion in Europe: a historical overview'
Allianz was founded in 1890 in Berlin and soon after its foundation 
established international branches in several European countries such as 
France, the UK, Holland and Italy. In 1913 before the outbreak of the First 
World War, 20 percent of total premiums were earned outside Germany. 
After the First World War, Allianz was forced to give up most of its 
international activities as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. In the interwar 
period, Allianz set out to rebuild its international activities in particular in 
Spain, Italy and Holland and several other European countries. Although
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the significance of international activities did not approach that before the 
war, Allianz once again managed to become the German insurer with the 
largest international portfolio. All international activities were again lost 
after the Second World War and this time it took longer before the firm 
made another attempt to rebuild its international activities.
It was not until the end of the 1959 that Allianz enters another 
European country with a branch in Paris; one year later it enters the 
Austrian market with a life insurance subsidiary which soon becomes one of 
the leading firms in the market. In 1966 Allianz enters into a strategic 
alliance with the British Commercial Union by establishing a cross­
shareholding. This shows that such alliances are certainly not a recent 
innovation.
It was not until the beginning of the 1970s, however, that Allianz 
enters a phase of a significant internationalisation process. The dramatic 
impact of this strategy can be assessed when looking at the premium income 
from foreign activities: these were only 3 percent in 1970, while in 1991 the 
income from international activities as a proportion of total activities had 
increased to 48 percent with premiums of ECU11 billion earned abroad, of 
which more than 80 percent were accounted for by the European countries. 
In 1992, Allianz belongs to the largest five insurers worldwide with a total 
premium income of ECU22.5 billion and 75,000 employees. The dramatic 
expansion of Allianz is reflected in the fact that both total premium volume 
as well as profits trebled between 1985 and 1991.
Initially, the cross-border entry activities of Allianz were primarily 
driven by the 'follow the customer' view. As German industrial firms 
expanded their activities from being predominantly export-oriented to 
increasing their direct foreign investment, Allianz realised that in order to 
provide adequate insurance services to the rapidly increasing number of 
foreign subsidiaries of German industrial firms, it needed to have a local 
presence in order to be able to perform risk assessment and monitoring 
activities at lower transaction costs than is possible from the German 
headquarters.
Subsequently, Allianz' cross-border expansion was increasingly driven 
by diversification considerations. As is formulated in a strategic review in 
1989: "to be dependent on just one market is too dangerous from the point 
of view of diversifying away economic risk arising from business cycles ... in 
addition, risk reduction results from the possibility of spreading insurance 
risk across several national markets. This provides important competitive 
advantages over those insurers which operate only in their domestic 
market".
In addition to such a diversification view of cross-border entry 
activities, Allianz also recognises the advantages which result from the
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transfer of product know-how among its subsidiaries. In its annual report of 
1989 it notes that "Allianz crosses national borders also because it wants to 
profit from the rich know-how in insurance and services which can be 
gleaned from operating in foreign markets ... know-how transfer resulting 
from international activities guarantees a significant com petitive 
advantage".
In 1974 Allianz started its process of international expansion with a de 
novo entry in the British market. Management and underwriting of the 
new subsidiary was delegated to Willis, Faber Ltd., a British firm with long­
standing experience in managing the British subsidiaries of several foreign 
insurers. However, this arrangement proved unsatisfactory, since Allianz 
did not get access to activities on its own account, nor did it gain an insight 
into management and underwriting activities. A similar de novo entry into 
the US market in 1977 which also led to significant problems leads to the 
general strategic conclusion that greenfield entry does not lead to the desired 
position in a foreign market. In the 1989 annual report dealing with the US 
venture, the company described its encountered problems with de novo 
entry activities. In particular, the lack of local know-how leads to cost 
disadvantages during the first entering phase: "the entering period into the 
new market turned out to be extremely difficult ... different customs and 
mentalities, a different legal system in particular in liability law and the 
need to establish an agent system entirely from scratch lead to difficulties of 
an extent not previously experienced".
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Allianz management therefore 
decided to enter foreign markets by acquisition rather than by de novo entry 
or strategic alliance. The first such large-scale acquisition attempt took place 
in the UK where Allianz had become increasingly dissatisfied with its 
marginal presence. In June 1981 Allianz acquired a 28.1 percent of Eagle Star, 
one of the largest UK insurers. After the management of Eagle Star did not 
cooperate w ith Allianz, however, the German insurer made a hostile 
takeover bid for Eagle Star in October 1983. The takeover bid was the highest 
ever made for a firm in the UK up to that year. However, soon after the 
offer, BAT, the third-largest UK conglomerate, steped in as a white knight 
and in a competitive race outbid Allianz. The German insurer, when selling 
its stake in Eagle Star to BAT, made a profit of ECU250 million.
After this failed hostile takeover attempt, Allianz decided in 1986 to 
acquire Cornhill Insurance in the UK in a friendly takeover for an 
acquisition price of ECU450 million. Cornhill was the eleventh-largest UK 
insurer with a special focus on the non-life sector, in particular motor car 
insurance, accounting for 36 percent of total premiums, where it is one of 
the market leaders. It had 3,400 employees in 1989 and a premium volume 
of ECU900 million of which 85 percent come from domestic activities. 
Cornhill has a reputation for being a product innovator. It was the first
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insurer, for example, which introduced the bonus/malus scheme in motor 
insurance, a scheme which is now commonplace.
In 1984 Allianz had already made a large-scale acquisition in the Italian 
market. A 51.5 percent stake of Riunione Adriatica di Sicuritti (RAS), the 
second-largest insurer in the country, was acquired for an amount of ECU560 
million. This was by far the largest cross-border acquisition in the financial 
services sector up to that year. RAS was founded in 1838 and is one of the 
most internationalised European insurers with half of the premium 
volume being earned abroad. The main countries of activities of RAS are 
Austria, Switzerland, France and Spain which constitute a significant 
strategic complement to Allianz which was not well-represented in these 
countries with the exception of Austria. In addition, RAS was attractive to 
Allianz due to its powerful standing in the Italian market which Allianz 
believed had significant growth potential and where Allianz was 
represented only with a small subsidiary. After the acquisition Allianz 
exercised a strategy of restraint concerning the business policy of RAS. It sent 
only two members to the board of directors of RAS although it would have 
the right to appoint eleven members. In addition, it did not interfere with 
the local management in Italy at all, but focused cooperation efforts on joint 
expansion outside the respective home markets.
Such joint expansion was exercised, for example, in Spain where the 
subsidiaries of RAS and Allianz were merged and now carry the name 
'Allianz-RAS Seguros'. After the merger Allianz became one of the largest 
insurers in Spain and the largest foreign insurer in the country.
Similarly in France, the RAS subsidiary, Protectrice, was integrated into 
the Allianz group. However, Allianz was not satisfied with its standing in 
the French market, a position described as "too big to die, too small to live". 
After integration of the RAS subsidiary it had a total premium volume of 
ECU250 million in France in 1987 which gave it only an insignificant market 
share. In addition, its position in the personal customer sector is clearly 
underdeveloped. In 1988 Allianz therefore started searching for a potential 
acquisition target in the French market but only with limited success. The 
main barrier to cross-border acquisition was the large degree of public 
ownership in the French market. The 'big three' national insurers are all 
government-owned, whereas a range of mutual companies cannot be 
acquired either.
Then, in September 1989 Allianz was approached by the holding 
company Compagnie de Navigation Mixte (CNM) which was subject to a 
hostile takeover bid by the national insurer AGF and the large merchant 
bank Paribas. CNM held a 95.8 percent stake in the insurance group 
VIA/Rhin et Moselle. Allianz quickly reacted and took over a 50 percent 
stake in the insurance subsidiary of CNM for a price of ECU930 million, the 
largest acquisition price paid for a cross-border acquisition until that time.
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The VIA/Rhin et Moselle group was the fifth-largest privately-owned 
insurance company with a total premium volume of ECU1.3 billion and 
2,400 employees. It had a market share of 2.2 percent and has a distribution 
network of 1,300 agents. Its main focus of activities were retail customers 
and its business portfolio consisted of two-thirds non-life and one-third life 
insurance.
With its large-scale acquisition programme in the 1980s, Allianz 
established a sizeable presence in most major European economies. Apart 
from its European cross-border entry activities, Allianz also entered non- 
European countries in particular the North-American continent where 
almost 20 percent of its foreign premiums are underwritten. Most recently, 
Allianz also entered the Eastern European markets through acquisitions and 
is so far the insurer with the largest presence in this geographic area. In 
Hungary, for example, Allianz acquired a 49 percent in one of the two large 
domestic insurers, Hungaria, which has a market share of 44 percent.
Allianz employs an M-form structure when managing its European 
subsidiaries. The central headquarters in Munich coordinates internatioal 
activities and sets return on investment targets for the subsidiaries, while 
day-to-day management is largely left to local management. The general 
strategic vision is formulated at headquarters. This includes the supervision 
of restructuring and integration processes in particular in Spain and France, 
as well as promotion of international know-how transfer. Such know-how 
transfer concerns in particular new product ideas, marketing innovations or 
computer systems solutions. In addition, the internal organisation structure 
of the European subsidiaries is to some extent harmonised where a 
customer-focused approach is implemented rather than the traditional 
functional organisational structure (e.g. fire, motor, life etc.). Allianz started 
this internal reorganisation in its home market which is now divided into 
personal customers, small- and medium-sized enterprises and large 
corporates. This organisational structure, which is certainly not yet common 
for insurance firms, shall also be implemented in the foreign subsidiaries 
after sufficient know-how is collected in the German restructuring whose 
experience can then be transferred to the other countries.
In the next sections, I discuss Allianz' current strategy in some EC 
countries in greater detail.
2.1.2. Allianz ’ strategy in Spain
Allianz expanded its presence in Spain primarily through the acquisition of 
RAS in 1984 which has been active in the Spanish market since 1918 
through its subsidiaries Adriatica and Cresa. In addition, a 51 percent stake 
in the small insurer Ercos was acquired in 1988 which complemented the 
activities in the personal customer segment. Until that acquisition, Allianz
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was only active in the industrial insurance field through its subsidiary in 
Madrid.
In 1990 all personal customer lines of business were reorganised under 
the new holding company Allianz-RAS Seguros, SA. The merged company 
had a premium volume of ECU219 million in 1990 and made a profit after 
tax of ECU0.2 million, a result which was burdened by an increase in 
reserves and the restructuring resulting from the merger. The company 
holds a particularly strong position in the motor insurance market where 
more than 50 percent of premiums are written. Life business accounts for 
only 14 percent of total premiums in the insurance sector. As is apparent 
from table 8.2 life business has had a particularly high growth rate in the 
Spanish market and is expected to continue to grow at rates above those of 
other EC countries. Similarly, in the non-life sector Spanish growth rates 
exceeded the EC average.
Table 8.2: Insurance growth rates in Spain from 1985 to 1989 compared to EC 
average
Life ins. Life: all EC 
countries
N on-life non-life: all 
EC countries
1986 +67.9% +16.2% +14.0% +8.5%
1987 +7.5% +16.3% +23.5% +7.3%
1988 +70.2% +15.1% +12.2% +5.6%
1989 -48.6% +13.5% +14.3% +3.9%
Source: Sigma, several issues.
As is apparent from figure 8.1, Spain has one of the lowest insurance 
densities in the EC. Allianz therefore expects significant growth potential in 
the Spanish market which is only comparable to that of the Italian market 
which is also characterised by a low insurance density both in life and non­
life business.
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Figure 8.1: Insurance densities in the twelve EC economies in 1989
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Figure 8.2 shows similar results concerning insurance density if 
measured in terms of premiums as a percentage of GDP. Again, Spain and 
Italy have the lowest insurance density, only ahead of Greece.
«
256
Insurance: Survey Evidence and Case Studies
Figure 8.2: Premiums as percentage of GDP in the twelve EC economies in 
1989
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To expand its position in the high-growth Spanish life-insurance 
market, Allianz entered a joint venture with Banco Popular Espanol in both 
life business and pension funds. The two JV companies, Eurovida and 
Europensiones, which are jointly owned by Allianz and Banco Popular, aim 
at distributing products which are underwritten by Allianz through the 
branch network of Banco Popular. In the motor insurance market, which 
constitutes by far the most important market segment for the group, 
Allianz-RAS attempts to gain a competitive advantage through introducing 
innovative products rather than competing on the price and premium 
level. This corresponds to a general business strategy of the Allianz group 
which mostly follows a medium- to high-price strategy in the markets in 
which it is active. In order to justify higher prices, it attempts to provide 
better service levels than those of competitors. A firm official notes that for 
the Spanish market
"we aim at providing high service quality rather than competing 
on the price level. In particular, we want to establish a reputation 
as an innovator and be the market leader in introducing new 
products. It is in this area in which we believe to have a 
competitive advantage due to the possibility of know-how 
transfers from other European subsidiaries of the Allianz group."
0  Non-life 
••‘ Life
257
Chapter 8
This strategy appears very similar to that of other European banks and 
insurers which follow the strategic objective of competing on the level of 
product or service quality or through innovations rather than by competing 
only on the price level.
2.1.3. Allianz ’ strategy in the French market
France was the first EC country in which Allianz became active by 
establishing a branch in 1959, after having lost all its international activities 
in 1945. It was not until the 1989 acquisition of a 50 percent stake of the 
Via/Rhin et Moselle group, however, that Allianz gained a sizeable market 
share in the French market. As is noted in an annual report, concerning 
strategy in France:
"it was in France ... that Allianz learned the most important 
lesson to be applied to its subsequent strategy abroad: that it is 
almost impossible, in a well-developed insurance market, to set 
up an efficient organisation for personal insurance business from 
scratch at reasonable cost."
In 1990 a new holding company, Allianz Via, S.A. was founded to 
coordinate all activities of the different group members. In this holding 
company the interests of the former RAS subsidiaries, Protectrice, are 
merged with those of Via/Rhin et Moselle and the original subsidiaries of 
Allianz. Allianz AG holds a majority stake of 65 percent in that group, while 
Compagnie de Navigation Mixte (CNM), the former majority owner, retains 
a stake of 34 percent. In turn, Allianz AG is one of the main shareholders of 
CNM with a stake of around 9 percent.
After these reorganisations which mainly took place in 1990, the 
French market had become the second-largest European market for Allianz 
in terms of premium volume (behind Italy). The French insurance market, 
which is the fifth-largest in the world, has experienced a significant growth 
rate in the life insurance sector which outstripped the EC average, as is 
apparent from table 8.3. In the non-life sector, however, there was a lower 
than average growth rate. Allianz expects these low growth rates to continue 
in the non-life sector with an average growth rate which equals the GDP 
plus one to two percent. In the non-life sector, however, Allianz expects 
continued growth rates of around 11 to 15 percent at least until 1995.
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Table 8.3: Insurance growth rates in France from 1985 to 1989 compared to EC 
average
Life ins. Life: all EC 
countries
Non-life non-life: all 
EC countries
1986 +25.7% +16.2% +3.3% +8.5%
1987 +19.4% +16.3% +3.4% +7.3%
1988 +32.6% +15.1% +2.4% +5.6%
1989 +21.9% +13.5% +2.2% +3.9%
Source: Sigma, several issues.
In 1990 the Allianz Via group had a total premium volume of ECU1.44 
billion which gave it an overall market share of slightly more than 3 percent 
in the French market. Of the total premium income, 33 percent fell into the 
life insurance category, while 60 percent were in the property and casualty 
insurance sector. In the industrial insurance sector, Allianz Via had a 
market share of 8 percent which reflects its long-standing focus on this 
market segment.
Whereas Allianz uses brokers as the main distribution channel in 
industrial insurance, in the personal sector general agents are used to 
distribute the firm's products. The group employs 1,500 agents which look 
after 2 million customers. Competition through non-traditional distribution 
channels has increased especially in the life insurance sector where the 
proportion of products distributed through banks increased from 10 percent 
in 1983 to 41 percent in 1989.
Based on Allianz' general strategic approach of providing high-quality 
rather than low-price products, its strategy in the French market aims at 
product innovation and high service standards in order to gain a 
competitive advantage. Innovative products are introduced both in the life 
and non-life sectors. In motor insurance, for example, Via introduced the 
'Auto Kilomètre' product which provides special rates for those motorists 
who drive less than a specified number of miles per year.
As an Allianz official notes, know-how transfer takes place from France 
to Germany rather than the other way around. This results from the fact that 
the French market is substantially more innovative than the German 
market and competition in terms of product innovations is actually greater 
in France than in Germany. Concerning pricing strategy, an Allianz 
executive notes that the firm currently ranks in the middle in terms of 
premiums and has no intention of cutting premiums.
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Equity & Law (E&L), the British life insurer founded more than 140 years 
ago, was acquired by the French Compagnie du Midi Group in 1987. 
Compagnie du Midi later merged with the Axa Group to form Axa-Midi, the 
second-largest European insurer after its 1992 takeover of US Equitable Life. 
Compagnie du Midi paid an acquisition price of ECU675 million to acquire 
the British insurer. Only few changes took place after the takeover of E&L by 
the French group. As a company official notes in a personal interview: "the 
Axa group believes that strategic issues and day-to-day management should 
be left to local management. After the takeover by the Axa Group there were 
therefore no changes in strategy, not even in senior management positions."
The main advantage which E&L sees as being owned by the French 
group relates to capital raising which is facilitated due to the status of Axa 
which has a AA+ Standard & Poor rating. This will facilitate E&L's 
ambitious expansion plans with the aim of belonging to the largest 10 UK 
life insurers by the end of the 1990s. It currently has a market share of 1.8 
percent in the overall market, up from 1.1 percent in 1988 and is the twenty- 
third-largest life company in the UK. In the market for pension plan 
products, E&L is currently market leader. Concerning cross-border entry 
strategies, E&L has been active in the Netherlands where it is the eleventh- 
largest life company with a market share of 2.3 percent, and Germany where 
it has been present since the beginning of the 1970s. I discuss E&L's entry 
strategy in Germany in the next section.
2.2. Equity & Law Life Insurance
2.2.1. Equity & Law’s de novo entry strategy in Germany
E&L has been active in Germany since 1974 when it founded a subsidiary in 
Wiesbaden. Since then it has acquired a significant market share of more 
than 17 percent in 1991 in the permanent health insurance market which 
has been the focus of its business strategy since entering the German market. 
Since the mid-70s, E&L has consistently broadened its product spectrum, 
however, in order to improve its competitive position in the general life 
insurance market and to get away from a reputation of being only a specialist 
insurer.
E&L's role in Germany can best be described as that of a product 
innovator: all the major products which were introduced into the German 
market were innovative products which were not offered in that form by 
any domestic German insurer. This started in 1974 with the entry product 
being a term life product which was offered only by few German insurers, 
since most incumbents focused on the more profitable endowment life 
insurance market. Another entry product was a permanent health insurance 
product which could be acquired separately from ordinary life insurance. 
This was a novelty in the German market, as permanent cover was only 
sold in conjunction with other life products by the major German
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incumbents. This innovation made it possible for consumers to acquire 
insurance coverage against the risk of disability even if no other life 
insurance products were acquired.
The second major innovative product introduced by E&L into the 
German market in 1979 was a term life insurance which distributed any 
valuation gains in regular intervals rather than only in the case of payout. 
An E&L official notes that competitors were first "surprised and shocked" by 
the new p roduct They were then quickly forced to introduce similar 
products, as E&L rapidly gained market share, since the new valuation 
system reduced premiums by almost a half. In 1991, E&L still had a market 
share of almost 6 percent in the term insurance market.
In 1988 E&L introduced as one of the first German insurers the unit- 
linked endowment insurance which links the value of the asset portfolio to 
a unit trust. The E&L group benefited from a transfer of know-how from its 
British operations to the German group, since unit-linked life insurance is 
the predominant product in the British market. Thus, the E&L group which 
has accumulated substantial experience in the management and marketing 
of unit-linked products in the UK market and has therefore progressed 
significantly along the learning curve, could transfer at least some of this 
know-how to its German operations. This provided E&L Germany with a 
significant potential competitive advantage compared to other purely 
domestic German insurers which had to acquire the product know-how for 
unit-linked products from scratch. In addition, E&L as part of the AXA 
group has a total asset portfolio of ECU125 billion and may therefore reap 
substantial benefits of scale and scope economies in the management of unit 
trusts to which the life insurance products are linked.
Most recently at the end of 1991, E&L introduced a dread disease 
insurance product which provides coverage in case of certain specified 
serious diseases, in addition to being an ordinary endowment life insurance. 
This product was also first introduced in the UK market and is now being 
transferred to the German market. Again, E&L is the first insurer which 
offers this new product. This product also exemplifies the dilemma which 
E&L faces in the German market: since product innovations in the financial 
sector are simple for competitors to copy, the product innovator has only 
little time to establish the product in the market before other firms offer 
identical products.1 In the case of E&L's dread disease insurance, competitors 
such as Volksfiirsorge already prepare similar products which are to be 
launched by the end of 1992. Thus, E&L has about one year to build market 
share before other firms enter the dread disease insurance market as well.
1 See, for example, Tirole (1988, p.401-404) for a review of the literature on the strategic 
adoption of product or process innovations.
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Table 8.4 presents some data from the annual reports for E&L Germany 
for the four-year period from 1987 to 1990.
Table 8.4: Analysis of financial statements of Equity & Law Germany from 
1987 to 1990
In ECU million
Gross
Premium
Income
Total
Operating
Expenses
Annual
Loss
Number of
distribution
outlets
1987 44.0 53.1 3.6 2,320
1988 50.9 60.1 4.0 2,665
1989 58.6 69.4 2.2 3,045
1990 68.1 84.2 5.2 3,621
Source: Annual Reports
E&L's main problem concerning its loss-making performance is that its 
market share in the ordinary endowment life insurance which has by far the 
biggest share of total business in life insurance is only a minimal 0.09 
percent. It accounted for only 7 percent of new business in 1990 with 
perm anent health insurance (PHI) accounting for 27 percent and term 
insurance for 56 percent. This shows that E&L is strong in the low-margin 
PHI and term insurance market, while being vastly underrepresented in the 
endowment life insurance market. The ordinary endowment life insurance 
market, however, is the main source of profits for life insurance companies 
in Germany. Even though E&L has introduced an ordinary endowment life 
insurance product, it had significant difficulties promoting this product, as it 
could not be considered an innovation compared to the already existing 
products. This shows that E&L is successful in the market only if it offers 
innovative products. It is therefore in a constant race to innovate and once it 
has introduced a new product, to innovate again as competitors are quick to 
emulate the newly introduced productv
Another significant factor to explain E&L's lack of success in profit 
terms in the German market is its lack of an indigenous distribution 
channel. In contrast to the vast majority of domestic German insurers which 
distribute their products through tied agents, E&L is dependent on the 
broker network where it is in direct competition with other large insurers.
In a personal interview, an E&L official notes that "we sell our products 
primarily to the broker rather than the customer". This fact is crucial to 
understand E&L's pricing strategy in the German market: in order to place 
its products in the market E&L needs to offer high commissions to the 
broker, rather than necessarily offering the lowest prem ium s to the
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customer. As the E&L official explains: "we prefer to pay a higher 
commission to the broker, rather than ranking on top of a consumer group 
survey of which firms charge the lowest premiums". This view in the 
management group of E&L is only recent, however, after the firm has gone 
through years of loss-making and there was a generally perceived need to 
change the firm's pricing policy. As a firm official explains: "there used to be 
a 'missionary' attitude in the firm which aimed at providing products to 
consumers at the least expensive prices. Such a strategy is not sustainable, 
however, for a firm which has no indigenous distribution channel". 
Concerning E&L's pricing strategy so far, it still ranks in the lower third in 
terms of premiums in the German market.
To summarise, Equity & Law which has operated in Germany for 
almost twenty years now has had a tangible impact on competition in the 
German insurance market. This resulted above all from its role as product 
innovator and its strategic policy of transferring product know-how 
especially from the British to the German market. Other German insurers 
were forced to adopt similar products to those introduced by E&L which led 
not only to improvements in product variety but also to tangible premium 
reductions for consumers.
2.3. Commercial Union's European strategy
2.3.1. CU’s entry strategy on the Continent
The Commercial Union (CU) is the third-largest UK non-life insurer with a 
market share of around 10 percent and the tenth-largest life insurer, 
accounting for 3 percent of total premiums. It has traditionally had an 
international focus with premium income from international operations 
accounting for 60 percent of total operations in 1991. Activities in 
Continental Europe thereby accounted for 31 percent of total premiums, the 
most important region right after the UK with 40 percent.
By far the largest EC subsidiary of CU is the Dutch insurer Delta-Lloyd 
which was acquired as early as 1973 and whose strategy is reported on in the 
next section. In the Netherlands, CU had a total premium income of ECU561 
million in 1991 which exceeded that in the rest of Europe which was ECU379 
million. In this section, I analyse CU's operations in the EC countries, 
excluding the Netherlands which is analysed in the next section.
The biggest operations in the EC of the Commercial Union are in 
France in particular in the life sector where 42 percent of total European 
premiums are written (excluding Netherlands). The French life insurance 
subsidiary, L'Epargne de France which was acquired in 1984, achieved profits 
of ECU4.8 million in 1991. These profits were more than wiped out by losses 
in the French non-life sector which amounted to ECU17 million. Since the 
acquisition of L'Epargne de France, CU decided to enter through greenfield
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rather than acquisition. It entered Spain in 1987 and Italy and Greece in 1989, 
all through de novo start-ups.
In Spain CU wrote premiums of ECU14.6 million in the life sector and 
ECU36 million in the non-life sector in 1991. Despite a loss of ECU2.5 
million resulting from start-up costs, CU sees significant growth potential in 
the Spanish market. Similar to Eagle Star, CU build a new tied sales agent 
network from scratch which numbers 650 full-time agents in 1991. Its main 
strategic objective is to introduce innovative products such as the dread 
disease policy which it introduced as the first Spanish insurer.
In Italy premiums underwritten amounted to ECU44.2 million and 
losses before taxation of ECU4.55 million. In the life sector the Italian 
subsidiary, CU Vita founded in 1990, entered a distribution alliance with 
Credito Italiano. The JV in which the Italian bank owns 30 percent currently 
uses Credito Italiano's vast customer base to undertake direct mail 
solicitations but will increasingly rely on over-the-counter sales in the retail 
branch network.
Total European operations resulted in a loss before taxation of ECU31 
million in 1991. The profit situation has steadily deteriorated since 1987 
when CU still made profits of ECU 8 million. This deterioration is partly 
attributable to start-up costs which inexorably arise during a process of 
expansion but also reflect the difficulty of establishing a position in a new 
foreign market.
2.3.2. Significant market share in the Netherlands: Delta-Lloyd
As early as 1973, Commercial Union acquired the Dutch insurer Delta-Lloyd 
in a competitive bid with the Dutch firm Nationale Nederlanden. Delta- 
Lloyd was an amalgamation of several Dutch insurers comprising 
Amstleven, Nedlloyd and Hollandsche Societeit, the oldest Dutch life 
insurer founded as early as 1807, which had merged at the end of the 1960s. 
Delta-Lloyd has always had a sizeable market share in the Dutch market, 
being the third-largest life insurer with a share of total premiums of around 
7 percent, and the fourth-largest firm in the non-life sector with a market 
share of around 5 percent.
As is apparent from figures 8.1 and 8.2, the Dutch insurance market is 
characterised by one of the highest rates of insurance penetration in the EC. 
At the same time, it is the least regulated insurance market in the EC 
together with the UK. Supervision is limited to control of solvency and 
technical reserve requirements. It has always been open to foreign entry and 
tariffs and premiums are not subject to regulatory control. Foreign entry is 
facilitated by the fact that in contrast to the German market, for instance, 
distribution channels are more readily accessible to new entrants. This
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results from the fact that in the life sector 68 percent of insurance sales are 
made via brokers or multiple agents, while another 15 percent are sold 
direct. In the non-life sector, 32 percent of sales are made through direct 
channels, while 39 percent are sold through brokers and multiple agents 
(Salomon Brothers, 1990, p.62). This allows foreign entrants to gain access to 
distribution channels more easily than if distribution is primarily through 
tied agents which confers a greater incumbency advantage, since an entrant 
has to build an agent network from scratch.
Even though there has been competition between incumbents on 
premiums, there was also a significant degree of "communication" between 
firms concerning pricing strategies. For the life-sector there was even an 
official group which was part of the Dutch Association of Life Insurers 
which "discussed" premium rates. In a personal interview, a Delta-Lloyd 
official notes that "this cartel-like group" broke down at the beginning of 
1992, as a number of firms dropped out of the cartel. The cartel fell apart as a 
result of a number of foreign insurers entering the Dutch market. These 
foreign firms include French UAP which cooperates with the largest Dutch 
bank ABN-Amro Bank in the distribution of life and pension products. 
NMB-Postbank, the third-largest Dutch Bank, has a distribution alliance 
with Austrian Erste Allgemeine, a subsidiary of Italy's Generali, which 
provides insurance products with NMB design but also handles all claims 
and trains branch personnel. The main reason why these large banks chose 
foreign rather than domestic insurers for their distribution alliances was 
clearly that foreign firms offered lower premiums and higher commissions 
to the banks, as they did not participate in the Dutch cartel.
In addition to these bank-insurer distribution alliances, a number of 
foreign insurers also entered the life insurance market by de novo entry. 
These firms include UK's Eagle Star, Prudential and Germany's DBV which 
formed a joint venture with a Dutch insurer. The ten foreign life insurers 
operating in the Dutch market which have their registered office outside the 
N etherlands had a market share of more than 10 percent in 1989 
(Association of Dutch Insurers, 1991, p.35). Since the Dutch market is close to 
its saturation level concerning insurance density, new entrants have to take 
away customers from incumbents. Thus, they need to offer significantly 
better terms than domestic incumbents. This was only possible, however, if 
foreign entrants were not members of the Dutch cartel. Thus, as foreign 
entrants drew away business from the domestic incumbents, the discipline 
of the cartel fell apart, since incumbents saw an increasing need to match the 
terms of the new foreign entrants so as not to lose market share.2
Delta-Lloyd, even though being a foreign-owned firm, is very much 
part of the incumbent group in the Netherlands and was an active member 
of the existing cartel in the life sector. Its pricing strategy is not aimed at
2 See also below for an account of Prudential's entry strategy in the Dutch market.
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offering better terms than competitors. In fact, as a firm official states in 
personal interview, "Delta-Lloyd is certainly one of the more expensive 
insurers in the market with its premium levels being located in the top 
third of all firms".
In the life insurance sector, Delta-Lloyd mainly draws on its reputation 
as being the oldest life insurer in the country. It was one of the first firms to 
introduce unit-linked life insurance products where it could draw on the 
extensive experience of the Commercial Union in this area. Nevertheless, 
there is no close cooperation in terms of marketing or product development 
between Delta-Lloyd and its mother company. Since the Dutch firm is 
actually older than the CU, there is sometimes even a know-how transfer 
from Delta-Lloyd to its UK owner.
In the non-life sector, Delta-Lloyd is also in the top range of premiums 
rather than being a low-price supplier, as a firm official notes in a personal 
interview.
Table 8.5 reports some data of the financial statements of Delta-Lloyd 
and compares these with aggregate data for the Dutch insurance market.
Table 8.5: Analysis of Delta-Lloyds financial statemets from 1983 to 1991
in ECU million
Total 
premiums 
in life
%
change
%
change 
for all 
firms
Total 
premiums 
in non­
life
%
change
%
change 
for all 
firms
% change 
in
pre-tax
profits
% change 
for all 
firms
1983 431 +15.9 +7.3 335 +3.9 +2.4 -4.7 +6.8
1985 413 -4.1 +15.1 345 +3.0 +7.8 -6.3 +1.3
1987 479 +15.8 +15.2 370 +7.1 +14.7 +5.2 -0.3
1989 570 +18.9 +30.6 398 +7.6 +13.0 +69.7 +72.0
1991 794 +39.4 n.a. 395 -0.7 n.a. +5.8 n.a.
Source: Annual Reports; Dutch Association of Insurers.
Delta-Lloyd recorded average premium growth rates in the life sector, 
while falling behind in the non-life sector. All insurers which use 
agents/brokers as their main distribution channel have to pay significant 
commissions to the distributors which are around 20 to 25 percent of annual 
premium volume, increasing costs significantly. Delta-Lloyd which has no 
direct sales therefore faces higher distribution costs than competitors which 
use less costly distribution channels. Commissions and expenses as a 
proportion of premiums remained constant in the non-life sector from 1982 
to 1991, while decreasing by 44 percent in the life sector.
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In 1991 Delta Lloyd transferred a total dividend payment of ECU35 
million (1990: ECU29 million) to the Commercial Union which contrasted 
with the overall loss of the Commercial Union Group of ECU10.9 million. 
This shows that Delta-Lloyd turned out to be a profitable investment for CU. 
In terms of the impact on domestic competition, however, Delta-Lloyd has 
been a domestic player which plays by domestic rules and does not upset 
existing collusive agreements. Its pricing strategy is that of a high-price 
supplier rather than that of a 'price breaker' and the firm played no role in 
upsetting the collusive agreements which existed in the Dutch market.
2.4. UAP’s and Liberty Life's acquisition of Sun Life
In 1989 the largest French insurer UAP and the South African life insurer 
Liberty Life each acquired a 27.7 stake in Sim Life Corporation which was 
sold by Sun Alliance. In 1991/92 this stake was increased to almost 100 
percent. A UK holding company for Sun Life, the Rockleigh Corporation, 
was founded in which each of the two acquirers have a 50 percent stake. The 
acquirers paid £16.10 per share which resulted in a total acquisition price of 
ECU771 million. This constitutes the third-largest cross-border acquisition in 
insurance so far.
Sun Life is the sixth-largest life insurer in the UK market. It had a total 
premium income of ECU1,206 million and made after-tax profits of 
ECU29.19 million in 1991. Rather than replacing top management after the 
takeover, the two acquirers each placed one representative on the board of 
directors which consists of eleven members. Thus, this takeover was not 
one for 'corporate control' reasons. According to a company executive "the 
new shareholders have not exercised significant influence on day-to-day 
management activities". Although major decisions are coordinated with the 
two majority shareholders, there is hardly any form of direct influence by 
either UAP or Liberty Life. In particular, there is no evidence that Sim Life 
has changed its product or pricing policy after the acquisition.
Concerning cross-border expansion activities, Sun Life will be 
responsible for developing those markets which are closest to the 'Anglo' 
markets. These include in particular the Scandinavian markets as well as 
the Dutch market where currently a range of pension products are being 
introduced. Sun Life has founded a joint venture in Luxembourg in 
February 1990 together with UAP, Royal Beige and Banque Internationale 
which are all members of the UAP group. This joint venture aims at 
developing life insurance products to be distributed across all the European 
subsidiaries. This venture actually provides an interesting example of a case 
of strategic relocation of a firm to the most attractive regulatory 
environment. As a company official notes it was "the favourable regulatory 
and tax conditions" which provided the impetus for sourcing life and
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investment products through the Luxembourg subsidiary. Products such as 
single-premium investment funds which are tax-free in Luxembourg are 
already being sold in the UK market. This example demonstrates that also in 
the retail sector strategic location decisions will be increasingly influenced by 
regulatory factors, in particular once the home-country rule will be fully 
established in the retail sector.
2.5. Victoire’s acquisition of Colonia
Colonia, the second-largest insurer in the German market, was acquired by 
the French group Victoire in 1989 for an estimated acquisition price of more 
than ECU2 billion for a 52 percent stake. This constitutes the largest cross- 
border acquisition so far, both in banking and insurance. Only a few weeks 
after the friendly takeover, Victoire was itself acquired in a hostile takeover 
by the giant Suez holding company. Colonia and Victoire have had a 
strategic alliance for more than 20 years which was aimed primarily at 
jointly developing their foreign activities.
Colonia has a particularly strong position in the non-life sector with a 
market share of around 4 percent. In the life insurance sector it has a market 
share of 2.6 percent and also holds stakes in a range of other financial 
services firms such as reinsurance, building societies and a mortgage bank.
20 percent of its premium income came from foreign operations. Total 
premiums of the Colonia group were ECU4.7 billion in 1990 and it had 9,600 
employees.
After the takeover, group assets of the Colonia group were transferred 
to a holding company in the Netherlands, Colonia-Victoire Nederland B.V. 
which is the holding company of all foreign activities of the Victoire group. 
There were no personnel changes in the Board of Directors, however. 
Representatives of the new majority shareholder were only appointed to the 
Supervisory Board. This illustrates the strategic policy of Victoire which has 
so far not interfered in the management of the Colonia group. Similar to the 
case of the acquisition of Sun Life by UAP and Liberty Life, there were no 
changes in pricing or distribution policies after the acquisition. A firm 
official notes that domestic strategy was unaffected by the takeover and that 
domestic issues are entirely left to local management. The only change 
which has taken place is that international committees were established 
which deal with a variety of issues and are intended to promote the know­
how transfer between the two groups. However, as a company official notes, 
it is perceived to be difficult to find areas where synergy effects between the 
two groups could be established due to the significant differences in product 
and distribution structures as well as different regulatory regimes.
Also similar to the case of Sun Life, Colonia and Victoire cooperate 
mostly in the area of cross-border expansion where foreign activities are
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merged and managed either by Colonia or Victoire, depending on whoever 
has had greater experience in that particular market.
2.6. Prudential’s strategy in Italy and the Netherlands
Prudential Corporation is the largest life insurer in the UK with a premium 
volume of ECU4 billion in 1991. It made a pre-tax profit of ECU186.9 million 
in 1991. While Prudential has substantial business in particular in the US 
where 12 percent of premiums were written, in the EC countries it has so far 
entered only Ireland, Holland and the Netherlands. I review here 
Prudential's strategy in the latter two countries.
In Italy Prudential initially entered a joint venture in both life and 
non-life insurance with the Benetton Group in which each of the partners 
owned 50 percent. In 1989 Benetton sold its stake to the French insurer 
L'Abeille, part of the Victoire group which also acquired Colonia in 
Germany. Prudential also increased its stake in the life insurance JV to 60 
percent in order to gain control, while reducing its stake in the non-life 
venture to 40 percent, conceding control to L'Abeille. Total premium 
volume of Prudential Vita in Italy was ECU11.5 million in 1991 and it 
achieved high growth rates over the past few years despite still operating 
from a small base. Concerning Prudential's strategy in the Italian market, a 
company official notes that there is as yet little scope for product 
differentiation in the Italian market due to regulatory constraints. However, 
Prudential attempts to differentiate its life insurance products through 
superior investment performance. Investment fund management for the 
Italian market which is performed out of the London headquarters has so far 
resulted in returns for the Italian policyholders consistently ranking among 
the top 5 life insurers in the Italian market. As Prudential currently uses 
only independent brokers and multiple agents as its distribution channel, it 
needs to provide sufficient incentives for the broker to distribute the 
products. A company official notes, however, that Prudential does not 
attempt to "buy" market share by offering significantly above average 
commissions to brokers.
In Holland, Prudential is much more of a niche player than in Italy. In 
the Dutch market with its high level of saturation, the company focuses on 
innovative products and market niches which are not yet served by 
incumbents. An example of such a product innovation is a unitised annuity 
which is targeted at the newly retired. Total premium income in Holland 
was ECU25.9 million and Prudential is not satisfied with the growth 
performance of the Dutch subsidiary. It is noticeable, however, that 
Prudential was one of the foreign companies which brought the cartel of 
Dutch life insurers to a breakdown at the beginning of 1992 by offering 
substantially lower premiums for a range of life products (see above).
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2.7. Eagle Star in Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands
Eagle Star, the fifth-largest UK insurer, has so far entered four Continental 
European countries. At the beginning of the 1980s, it entered France and 
Holland, and in 1987/88 it established a presence in Spain and Portugal. All 
entry activities were de novo start-ups, with the Spanish operations being 
run from a hotel room during the first phase. In terms of premium 
revenue, the Spanish and Portugese operations each accounted for ECU2.5 
million in 1990, while the French and Dutch subsidiaries had a volume of 
ECU3.7 million, all in the life sector. In total, foreign operations accounted 
for 25 percent of total premium revenue of the Eagle Star Group of which an 
increasing share comes from the European operations.
Eagle Star's strategic objective when entering other European countries 
was to introduce a new product which was not available in this form in the 
host country. In the Netherlands, this product was a universal life plan 
which was characterised by its link to a unit trust. Unitised products, 
although originally 'invented' in the Netherlands in the 1950s, were not 
actually introduced in a marketable product form in this country. Thus, 
Eagle Star was actually the first firm to introduce a unit-linked life insurance 
product in the Dutch market and was quickly followed by other companies, 
among them Delta-Lloyd, as discussed above. After the introduction of this 
innovative product, Eagle Star introduced a number of other new products 
to build up its product range and be able to compete with indigenous 
institutions. The UK firm attempted to differentiate its products from those 
of competitors by focusing either on innovative niche products, such as a 
savings plan which parents buy for their children, for example, or by 
introducing a standard product which has new product attributes, such as 
the unitised life insurance product.
In Spain and Portugal, Eagle Star followed a very similar strategy by 
focusing on one innovative product, a unit-linked life insurance, which was 
a complete novelty in these markets. An Eagle Star official notes in a 
personal interview that the Iberian markets are "very dogmatic, very slow, 
and receiving regulatory approval of the new product was a torturous 
process". Due to regulatory requirements concerning investment of the 
assets, only a low proportion of total funds of the unit trusts to which the 
life products are linked are invested in shares, whereas the majority is 
invested in low-risk government bonds. Such requirem ents will be 
harmonised by the Third EC Life Directive. Currently, the Iberian operations 
are still basically one-product operations but there are plans to introduce 
other products which are standard in the UK but innovative in the less 
sophisticated Southern European countries.
Concerning distribution channels, an Eagle Star official notes that it 
was not necessarily easier to enter the Dutch market with its well-established
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brokerage network than the Iberian markets in which a sales agent network 
had to be established from scratch. This stems from the fact that due to the 
novelty of the product, it was not difficult to find agents in Spain and 
Portugal which were eager to distribute Eagle Star's unitised product, as 
these products offered significant commission potential. However, in order 
to expand the distribution network of Eagle Star, the firm currently 
contemplates a distribution alliance with a local bank. Even though the 
insurance firm would have to share commissions with the cooperating 
bank, an Eagle Star official notes that it is not evident per se that distribution 
costs will rise, since the costs of actually contacting the customer are reduced 
due to the frequent-interaction relationship between bank and customer.
Concerning regulatory changes on the EC level, the Eagle Star official 
notes that these are closely monitored by the firm and actively incorporated 
into the current strategies. For example, after the UCIT-Directive 
(concerning mutual funds) took effect in all EC countries, Eagle Star decided 
to enter the German market and to start the distribution of investment 
funds through established brokers, based on the freedom of services 
provision in the EC Directive. Further, it is expected that the home-country 
rule will also lead to significant pressure on national regulators to 
harmonise tax regulations. This stems from the fact that it will be possible to 
relocate to a low-tax country such as Luxembourg, for example, where, 
unlike in the UK, reserves are not taxed. Thus, all European operations 
including those in the home country could be channeled through such a 
low-tax country, making domestic tax regulations basically ineffective.
In summary, Eagle Star has followed a clear strategy of being a product 
innovator in its foreign markets. It provides a good example of a firm 
introducing new products into a market which benefits consumers by 
increasing product variety.
3. Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter, I presented the results of a questionnaire 
survey which was sent out to the largest 270 banks and insurers in the 
European Community. The response rates were 31 percent in banking and 
34 percent in insurance.
Foreign firms currently play a more significant role and are perceived 
to be stronger competitors in the retail insurance sector than in retail 
banking. In banking, foreign firms are at present still considered to be most 
significant in the wholesale and investment banking sectors, while 
perceived to become more significant in retail banking. In the retail 
insurance sector, however, the impact of foreign firms is generally expected 
to be greater than in retail banking.
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Concerning the impact of the internal market programme, around 60 
percent of banks and insurers currently take the single financial services 
passport into account. Not surprisingly, this rate was higher for bigger firms 
than for smaller firms which operate largely in the domestic market. The 
vast majority of respondents both in banking and insurance expect an 
increase in cross-border entry activities in their home market. Spain, Italy 
and France are expected to be most affected by the changes resulting from the 
internal market programme in the banking sector, while Germany is 
additionally listed in the insurance sector.
Concerning the significance of barriers to entry, it is interesting to find 
that regulatory barriers are not perceived to be all that important in the 
financial services sector. The most important barriers in insurance are lack 
of know-how and lack of right distribution channels, while the lack of 
suitable acquisition targets is additionally listed as a significant barrier in the 
banking sector.
De novo entry in the personal customer segment is perceived to be a 
feasible entry strategy by the majority of respondents in insurance, but not in 
banking. Cross-border provision of services, however, is not considered to be 
a successful entry strategy in both sectors.
The second part of this chapter presented a number of case studies in 
the insurance sector, analogous to the approach in the previous chapter. It 
emerged that in the retail sector there has been a greater scale of cross-border 
transactions in the insurance than in the banking sector, in particular 
concerning the size of individual cross-border acquisitions involving firms 
which have a significant market share in their domestic market. For these 
large-scale cross-border acquisitions, however, it was noted that the strategic 
impact of a change in ownership has, so far at least, been negligible. After the 
takeover by a foreign company, few strategic variables have been changed 
and these takeovers have certainly not been for corporate control reasons. It 
seems that the larger the transaction, the less significant the impact on day- 
to-day management of the acquired firm. The large firms which were 
acquired are very much domestic players and are unlikely to upset any 
existing collusive agreements or to suddenly start competing on the price 
level only because of an ownership change. It seems that foreign acquirers 
pursue a very cautious approach when integrating the foreign firm and 
implement a policy of least interference in the domestic affairs of the newly 
acquired firm.
De novo entries which, in contrast to the retail banking sector, actually 
exist in insurance seem to have much more of an impact on competition in 
the host country, as entering firms are forced to provide services either at 
lower premium levels or introduce new, innovative products. In practice, 
insurers most frequently choose the second strategy when entering foreign 
markets and firms like Equity & Law in Germany and Eagle Star in Spain
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and Portugal provide good examples of foreign firms which have 
introduced new products, forcing domestic firms to adapt similar products 
in order not to lose customers.
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Chapter Nine:
The Liberalisation of 
Inter-State Entry in US Banking: 
a comparative analysis
The process of opening up national financial services markets to foreign 
competition in the EC may be comparable to the movements in the United 
States to relax the restrictions on out-of-state entry by banks. I focus in this 
chapter on banking services rather than retail financial services in general, as 
this provides the most interesting parallel to the opening up of European 
financial services market. In particular, regulatory restrictions in the US 
prevent a similar cross-industry penetration between the insurance and 
banking sectors as in Europe.
Such a comparative analysis between financial services in the US and in 
Europe is suggested, for example, by Neven (1990, p.175) who states that "the 
United States could be a laboratory experiment for European deregulation". 
Similarly, Santomero (1990, p.438) notes that "as Europe approaches 1992 its 
financial services industry looks to the United States for some insight into 
what will happen in its future".1 In this chapter, I discuss existing parallels 
and the limits to drawing analogies between the US and the EC.
The focus of the analysis is placed on the two aspects most relevant to 
our analysis of cross-border entry in Europe, namely that of regulatory 
competition between state regulators and the impact on state market 
structure, conduct and performance of out-of-state entry.
The next section gives a brief historical overview of how and why the 
regulatory structure of interstate banking in the US has evolved as it has. 
The second section focuses on the question of dynamic regulatory 
competition between state regulators, while the final section gives an 
overview of the available evidence about the impact of liberalising interstate 
banking restrictions on competition in banking markets.
1 However, as will be explained in this chapter interstate entry in the US is actually more 
difficult than cross-border entry in the EC, as implemented in the Second Banking Directive. 
Thus, regulatory efforts to establish freedom of entry have so far been significantly more 
successful in the EC than in the US.
Inter-State Entry in the US
1. The evolution of interstate banking: gradual lifting of 
restrictions in the 1980s
Interstate banking was first federally regulated by the 1927 McFadden-Pepper 
Act, after the National Bank Act of 1863 had established federally chartered 
banks which were restricted to a single branch. In contrast to general 
perception, however, the McFadden Act at the time of its passing actually 
extended rather than limited the scope of branch banking. This stems from 
the fact that branch banking per se was frequently discouraged or even 
prohibited in the majority of federal states where single-branch banks were 
the norm. This preference by regulators and legislators for local banks 
resulted from a deeply-rooted distrust against large powerful banks and the 
view that community-based banks serve the local clientele most effectively.2
The McFadden Act conferred the power on federally-chartered banks to 
branch within their home-office cities if state-chartered banks enjoyed the 
same privilege. The 1933 Banking Act extended branching powers of national 
banks to the state level (but only inside state boundaries) unless state laws 
prohibited state-wide branching to state-chartered banks. Moreover, the Act 
established the state sovereignty principle which stipulates that all regulatory 
powers concerning branching rules of both federally and state-chartered 
banks lie with the state legislators.
The continuing spread of bank holding companies was regulated under 
the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act which placed the supervision of such 
holding companies with the Federal Reserve Board. Thus, the Fed was given 
the right to review and approve any inter-state acquisition by bank holding 
companies. In addition, the 1957 Douglas Amendment prohibited bank 
holding companies from acquiring banks in more than one state unless 
explicitly approved by the state which is to be entered.
Until 1975 no states actually made use of their given powers to liberalise 
interstate entry. Due to these regulatory restrictions most interstate entry 
activities in the 1960s and early 1970s took place in non-bank business such as 
leasing, mortgages or finance companies. In 1975 Maine was the first state to 
pass a bill which enabled out-of-state banks to acquire domestic banks or set 
up a de novo entity if the entering bank's home state allowed equivalent 
access to the Maine banks. It was not until 1981, however, that the first actual 
interstate acquisition took place in Maine. New York and Massachusetts were
2 In the 1985 Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System case, for 
example, the Supreme Court noted that "our country traditionally has favored widely 
dispersed control of banking". These arguments are still powerful in political debates even 
today and may have been the main reason why the reform proposals to establish full 
interstate banking failed in 1991.
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the next states to adopt reciprocal interstate entry provisions,3 followed by a 
wave of similar provisions in the whole country, especially after the 
Supreme Court's 1985 Bancorp decision. By 1991 all but five states had 
adopted interstate provisions for Bank Holding Companies, as is 
summarised in table 9.1. In addition, regulatory restrictions on federally 
chartered Savings & Loan Institutions concerning interstate branching were 
lifted in May 1992 by the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Table 9.1: Interstate banking laws in the federal states in 1991
Entry from all states allowed 
with no attached reciprocity 
provisions
14 states: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, 
Maine, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, 
Utah, Wyoming, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, California, Nevada, 
Wash. D.C.
Entry from all states allowed 
if equal access is granted 
(reciprocity)
15 states: Kennt., Louis., Mich., 
Ohio, New York, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, South Dak., Wash., 
West Virg., Verm., Delaw., 
Illinois, Indiana, Colorado,
Entry allowed from same 
regional area if equal access is 
granted
16 states: Alab., Arkans., Conn., 
Florida, Georgia, Maryl., Mass., 
Minnes., Missouri, New Hampsh., 
N.C., S.C., Tenn., Virg., Wise., 
Penns.,
No interstate entry allowed 5 states: Kansas, Montana, Iowa, 
North Dakota, Hawaii,
Source: own compilation from Federal Reserve Board Bulletins and American Banker.
The passing of various interstate banking laws had a significant effect on 
the number of interstate bank acquisitions. Figure 9.1 shows the number of 
inter-state acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies (BCHs) in the US from 
1980 to 1989. It is apparent that the number of interstate acquisitions has 
increased dramatically, especially since interstate banking restrictions were 
partially lifted in most states in 1985.
Nevertheless, one could argue that concerning the large number of 
commercial banks in the US with still more than 12,000 banks in 1992, the 
number of interstate acquisitions is comparatively low. Interstate banking 
laws have facilitated interstate entry but have certainly not yet led to a 
significant consolidation process in the US.
3 Massachusetts, however, only extended reciprocity provisions to the six New England states, 
since it wanted to prevent entry from the large money-center institutions based primarily in 
New York. Such 'selective' reciprocity was upheld to be constitutional by the Supreme Court 
in its 1985 Bancorp decision.
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It is interesting to note, however, that most recently there has been a 
trend towards 'mega-mergers' between some of the largest banks in the US. 
These include the mergers between Bank of America and Security Pacific, 
Manufacturers Hanover and Chemical Bank, and NCNB and Sofran.
Figure 9.1: Number of interstate acquisitions in the US from 1980 to 1989
Note: 1989 data are annualised 
Source: Rose (1989, p.10).
The lack of a significant degree of national consolidation between the 
smaller and medium-sized banks may be the result of continuing barriers to 
interstate expansion: while interstate banking has been liberalised, interstate 
branching is still prohibited in all states except Utah, Nevada, Rhode Island, 
Montana, New York, Oregon and Virginia. Thus, subsidiaries owned by the 
same BHC still need to be capitalised and incorporated separately in each 
state and there are restrictions on de novo entry from out-of-state banks. In 
addition, each subsidiary must have its own board of directors, submit 
regulatory reports to each of the host state's authorities and maintain 
separate accounting and computer systems (see Mengle, 1990). These 
requirements result in potentially significant organisational inefficiencies, as 
information and transaction costs within the BHC increase compared to a 
completely integrated organisational form. The 1991 Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Act did nothing to expand interstate branching 
pow ers.4 More recently, however, the Office of Thrift Supervision was
4 It was argued that the Independent Insurance Agents of America placed pressure on 
legislators to scrap originally contained expansion of interstate branching due to fears that 
future nation-wide banks would venture into insurance activities. Thus, the bill actually 
reduced the ability of state-chartered banks to enter into insurance-underwriting activities 
which were previously permitted in several states.
4 C
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charged by the White House to allow interstate branching for savings & 
loans institutions. Since this may lead to competitive disadvantages for 
banks, the latter are likely to place pressure on Congress to facilitate interstate 
branching.
Currently, however, the EC guidelines concerning cross-border 
branching possibilities actually go further than the US liberalisation of 
interstate banking. As far as the regulatory environment is concerned, cross- 
border branching in the EC after 1992 will therefore be easier than interstate 
branching in the US.
2. Regulatory competition between state regulators: the 
examples of South Dakota and Delaware
The theory of regulatory competition between regulators as developed in the 
second chapter can be applied to the case of inter-state competition between 
legislators in the US.5 State legislators have considerable leeway in 
determining the supervisory and regulatory rules for the financial services 
firms which are headquartered in their territories and for the local 
subsidiaries of out-of-state firms. This section discusses the examples of 
South Dakota and Delaware which were both extremely successful in 
attracting out-of-state firms in the 1980s.
The main motivation for federal states to seek entry of out-of-state 
financial services firms is, firstly, the projected increase in employment 
growth in financial services,6 and secondly the prospect of increased tax 
revenue from firms which locate subsidiaries in the state and channel a 
significant proportion of their taxable business through the state.
Consider first the example of credit card regulation. Interest rates on 
credit cards were for a long time regulated by imposing upper 'ceilings' on 
the permissible rates which may be charged by the credit card providers. In 
addition, annual fees for credit cards were either entirely prohibited or also 
subject to maximum limits. Both regulations were enacted and enforced on 
the state rather than the federal level.
In 1978 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in its decision 
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corporation that a
5 This section draws on Erdevig (1988).
6 Concerning employment growth, for example, a study by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(Kutscher, 1987) predicted an increase in 1.6 million jobs in the financial services sector 
between 1986 and the year 2000.
278
Inter-State Entry in the US
federally chartered bank has the right to charge out-of-state customers at the 
rate which it charges in its home state. In other words, for regulations 
concerning credit cards the Supreme Court introduced the home-state rather 
the the host-state rule which makes this case an interesting analogy to the 
home country rules to be introduced in 1993 by the Second Banking 
Directive.
In 1980 South Dakota was the first state to introduce legislation targeted 
at attracting out-of-state credit card operaters by abandoning all usury ceilings 
on consumer loans including credit card facilities. At the same time, it passed 
a law which permitted out-of-state banks to found a de novo entity in the 
state which operates primarily in the consumer lending area. It is interesting 
to note that the new legislation imposed severe restrictions on new out-of- 
state entrants to compete in the intra-state market by limiting out-of-state 
banks to opening only one branch and restricting them to operations which 
do not attract customers away from other state banks. While such restrictions 
were later eliminated in the course of reciprocity provisions with other 
states, they effectively sheltered state banks from outside competition and 
thus ensured that the impact of out-of-state entry on state competition was 
limited.
Let us first analyse how banks reacted to the new legislation. The 
response by banks to the new legislation which allowed them to charge 
higher interest rates nationwide by relocating their credit card operations to 
South Dakota was significant. The first bank which decided to relocate its 
credit card operations to South Dakota was Citicorp which is the largest 
issuer of credit cards in the US. By 1987 Citicorp (South Dakota), N.A. had 
also become the largest commercial bank in the state with a total of 3,500 
employees.
Other out-of-state banks followed Citicorp to open banking subsidiaries 
in South Dakota mainly operating in the credit card market, among them 
banks from Texas, Nebraska and Minnesota. As a result of this significant 
entry movement, South Dakota experienced the fastest growth rate in credit 
card loans between 1980 and 1987 in the US and the second-highest growth 
rates in total banking assets, total loans and employment. The highest 
growth rates were achieved by Delaware which is the second example of 
strategic deregulation to which I turn now.
Delaware is a state which has a well-known reputation for providing a 
favourable legislative corporate environment including tax, takeover and 
financial regulations which are explicitly aimed at attracting companies from 
other states, in particular from the neighbouring state of New York. This 
favourable regulatory environment has resulted in more than half of the 
Fortune 500 companies being incorporated in Delaware. In the financial 
services sector, Delaware followed South Dakota's example of attempting to 
attract out-of-state firms by providing a favourable regulatory environment.
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In 1981 Delaware legislators passed the Financial Center Development 
Act (FCDA) which was very similar to the South Dakota legislation allowing 
out-of state banks to establish single branch subsidiaries which were not 
aimed at attracting residents from the state of Delaware. The Delaware FCDA 
went even further than the South Dakota legislation, however, by abolishing 
restrictions on charging annual credit card fees as well as eliminating all 
usury interest rate ceilings on the vast majority of bank loans including 
consumer credit. In addition, it provided a tax incentive structure 
characterised by a regressive schedule which made the state attractive for 
bigger banks. Relocating banks were required to create at least 100 new jobs in 
the state. Calculations show that the marginal corporate income tax rate in 
Wilmington, Delaware stands at 4.5 percent compared to 24.2 percent in New 
York City, for example.
Due to the wider scope of the deregulation which included commercial 
banking activities, new out-of-state entry was not limited to the case of 
consumer lending as was the case in South Dakota, but included wholesale 
activities as undertaken by some of the New York merchant banks such as 
J.P. Morgan which was the first to open a subsidiary in the state of Delaware 
under the FDCA. In addition to the FDCA, which played by far the most 
significant role in attracting out-of-state banks, Delaware also implemented 
an additional Consumer Credit Banking Act in 1983 specifically targeted at 
consumer loan business by offering minimal capital requirements, and the 
International Banking Development Act of 1983 which aimed at attracting 
foreign banks away from New York City and encouraged the establishment 
of Edge Act banks by abolishing reserve requirements.
Due to the dual targeting of the Delaware legislation, the state managed 
to attract both wholesale banks from the New York City area, as well as banks 
from other states such as Georgia, Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania 
which mainly channel their credit card and consumer lending business 
through their Delaware subsidiaries. In addition to banks, the state also 
attracted a number of non-bank financial institutions which do not fall 
under the restrictions of the 1956 Bank Holding Act because they either do 
not accept deposits or do not engage in lending activities. These institutions 
accounted for almost half the growth in new banking employment in the 
state. By far the largest and best-known non-bank financial services firm 
which uses Delaware as its base is the retailer Sears which acquired the card 
processor Greenwood Trust Company and started offering the new and 
extremely successful 'Discover' credit card in 1985.
Table 9.2 presents some data on the success of the strategic deregulation 
moves of the two states. It is evident that domestic assets grew significantly 
more in the two states than the average in the US. For the case of South 
Dakota this was largely due to the growth in credit card loans which 
accounted for 90.1 percent of all personal loans in the state in contrast to 32.7
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percent for the US average. Delaware was also able to attract a significant 
amount of commercial and industrial loans which are booked through 
subsidiaries of out-of-state banks. Similarly, credit card loans account for the 
vast share of personal loans with 95.6 percent. It is noteworthy that these two 
states alone accounted for 40 percent of total credit card loans in the whole 
US in 1989.
Table 9.2: Compound annual growth rates at commercial banks in South 
Dakota and Delaware between 1980 and 1989
Figures in $ million
South Dakota Delaware in comparison: 
all US states
total domestic 
assets
1980: 5,084,075 
1989: 20,118,000 
CAGR: +16.5%
1980: 3,685,060 
1989: 70,814,000 
CAGR: +38.9%
1980:1,855,687,813 
1989: 3,299,026,000 
CAGR: +6.6%
personal loans 1980:498,590 
1989:11,611,000 
CAGR: +41.9%
1980:640,478 
1989:43,760,000 
CAGR: +59.9%
1980:187,375,654 
1989: 400,580,000 
CAGR: +8.8%
comm. & 
industr. loans
1980:667,905 
1989:1,634,000 
CAGR: +10.5%
1980: 335,226 
1989: 6,476,000 
CAGR: +39.0%
1980: 390,930,841 
1989: 618,625,000 
CAGR: +5.2%
Source: own compilation from several issues of FDIC Bank Operating Statistics and Banking 
Statistics.
Figure 9.2 analyses the impact of the regulatory moves of the two states 
on domestic employment in the banking sector. It is obvious that both states 
could substantially increase their employment. South Dakota managed to 
double its number of employees in the banking sector from 4,395 in 1980 to 
8,801 in 1989 with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.1 percent. 
Banking employment in Delaware increased even more significantly from 
3,902 in 1980 to 21,862 in 1989, a CAGR of 21.1 percent.
This contrasts with a constant labour force in US banking where the 
total number of employees stood at 1.53 million in 1989 which is almost 
unchanged from 1980.
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Figure 9.2: Impact of banking legislation on banking employment in South 
Dakota and Delaware
1989
Source: own compilation from several issues of FDIC Bank Operating Statistics and Banking 
Statistics.
Figure 9.3 analyses the second strategic target variable of state regulators: 
the amount of local and state income taxes paid by resident banks. The 
increase in tax revenue for the states is dramatic: South Dakota increased its 
tax revenue from $21.7 million in 1980 to $296.1 million in 1989 at a 
compound annual growth rate of 33.1 percent, while Delaware had a tax 
revenue of $13 million in 1980 which rose to $520.2 million in 1989 at a 
CAGR of 49.9 percent.
This contrasted with a CAGR for the whole of the US of only 7.5 
percent.
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Figure 93: Income tax revenue from banks in South Dakota and Delaware
Tax revenue in $thousands
1989
Source: own compilation from several issues of FDIC Bank Operating Statistics and Banking 
Statistics.
In the second chapter I have argued that competing regulators are 
unlikely to stand by idly and see their domestic employment and tax revenue 
reduced, while domestic banks relocate to other states which offer a more 
attractive regulatory environment. Especially where such tax and 
employment losses are likely to be significant when relocation is not limited 
to the mere opening of 'brass-plate' subsidiaries in other states but involves 
actual transfer of capital and labour, regulators are likely to emulate or even 
outbid other states' moves to prevent the loss of domestic business.
Exactly such a process of strategic regulatory liberalisation could be 
observed after South Dakota and Delaware had enacted their more 
permissive banking rules. In particular, near-by states felt the need to relax if 
not match the new regulations, since banking institutions either threatened 
or actually moved operations abroad. Only seven months after the South 
Dakota legislation took effect, New York emulated its moves by also
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eliminating usury interest rate ceilings as well as allowing annual fees. 
Nevertheless, the legislation came too late to prevent Citibank from 
changing its plans to move to South Dakota. Competition against the 
neighbouring state of Delaware was even more difficult as the latter state 
offered a corporate tax rate which New York could not match without losing 
substantial tax revenues in other sectors.
Similarly Nebraska, the southern neighbouring state of South Dakota, 
abolished all remaining interest rate restrictions and allowed the imposition 
of an annual services charge for credit cards in April 1983 after its largest state 
bank, First National, had acquired a bank just across the border to South 
Dakota and threatened to channel its credit card operations through that 
state. Almost an identical story can be told of Virginia, close to Delaware, 
which deregulated its interest rate ceilings in April 1983 and passed 
legislation similar to that of South Dakota to attract single branch out-of-state 
banks.
But not all states responded in the same way. Both Maryland and 
Pennsylvania were much slower to respond to the regulatory challenges 
posed by South Dakota and Delaware. Recall from chapter two that the 
regulator maximises a social welfare function which consists of industry 
profits, consumer surplus and financial stability. As banks raise interest rates, 
industry profits increase, whereas consumer surplus decreases with no 
adverse effect on financial stability. Thus, if a regulator attaches a greater 
weight to consumer surplus than to industry profits, she may decide not to 
follow other states' legislation to deregulate interest rates entirely in order to 
keep domestic interest rates below a certain level, an action which may 
benefit consum ers.7 Indeed, the pressure of consumer groups in both 
Maryland and Pennsylvania prevented the states' regulators from matching 
the more permissive regulatory regimes of other states. In Maryland, the 
interest rate ceiling was raised to a higher maximum limit in July 1982 rather 
than abolishing it altogether, while annual fees and other restrictions 
continued to be prohibited. This policy of 'restrained deregulation' did not 
work, however: the original idea of state legislators was to keep interest rates 
of domestic banks low which were then able to retain their domestic 
customers, since consumers would prefer these institutions over out-of-state 
banks which asked for higher rates. Domestic banks, however, did not react 
according to the legislators' expectations: the four major banks of the state 
decided to relocate their credit card operations to Delaware in the course of 
1982. Finally, in July 1983 state regulators gave up their hesitant approach to 
credit card deregulation when they adopted legislation similar to that of 
neighbouring Delaware.
7 Similar arguments were recently put forward by Congressmen who wanted to reimpose usury 
interest rate ceilings on credit cards in order to boost consumer spending. After the stock market 
reacted with a significant slump after the announcement due to the fact that such ceilings 
would eliminate one of the last profitable business lines of the troubled US banking industry, 
these plans were quickly abandoned.
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What conclusions can be drawn from this example of strategic 
deregulation? First, let us note that the ease by which banks were able to 
relocate their credit card and consumer loan business was facilitated by recent 
improvements in communication and information technologies which 
made long-distance information processing less costly. Electronic data 
transmission, funds transfer and payment processing make it increasingly 
possible to locate back-office bank facilities in areas which may be remote 
from the actual customer. Thus, lines of business which do not require 
immediate contact with the customer can be more easily transferred to the 
most favourable regulatory environments.
In addition, it has become clear that once one of the competing 
legislators has started to introduce a more favourable regulatory 
environment which attracts non-domestic institutions, other regulators are 
required to follow suit if they want to stem the tide of domestic institutions 
leaving their territories. They are more likely to do so when there are 
actually adverse effects on domestic parameters such as industry profits, tax 
revenues or employment, and domestic financial stability is not adversely 
affected by the deregulatory moves. As both conditions were fulfilled for the 
case of interest rate regulations, state regulators responded in the way 
predicted. Attempts by state regulators to abstain from the process of strategic 
deregulation failed entirely, as banks quickly abandoned domestic terrain in 
favour of more permissive regulatory environments. For the case of interest 
rate ceilings domestic financial stability is not adversely affected such as in 
the case of capital requirements, for example, where state legislators may be a 
lot more hesitant to engage in a competitive race. Thus, as was stressed in the 
second chapter, whether or not strategic deregulation ensues, depends very 
much on the specific regulation under scrutiny and its significance for 
maintaining financial stability.
3. The impact of lifting interstate banking restrictions on 
intrastate competition
Increasing interstate penetration may be expected to lead to greater 
competition, very much like in the case of European cross-border entry. As 
was discussed in chapter four, such increased competition may manifest 
itself in lower prices for consumers, spoiling of collusive domestic equilibria, 
introduction of new services or greater quality of services.
Unfortunately, there are only few research studies on the actual impact 
of interstate entry on domestic competition, as most existing studies deal 
with the quantitative extent of interstate entry or analyse the stock market 
reaction to merger announcements. Frieder and Petty (1991, p.13), for 
example, note that the "recent interstate bank merger phenomenon has
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received little attention in the literature". I review here the existing evidence 
which may provide some indication about the impact of interstate entry.
Evanoff and Fortier (1986) analyse the impact on competition of 
abandoning unit-branching restrictions in a range of US states. The 
elimination of such infrastate branching restrictions is comparable to the 
derestriction of interstate banking. In their study, the authors find that 
customers in states where statewide branching is allowed, as distinct from 
those states where banks are only allowed to maintain a single branch, are 
offered a wider range of services and improved service accessability. They 
conclude that the impact of the liberalisation of geographic restrictions is "to 
increase competition and the array of services, improve credit availability 
and service accessability, and more efficiently allocate financial resources". In 
a similar spirit, Baer and Scheld (1986) present a statistical analysis of prices 
for banking services in unit branching states and compare these with states 
where statewide branching is permitted. They find that banks in states where 
statewide branching is allowed charge significantly lower service charges and 
lower interest rates on real estate loans than banks in states with unit 
banking regulations. This provides some evidence that price competition 
increases as geographic branching restrictions are abandoned.8
Laderman and Pozdena (1991) analyse the impact of changing legislation 
concerning interstate entry on publicly quoted banks' share prices. They 
hypothesise that if increased interstate entry leads to increased competition 
then banks from the state which is opened to out-of-state entry may 
experience negatively abnormal returns. This will be the case only if the 
increase in competition in the home state more than wipes out potential 
increases in profits from being given the opportunity to enter new states. In 
their regressions they find a highly significant reduction in the banks' share 
prices in states where interstate banking laws were passed in the preceding 
quarter. This provides strong evidence that financial markets associate an 
increase in competition with the opening up of state markets to out-of-state 
competition which outweighs any expected increase in bank profits due to 
greater entry and profit opportunities for the banks of the home state which 
has passed the interstate law.9
8 Interstate entry takes place especially in the retail area. Rose (1989b) finds that banks 
making interstate acquisitions are characterised by a stronger retail orientation than those 
which are not active in interstate banking.
9 A similar approach is pursued by Chong (1991) who finds an increase in banks' profits around 
announcement dates of interstate banking laws, in contrast to Laderman and Pozdena. 
However, his model differs from the latter authors in three respects: first, he uses daily 
rather than quarterly stock return data. Second, Chong does not analyse stock returns around 
the date at which the law actually takes effect as distinct from the passing of the bill and 
thirdly, he does not differentiate between different types of laws concerning reciprocity, for 
example.
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Perhaps the most significant industry development after liberalisation 
of interstate banking regulations has been the emergence of the so-called 
'superregionals', BHCs with an extended retail branch presence across one 
particular region of the US. Examples include the Bank of Boston in the 
Northeast, NCNB in the Southeast and Banc One in the MidWest. At the 
same time, the moneycenter banks have expanded their branch network to 
cover an increasing number of states in addition to their home state. 
Examples include Bank of America's acquisitions in the Western states, 
Chemical's acquisition of Texas Commerce Bank and Citicorp which has a 
widespread retail presence in several states. There is substantial evidence 
that such interstate entry has led to increased pressure on the local state 
banks to offer more competitive services in order to match the entrants' 
terms and conditions. As one observer notes, "the entry of large banks into 
local markets - particularly in their current retail orientation - generates 
intense competition and puts considerable strain on smaller institutions" 
(Duffy, 1990, p.20). Examples include Citibank's mortgage programme which 
prompted local banks and thrifts to reduce the time for mortgage processing 
from several weeks to only a few days in order to be able to match Citibank's 
automated and much quicker decision process.
Remaining barriers to interstate expansion have led to a shift in 
delivery systems away from the traditional branch-based distribution to 
technology-based systems. Santomero (1990), for example, notes that
'Telecommunications and electronics began to replace brick and mortar 
as a delivery system of retail products ... on the consumer side the 
telephone became a substitute for location in retail deposit gathering. 
Home banking, wire transfer and the mail box slowly replaced the teller 
line".
These developments are interesting also for the European case. They 
show that despite the lack of a branch network in the host country it may be 
possible to enter the retail market through card-based products, home 
banking or telephone banking facilities. Such technology-based entry 
strategies may be very successful as the example of Citibank's credit cards 
shows which have the largest market share in the US despite the fact that 
Citicorp is represented in only a small number of US states. Direct mailings, 
as well as telephone and home banking serve as a substitute for branches.
Another development which will almost certainly be paralleled in 
Europe is the increase in financial services competition due to entry of 'non­
bank' financial services groups which either do not accept deposits or do not 
give out loans. Due to the lack of a bank status these institutions do not fall 
under the regulatory scope of the Banking Acts and can therefore branch 
freely as well as offer all financial products without being restricted by
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product line restrictions.10 Such non-bank financial institutions include the 
major car producers which offer consumer loans, the retail companies such 
as Sears with its Discover credit card which has become the credit card with 
the second-largest nationwide distribution, or J.C. Penney which has acquired 
the low-commission brokerage firm Dean Witter which has distribution 
outlets in the retailer's stores. Similarly, AT&T introduced its "Universal" 
phone charge card which at the same time serves as a VISA credit card. Ford 
Motor Company which acquired First Nationwide Bank actively solicits 
savings deposits through nationwide advertising, a network of 'account 
representatives' and nationwide access to ATM machines. Eisenberg (1988, 
p.28) notes that at the end of the 1970s "only visionaries spoke of a 'financial 
services industry'. Now the term is commonplace."
An interesting case of actual foreign entry into a state market is that of 
Japanese banks in the Californian banking market. In fact, this example may 
be the most successful and significant case of cross-border entry in the retail 
banking area which has so far occurred. In contrast to the British banks 
which acquired Californian banks only to divest them later on due to lack of 
success, the Japanese banks are highly successful and now capture 25 percent 
of total banking assets in California and almost thirty percent in the 
commercial loan market with a total number of branches of 424 in 1988 
(Zimmerman, 1989).11 They not only operate in the corporate market but also 
in the retail banking area with a similar retail deposit funding base as the 
indigenous institutions. Thus, the Japanese banks apparently managed to 
overcome possible barriers resulting from a 'foreign' name, as some of them 
maintain their Japanese name (e.g. Sanwa Bank California and Sumitomo 
Bank of California). There is some evidence that Japanese banks pursued 
aggressive pricing strategies in order to attract customers (Tschoegl, 1982). 
The success of the Japanese banks shows that the retail market is not 
necessarily "closed to foreign banks", as is frequently argued by many 
European bankers, but can be successfully penetrated by foreign banks.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter an analysis of interstate entry in the US was undertaken to 
shed light on aspects of cross-border entry in the EC. Rather than 
undertaking a full-fledged analysis of regulatory issues in US banking in 
comparison to the EC, this chapter concentrated on the two issues which
10 In the US this regulatory loophole' has been closed. Existing non-bank financial 
institutions were allowed to continue to exist, however.
11 In 1984 Mitsubishi paid $2425 million to acquire BanCal Tri-State Corp., in 1986 Sanwa 
Bank paid $263 million to buy Lloyds Bank California and in 1988 Bank of Tokyo paid $750 
million to purchase Union Bank.
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form the focal point of this thesis: regulatory competition and the impact on 
competition of entry from abroad.
A brief review of the liberalisation process of interstate banking in the 
US has shown that despite the movement towards opening state markets to 
out-of-state entry, significant regulatory entry barriers remain which actually 
exceed those in the EC. Thus, the number of interstate mergers and 
acquisitions in the US has remained comparatively low, despite the increase 
in transactions since 1985. This stems largely from the fact that for interstate 
acquisitions approval by the Federal Reserve Bank was required which, until 
recently, was difficult to obtain.
Concerning regulatory competition, the examples of South Dakota and 
Delaware show that state regulators have successfully used strategic 
regulation to attract out-of-state banks. By relaxing restrictive credit card 
regulations, both states achieved vastly overproportional growth in credit 
card loans booked through subsidiaries of out-of-state banks. This mainly 
resulted from the fact that credit card services can be easily transferred to the 
most favourable regulatory environment, since they do not require a 
presence close to the customer. At the same time, both states significantly 
increased their income tax revenue from banks as well as increasing banking 
employment. These effects were obtained despite the fact that most other 
states were quick to emulate the more permissive regulations of the two 
states. This seems to indicate a first-mover advantage for those regulators 
who are first to introduce less restrictive regulations. Such a first-mover 
advantage may stem from transaction costs which prevent a firm from 
moving back to its original location even if that state has passed an equally 
competitive legislation. This example makes clear that regulators are not able 
to maintain a more restrictive regulatory environment if firms can easily 
move business into another legislation. Thus, for financial services where 
personal interaction is not required and which can therefore be moved to the 
location with the lowest net regulatory burden, regulations across states or 
countries are likely to equalise.
Concerning the impact of out-of-state entry on domestic competition, 
the empirical evidence is scarce so far. Studies of the liberalisation of 
statewide branching show that credit availability rises, new products and 
services are introduced and prices for at least some products tend to fall as 
competition increases. In addition, financial markets seem to expect a 
significant increase in competition, as states pass and enact more liberal 
regulations concerning out-of-state entry.
The continued restrictions on interstate branching have led to a 
stronger focus on distribution channels which increasingly rely on 
telephone, mail and computer support rather than the traditional branch 
network. This example shows that it is possible to make significant inroads 
even into mass retail financial services without the need to maintain a large
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branch network. One may expect similar developments and distribution 
methods to become increasingly important in Europe as well. Equally 
interesting is the increasing involvement of non-bank firms to enter 
traditional financial services. These firms include telephone companies, 
retailers and automobile concerns which all have a substantial customer 
franchise and thus a potentially powerful base to which they can sell 
financial services. It is likely that such entry activities of non-banks will also 
rise in significance in Europe.
Finally, the example of the Japanese banks which have acquired 25 
percent of banking assets in California shows that foreign banks can 
successfully enter even the retail banking market and capture a significant 
market share. Although such a development is unlikely in Europe in the 
near future as was argued in chapter four, it demonstrates that foreign banks 
can become a significant force even in retail banking.
290
Chapter Ten: 
Cross-Border Entry 
in Retail Financial Services: 
Policy Implications
This chapter presents some public policy conclusions which can be derived 
from the theoretical reasoning and the empirical evidence presented in the 
preceding chapters. In particular, it looks at the implications for European 
competition policy and develops some policy proposals for preserving 
financial stability in a European retail financial services market increasingly 
characterised by cross-border activities. For the latter question, it focuses on 
the question of home country versus host country provision of deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort facilities which are the two main 
regulatory tools to attempt to make financial systems 'run-proof'.
1. Competition policy and cross-border transactions
What are the policy conclusions with respect to competition issues related to 
cross-border entry? More specifically, does cross-border entry in retail 
financial services lead to a danger of a reduction in competition as European 
financial services 'giants' emerge which may possess undesirable market 
power? The two major academic studies of European financial services 
integration seem to have such a scenario in mind: Vives (1991, p.24) states 
that "mergers, acquisitions and cross-participations agreements will tend to 
soften competition". In a similar spirit, Neven (1990, p.176) concludes his 
study by stating that:
"given that mergers and acquisitions are often difficult to realise 
because of managerial, cultural and organisational problems, one is 
left rather agnostic about the benefits of cross-border mergers in 
banking, apart from market power. Hence, from a public policy 
perspective, it does not seem that such mergers should be 
encouraged".
This study does not support these policy conclusions for three main 
reasons: first, it was seen that cross-border acquisitions do not display the 
organisational problems of industrial transactions. This results from the fact 
that unlike industrial combinations, expectations concerning scale and scope 
economies in financial services are usually low anyway and thus do not lead 
to post-m erger disappointments. The main reason for cross-border
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acquisitions is to share into domestic profits rather than to achieve significant 
synergy effects.
Second, as was argued in the fourth chapter, the definition of the 
relevant market in retail financial services is mostly national and may even 
be regional or local. Thus, concentration indices need to be calculated on a 
national, regional or even local basis and cross-border acquisitions, as distinct 
from domestic mergers, are unlikely to increase market power, since they are 
likely to leave these concentration indices unchanged. Only where 
competition is on a European scale such that concentration indices also need 
to be calculated on a European basis is there a danger of increased market 
power due to cross-border combinations. This is unlikely to be the case for 
retail financial services for a long time to come, however.
Third, and most importantly, cross-border mergers are most likely to 
increase the level of domestic competition and thus reduce the market power 
which can be exercised by domestic institutions. Even though domestic social 
welfare may decrease in particular circumstances when the loss in producer 
surplus outweighs the gain in consumer surplus, such cases are likely to be 
rare. Thus, our policy conclusion would be diametrically opposed to Neven's: 
rather than restricting cross-border acquisitions, they should be encouraged 
through public policy means as an effective means of increasing the level of 
domestic competition.
Drawing such policy conclusions, one should carefully distinguish 
between cross-border acquisitions and domestic mergers. The latter category 
needs to be assessed on a different scale than the former. In particular, the 
threat of cross-border entry may induce domestic institutions to increase 
concentration in order to deter foreign entry. If such entry deterrence is 
successful then the threat of cross-border entry may not be sufficient to 
ensure an adequate level of competition. In particular, the relationship 
between prices and concentration seems to be positive in the relevant 
geographic markets, as shown by Berger and Hannan (1989) who examine a 
sample of US banking markets and find a statistically significant negative 
relationship between money market deposit interest rates and market 
concentration. This supports the view that greater concentration allows 
financial services firms to operate with higher margins. A similar result is 
obtained by Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990) who regress a range of 
explanatory variables against deposit rates and find a statistically significant 
relationship at the 1 percent level between local market concentration and 
deposit rates. Thus, competition policy intervention may be required where 
domestic concentration increases significantly. As national regulators have 
little incentive to intervene in such domestic concentrations and sometimes 
actually encourage them, the assessm ent of large-scale dom estic 
concentrations may have to be delegated to a supra-national authority such as
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the Commission of the EC, in particular for cases in countries which do not 
have effective merger control regulations.1
Poliq/ Conclusions
2. Financial services regulation in the Internal Market
This section analyses the implications of cross-border entry and increased 
internationalisation of European financial services for preserving financial 
stability in the internal market. In chapter two it was argued that the 
possibility of runs inflicting negative externalities on the economy was one of 
the two major market failures which justify public regulation of financial 
services. Two main tools exist to limit the risk of negative externalities posed 
by contagious bank runs by means of public regulation: deposit insurance 
schemes, official or de facto lender-of-last-resort facilities by the Central Bank 
providing financial aid in liquidity crises.2 In the next two sections I focus on 
deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities and analyse how these 
need to be adapted with increased cross-border entry in the internal financial 
services market.
2.1. EC deposit insurance schemes in an international context
Deposit insurance schemes with differing degrees of coverage operate in most 
Western countries. Their purpose is to provide protection for deposits and 
thus to calm depositor panic in case of liquidity problems of a financial 
institution.3 I first discuss the properties of actual deposit insurance schemes 
in the EC. A second section then analyses the implications of increasing 
internationalisation on the operation of national deposit insurance systems 
and analyses the proposed EC Directive.
1 Such delegation to a supra-national authority may be in conflict with the subsidiarity 
principle in the EC, however, which stipulates that decisions with predominantly domestic 
consequences should be taken by the relevant national authorities.
2 Jacklin (1987,1990) points out that if current accounts are money market funds then runs will 
not occur and deposit insurance is only required to cover fraud, since demand deposits will be 
backed by marketable securities which are not characterised by asymmetry of information 
concerning their current value. In this scenario, bank loans would be backed by non-demand 
deposits such as long-term debt, equity or CDs or may even be bundled together and securitised.
3 Friedman (1959, p. 38), for example, stresses the signalling function of a deposit insurance 
scheme when stating that "... (US) federal deposit insurance has performed a signal service in 
rendering the banking system panic-proof" and further adds that the introduction of deposit 
insurance was "the most important structural change in (the US) monetary system in the 
direction of greater stability since the post-Civil War tax on state bank notes" (ibid. p.21). 
Kareken and Wallace (1978) dispute the notion that deposit insurance is required to ensure a 
safe banking system. For their results to obtain, however, it is necessary that depositors have 
complete and perfect information about banks' portfolios. This assumption is obviously 
unrealistic, however, since complete monitoring is precluded by the informational asymmetries 
between banks and customers which lie at the heart of financial intermediation.
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Table 10.1 reports the type and coverage of deposit insurance schemes in the 
EC in 1991.
2.1.1. Deposit insurance in the EC
Table 10.1: Deposit insurance schemes for commercial banks in the EC in 1991
Country Coverage in ECU Type of 
Scheme
Year of 
Establish.
Partici­
pation
Deposit
Funds
Amount of 
Funds in  
m illion ECU*
UK 75% of deposits, 
maximum of 21,700
Public 1979 Com puls. Funded between 4.34 
and 8.69
France 100% up to ceiling of 
57,800
Private 1979 Voluntary** Unfunded 144.09
Germany 100% up to a lim it of 
30% of bank's equity 
capital per depositor
Private 1966 Voluntary Funded n.a.
Spain Deposits up to 11,700 Semi-public 1977 Com puls. Funded n.a.
Netherl. 100% up to ceiling of 
17,200
Public 1979 Compuls. Unfunded n.a.
Belgium 100% up to ceiling of 
11,800
Semi-public 1974 Com puls. Funded 106.15
Italy 100% up to a ceiling of 
130,625,75% up to 
522300
Private 1987 Voluntary Unfunded 2612.65
Luxemb. 100% up to 11,800 Private 1989 Compuls. Unfunded n.a.
Denmark 31,000 ECU Public 1987 Compuls. Funded 240.50
Ireland 80,70 and 50% up to 
13,000 max. pay out
Public 1989 Compuls. Funded 240.25
Portugal Under discussion
Greece Under discussion
* For unfunded schemes the amount required to be paid in at the first request in case of call 
commitments is listed.
** While voluntary in theory, the French scheme is de facto compulsory, since all members of 
the French Bankers Association are required to be members of the deposit protection scheme.
Source: DG15, EC Commission. *
First, it becomes apparent from the table that compared to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the US which was established in 1933 as a 
response to the large number of bank failures during the Great Depression, 
deposit insurance schemes in the EC have been introduced only recently. The 
only two EC countries which do not yet have deposit insurance schemes, 
Portugal and Greece, currently contemplate their introduction. All schemes 
have limited coverage either by imposing an absolute maximum pay-out 
amount or by covering less than 100 percent of deposits.4 The operation of
4 In Germany there is next to complete coverage with the exception of very large depositors. For 
a bank with one billion ECU equity capital, for example, the fund covers up to 333 million ECU 
for any individual depositor.
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deposit insurance schemes, however, is widely unknown in the European 
countries and even intendedly so, as regulators avoid to widely publicise 
their existence. In France and Luxembourg deposit insurance funds actually 
operate as 'secret' arrangements where participating banks are legally 
prohibited to publicise their membership. Membership in the funds is not 
always compulsory.5 Finally, all schemes in the EC have flat-rate insurance 
premiums rather than premiums which depend on a bank's asset risk.6
Similar to the deposit insurance scheme, it seems useful to establish 
guarantee funds for the insurance sector. So far, in the EC only the UK has 
such a scheme which was established in 1975 under the Policyholders 
Protection Act. The Policyholders Protection Board serves a similar function 
as the deposit insurance schemes in banking. The scheme is designed 
exclusively to protect personal policyholders and excludes companies or other 
business organisations. In the case of insurer insolvency it pays the full 
liability to the insured and third parties for compulsory insurance and for 
other general insurance services it covers 90 percent of liabilities. For the case 
of long-term insurance such as life, the Board transfers the policy to another 
insurer or pays out 90 percent of value to the policyholder. In addition, the 
Board has the right to intervene if the insurance company is in financial 
difficulties which may go as far as tranferring its business to another firm.
In chapter two it was argued that negative externalities in the case of 
runs are not limited to the banking sector but may equally occur in the 
insurance sector. Solvency requirements alone do not seem sufficient, 
however, for maintaining financial stability as they do not exclude the 
possibility of firm failure. It therefore seems necessary to provide an 
additional safety net just like the deposit insurance schemes in banking. Since 
only the UK has so far established such a scheme in the insurance sector, it 
seems recommendable to introduce an EC Directive which requires insurance 
guarantee funds, modelled according to the UK example.
The absence of insurance guarantee schemes in Europe contrasts with 
the existence of insurance "Guaranty Funds" in 47 US states. Most of these 
were formed on the basis of the 1969 "Post-Assessment Property and Liability 
Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act" which was adopted as a response 
to a number of insurer failures in the 1950s and 1960s. The US guaranty funds
Policy Conclusions
5 In practice, however, the vast majority of banks are in fact members in the national deposit 
insurance schemes. Nevertheless, since it requires only a few bank failures to shake depositors’ 
confidence and since depositors may have only imperfect information on which banks 
participate in the scheme and which do not, it seems preferable to make participation legally 
binding.
6 The Italian Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi, however, provides for the insurance 
agency to monitor efficiency, liquidity and solvency ratios. Banks whose ratios exceed or fall 
below the required standards are given up to two years to rectify the situation under the threat 
of expulsion from the fund. This solution comes very close to risk-based premiums, since high- 
risk banks will be penalised by expulsion and their license may even be withdrawn.
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operate on very similar principles as deposit insurance schemes. In contrast 
to the US deposit insurance scheme, however, they are organised and 
monitored by the states rather than on the federal level. Their function is to 
guarantee liabilities of both first-party and third-party claims in case of 
insurer insolvency up to a limit on maximum pay-outs per policyholder 
which ranges from $100,000 to $1,000,000. All guaranty associations are 
funded by the insurance industry itself. Over the past two decades, the state 
guaranty funds became active in more than 200 insurer insolvencies and paid 
out more than $3.3 billion (see Spencer, 1991). Recent strains on the fund by 
the failure of multi-state operators have led to calls for federal regulation of 
the insurance guaranty fund, however (Semaya, 1991).
2.2.2. The implications of increasing internationalisation on deposit 
insurance
As barriers to cross-border entry in EC financial services decrease, it is likely 
that there is an increasing number of branches and subsidiaries owned by 
foreign firms. What are the implications for deposit insurance schemes? In 
particular, should foreign branches and subsidiaries be covered by host- 
country or home-country deposit insurance? While I discuss these questions 
for the case of banking, the basic thrust of the argument applies equally to 
insurance guarantee funds which may eventually be set up.
Consider first the host-country rule where national insurance schemes 
cover both domestic and foreign institutions operating under domestic rules 
of conduct. This solution has the advantage that it reduces possible 
competitive distortions between domestic and foreign banks and establishes a 
clear and easily-understood rule for depositors. The problem with the rule is, 
however, that foreign banks cannot be controlled by the domestic insurance 
agency or regulator as far as prudential rules are concerned. It is therefore 
fundamentally at odds with the home-country rule of supervision of the 
Second Banking Directive. Furthermore, under the host-country rule 
domestic regulators could be tempted to undertake lax supervision of the 
foreign branches and subsidiaries of domestic banks, since in the case of 
failure the foreign deposit insurance has to cover the costs.
Consider next the suggestion that the domestic deposit insurance 
scheme should also cover the foreign branches and subsidiaries of domestic 
banks but that they are not covered by the insurance system of the host 
country. This would be analogous to the home-country principle concerning 
supervision and adherence to prudential regulations of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries. It therefore has the advantage of being consistent with the 
general home country approach to supervision adopted in the Second 
Banking Directive. In addition, it guarantees equal treatment of depositors of 
a (failed) multinational bank in different EC countries. The home country 
principle may also lead to confusing situations, however, and confer an 
unjustifiable competitive advantage on either the domestic or foreign 
institution. Suppose that a domestic insurance scheme exists, but that foreign
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banks are only partially insured by their home country deposit insurance or 
not covered at all (non-EC banks). Domestic depositors may then prefer 
domestic banks purely because they offer a lower probability of deposit loss. 
Foreign banks may therefore be disadvantaged because they do not participate 
in a deposit insurance scheme. The reverse holds if only foreign institutions 
are covered. In addition, there may be confusion among domestic depositors 
of which banks are covered and which are not, since it is not always easy to 
find out whether a bank is owned by a foreign parent. The EC Deposit 
Insurance Directive to be discussed in the next section ingeniously solves this 
problem by permitting banks to voluntarily join the host-country scheme if 
they wish to supplement the coverage provided by their home-country 
scheme. A bank will decide to join the host-country scheme if it perceives the 
benefit of being able to provide a greater level of safety to its depositors to 
outweigh the additional costs of contributing to a second deposit insurance 
scheme.
Table 10.2 depicts the characteristics of current deposit insurance 
schemes concerning the extent of coverage of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries.
Table 10.2: Coverage of multinational banking under domestic deposit 
insurance schemes in 1991
Country Coverage of 
foreign branches/  
subsidiaries in 
domestic country
Coverage of 
domestic  
banks' foreign 
activities
Coverage of 
foreign 
currency 
deposits
UK Yes No No
France Yes No No
Germany Yes, if foreign banks 
participate
Yes Yes
Italy Yes Only if no 
scheme exists in 
host country or 
branch does not 
participate
Yes
Spain Yes No Yes
Netherl. Yes No Yes
Belgium Yes Only if no 
scheme exists in 
host country
No
Luxemb. Yes No Yes
Ireland Yes No No
Denmark Yes Only if no 
scheme exists in 
host country
Yes
Source: DG15, EC Commission.
It becomes obvious that the vast majority of schemes are characterised by 
the host country principle where foreign branches are covered by the host
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country deposit insurance. However, there is no dominating principle 
concerning coverage of foreign currency deposits.
2.1.3. The proposed EC Directive on deposit insurance
The operation of effective deposit insurance schemes in the EC countries was 
targeted as early as 1984 by the Commission of the EC as forming part of the 
core of regulatory measures which should be subjected to minimum 
h arm o n isa tio n .7 A Commission Recommendation was adopted on 22 
December 1986.® Concerning the question of participation of branches of 
foreign credit institutions, Article 1(b) of the Recommendation clearly 
suggests the host-country principle where depositors of branches of foreign 
banks should be included in the coverage of the scheme.
Over the past years, the Commission has changed its view on the host- 
country principle, however. The Directive proposed in 1992 which is to be 
implemented by January 1994 has shifted to the home-country principle. The 
arguments which have led to this 180 degree shift are illustrated in the 
statement by the Banking Advisory Committee of the Commission of the EC. 
The main argument for the home-country principle for deposit insurance is 
consistency with the principles of the Second Banking Directive. As the 
Committee (1991, p.2) formulates: "a breach of the home country approach in 
an area so closely linked to banking supervision as {deposit protection 
schemes} would set a potentially dangerous precedent in the creation of the 
Single Market for banking supervision". The argument that the operation of 
a home country scheme may lead to competitive distortions where banks 
operating in the same country are covered by different schemes, is countered 
by the observation that "regulatory competition is a necessary, and intended, 
consequence of the principle of minimum harmonisation" (p.4).
Nevertheless, there is a difference between regulatory competition in 
the area of certain prudential rules and that of deposit insurance. In the latter 
area it is the depositor rather than the bank who needs to respond to 
regulatory differences. Thus, for regulatory competition to be effective the 
depositor needs to be fully informed about the different schemes of deposit 
insurance in the home country of the deposit-taking foreign branch. This 
requires public awareness of the existence, role and functioning of deposit 
insurance schemes. In order to successfully implement a home country 
approach, it therefore seems mandatory to improve the level of public 
information concerning membership and coverage of the bank's deposit
7 See the Commission's White Paper on the 'Completion of the Internal Market' (COM 85, 310, 
14 June, 1985, Annex, p. 31) where deposit insurance was targeted to be subject of a 
recommendation.
8 OJL 33 4 February 1987, p.16/17.
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insurance scheme.9 Since such information is crucial in blocking the 
incentive for a bank run in the case of firm failures, it appears that the 
resistance of banks and regulators to publicise the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes is not justifiable on economic grounds. In particular, as 
depositors have a choice of credit institutions across the EC countries, it 
seems imperative that they are able to assess and compare the extent of the 
differing insurance coverage under the respective national system.10 One may 
have some doubts, however, whether deposit insurance will ever receive the 
kind of attention to make 'regulatory competition' in this area work 
effectively.
Other features of the deposit insurance system proposed in the Directive 
include coverage up to a level of ECU15,000 and compulsory membership. 
Member States are free, however, to implement higher amounts of coverage 
or to provide co-insurance with 90 percent coverage. In the latter case which 
was included on account of the UK scheme, the minimum coverage is 
increased to ECU18,750.
There are two rationales for limiting total coverage of insurance 
schemes: when depositors are faced with a residual loss even when their 
funds are protected under the scheme, it is argued that they increase their 
monitoring activities. However, one may argue that since the existence of 
insurance schemes is currently not widely known in public, depositors' 
monitoring behaviour is unlikely to change even if limited coverage is 
introduced. Second, the combination of deposit insurance schemes with 
lender of last resort facilities leads to the general impression that deposits are 
'made safe' by the central bank and larger institutions are almost certain to be 
bailed out. In fact, there have been only few bank failures where personal 
depositors actually suffered losses. Thus, the threat of partial deposit losses in 
case of incompletely insured deposits suffers from a serious credibility 
problem, as actual losses are highly unlikely. The recent failure of the 
Luxembourg-incorporated Bank of Credit & Commerce International, 
however, may be an example of depositors suffering actual losses. At the 
same time, this case illustrates that depositors' monitoring behaviour is at 
best incomplete: it was publicly known even before the failure that at least 
part of the bank was subject to fraud and criminal money laundering 
activities but this fact did not lead to tangible changes in the behaviour of 
depositors.
Policy Conclusions
9 The current lack of public information on deposit insurance schemes in the EC countries and the 
apparent resistance of both regulators and banks to advertise their existence is in stark contrast 
to the operation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the US. In contrast to 
their European counterparts, banks in the US can actually advertise by displaying an TDIC- 
Member' sign in their branches.
1® This issue is currently being discussed and will be decided only by the Council of Ministers in 
the final Directive.
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Finally, the proposed Directive imposes flat-rate rather than risk-related 
prem ium s. The main reason why deposit insurance schemes are 
characterised by flat-rate rather than risk-related prem ium s are 
administrative and theoretical problems of how to measure banks' asset risks. 
Flat-rate prem ium s may lead to significant moral hazard problems, 
how ever.11 As banks are not penalised for taking higher risks, they have no 
incentive to follow a prudent asset portfolio strategy: formulating the bank's 
asset allocation problem in the mean-variance framework of portfolio theory 
(see, for example, Pyle, 1971; Hart and Jaffee, 1984), it is easily shown that if 
the return is not reduced proportionately by variable risk premiums the bank 
will always choose the riskiest asset portfolio. Thus, to avoid such adverse 
moral hazard effects it is clearly theoretically preferable to implement a 
scheme with risk-related premiums.
There may, however, be significant practical obstacles to implementing 
such a risk-based scheme. The main problem lies in assessing banks' portfolio 
risk. A similar problem exists when determining capital adequacy ratios. 
Concerning capital adequacy, however, some central banks have most 
recently switched to assessing banks' assets on a risk basis.12 Equally, the EC 
Solvency Ratio Directive uses a range of risk weights to determine the 
necessary minimum capital-assets ratio.13 In addition, there have been 
theoretical advances in linking risk measures to the theory of finance to 
design sounder risk measures (e.g. Shaeffer, 1987,1990).14
Apart from practical and administrative concerns, two economic reasons 
may speak against risk-related premiums: first, banks may seek to avoid those 
asset allocations which are penalised by higher risk premiums. Instead they 
may attempt to invest in areas which are not (yet) adequately priced by the 
premiums (e.g. new off-balance sheet activities, new forms of options) in
11 Kareken and Wallace (1978) show that if bank liabilities are insured at a premium which is
uncorrelated to the bank's portfolio risk then banks lack an incentive to restrain risk and "hold 
the riskiest portfolios they are allowed to hold". In fact, Kareken and Wallace argue that the 
half-hearted regulation of banks before the Great Depression and the lack of correlation 
between insurance premiums and portfolio risk was mainly responsible for the high number of 
bank failures. «
12 The Bank of England, for example, determines a risk asset ratio by dividing assets into seven 
risk categories which are then weighted according to their riskiness. Notes and coins receive 
the lowest weight and property lending is considered to be the most risky asset allocation. See 
Shaeffer (1987) for a criticism of this somewhat ad hoc approach.
13 Article 6 of the Directive classifies five categories of risk weights which need to be assigned 
to different assets to determine the denominator of the solvency ratio.
14 Merrick and Saunders (1985) depict a socially optimal deposit insurance premium p for any 
particular bank as taking the following form: p - l  (0) + c ( n ) + e, where I (.) is the expected 
loss of the insurance fund in case of bank failure which is an increasing function of 0 ,  the 
riskiness of bank assets, c ( / / )  is the cost function of the deposit insurance agency, and e is the 
externality cost of a bank failure (e.g. interrupting otherwise profitable production). Possible 
measures of 0  are discussed, for example, in Shaeffer (1987).
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order to minimise their premium payments. To address such a strategy of 
minimising insurance premiums, flexible rules of assessing asset risk should 
be implemented which can be easily modified to take account of new 
financial instruments and innovations. Since such flexibility is already 
required for updating the rules concerning asset risk assignment in the 
context of capital adequacy, no additional administrative effort is needed.
A second more serious objection to risk-related premiums is that they 
aggravate the financial situation of troubled banks and thus merely increase 
their probability of insolvency, rather than contributing to financial stability. 
In particular, a bank attempting to recover from temporary difficulties is 
penalised by higher insurance premiums, hindering its recovery efforts. This 
stems from the fact that for a variable rate system to be effective, the variance 
of premiums needs to be significant to result in sufficient incentive effects. To 
address such concerns, there should be a possibility of replacing ex ante 
premiums by some form of ex post mechanism. Thus, the insurance agency 
may decide on a temporary moratorium in exceptional circumstances where 
a bank is aiming to recover from financial difficulties. If the bank then 
follows a prudent low-risk strategy it would be rewarded ex post by lower 
insurance premiums.
The fact that no country has so far established a risk-based deposit 
insurance scheme may speak for the fact that there are formidable practical 
obstacles to designing and administering such a scheme, however. Recent 
research in the US on deposit insurance has taken as a starting point the 
premise that it is nearly impossible to design a practical risk-adjusted deposit 
insurance scheme.15 Thus, while a risk-based system is clearly theoretically 
preferrable, it may not be obtainable in practice.
Policy Conclusions
2.2. Lender of last resort in an international context
2.2.2. The lender of last resort: theoretical considerations
The lender of last resort function (LLR) refers to financial aid granted to 
illiquid but solvent institutions.16 It is usually performed by the Central Bank, 
although there are also private institutions set up by the banking sector
15 See, for example, the contributions in the 1991 special issue of the Journal of Banking and 
Finance on deposit insurance.
16 A bank is insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets. It experiences liquidity problems when 
it is not able to meet its short-term cash obligations while still maintaining positive net 
worth. This distinction goes back to Bagehot (1873) (see Humphrey, 1989, for a historical 
analysis). As noted by Goodhart (1985, p.35), however, in practise, this distinction is not 
always clear-cut, since valuation problems may blur the line between illiquidity and 
insolvency and the necessity to take quick action makes full-fledged balance sheet evaluations 
impossible.
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which fulfill a similar role.17 In the case of symmetric and perfect 
information between the bank and the capital market there would be no need 
for lender of last resort facilities, however, as the illiquid bank could always 
obtain funds on the market (possibly at above the market rate). In practice, 
informational asymmetries preclude such a market solution since potential 
lenders are unable to evaluate perfectly the financial status of the troubled 
bank. Thus, lenders face a residual risk that the bank is actually insolvent 
rather than just illiquid and they are therefore likely to ration credit rather 
than increase the interest rate. Market equilibria may therefore obtain at a 
level of lending insufficient to cover the troubled bank's liquidity needs and 
therefore public intervention is required to prevent bank failures of illiquid 
but solvent banks.
As is the case with flat-rate deposit insurance schemes, lender of last 
resort facilities may lead to moral hazard problems as banks may be induced 
to pursue a less prudent liquidity management strategy.18 To optimise its 
assets and liabilities management, a bank equates the marginal return of 
individual assets to the expected marginal cost of adjusting reserves by 
borrowing the required funds in case of illiquidity. Hence, when lender of last 
resort facilities are certain, the expected costs of illiquidity are lowered and the 
opportunity costs of holding additional reserves increases. Banks are 
therefore induced to lower reserve holdings, increasing the likelihood of 
liquidity problems.
Two possibilities exist to reduce such moral hazard effects. First, the LLR 
may charge a penalty rate for its funds.19 The rate needs to be high enough to 
make reliance on LLR funds sufficiently unattractive for banks. On the other 
hand, it must not be higher than the cost of selling illiquid assets since in this 
case it would not be taken up by the bank. Since the bank expects to draw on 
LLR funds only for short periods of time, however, whereas the opportunity 
costs of holding higher liquid reserves are continuously compounded, it is 
likely that the penalty rate required to reduce moral hazard problems exceeds 
the asset liquidation rate (see Guttentag and Herring, 1987). Thus, imposing a 
penalty rate for LLR funds is unlikely to have much of an effect on banks' 
liquidity management.
17 Such as the 'Liquiditats-Konsortialbank' in Germany, for example, which was set up as a 
joint venture between private banks and the Central Bank in response to the Herstatt bank 
failure, providing financial aid of up  to almost DM 1 billion for banks in liquidity crises. Its 
capital was doubled in 1991. The Bundesbank continues to act as the true lender of last resort, 
however.
18 Kindleberger (1978, p.163) summarises the predicament facing public authorities in the case 
of a bank failure: "Central banks should act one way (lending freely) to halt the panic, but 
another (leave the market to its own devices) to improve the chances of preventing future 
panics".
19 As suggested by Bagehot (1873).
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The second possibility to reduce moral hazard problems is to make LLR 
assistance discretionary rather than certain. This is the solution most often 
used in practice. Banks and depositors then face the problem of assessing the 
probability of liquidity aid by the LLR. Since the LLR's objective is to 
minimise the social costs of bank failures and the risk of contagious bank 
runs and these are likely to be greater the bigger the bank, discretionary 
intervention results in large banks being protected with a high probability, 
whereas smaller banks have a lower chance of being rescued by the LLR (the 
'too big to fail' doctrine). Obviously, this may lead to competitive distortions 
as larger banks are able to operate with lower reserves than smaller banks, 
since the latter face higher expected costs of illiquidity and depositors demand 
higher rates to compensate for the higher risk of default.
In practise, liquidity crises are comparatively uncommon in European 
countries. In particular, compared to the US there have been few crises in 
Europe. In few cases has there been a failure of the domestic LLR to provide 
liquidity assistance and therefore LLR assistance can be considered to be 
almost a certainty especially when larger instiutions are concerned.20
2.2.2. The LLR for multinational banks: home-country or host-country 
responsibility?
As scale and significance of multinational banking increases, there are a 
number of questions concerning the applicability and competence of national 
LLRs for foreign branches and subsidiaries. In our discussion we have to 
distinguish between LLR functions for foreign branches and those for 
subsidiaries. As the latter are legally separate institutions, the parent bank has 
no obligation to provide liquidity aid in cases of financial crisis. Branches, 
however, are legal parts of the parent institution and therefore the latter 
holds ultimate responsibility for the liabilities of the branch.
To see why there may be regulatory ambiguities in the case of 
multinational banks, consider a country with a domestic LLR and several 
multinational banks, i.e. foreign banks which have branches and subsidiaries 
in the country. Thus, some depositors and lenders are located abroad and 
these may be assigned less weight in the LLR's social welfare function. The 
LLR is assumed to maximise a social welfare function of the following type: 
W(a[J, bCS, S), where 77is industry profits, a is the percentage of profits that
20 Such as Credit Lyonnais which experienced a liquidity crisis in 1973 and was actively 
supported through lending by the Bank of France. When the subsidiary of A1 Saudi Bank in 
France experienced liquidity problems in 1988 there was a cooperative rescue effort by French 
banks (similar for Germany's Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst in 1982), so that the central banks 
did not have to intervene. Johnson Matthey in the UK though technically insolvent was 
rescued by a cooperative effort of the large UK clearers due to fears of depositors losing 
confidence, while British & Commonwealth Merchant Bank though only illiquid rather than 
insolvent was not rescued by the Bank of England. The latter example illustrates the 
discretionary nature of the LLR. German Herstatt Bank was allowed to go under by the 
Bundesbank in 1974.
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remain in the country, CS is consumer surplus, b is the share of consumer 
surplus which accrues to domestic consumers and S is financial stability. 
Suppose a foreign-owned subsidiary which is not covered by the home LLR 
experiences liquidity problems. The domestic LLR has to decide whether or 
not to provide emergency liquidity assistance. The net domestic damage 
(NDD) of failure of the subsidiary is given by
NDD — cD + 8L. + Pd + Sd
where c is the percentage of domestic residents who lose their deposits (D), 8 
is the share of domestic firms who are engaged in a long-term credit 
relationship with the subsidiary and may lose their reputational capital and 
Pd and Sd stand for the detrimental impact on the domestic payments system 
and financial stability. The LLR is assumed to balance the NDD against the 
social costs of providing liquidity assistance. These costs are given firstly by 
the potential loss of funds in case the foreign subsidiary defaults and secondly 
by the adverse effect on future monitoring activities which may increase 
moral hazard problems (see above). In its optimising decision the LLR 
provides liquidity assistance up to the point where the marginal benefit of 
reducing the NDD just equals its marginal social cost. The former is likely to
be greater the higher the values of c and 8 and the greater the expected 
adverse impact of not granting assistance to the subsidiary on the domestic 
payments system and financial stability. If the benefit of reducing the NDD is 
low the domestic LLR is more likely not to provide liquidity assistance to the 
troubled subsidiary since the social costs of failure are largely borne by non­
residents.
Thus, in the case where the host-country LLR holds responsibility for 
foreign subsidiaries no incentive problems arise if the subsidiary pursues 
mostly domestic activities, as is likely to be the case in retail financial services, 
since the NDD of failure is similar to that of domestic banks. Only if the 
foreign subsidiary deals mostly with foreign clients, has the domestic LLR 
little incentive to provide liquidity assistance. The host-country rule of LLR 
assistance is somewhat inconsistent with the home-country rule of 
supervision of the Second Banking Directive, however. This results from the 
fact that the LLR needs to have a certain degree of familiarity with the 
troubled institution in order to distinguish illiquidity from insolvency. This 
familiarity is best achieved when the LLR is at the same time the prudential 
and supervisory regulatory authority of the institution. The Second Banking 
Directive, however, assigns these functions to the home-country authorities.
To improve consistency with the Second Banking Directive, the LLR 
function for foreign subsidiaries could therefore be exercised by the home- 
country authorities. While this has the virtue of according with the home- 
country principle of supervision and thus establishing a clear-cut and 
consistent rule, it encounters problems if the NDD is low, as it is likely to be 
for most foreign subsidiaries with mainly foreign activities, since the home 
country authorities have little incentive to bail out a subsidiary if the social
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welfare reduction occurs mainly in another country. In practice, foreign 
subsidiaries are likely to be bailed out by the parent institution, since the latter 
may otherwise suffer irreparable reputational damage if it lets one of its 
subsidieries go under without having undertaken everything possible to 
pursue its rescue.
In summary, it therefore appears to be preferable to retain the host 
country principle for the LLR function of foreign subsidiaries, primarily 
because the social welfare effects are most likely to occur in the host country 
especially in retail financial services, and the central bank has a greater 
incentive to provide liquidity assistance.
3. Conclusions
In this chapter I have reviewed the public policy implications which can be 
derived from the theoretical and empirical analysis of the previous chapters. 
Concerning competition policy aspects, I have argued that cross-border 
acquisitions are likely to increase rather than decrease competition in 
financial services. This conclusion is diametrically opposed to those of 
previous academic studies of cross-border acquisitions in financial services. 
However, it was argued that one must carefully distinguish between cross- 
border and domestic transactions. The latter may reduce the level of domestic 
competition in particular in those countries which do not have effective 
merger control regulations and where regulators actively support such 
domestic consolidation efforts. In these cases, intervention on the EC level 
may be required, as domestic regulators have no sufficient incentive to 
ensure an effective level of competition.
The two main policy tools to reduce the risk of contagious bank runs 
both operate under second-best principles. Deposit insurance as implemented 
in the EC countries is aimed primarily at protecting small investors, rather 
than preventing bank runs. To reduce the problem of moral hazard, coverage 
is comparatively low, in particular comparing it to the deposit insurance 
scheme in the US. Concerning the coverage of foreign branches, it suggests 
the home-country principle which although consistent with the Second 
Banking Directive may lead to confusion among depositors which need to 
assess the coverage of different insurance schemes when making their choice 
between domestic and foreign banks.
Concerning lender of last resort facilities, the discretionary nature of 
liquidity assistance by the central bank is supposed to reduce possible moral 
hazard problems. At the same time, it provides an argument for exempting 
LLR facilities from the home country approach, since home country 
regulators may have little incentive to provide assistance to a foreign 
subsidiary of a domestic bank if the detrimental welfare effects largely occur 
in the host country, as is likely to be the case in retail financial services. Thus, 
assignment of foreign subsidiaries to the host country LLR may be preferable 
to home country responsibility.
Policy Conclusions
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Conclusions
In this last section, I briefly review the questions tackled in this thesis, the 
methodology adopted to address these issues and the conclusions which 
emerge from the preceding theoretical and empirical analysis. I follow the 
conclusions of the individual chapters of the thesis.
The first chapter introduced the basic definitions of the financial 
services industry and markets. Rather than following the traditional divide 
between banking and insurance, I introduced a customer-oriented definition. 
This makes economic sense, since due to increasing decompartmentalisation 
an institutional classification no longer provides a sufficient basis for 
evaluating financial services competition, most especially in the retail sector. 
I defined retail financial services as comprising the mass personal and small- 
and medium sized business market. Cross-border entry takes place when a 
firm follows the strategic objective of expanding operations to foreign 
markets through a range of possible entry vehicles including de novo entry 
over acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint ventures or exporting.
A brief overview of the historical evolution of cross-border banking in 
Europe has shown that significant foreign penetration started only around 
the beginning of the 1960s and was predominantly in the area of wholesale 
and investment banking, rather than in the retail sector. In contrast, in the 
insurance sector there was a significantly higher degree of cross-border entry 
also in the retail sector.
In chapter two, I briefly reviewed the main economic reasons for 
regulating retail financial services and assessed the changing regulatory 
approach of financial services regulation on the EC level. Capital 
liberalisation constitutes the conditio sine qua non for increased cross-border 
penetration in financial services, as it allows agents to obtain the optimal 
risk-return tradeoff across the EC countries, as well as purchasing financial 
products in those countries which offer the best conditions. The Second EC 
Banking Directive and the Third EC Insurance Directives establish a 
regulatory regime which allows cross-border provision of services and 
freedom of establishment under the home-country rule. Despite some 
ambiguities concerning the boundary between home country regulation and 
host country supervision of "rules of conduct", it seems certain that foreign 
financial services firms will be able to operate under home country 
regulatory rules for most of their activities and will therefore no longer have 
to deal w ith several different supervisory agencies when operating 
internationally.
Conclusions
The new regulatory regime on the EC level characterised by minium 
harm onisation, home-country supervision and mutual recognition is 
predicted to lead to a process of strategic deregulation where national 
regulators or policy-makers aim to provide domestic financial institutions 
with competitive advantages abroad or attract foreign firms to the home 
country. In order to analyse this prediction, I developed a simple game- 
theoretic model. It became clear that once objective functions and strategies 
are fully specified, regulators or policy-makers have no interest to deregulate 
ad infinitum, since this would jeopardise financial stability in their home 
country. In addition, they are able to 'free-ride' on the deregulatory moves of 
other national regulators. It is therefore by no means evident that regulatory 
competition results in lax supervision or leads to neglect of the original 
economic objectives of alleviating market failures, as predicted by some 
academic commentators.
Several areas which may nevertheless be affected by strategic regulation 
were identified. In the banking sector these include minimum reserve 
requirements, deposit rate regulation, taxation of interest rate earnings and 
line of business restrictions. In these areas it is likely that domestic banks will 
place pressure on their regulators or policy-makers to abolish restrictions 
which place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign 
institutions. In the insurance sector the impact of enforced deregulation will 
be felt most in those countries which have so far relied on a material control 
system of supervision with premium and profit regulation. These countries 
will be forced to replace this approach by a deregulated system of 
unrestrained competition on premiums where regulators control only 
solvency and reserve requirements.
In order to explain the process of cross-border entry in retail financial 
services, I developed a theory of cross-border entry activities in chapter three. 
I argued that traditional trade theory which focuses on comparative cost 
differences cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for cross-border entry in 
financial services. A firm-level approach to the theory of cross-border entry is 
needed. I developed such a theory on the basis of the eclectic paradigm of 
multinational enterprises which builds on an analysis of corporate-level 
competitive advantages transferable to foreign markets and locational 
factors inducing cross-border entry. The eclectic paradigm starts from the 
premise that foreign firms suffer from a cost disadvantage. I argued that 
foreign banks may have higher costs due to a reputation which has yet to be 
established, a lower position on the learning curve and fewer transactional 
relationships which make the basic intermediation function more costly. 
Similarly, foreign insurers face cost disadvantages, as they may not be able to 
perform the risk pooling function as effectively as domestic firms due to the 
operation of the law of large numbers. In addition, foreign insurers have less 
experience w ith risk assessment and may also face reputational dis­
advantages.
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To the degree that foreign banks and insurers face a cost disadvantage 
they need some competitive advantage to compensate for this. Concerning 
firm-level competitive advantages, I argued that the follow-or-lead the 
customer hypothesis is not only applicable to the largest corporate customers 
but also to medium and small-sized firms and even to some extent to 
personal customers who travel extensively across Europe. The second 
potential source of a firm-level advantage is product know-how resulting in 
learning economies which can be transferred to foreign markets at low 
marginal costs.
The second source of potential competitive advantages are locational 
factors. These include in particular high oligopoly profits in foreign markets 
which may attract foreign entry. However, expectations of domestic 
incumbents' reaction to foreign entry are crucial for determining such a 
locational advantage. A second potentially important locational explanation 
results from diversification advantages which achieve risk reduction at 
constant returns if risks in these markets are less than perfectly correlated.
Concerning the mode of entry, I argued that cross-border provision of 
services will play only a marginal role in retail financial services, as the vast 
majority of services require at least some degree of personal interaction 
between customer and supplier. De novo entry faces the problem of building 
up a distribution and customer network entirely from scratch. In retail 
financial services, acquisitions or strategic alliances are therefore likely to be 
the most likely entry routes. While large firms are likely to prefer 
acquisitions, medium-sized institutions may opt for alliances or joint 
ventures due to lack of financial resources to undertake large-scale 
acquisitions.
The extent of cross-border penetration depends on the significance of 
barriers to cross-border entry in retail financial services which I examined in 
chapter four. Two main sources of entry barriers were identified: first, barriers 
arising from the regulatory environment which are attacked by the EC 
internal market programme. Second, entry barriers which I called 'market- 
inherent' arising from the particular market structure or product 
characteristics. These are likely to persist - though becoming less severe - 
even after the integration of European financial markets.
Concerning regulatory entry barriers, it was noted that regulatory 
resistance to takeovers of domestic firms by foreign institutions is greater in 
banking than in insurance, as the banking sector is considered to have a 
strategic role for domestic economic policy. Moreover, the lack of a corporate 
control market in the EC may be especially severe in the banking sector 
resulting from the large extent of public ownership in some EC countries.
Market-inherent barriers to cross-border entry are unlikely to result 
from size economies which do not appear to be significant in most areas of
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financial services. In contrast, incumbency advantages arising from firm 
reputation and switching costs may constitute the most significant barriers to 
entry in the retail financial services sector. Thus, price differentials do not 
necessarily induce a switch from one supplier to another, allowing 
incumbents to exercise a certain degree of market power. Barriers to entry 
arising from switching costs are likely to be greater in banking than in 
insurance which is partly due to the fact that the latter industry is 
characterised by less-frequent interaction. In addition, reputational factors 
may be less significant in insurance than in banking. Finally, there are fewer 
joint products in insurance such that individual products are separable. This 
further facilitates entry in insurance where a foreign firm can enter only one 
particular product market. In banking, however, there are fewer stand alone 
products. Thus, the insurance sector is characterised by fewer barriers to 
foreign entry than retail banking.
Faced with the threat of increased foreign entry, domestic regulators and 
institutions may attempt to implement entry-deterring strategies, in 
particular in retail banking. These include especially domestic consolidation 
which has increased significantly in some EC countries. Further, domestic 
banks may attempt to exclude foreign banks from domestic networks such as 
ATMs or clearing systems. Finally, branch proliferation by domestic banks 
may have the objective of closing potentially profitable locational niches to 
foreign entrants.
In chapter five, I have analysed the potential impact of foreign entry on 
domestic competition in retail financial services. I showed that for the simple 
case of Cournot competition in deposit markets both cross-border 
acquisitions and de novo entry lead to higher deposit rates and thus to an 
increase in consumer surplus. As domestic firms lose market share to foreign 
entrants, however, domestic producer surplus decreases and this decrease 
may outweigh the increase in consumer surplus. In addition to stimulating 
price competition, cross-border entry may spoil domestic collusive equilibria 
such as (tacit) agreements not to compete on deposit rates or agreements to 
fix insurance premiums. Further, foreign financial services firms can bring 
new expertise to the market in the form of introducing new products or may 
increase quality competition by offering existing products at a higher quality 
level. Finally, if foreign entrants are more cost-efficient than domestic firms 
this may induce a restructuring of domestic firms and reduce X-inefficiency.
As the Price Waterhouse study is characterised by some insufficiencies 
concerning statistical sampling, I decided to gather additional data on price 
differences in retail banking across six EC countries. It became obvious that 
there are significant differences in the pricing structure of retail products. 
Differing degrees of cross-subsidisation are likely to come under intense 
scrutiny when competition intensifies. I also showed that there is substantial 
evidence for X-ineffidency in some countries, as well as differing quality 
levels concerning products and services.
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In chapter six, I provided an aggregate overview of cross-border entry 
activities in the EC. Cross-border provision of services currently constitutes 
only a fairly insignificant amount of total services trade. I decided to 
construct an original database of cross-border entry activities of the largest 
sixty European banks and the largest forty insurers for the period from 1986 
to the beginning of 1992. A comparison of cross-border acquisition activity in 
financial services with that of other industries in the EC revealed that the 
financial services industry is particularly active in this area with the number 
and disclosed value of transactions exceeding those in other industries.
An analysis of acquisitions in EC financial services since 1975 suggests 
that there has been a significant increase in transactions, especially since 1986. 
The most recent decrease in cross-border acquisitions seems to suggest that 
most firms have already undertaken their European expansion plans in 
preparation of the internal market, however.
Joint ventures play a less significant role than cross-border acquisitions 
but account for a similar proportion of total cross-border entry activities as in 
other industries. Strategic alliances have been a common form of cross- 
border cooperation for some time, especially in the banking sector. Recent 
evidence suggests that such agreements have become increasingly popular, as 
a less costly alternative to a majority acquisition. Finally, de novo entry 
activities still account for a large number of cross-border entry activities of 
European banks but almost exclusively in the area of corporate and * 
investment banking.
Entry by non-EC institutions into the EC market has been concentrated 
in the market for large corporates. Neither US nor Japanese firms are likely 
to play a significant role in European retail financial services in the 
foreseeable future.
In chapter seven, I first provided some evidence from a range of 
interviews with banks on the general impact of the regulatory changes in the 
context of the internal market programme. Most practitioners agree that the 
impact of 1992 is likely to be minimal in the market for large corporates and 
institutions. Retail banking is seen to be more affected but it may well take 
another ten years before greater cross-border penetration in this sector is 
achieved.
I undertook a number of in-depth case studies for cross-border 
acquisitions and alliances in the banking sector. For cross-border acquisitions 
it became apparent that post-acquisition strategies vary significantly for 
individual cases. While for some cases a hands-off approach is pursued by 
the acquirer, other acquisitions are actively integrated into the group 
following a unified European strategy. It appears that acquired banks do not 
follow a strategy of consistently undercutting indigenous institutions on
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prices. However, they frequently do offer better conditions on selected 
products such as deposit interest rates, like CC-Bank and Citibank in 
Germany or Barclays in Spain, or credit cards such as Citibank and Barclays in 
Germany and may therefore force domestic competitors to follow suit. In 
addition, it seems that foreign institutions frequently compete on quality and 
efficiency of services. In addition, foreign banks are frequently forced to rely 
on technology-intensive distribution methods in order to compensate for the 
lower number of branches. Thus, they may introduce new distribution 
methods such as home banking and advanced ATMs, as Citibank has done in 
Germany, which may eventually be copied by domestic competitors. Thus, 
foreign banks are frequently competing on service quality and efficiency of 
distribution rather than merely on prices.
Does actual or potential foreign entry in retail banking place constraints 
on domestic firms and reduce their ability to exercise market power? Our 
emprical evidence seems to suggest that foreign banks in the retail area 
compete on the price level only in selected areas. This may concern the area 
of interest rates on deposit accounts, for example, where foreign banks are 
often the first banks to offer significantly positive or above average rates. 
Possibly more importantly, foreign banks frequently compete on the quality 
and efficiency level. Firstly, this probably results from the simple fact that 
price cuts can be immediately matched by domestic competitors, whereas a 
technological edge requires more time to be imitated by competitors. More 
importantly, foreign banks are to some extent forced to compete on efficiency, 
technology, and quality levels, as they cannot compete with domestic banks 
in terms of the extent of the retail branch network. Innovations in the field 
of product-delivery methods may bring considerable benefits to the 
consumer, as they are likely to facilitate the communication and interaction 
with banks. In particular, new distribution methods introduced by foreign 
banks may be copied by domestic institutions.
In general, it seems clear, however, that in the retail area the impact of 
foreign banks on domestic competition is limited. In contrast to investment 
banking, geographic expansion in the retail sector entails large fixed costs, as 
product delivery still necessiates a large number of distribution outlets. Only 
when communication technology has progressed so far as to make non­
branch based distribution methods widely acceptable, will foreign banks be 
able to make a greater impact on domestic competition in the retail banking 
sector.
The impact of strategic alliances on competition does not seem to be 
significant, in general. As the example of Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco 
Santander shows, however, such an alliance can bring significant benefits in 
the retail area where technological cooperation between two large branch 
networks leads to a simplification of cross-border transactions.
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In chapter eight I reported the results of a questionnaire survey which 
was sent out to the largest 270 banks and insurers in the European 
Community. The results showed that foreign firms currently play a more 
significant role and are perceived to be stronger competitors in the retail 
insurance sector than in retail banking. In banking, foreign firms are at 
present still considered to be most significant in the wholesale and 
investment banking sectors, while perceived to become more significant in 
retail banking. In the retail insurance sector, however, the impact of foreign 
firms is generally expected to be greater than in retail banking. Concerning 
the impact of the internal market programme, around 60 percent of banks 
and insurers currently take the single financial services passport into 
account. Spain, Italy and France are expected to be most affected by the 
changes resulting from the internal market programme in the banking 
sector, while Germany is additionally listed in the insurance sector.
Concerning the significance of barriers to entry, it is interesting to find 
that regulatory barriers are not perceived to be all that im portant in the 
financial services sector. The most important bariers in insurance are lack of 
know-how and lack of right distribution channels, while the lack of suitable 
acquisition targets is additionally listed as a significant barrier in the banking 
sector.
De novo entry in the personal customer segment is perceived to be a 
feasible entry strategy by the majority of respondents in insurance, but not in 
banking. Cross-border provision of services, however, is not considered to be 
a successful entry strategy in both sectors.
In the second part of chapter eight, I presented a number of case studies 
for the insurance sector. It emerged that in the retail sector there has been a 
greater scale of cross-border transactions in the insurance than in the banking 
sector, in particular concerning the size of individual cross-border 
acquisitions involving firms which have a significant market share in their 
domestic market. For these large-scale cross-border acquisitions, however, it 
was noted that the strategic impact of a change in ownership has, so far at 
least, been negligible. After the takeover by a foreign company, few strategic 
variables have been changed and these takeovers have certainly not been for 
corporate control reasons. It seems that the larger the transaction, the less 
significant the impact on day-to-day management of the acquired firm. The 
large firms which were acquired are very much domestic players and are 
unlikely to upset any existing collusive agreements or to suddenly start 
competing on the price level only because of an ownership change. It seems 
that foreign acquirers pursue a very cautious approach when integrating the 
foreign firm and implement a policy of least interference in the domestic 
affairs of the newly acquired firm.
De novo entries which, in contrast to the retail banking sector, actually 
exist in insurance seem to have much more of an impact on competition in
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the host country, as entering firms are forced to provide services either at 
lower premium levels or introduce new, innovative products. In practice, 
insurers most frequently choose the second strategy when entering foreign 
markets and firms like Equity & Law in Germany and Eagle Star in Spain and 
Portugal provide good examples of foreign firms which have introduced new 
products, forcing domestic firms to adapt similar products in order not to lose 
customers.
In chapter nine, I undertook an analysis of interstate entry in the US in 
order to test the view whether predictions can be derived from the US 
experience for the EC. A brief review of the liberalisation process of interstate 
banking in the US showed that despite the movement towards opening state 
markets to out-of-state entry, significant regulatory entry barriers remain 
which actually exceed those in the EC. Even though the number of interstate 
mergers and acquisitions has increased, no significant consolidation process 
has so far taken place with the possible exception of large-scale mergers 
between the bigger banks.
Concerning regulatory competition, the examples of South Dakota and 
Delaware show that state regulators have successfully used strategic 
regulation to attract out-of-state banks. By relaxing restrictive credit card 
regulations, both states achieved vastly overproportional growth in credit 
card loans booked through subsidiaries of out-of-state banks. This resulted in 
a significant increase in income tax revenue from banks as well as increasing 
banking employment. Strategic deregulation was successful despite the fact 
that other state regulators quickly emulated the more permissive regulations.
Concerning the impact of out-of-state entry on domestic competition, 
studies of the liberalisation of statewide branching show that credit 
availability rises, new products and services are introduced and prices for at 
least some products tend to fall as competition increases. Continued 
restrictions on interstate branching have led to a stronger focus on 
distribution channels which increasingly rely on telephone, mail and 
computer support rather than the tradional branch network. This example 
shows that it is possible to make significant inroads even into mass retail 
financial services without the need to maintain a large branch network. One 
may expect similar developments and distribution methods to become 
increasingly important in Europe as well.
In chapter ten, I reviewed the public policy implications which can be 
derived from the theoretical and empirical analysis of the previous chapters. 
Concerning competition policy aspects, I argued that cross-border acquisitions 
are likely to increase rather than decrease competition in financial services. 
This conclusion is diametrically opposed to those of previous academic 
studies of cross-border acquisitions in financial services. However, I argued 
that cross-border acquisitions are quite different from domestic mergers. The
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latter may reduce the level of domestic competition in particular in those 
countries which do not have effective merger control regulations.
I finally discussed the two main policy tools to reduce the risk of 
contagious runs on financial institutions. A deposit insurance scheme as 
envisaged in the EC Directive aims primarily at protecting small investors in 
the case of bank failure, rather than preventing bank runs per se. Since firm 
failures and runs with potentially harmful effects may also occur in the 
insurance sector, as recent examples from the US illustrate, guarantee funds 
should be set up also for insurers which may be modelled according to the 
institutions which already exist in most US states.
Concerning lender of last resort facilities, the discretionary nature of 
liquidity assistance by the central bank provides an argument for exempting 
LLR facilities from the home country approach, since home country 
regulators may have little incentive to provide assistance to a foreign 
subsidiary of a domestic bank. This results from the fact that in retail 
financial services the detrimental welfare effects largely occur in the host 
country. Thus, assignment of foreign subsidiaries to the host country LLR 
may be preferable to home country responsibility.
In summary, it emerges from this study that the impact of cross-border 
entry in retail financial services on domestic competition is less significant 
than what is predicted in the Cecchini report. It will be interesting to 
undertake a similar study like the present one in about five years time to 
analyse the changes which have actually taken place in the European retail 
financial services sector.
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Appendix 1:
Database of Cross-Border EC Bank 
Acquisitions, Cooperative Agreements, Joint 
Ventures and De Novo Entry Activities 
for largest EC and non-EC banks
The following ranking lists the largest 60 EC banks and the largest US, Japanese 
and other European banks by size of their Tier-1 capital in 1990, as defined by the 
Cooke Committee which includes equity (both ordinary and preference shares) as 
well as retained earnings. A ranking of banks according to this criterion is 
published annually in The Banker. The first column contains the bank's name, 
its country of origin, and its capital size in US dollar (in 1990).
For each bank, its acquisitions from 1986 to the beginning of 1992 are listed. 
The second column lists the year of the transcation, the name of the acquisition 
target, followed by its country of operation and, where known, the equity capital 
of the acquisition target, the percentage stake of the acquisition and the area of 
activity of the target bank.
The third column lists joint ventures (JV) between the bank and any other 
EC bank. After the year of the transaction, the names of the participants of the JV 
are given, followed by the name of the joint venture, the stakes which the banks 
hold in the JV and a comment about the area of activity of the JV and its 
objectives pursued.
The fourth column lists cooperative agreements (and strategic alliances) 
between the bank and any other EC bank and again gives the year of the 
agreement, the names of participants and the type and objectives of the alliance.
Finally, column five lists any kind of cross-border de novo entry of the bank 
in another EC country. Where known, it also lists the area and type of operation 
of the newly opened representative office, branch or subsidiary.
Bank Acquisitions Joint Ventures Cooperations New Entry
1. EC banks
1. Credit 
A g r i c o l e ,  
France,  
$ 1 1 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• 1988: CAFOO, UK, Mortgage 
Bank
• 1988: Comp. Finaaziaria. Italy. 
S859 million, 20%, Finance 
Company
• 1989: Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano, 
Italy. 12%. private banking
• 1989: CO F IG  A S  A, Spain, 50%, 
Spain*» leading consumer credit 
cards company
• 1990: Agente« de Boita 
Asociados, Spain, 55%. brokerage
• 1990: E T E B A  (National 
Investment Bank for Industrial 
Development, Greece, 10%, 
investment bank
• 1986: Espirito Santo, 
Portugal, Banco Internacional 
de Credilo, 20:80, offers full 
range of banking services in 
Portugal, emphasis on 
corporate clients
• 1988: AGF, France, B A M I,  
Spain; Euroaredito 
Im m obilità; 35:35:30.
• 1988: M A G , UK; to enter 
mortgage market in UK. M A G  
markets two of CA s mortgage 
products
• 1989: Rabobank. Netheri., 
customer! able to use the other 
bank's network, mutual assistance 
of clients
• 1990: Banco Ambrosiano 
Veaeto, Italy, Reciprocal services
• 1990: C E R A  - Savings Bank. 
Belgium, trade activities, product 
development
• 1986: Germany, branch, 
banking
• 1988: Spain, upgrade of rep. 
off. to subs.
• 1988: Unibank, Spain, credit 
cards
• 1988: Unibank. Italy, credit 
cards
• 1988: Luxembourg, fund 
management
2 .
Barc lays
Ba nk ,
UK,
$ 1 0 . 7
b i l l i o n :
• 1987: B C R  Roma Factoring, 
Italy, 100%
• 1989: C F S  Finance SYS, 
Germany, 532 million, 75%, Credit 
Cards
• 1989: Paget Mahe, France, S10 
million, 75%, Brokerage
• 1990: Merck Fink . Germany. 
100%. $200 million. Banking
• 1990: L*Européenne de Banque, 
France. 100%, $306 million. 
Banking
• 1990: Hertie, Germany; 
O P T IM U S Bank. 49:51. to 
offer store card to Hertie 
customers
• member of A BECO R • 1990: Barclays Commodity, 
Netherlands
3 .
Nat ional  
W est ­
minster  
Bank,  
UK, $9.8 
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Banco de Asturias, Spain, 
90%. Banking
• 1988: Banque de L ’Union 
Européenne, France, FF 877 
million, Banking
• 1989: Banco Nat West March, 
Spain, $126 million, increase of 
stake from 49% to 83.6%, Banking
• 1989: Sellier. France, 100%, 
Brokerage, FF12.7 million
• 1990: Van Lanschot Bankiers. 
Netherlands, Dfl.269.239. increase 
from 40 to 80%, Banking
• 1989: Credito Italiano, Italy; 
Banca Credit West e dei 
Comuni Vesuviani; originally 
Nat West held 30% stake 
since 1972. then dilution to 
19% by taking in Credito 
Vesuviano, Banking
<
4 .
Deutsche
Bank,
Germany,
$ 8 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Banca d'America e d’ltalia, 
Italy. $366 million, 100%, 
Banking
• 1988: M D M  Sociedade de 
Investimento. Portugal.$6 million. 
100%, Investment Banking
• 1988: Bary A  Co.. Netherl., $62 
million, 100%. Banking
• 1989: Banco Comercial 
Transatlantico, Spain. $13 million, 
72%. Banking
• 1989: Morgan Grenfell, UK. $623 
million, 100%, Investment 
Banking
• 1989: FTAT, Fidis. Italy, 
introduction of new credit card 
called FIDlS-card through 
subsidiary Banca d* America
• member of E B IC • 1986: D B  Finance. Belgium. 
Finance Company
• 1988: D B  de Investimento. 
Portugal, investment bank
• 1989: D B  M & A . France, 
mergers^ acquisitions advice
• 1989: DB  Capital 
Management, UK, fund 
management of in fl bond &  
European equity portfolios
• 1989: Europlische 
Hypothekenebank, 
Luxembourg. Mortgage Bank
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5* Banque
Paribas,
France,
$ 7 . 0
b i l l i o n
• 19*6: Quilter Goodison, UK, 513 
million, 99%, Finance Company,
• 1989: Banca Commerciale Italia, 
Italy, $3200 million. 2%, Banking
• 1990: Unispar, Belgium, $28 
million, 89%, Savings Bank
• 1988: COMIT, Italy. 
Assicuarazioni Generali, Italy; 
Banca Internazionale 
Lombarda; 40:20:40, Banking
• 1990: Hafnia Holding, 
Denmark, Cobcpa, Belgium; 
Holnor, 33:33:33, Holnor is 
to invest in Northern 
European companies
• 1990: Cobepa, Belgium, 
Executives, India; Paribas, 
Deelnemingen, N V  68:20:13, 
Industrial holding company
• 1989: James Capei, UK, 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, US, 
IBJ, Japan; Intermediate 
Capita] Group, focus on
M B  Os, mezzanine finance, 
familiy buy-outs, first in thr 
UK, then France. Italy,
Netherl.
• 1989: Kreditanstalt Ittr 
Wiederaufbau, Germany, Paribas 
will assist in the allocation of credit 
facilities for either German 
investment in the EC  or foreign 
investment in Germany
• 1988: Belgium, branch
• 1989: Paribas Futures, UK. 
Fund Management
6. Banque 
National  
de Paris, 
France,  
$ 6 . 1  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: A R K  Sec. UK, 75%, 
Brokerage
• 1988: Chemical Bank Home 
Loans, UK, 100%, Mortgage Bank
• 1989: Banco di Credito y Ahorro, 
Spain, $11 million, 100%, 
Banking
• 1989: Credito Romagnolo, Italy, 
$784. 2%. Banking
• 1990: Bank Nagelmaekers 
Belgium, BFr 589 million, 75%, 
banking,
• 1991: Klein wort Benson, UK,
5%, merchant banking
• 1988: Naco Borges e Imaro, 
Portugal, Union des 
Assurances de Paris, France; 
BN P Factor, 75:20: 5, overall, 
fourth factoring company in 
Portugal
• 1991: Dresdner Bank, Germ., 
OKHB. Hungary, 37:37:26, 
provision of trade and project 
finance, privatisation in 
Hungary
• member of ABECO R
• Credito Romagnolo, Italy.
• 1989: Dresdner Bank, Germany» 
strategic alliance, supported by 
share swaps, exchange of board 
members,
• 1987: Belgium, Brussels,
• 1987: Spain, Pamplona, 
branch
• 1987: Portugal. Porto
• 1987: BN P Capital Markets. 
UK, Investment banking
• 1988: BN P  Mortgages, UK. 
Mortgage Bank
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7. Credit
L y o n n a i s ,
France,
$ 5 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Slavenburg's Bant. 
Nether I., 1574, 95«. Banking
• 1987: A LC M : UK, 100«. 
Brokerage
• 1987: Astair aad Co., UK. SI 
miUion
• 1988: Nederlandse Creditbank, 
Nctherl. 100«. Banking
• 1989: Banque de Commerce. 
Belgium, $45 million, 100«, 
Banking
• 1988/90: Banco Lombarda di 
Deposito, Italy, $38 miUion. 31«. 
Banking
• 1989/91: Credho Bergamasco, 
Italy, $422 million, 53«, Banking
• 1989: Regent Trade Finance, UK. 
Finance Company
• 1989: Chase Manhattan 
Handelsbank (Belgium), branches 
and subsidiary
• 1990: Iberagentas, Spain, 40«, 
brokerage
• 1990: International Bankers 
Incorporate. FF224 million. 
Luxembourg, 25«, brokerage
• 1990: Woodchester, Ireland, 
29.85«, leasing, consumer credit, 
mortgages
• 1990/91: Banco Commercial 
Espanol, Spain, 97«, FF 2,220 
million, banking
• 1991: Banco Jover, Spain, 
majority,
• 1991: Eurofactors, Belgium, 
majority acqu., business factoring
• 1988: Daaoise 
Kreditforeningen, Denmark; 
Kredit Danmark; 10:90
• 1989: National Bank of 
Greece, 50:50, French Greek 
Leasing, Inc..
• 1990: G EM IN A , Italy,
Sod eta di Intermediazioite 
Mobil iare, 30:70, Merger of 
Gemini's equity commission 
house and two broken baaed 
in Milan aad Rome
• member of Europartnen • 1988: C L  A  Co. OHG, 
Germany, banking
• 1989: C L  Asset Management, 
Luxembourg, Fund 
Management
8. Société
Generate,
France,
$ 5 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Straus Turnbull. UK. 
29.9«. brokerage
• 1988: SG ST  Securities. UK. $11 
million, 60«, Brokerage
• 1989: Ingversen and Co. Netherl.. 
55«, Brokerage
• 1989: Touche Remnant Hold.
UK. $25 million, 100«. Fund 
Management
• 1990: Companhia Financiers 
internac. sociedade Conetora. 
Portugal. 20«, brokerage
• Interdealers. Spain. 40«, 
brokerage
• 1990: Barclays Bank Consumer 
Credit. Italy. 100«
4
• member of E B IC
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9 .
Dresdner
Bank,
Germany,
$ 5 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Thornton & Co., UK, S3 
million, 70%, Fuad Management
• 1989/90: Basque International de 
Placement, France, $66 million. 
64%, Investment Bank
• 1991: La  corporacion Banesto, 
Spain, 5%. holding company of 
Baneato Bank
• 1987: F ID IS, Italy. Caasi di 
Risparmi di Verona e Vicenza 
e Belluno, Credilo di 
Padova/Rovi, Enel; Comeba, 
10:26:15:30:19. Merchant 
bank to provide corporate 
finance to small and medium* 
sized Italian fin »
• 1990: London and 
Manchester Group, UK; 
London and Manchester 
Mortgages, 40:60, Mortgage 
company,
• 1990: BNP, France; O KH B  
Bank, Hungary; 37:37:26, 
BNP-KH-Dresdner Bank Rt,
♦ member of ABECO R
• 1989: BNP, France, strategic 
alliance, supported by share swaps, 
exchange of board members,
• 1988: Europa Bank. 
Luxembourg, Holding
• 1989: D B  Asset 
Management, Luxembourg, 
Fund Management
• 1989: Ireland, branch. Fund 
Management
10. Rabo­
bank,  
Nether* 
lands ,  
$ 5 . 3  
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Banco Popular. Spain, 
S711 million, 1.25%, Banking
• 1989: ADCA-Bank, Germany, 
increase in stake from 84% to 
100%
• 1989: Banco Popular Espanol, 
Spain, agreement to serve each 
other's customers and use each 
other’s branch network, supported 
by mutual shareholdings
• 1989: Credit Agricole, France, 
similar agreement as with Banco 
Popular Espanol
• 1988: Luxembourg, 
subsidiary
11. Banco
Bi lba o
Vizcaya,
S pa in ,
$ 4 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Hambrot, UK. $440 
million, 6%. Invettment Bank
• 1989: Basque Credit Commercial, 
Belgium, $9 million, 100%, 
Banking
• 1989: Credit Universel. France, 
$22 million. 98%, Banking
• 1990: Lloyd's Bank Portugal, 
100%
• 1990: Credit 
Commnnal/Gemeentekredit 
Belgium. Cooperation in different 
sectors such as real estate 
acquisitions in Spain
• 1989: Hambros. UK, M & A  
activities
• 1988: B B V  Sociedade de 
Investimentos, Portugal. 
Investment Banking
• 1988: Netherl., branch
1 2 .
Cariplo ,
I t a ly ,
$ 4 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Co. International de 
Banque. France. $10 million, 65%, 
Banking
• 1988: Banco de Santander, Spain, 
$686 million, 0.8%. Banking
• 1989/90: Bankhaus LObbecke &  
Co.. Germany. $59 million. 89%, 
Private Banking
• 1989: Banco Jover. Spain, $49 
million. 30%, Banking
• 1990: Banco Comercial 
Portugues, Portugal, 1.5% (share 
swap)
• 1991: TSB, UK, Caisse 
Nationale de Prevoyance, 
France; Carivita. 60:20:20, 
project led by TSB, Cariplo 
provides technical support 
and branch network
• 1988: Banco Santander. Spain. 
30% swap of stakes in susidiaries 
Istitmo Bancario Italiano and Jover
• 1989: Caisse de Depots &  des 
Consignations, France, marketing 
various financial services especially 
outside E C
• 1990: Banca Jover. Spain, to 
offer services to Italian companies 
in Sapin, especially in Catalonia
• 1986: Spain. Madrid, rep. 
off.
• 1989: Germany, Frankfurt, 
upgrade rep. off. to branch
1 3 .
Midland 
Bank,  
UK, $4.3 
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Northern Bank, Ireland, 
majority acqu.
• 1988/91: Euromobiliare, Italy, 
54.5%, Investment Bank
• 1989: BN P  (Corporate Business). 
Spain, Corporate banking
• 1988: Nether!., branch.
• Banque Immobilière de 
Credit, France, Mortgage Bank
14. Banca
Naz. del
Lavoro,
I ta ly ,
$ 4 . 2
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Bankhaus Hesse Neumann. 
Germany, $45 million. 100%. 
Banking
• 1990: Bank Leumi. France. Paris 
branch only.
• 1989: Spain, subsidiary, 
focus on Ufe insurance and 
pension funds
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15. Banco
Central ,
S p ai n ,
S 3 . 9  
b i l l i o n
16« 
Abbey  
N at io na l ,  
S3 «9 
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Ficofrance, France. 42%. 
Finance Company real estate
• 1988: Corgroop. Spain, 
Winterthnr, SwitzarL; 
Abbeycor Nacional 
Hipotecario, 67:23:10, 
mortgage specialist (70% 
endowment mortgages) lo 
open in Barcelona
• 1990: Monceau, France, 
launching of real estate loans and 
life insurance
1 8 .
Groupe de
C ai ss e s
d'Epargne
Ecureuil ,
France,
$ 3 . 9
m i l l i o n
• 1988: Caja de Madrid and Caja 
de Barcelona, Spain, renouncing of 
opening of branches in host 
country, cooperation in retailing 
products
• 1989: ICCR1, Italy, representing 
78 savings bank in Italy, mutual 
representation agreement
• 1990: reciprocal representation 
agreements, technical and 
distribution cooperation with 
Dutch. German and Belgian 
Savings Banks Associations,
1 9 .
Commerz­
ban k,
Germany,
$ 3 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Cholet Dupont, France, 
5%, Brokerage
• 1989: A lB  Investment 
Management (Allied Irish 
Bank). 75:25, C IC M  Ireland 
Ltd., hind capital of IR P  500 
million expected from 
institutional investors
• 1991: Banco Hispano 
Americano, Spain; Hispano 
Commerzbank Gibraltar. 
5050, to specialise in 
portfolio and asset 
management
• member of Europartner group 
including Banco Hispano 
Americano, Credit Lyonnais and 
Banco di Roma
• 1989: specific alliance with 
Banco Hispano Americano, Spain, 
focusing on retail banking; 
planned to offer joint cheque 
books, A T M  cards, savings 
accounts, unified computer system, 
mutual renouncement of opening 
branches in each other's markets
• 1989: Italy, Milan, rep. off.
2 0 .
Is t l tuto
Bancario
San Paolo
di Torino,
I t a ly ,
$ 3 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1986/91: Hambros, UK, 17%. 
Investment Banking
• 1987: Comp. Financière de Suez, 
France. $4882, 1%. Finance 
Company
• 1987: Banque Indosuez, France. 
$627 million, 4%, Banking
• 1988: Banque Vernes. France,
$64 million, 100%, Banking
• 1988: Credit Commercial de 
France. France, $381 million, 1%, 
Banking
• 1988: ODDO. France, $40 
million, 10%, Brokerage
• 1989/90: Hambros. UK, $440, 
14%, Investment Banking
• 1989: Banque Française 
Commerciale, France, $22 million. 
100%, Banking
• 1990: Eorosic, France, 20.4%, 
Finance Company
• 1990: Abel Matutes, Banco de 
Ibiza, Spain, 40%, banking
• 1987: Hambros. UK. San 
Paolo Hambros. 60:40. 
investment fund JV£ 100 
million under management
• 1989: Banque Indosuez. 
France. Assurances Generale« 
de France. Uniphenix, 
30:40:30, real estate financing 
and credit
• 1990: Hambros, UK, Nicco. 
India; Hambros-Nicco 
Financial Services.
12.5:12.5 ¡75, Merchant 
banking services between 
Europe and India
•1986: Hambros, UK, mutual 
stakes, exchange of board 
members, general cooperation
• 1989: Caisse des Depots Sl des 
Consignations. France, provision 
of project finance for infrastructural 
work especially in Southern 
Europe
• member of Inter-Alpha group
• 1989: Spain, branch
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2 1 .
Monte dei
Paschi di
S i ena ,
I t a l y ,
$ 3 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Grindlays Bank. UK. $562 
million. 14 retail branch« in France
• 1989: Banqoe de Vizille of Lyon, 
France, 10.1%, Banking
• 1990: Bankhaus H. Aafhauser. 
Germany» 14% banking
• 1990: Sindibank, 24%, banking,
• 1989: Belgium, branch
2 2 .
Al gem e ne
Bank
Nederland
Nether l . ,
$ 3 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Alicon, Borsmaeglerskab, 
Denmark* 50%. Brokerage
• 1988: Dofour. France. 16%. 
Brokerage
• member of ABECO R • 1988, Luxembourg, branch
• 1988: Belgium, Antwerp, 
branch
• 1988: A BN  Financial 
Services, Ireland. Finance 
Company
• 1989: Portugal, branch
2 3 .  
Lloyds  
Bank,  
UK, $3.5 
b i l l i o n
• 1984: Schröder, Münchmeyer. 
Hengtt, Germany, 95%, private 
banking
• 1987: Finance Plus. France. 30%. 
Brokerage
• 1989: Portugal, Agency
24. Banco
Espanol
de
Credito,
Sp ai n ,
$ 3 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Banco Totta e Acoret, 
Portugal, 11% banking
• 1989: Lombardia &  Lacaci 
Securities. Italy, 30%, brokerage
25. Amro
Bank,
Nether l .
$ 3 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Matsonaud, France, $20 
million. 52%. Brokerage
• 1989: Generale Bank, Belgium, 
10%. Banking
• 1990: Frankfurter Kreditbank. 
Germany, $122 million, 100%, 
Banking
• 1990: C M  Capital Markets, Spain. 
20%. brokerage
• 1990: Banque Sudameris, France, 
banking
• 1989: CeteJem, France; Le 
Card, 60:40. Focus on private 
label credit cards. Le. those to 
which retailers can attach own 
logo and facilities
• 1990: Generale Bank. 
Belgium and Banque 
lndosuez. see there
• member of EB IC
26. Banca 
Commer­
c ia le  
Ital iana,  
I t a ly ,  
$ 3 . 4  
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Mercury International, UK, 
$680 million, 2.2%, Investment 
Banking
• 1989: Banque Paribas. France. 
$1063 million, 2%. Banking
• 1990: Banque Sudameris. France, 
100%, FF250 million. Banking
• member of EB IC • 1988: Germany, upgrade of 
rep. off. to branch
• Comit Sociedade de
1 avestime□ Los. Portugal, 
Finance Company
2 7 .
Is t i tuto
Mobil iare
Ita l i ano ,
I ta ly ,
$ 3 . 2
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Invesco M IM  
(Britannia Arrow), UK, IM I 
M IM  International Asset 
Management, pan-European 
investment managem. group, 
seeks investment from outside 
Europe
• 1989: Institute de Credito Oficial, 
Spain, collaboration in Italo- 
Spanish venture capital and mutual 
funds management
• 1989: Germany , branch
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28. TSB 
Group,  
UK, $3.1 
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Cariplo, Italy, tee 
there
• 1991: strategic alliance of 
merchant bank subsidiary Hill 
Samuel with Cariplo. Italy to 
cooperate in corporate finance
• 1987: Luxembourg, TSP  
Private Bank International,
29. West-
deutscbe
Landes-
bank ,
Germany,
$ 3 . 1
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Standard Chartered 
(European branches, except CH, D), 
Banking. E C U  500 million
• 1989: Standard Chartered, 
UK, Chartered WeetLB 
Holdings. 50:50, merchant 
bank resulting from merger 
between SC  merchant bank 
and WestLB corporate finance 
depcrtm.
• 1990: Standerd Chartered, 
UK; CW B Capital Partner*, to 
invest in European LB O i
• 1989: Standard Chartered, UK, 
preferred corresondents, SC B  can 
use former European branches, 
WestLB can use SC B 's  Far East 
network
• 1989: Italy. Milan, rep. off.
• 1989: Spain. Madrid, rep. off
30. NMB 
Postbank  
Group,  
Nethe r l . ,  
$ 2 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• member of Inter-Alpha group
31. DG
Ban k,
Germany,
$ 2 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1987: London &  Continental 
Bankers. UK. 78.6%. Banking.
• 1989: Philipp* de Gmaff. Netherl. 
75%. Brokerage
• 1989: JV with 24 regional 
cooperative banks in Spain to 
form Banco Cooperativo
• 1990: Istituto Nazionale di 
Credito Edilizio, Italy, the latter 
owns majority of Banca di Novara 
(largest coop, bank in Italy), D G  
Mortgage Bank can use its retail 
network to offer its own products
• 1990: D G  Finance. France, 
Banking
3 2 .
Bayriscbe
Hypo-
tbeken
bank ,
Germany,
$ 2 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Banca Trento e Bolzana, 
Italy, 15%, S65 million. Banking
• 1988: Richard Ellis Fin. Servives, 
UK, 25%, $9 million. Mortgage 
Financing
• 1989: Foreign & Colonial 
Management, UK. 50%. $8 million. 
Fund Management
• 1989: Banco Popular Espanol, 
Spain, 1.7%, 5711 million. 
Banking
• 1990: Banco Commercial 
Portuguec. Portugal. 3%, banking
• 1990: Interbanca. Italy. 41%. 
banking
• 1989: Banco Popular 
Español, Spain, to establish 
two joint companies. Europea 
Hypotecaria and Hipotecaria 
de Leasing using B P E ’s 
distribution network and 
Hypo's know-how
• 1989: Richard Ella, UK: 
Richard Ellis Financial 
Services. 25:75. to lead 
manage syndicates, underwrite 
¿finance transactions up to 
£25 million
• Banco Popular Español. Spain, 
exchange or board members.
• 1986: Bayernhypo Finance, 
Netherl. Finance Company.
• 1988: Hypo Property Fin. 
Capital Management. Ireland, 
Fund Management
• 1989: Hypo Property Fin. 
Capital Management, 
Luxembourg. Fund 
Management
3 3 .
Credito
Ita l ia no ,
I t a ly ,
$ 2 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Bank C1C Union 
Europeene AG. Germany. 35%, 
S53 million. Banking
• 1989: Compagnie Fiduciaire. 
France. 30%, Finance Company
4
• 1989: Commercial Union. UK, 
C U  can distribute its life and non- 
life insurance products through 
Credito Italiano's branch network
• 1990: Banco Portugués do 
Atlaatico, Portugal.
• 1988: Spain, branch
• 1989: Germany. Munich, rep. 
off.
3 4 .
Groupe de 
Banques  
Popu­
l a ir e s ,  
France,  
$ 2 . 6  
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Banque de Credit Liegois, 
Belgium, 51%. $11 million. 
Banking
• 1988: Banque Pop. 
Luxembourg
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3  5 .
Bayrische
V ere in s­
bank,
Germany,
2 . 5
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Rome and Milan branches 
of First National Bank of Chicago, 
banking
• 1989: Caisse Centrale des 
Banquet Populaires, France, 
Banque Internationale de 
Credit ft Gestion, 51:49, 
Private Banking in Monaco
• 1989: Credit Nationale, 
France, Crediop. Italy, 
Hambros bank. UK; Biro  
Synergies, 20:40:20:20, to 
provide finance for 
medium/large companies to 
finance expansion through 
acquisitions
• 1989: Credit Lyonnais, 
Banca Commercial* Italians 
and others ; International 
Moscow Bank
• 1990: Credit Fonder de 
France; CFF-BV Immobilten, 
34:64, specialises in French- 
German real estate transactions
• 1989: Gruppo Area Nordest,
Italy, mortgage business and cross- 
border M & A
• 1989: Credit Foncier de France, 
planned creation of JVs in real 
estate
• 1990: Banco de Sabadell, Spain, 
focus on financial operations and 
credit
• 1988: Italy, branch
• 1989: Greece, branch
3 6 .  Royal 
Bank of 
Scot land ,  
UK, S 2 .3  
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Credit du Nord, Belgium, 
50%
• 1988: CC-Bank, Germany. 50%,
• 1990: Banco de Commercio e 
lndustria, Portugal, 19.9%. £48.8 
million
• 1989: Banco Santander. 
Spain. RBS Gibraltar, 50:50, 
to provide offshore and 
expatriate services in Gibraltar.
• 1988: Banco Santander, Spain, 
general alliance (see chapter 6)
• member of Inter-Alpha group
37.
Generale
Bank,
Belg ium,
$ 2 . 1
b i l l i o n
• 1988: A M R O  Bank, Netherl. 
10%. banking
• 1989: Banco Totta e Acores, 
Portugal, banking
• 1990: Banque Paris ienne de 
Credit (BPC), France, banking
• 1990: Banque Indosuez, see 
there
• 199a La Cie de Suez. 
France; Banque Paris ienne de 
Credit; 45:55, to focus on the 
Northern French region
• 1987: Germany, branch
• 1988: UK, branch
38. Banco 
di Roma, 
I ta ly ,  
$ 2 . 1  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Cholet Dupont. France, 
brokerage
• 1990: SO VA C  (subs, of 
Lazard), France, Romacredit. 
51:49, initially distributes car 
loans.
• member of Europartners • 1989: Germany, upgrade of 
rep. off. into branch.
39. Banco 
Santander  
, Spain, $ 
2 . 0
b i l l i o n
• 1987: C C  Bank, Germany, 50%, 
S87 million, banking
• 1988: Credit du Nord, Belgium, 
50%, S31 million, banking
• 1988: RBS. UK. 10%, S2152 
million, banking
• 1989/90: Banco de Comercio e 
lndustria, Portugal. 29.9%, S70 
million, banking
• 1989: Landesgirokasse 
Stuttgart. Berliner Bank, 
Germany, B& S Visa card 
Services, 30:25:25, 
processing company replacing 
Banco Santander Visa card 
services, A D  A C  and regional 
banks offered 10% each
• 1988: Royal Bank of Scotland, 
UK. general alliance, see chapter 6
• 1988: Cariplo, Italy (see there)
40. CIC
Group,
France,
$ 1 . 9
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Banque Transatlantique. 
Belgium, 20%, FF 160 million, 
banking.
4 1 .
Bayrische
Landes­
bank,
Germany,
$ 1 . 9
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Credito Commercial«, Italy, 
5%, banking
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42. Bank 
o f
Ireland,
Ireland,
$ 1 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Bankamerica Finance, 
mortgage bank,
• 1988: E. Davy. Spain, 49«, 
brokerage
4 3 .
Banque
Indosuez ,
France,
$ 1 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1987: W X  Carr, U K . 100%, 
brokerage
• 1990: Ganmore Investment 
Management, UK. 100%. fund 
management,
• 1990: Kitext &  Aitkeo. UK, 
brokerage, 100%
• 1991: Bankhaus Marcard Stein, 
Germany, 100% Private Banking
• 1989: Mapfre, Spain; Mapfre 
Indotuez, to provide financial 
services through Mapfre's 
retail network, focus on small 
investors
• 1990: Generale Baak, 
Belgium. Amro Bank, Netheri. 
Société Generale de Belgique ; 
European Turkish Investment 
Bank, 40:25:25:10, merchant 
bank focusing on foreign 
investors
• 1987: Guiness Feat Aviation, 
Ireland, Aircraft Leasing Co.,
• 1988: SEF1S, Portugal, 
Finance Company
• 1989: Synerlease. Belgium, 
leasing
4 4 .
Crediop,
I ta ly ,
$ 1 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Crediop Finance, UK.
45. Caja 
de
Madrid,
S p a in ,
$ 1 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Groupe Eccreuil (see there)
46. Den
Danske
Bank, af
1 8 7 1 ,
Denmark,
$ 1 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Kreditanstalt Itlr 
Wiederaufbau. Germany, access to 
K fW 's government supported 
programmes
• 1988: Spain, branch
• 1988: UK, upgrade rep. off. 
in branch
• 1989: Germany. Hamburg, 
branch
47. Banco 
Hispano  
Ameri ­
c a n o ,  
Sp a in ,  
$ 1 . 6  
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Commerzbank, Germany. 
3%. banking
• 1988: Continental Bank, 
Belgium, banking. 75%
• 1990: F1D1S, Italy; Prime 
Hispano, fund and investment 
manage m. and merchant 
banking
0
• member of Europartnen
48. Nord­
deutsche  
Landes­
ban k,  
Germany,  
$ 1 . 5  
b i l l i o n
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49. Bank 
o f
Sco t land,  
UK, $1.5 
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Equity Bank, Ireland, 85%, 
£2.1 million
• 1990: Dorian Bank. Greece, 30%
• 1991: Quelle Bank. 
Germany, processing credit 
cards in Nuremberg
5 0 .
Standard 
Chartered 
UK, $1.5 
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Westdeutsche Landesbank. 
Germany (see there)
51. Credit 
Commer­
cial de 
France,  
France,  
$ 1 . 5  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Fotter &  Braithwaite, UK, 
Finance Company, 100%
• 1988: Irish Bank of Commerce, 
Ireland, 100%
• 1988: Laurence Prust, UK, 
Brokerage, 81%
• 1990: Fida Holding. Italy, 
Finance Company, 20%
• 1990: Framlington Holdings, UK, 
fund management. 25%. £18.75 
million
• 1987: Interfinanz, Germany, 
CCF Interfinanz, M & A
* 1988: National Home Loans, 
UK; to offer mortgage finance 
in France
• member of Inter-Alpha group
5 2 .
Krediet-
bank,
Be lg ium,
$ 1 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Bank van der Hoops offers, 
Netherl., banking 100%
• 1989: Bankverein Bremen, 
Germany, banking, 17%,
• 1989: Banque Joire, Pajot Martin. 
France, banking
• 1990: Berisford Leasing. Ireland. 
85%, £5.8 million
• member of Inter-Alpha group
53. SDS
Bank,
Denmark,
$ 1 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1985: London Interstate Bank, 
UK, 100% banking
54. Banca 
Populare 
di
Novara,
I ta ly ,
$ 1 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Banque de L ’union 
maritime et financière. France. 80%, 
banking.
• 1990: SFE Bank. UK. banking
55. BfG 
Bank,  
Germany,  
$ 1 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Hollandse Koopmansbank. 
NL. 50%, banking
• 1990: Banque Hervet, France, 
exchange of board members, coop, 
in commercial banking ¿capital 
market*. BfG can use Hervet'$ 
branch network to sell insurance 
products
• 1990: Banco Pastor. Spain, focus 
on cross-border services in 
commercial transactions and capital 
market operations
• 1987: UK,
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5 6 .
Landes­
kredi t­
bank
Baden-
Württem­
berg ,
Germany,
$ 1 . 2
b i l l i o n
57. Allied 
Irish  
Ban k,  
Ireland,  
$ 1 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 1990: U V W  Germany, 10% 
letting
• member of Into--Alpha group
58. Banco 
Amro-  
s i a n o  
V e n e to ,  
I t a l y ,  
$ 1 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Banco Espanol de Crediio, 
Spain, provision of reciprocal 
banking services including loans)
59. Bank 
Brusse ls  
Lambert,  
Belg iu m,  
$ 1 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 19S7: Credit Europeene. 
Luxembourg, 99%, banking,
• 1987: Banque Paribas, France, 
10%
• 1989: Banque Dreyfm, France, 
100%,
6 0 .
C o p e n ­
hagen
Handels ­
bank,
Denmark,
$ 1 . 2
b i l l i o n
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2. United States
1 .
Cit i corp ,
$ 7 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1983: Banco de Levante, Spain, 
banking, renamed Citibank España
• 1985: Banca Centro Slid, Italy, 
100% S i 30 million, banking, 
renamed Citibank Italia
• 1985: Banqoe Soficam, France, 
90%, FF200 million
• 1985: Basque Sod Beige 
Belgium, banking
• 1985: Seccombe, Marshall A  
Campion, UK, brokerage
• 1985: Diner's Club U K  franchise 
acquired from Nat West
• 1987: Compagnie Generate de 
Banque. France, banking
• 1986: Vickers Dacosta, UK, 
brokerage, merged with Citibank
2. Bank
America
Corp. ,
$ 5 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1986: divestment of Banca
d'America e d’ltalia to Deutsche 
Bank
• 1986: divestment of 20% holding 
in Lisban Leasing to Banco Bilbao
• 1987: divestment of Banc America 
Finance, U K  to Bank of Ireland
• 1987: divestment of Bankhaus 
Centrale Credit, Germany to Banco 
de Santander
• 1988: divestment of CC-Bank, 
Germany to RBS and Banco 
Santander.
• 1989: Interpayment Services, UK, 
traveller cheques
• 1991: divestment of Luxembourg 
branch to Royal Beige
3. J.P. 
Morgan,  
US, 4.7 
b i l l i o n
• 1987/90: Nivard-Florooy, France, 
100% brokerage, renamed Soc. de 
Bourse J.P.Morgan
4 .
Securi ty
Pac i f i c ,
3 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1984: W IFAG  Bank, Germany, 
banking
• 1984: Bankhaus Brohl &  Co.. 
Germany, banking
• 1985: Baumeister Kreditbank, 
Germany, banking
• 1986: Anglo Factoring Services, 
UK. factoring
• 1987: Hoare Govea. UK. 
brokerage. 100%
• 1991: divestment of Security 
Pacific Euro factors, Belgium to 
Credit Lyonnais
Bank Acquisitions Joint Ventures Cooperations New Entry
5. Chase 
Man­
hattan,  
$ 3 . 6  
b i l l i o n
• 1985: Banco de Fwanzas, Spain. 
91«. banking. E SP  6360 million, 
renamed Chase Manhattan. España
• 1985: German branch of 
Nederlandae Creditbank
• 1989: divestment of Le Chase 
Banque de Commerce to Credit 
Lyonnais
• 1991: divestment of Chase 
Espagne to Caixa Geral
• 1989: sale of Belgian subsidiary 
to Credit Lyonnais
6. Banc 
One
Corp., $3 
b i l l i o n
7. Mano-
factnrers
Hanover,
$ 2 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Manufacturers Hanover 
Nordiqoe, France, banking. 100%
• 1988: divestment of Luxembourg 
branch to Bankers Trust
• 1991: divestment of German 
branch to Caisse de Depots et 
Consignations
• 1988: Portugal change from 
branch to subsidiary
• 1989: France. Rais, branch
8 .
Chemical
Ban k,
$ 2 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1987: divestment of Italian branch 
to Banca della Provicia di Napoli
• 1988: divestment of Chemical 
Bank Home Loans Group, U K  to 
B N P
• 1988: divestment of Spanish 
branch to BancapiuJ
• 1989: divestment of Transbanque, 
France to LaFarge
3. Japan
•
1. Sumi­
to m o  
Ban k,  
1 5 . 7  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Ugresti, Italy; F IDA, fund 
management
♦
• 1988: Germany, subsidiary 
incorporated as GmbH
• 1988: France. Paris, upgrade 
of rep. off. to branch
2. D o ­
l c h i  
Kangyo  
Ban k,  
1 4 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: France, branch, 
corporate finance &  lending
• 1988: Germany, Munich, rep 
off
• 1989: Spain.
• 1989: Italy, upgrade of rep. 
off. to branch
• 1989: Germany, subsidiary 
incorporated as AG
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3. Fuji 
Bank,  
1 3 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Germany, Munich, rep. 
off.
• 1988: Italy, Milan, upgrade 
of rep. off. to branch
• 1989: Germany, Frankfurt, 
branch
• 1989: NetherL, Amsterdam, 
rep. off.
4. Sanwa 
Bank,  
1 3 . 4  
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Robert Fleming &  Co.. UK. 
private banking division only
• 1987: UK, Manchester, rep. 
off.
• 1988: France: upgrade of rep. 
off. to branch
• 1989: Germany, Munich, rep. 
off.
• 1989: subsidiary 
incorporated as AG
• 1991: Sanwa Businets 
Credit, U K
5. Mitsui 
Taiyo  
Kobe  
Bank,  
1 2 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Spain, branch
• 1988: Luxembourg, 
subsidiary
• 1989: Italy: rep. off.
6 .
Mitsub­
i s h i
Bank,
1 1 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Spain, branch
• 1988: UK, Birmingh. rep. 
off.
• 1988: Germany, DQsseldorf, 
branch
• 1989: Italy, Milan, upgrade 
rep. off. into branch
7 .
Industrial  
Bank of 
Japan,  
9 . 6
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Germany. DQsseldorf. 
branch
• 1988: Italy, Milan, rep. off.
• 1989: Spain. Madrid, 
upgrade of rep. off. to branch
8. Tokai 
Bank, 7.8 
b i l l i o n
* 1989: upgrade of rep. off. to 
branch
9. Long-
Term
Credit
Bank of
Japan,
7 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Marceau Ines tisse me o ls , 
France, 62%, Finance Company
• 1988: Foreign &  Colonial 
Asset Management, UK,
• 1989: Italy. Milan, rep. off.
• 1989: Spain, branch
10. Bank 
of Tokyo,  
6 . 9
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Touche Remnant Asset 
Management. 100%, fund 
management.
• 1984: Touche Remnant, U K
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4. Other European banks
1. UBS, 
Swltzer l .  
1 3 . 2  
b i l l i o n
• 1986/89: Basco di Roma per la 
Svizzera, 100%. banking
• 1989: Banca Internazionale, 
Lombarda, Italy, 20%, banking
• 1985: Deutsche L&nderbank. 
Germany, banking
2. Swiss 
Bank  
Corpo ­
ra t ion ,  
Sw ltzer l .  
9 . 0
b i l l i o n
• 1987/89: Banque Stern, France, 
100%, banking
• 1987: Ducale! Duval, France, 
brokerage,
• 1989: M f tA  Società. 70%, Italy, 
M ftA
• 1989: Baneato, Spain, 2%
3. Credit 
S u i s s e ,  
Sw ltzer l .  
billion
• 1984: Buckmaiter ft Moore, UK, 
brokerage.
• 1985: Gmadig Bask, Germany, 
banking.
• 1989: Spain , branch
4. Union 
Bank of 
Finland,  
b i l l i o n
5 .
Sven ska
Handels ­
ban ken ,
Sweden,
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Thestnip, 
Borsmaegterskelskap. Denmark, 
brokerage.
• 1989: UK, Manchester, rep. 
off.
• 1989: Germany, Frankfurt, 
branch
6. PK 
Bank en ,  
Sweden,  
b i l l i o n
• 1986: English Trust Group, UK, 
investment banking
• 1987: L ’ Omnium Banc aire et 
Commerciale, France. 20%
«
Sources: own compilation from several sources including telephone and personal interviews, press clippings, 
annual reports, EC Commission DG15, Faßbender and Leichtfuß (1990), EFIMA-database, Acquisitions 
Monthly, The Bankers’ Almanac.
Appendix 2:
Database of EC Insurance Acquisitions, 
Cooperative Agreements, Joint Ventures 
and De Novo Entry Activities for largest 
European insurers
The following ranking lists cross-border transactions for the largest European 
insurance companies. Insurance firms were listed by their market capitalisation 
in the year 1991, as published in the Financial Times supplement on the largest 
European companies on January 13, 1992.
For each firm, its acquisitions from 1986 to 1991 are listed. The second 
column lists the year of the transaction, the name of the acquisition target, 
followed by its country of operation and, where known, the percentage stake of 
the acquisition, the area of activity of the target firm and its premium size, 
revenues or capital.
The third column lists joint ventures (JV) between the firm and any EC 
firm. After the year of the agreement, the names of the participants of the JV are 
given, followed by a comment about the area of activity the JV falls into and its 
objectives pursued. The fourth column lists cooperative agreements between the 
firm and any EC firm and again gives the names of participants and objectives of 
the agreement. Finally, column five lists any kind of cross-border de novo entry 
of the firm in any EC country. It also lists the area and type of operation of the 
newly opened representative office, branch or subsidiary.
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1. EC Insurers
1. Allianz
H old in g ,
Germany,
$ 2 1 . 5
b i i l l o n
• 1986: Affiliated Legal Protection. 
U K, 79.9%,
• 1986: Corahill Insurance. UK. 
£305 million. 100%
• 1987: Riunione Adriatic« di 
Sicurita (RAS), Italy, 51 J % .  1,100 
million D M
• 1988: Basco Popular Eapaool, 
Spain, 5%
• 1989: Ercot de Seguros Jt 
Reaaaeguroc, Spain. 51%, purchaae 
price: PTA 3 billion
• 1989: Ergobank, Greece. 20%
• 1989: Compagnie de Navigation 
Mixte, France, 10%,
• 1989: Rhin A. M oadk. France, 
50%, together with Navigation 
Mixte, purchase price: FF6.53 
billion
• 1989: Via Assurances, France, 
50%, together with Navigation 
Mixte
• 1989: Banco Popular 
Espanol; Eurovida. Spain 
51:49, selling life insurance in 
Spain
• 1989: Banco Popular 
Espanol, Europensiones, 
49:51, pension fund 
management in Spain
• 1990: Compagnie de 
Navigation Mixte, France, 
Allianz/CNM Holding. 66:34.
• 1990: Ergobank, Greece, to 
offer life insurance products in 
Greece
•
2 .
General i ,
I t a l y ,
$ 1 1 . 9
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Northern Star Insurance, 
UK, 98%,
• 1989: laterpayment Services, UK, 
traveller cheques
• 1989: Compagnie du Mkli, 
France. 17%,
• 1989: Les Pairo os Reunis, 
Belgium, 70%.
• 1989: Union dea Assureun de 
Bruxelles. Belgium. 98%
• 1986: Credit Bank, Greece, 
General Life. 60:40, life 
insurance
• 1988: BNP, France, pension 
fund management in Spain
• 1989: Compagnie du Midi, 
strategic alliance
• 1990: Generali 
Krankenversicherung. 
Munichcapilal: D M 4  million
3 .
Prudential  
, U K ,  $ 
8 . 2
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Prudential Vita, Italy, 60%, • 1987: Benetton. Italy; 
Prudential Italy, 50:50
• 1989: Credit Agricole. France, 
cooperation on mortgage offerings 
in the U K
4 .
Compagni
e
Financier  
e de Suez, 
France,  
$ 7 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Societe Geaerale de 
Belgique. Belgium. 50.6%
• 1989: Baltica Holding. Denmark. 
23%. purchase price: D K R  4.2 
billion
• 1989: Colonia. Germany. 50.5%. 
total premia: DM3140 million 
(through holding in Victoire)
• 1989: Nieuw Rotterdam. Netherl.. 
maj. stake, capital: Hfl. 719 million, 
fifth-largest Dutch insurer
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5. U.A.P,  
France,  
$ 7 . 7  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Intenmerican. Greece, 40%,
• 1987: New Ireland Assurance, 
82%. chiffre d'affaires: FF1.5 
billion
• 1987: Royal Beige, Belgium, 
34.1%,
• 1988: merger of U A P  Portugal 
with Garantia to become sixth- 
largest insurer in Portugese market
• 1989: All secures, Italy. 90%. 
revenues of l i t  170 billion. 10% 
are held by Toro Ass.
• 1990: General Europea. Spain. 
73%. purchase price: FF40 million
• 1989)90: Sun Life Insurance. UK. 
27.6%,
• 1990: Vasco Navarra. Spain,
30%,
• 1991: together with Liberty Life 
(S. A )  acquires 39% of Sun Life 
and transfers shareholding to 
jointly owned Rockleigh Corp.
• 1991: Alianca Seguradora. 
Portugal, 45%
• 1989: Royal Beige, Garantie 
Beige Protection Juridique. 
Belgium. 20:80. legal 
protection insurance
• 1991: Sun Life. UK. Royal 
Beige. Betg.. B IL, Lux.; Pan 
Euro Life. 30:20:20:20. first 
pan-European life insurance 
company
• 1990: Banco Central, Spain, 
distribution alliance
6. GAN, 
France,  
$ 6 . 7  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Minster Insurance, UK, 
100%
• 1989: General Portfolio, UK, 
51%. purchase price: £119 million 
(already represented in U K  since 
1984 through acquisition of 
Minster Insurance)
• 1989: Societa Assicuratrice 
Industriale. Italy, 10%.
• 1990: Alianza Aseguradora, 
Spain, 98%,
• 1991: Uniseguros. Spain, 49%. 
purchase price: 530 million
7 .
Internat io
naie
Nederland 
e Group, 
Nether l .$  
6 . 0
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Medisure Marketing &  
Management, UK, 75%,
8. Axa, 
France, $ 
5 . 1
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Mare Nostrum, Spain,
• 1987: Equity and Life, UK, 100%
• 1987: Lloyd Europeen, Belgium, 
total premia. FB 900 million
• 1989: Ahorro Familiar, Spain.
• 1990: Assurlux, Luxembourg, 
100%,
• 1991: Assurlux. Lux., 100%,
• 1989: ICCR I, Italy. Casse di 
Risparmio de Italiane, Italy, 
30:31:39, Italian savings 
banks distribute Axa's 
products
9. Lloyds 
Abbe y  
Life, UK, 
$ 5.1 
b i l l i o n
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10. AGF,  
France, $ 
4 . 9
b i l l i o n
• 1985: SMrbnieck. Sadnwn. 62«  
and Krnnkeavets. , 55.5%, 
Germany.
• 1986: SofilMuiqiie, Belgium, 
25.1%
• 1986: Popular de Seguros 
(capital: FF134 million) and Fenix 
Peninsular capital: FF89 million), 
Spain. 100%
• 1986: Omnia, Spain. 100%
• 1987: City of Westminster 
Assurance. UK,
• 1987: Sentry, UK. 100%,
• 1987: Cosmos, Greece,
• 1988: Assubel Life Insurance, 
Belgium, 51%
• 1989: Alianza Seguradora, 
Portugal. 3.9%
• 1990: Mutual and General 
Insurance Ass. UK,
• 1990: Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 
purchase price: l i t  107 million 
(AG F  also holds 27% percent stake 
in Church and General, Irel.)
• 1990: Milano Assicurazione.
Italy,
• 1990: L ’Escaut de De Schelde, 
Belgium, maj. acqu., purchase 
price: Bfr. 9.4 million
• 1991: Aachener dt Muenchner, 
Germany. 25 percent, purchase 
price: D M  1 billion
• 1991: Irish Life. 5%
• 1989: Banco Atlantico, 
Spain; AGF Atlantico, 
personal and group pension 
schemes
• 1991: Istbank. Italy; 8 other 
Italian banks; CBA, 30:70, to 
offer life insurance products in 
Italy
• 1989: London, subsidiary to 
offer general damage coverage
11. Sun 
A l l i a n c e ,  
UK, 4.6 
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Fenix Latino. Spain,
• 1991: Royal Insurance Belgium, 
maj.acqu.
1 2 .
A l l ia n z
Leben,
Germany,
$ 4 . 6
b i l l i o n
1 3 .
General  
Acc ide nt ,  
UK, $4.0 
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Seven Provinces, Netherl.
• 1990: Assecura Holding. 
Luxembourg. 40%.
1 4 .
A l l e a n z a ,
I t a l y ,
$ 4 . 0
b i l l i o n
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1 5 .
Commerci  
al Union, 
UK, $3.8 
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Rawes ft Pinto Basto Lda., 
Portugal, 70%,
• 1990: Credito Italiano, Italy; 
Commercial Union Vita, 70:30
• 1990: Akros, Italy. 60:40
• 1989: Credito Italiano, Italy, 
distribution of C U ’s products 
through the Italian bank's branch 
network
• 1989: Commercial Union 
Assecurazioni. Italy, 
subsidiary
• 1989: Commercial Union 
Life. Greece,
16. Legal 
Sc
General ,  
UK, $3.5 
b i l l i o n
17. Royal 
Insurance 
, UK, 
$ 3 . 0  
b i l l i o n
• 1983: Velazquez. Spain. 99%
• 1989: Lloyd Italico, Italy. 90%.
• 1989: Systema Terra, Italy,
• see Aachener und Münchner • 1989: Royal Life. Spain
1 8 .
F o r t i s ,
Belg ium /
Netber l .
$ 2 . 9
b i l l i o n
Fortia group was created in 1990 as 
cross-border merger between 
Groope d'Assurances, Belgium and 
A M E V . Netherl.
1 9 .
Guardian
R oya l
Exchange
• UK,
$ 2 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Cidas, Italy. 51%.
• 1989: New PMPA, Spain,
• 1989: Polaris Vita. Italy, 49%.
• 1989: Sipea, Italy, 51%
• 1989: Istituto Bancario San 
Paolo di Torino. Italy; Polaris 
Vita, 49:51; Sipea, 51:49; 
Cidas. 51:49
• 1988: Guardian Vie, France 
life insurance
2 0 .
A e g o n ,
Netherl*
$ 2 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Union Levantina de 
Seguros. Spain.
• 1989: Aspis Pronia, Greece,
• 1987: Union Previsora, Spain. 
90%. revenues: Hfl.100 million
• 1991: Precam. Belgium, 
maj.acqu.. capital: Bfr. 2 billion
• 1991: Regency Life, UK. maj. 
acqu., capital: Hfl.: 118 million
2 1 .
Aachener
&
Muenchne
r
H o ld in g ,
Germany,
$ 2 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Groupement Francais 
d'assurances, France. 80%.
• 1990: GA1C, Italy,
• 1991: International Hellas. Greece, 
65%.
• 1991: strategic alliance with 
Royal Insurance, U K  and 
Fondiaria, Italy,
Firm Acquisitions Joint Ventures Cooperations New Entry
2 2 .
Fondiaria  
» Italy, 
$ 2 . 3  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Dominion Insurance, UK, 
50%,
• 1988: VoUcifttnorgt, Germany, 
25%,
• 1988/90: Aachener St Münchner. 
Germany, 26%,
• aee Aachener und Münchner
2 3 .  
W i l l i s  
Corroon,  
UK, $2.1 
b i l l i o n
2 4 .
Victoria
H o ld in g ,
Germany,
$ 2 . 0
b i l l i o n
25. RAS,  
I t a l y ,  
$ 2 . 0  
b i l l i o n
• acquired by Allianz, Germany (aee 
there)
26. Toro 
A ss ic u r . ,  
I t a l y ,  
$ 1 . 8  
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Le Continent, France. 
100%, total premia: FF1.65 billion
t
2 7 .
Roya le
B e i g e ,
Be lg iu m ,
$ 1 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1990: Gelderland, Netberl. 39%,
2 8 .
Sedgwick  
Group,  
UK, $1.7 
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Colonia. Germany, 
Nordatern. Germany, Colonia- 
Nordatern
Schade verzekering 10:54:36; 
marine insurance
• 1988: Sedgwick Financial 
Services. Sa. France
29. SAI,  
I t a ly ,  
$ 1 . 6  
b i l l i o n
• 1989: G A N  International. France, 
9% .
• 1990: Kairo« Segoros. Spain. 
10%,
• 1990: Friendi Provident, 
UK; Fineuras, Italy, 55:45,
3 0 .
Bal tica
Hold ing ,
Denmark,
( 1 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Colonia Victoire. France. 
7.6%,
• 1989: Compagnie de Suez, 
France, 3%
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3 1 .
Wuerttem
b erg is ch .
Versicher
ung ,
Germany»
$ 1 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Fraser ft Co. NL, Allg. 
Rcntenaostalt, Germany; 
Erasmus Leven, NL.,
60:10:30, to offer life 
insurance products in Netherl.
32. Sun 
Life
Corp. UK, 
1 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1991: Sun Life is majority-owned 
by Liberty Life (5.A.) and UAP, 
France
3 3 .
Mapfre,
S p a in ,
$ 1 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Progress Insurance. Italy. 
40%.
• 1988: Union Assicurazioni. Italy,
• 1989: O A R .  Belgium, 52.5%
• 1989: Etoile Commerciale, France. 
10%.
• 1989: Banque Indosuez, 
France: Mapfre Indosuez, to 
distribute financial products 
through retail network of 
Mapfre in Spun
• 1989: Gothaer Versichening, 
Germany, distribution alliance
34. Codan 
Group,  
Denmark,  
$ 1 . 1  
b i l l i o n
3 5 .
Britannic  
Assurance  
, UK,
$ 1 . 1
b i l l i o n
3 6 .
Deutsche
Beamtenv
ers .
Germany,  
$  1
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Ambrosiana Assicurazioni. 
Italy, 80%, purchase price: Lit 28 
billion.
3 7 .
A s s l t a l i a ,  
Italy, $1 
b i l l i o n
3 8 .
Aachener
u.
Muenchne  
r Leben, 
Germany,  
0 . 9
b i l l i o n
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3 9 .
Volksfuer
s o r g e ,
Germany,
0 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1990: G A IC , Italy.
• 1987: Uniti, Spain. 40«.
4 0 .
Hafnia
H old in g ,
Denmark,
$ 0 . 8
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Prolific Group. UK, 100%. 
purchase price: £90.6 million
2. Non-EC Insurers
1. Zurich 
Insurance  
S w i t z e r l . ,  
5 . 0
b i l l i o n
• 1987: Astorg Vie et Accident, 
France, minority holding
• 1987: Caudal Sa de Seguros y 
Reaseguros, Spain,
• 1986: Minerva, Italy. 65%, total 
premia: Lit.245 billion
• 1988: Union Iberamericana Ca de 
Seguros y Reaseguros, Spain,
50%. total premia: PTA.33 billion
• 1991: merger of Zorich 
International France (capital: FF350 
million) with Saltiel Assurances, 
France (capital: 708 million).
• Sydabank. Denmark, general 
alliance
2. Swiss
Reinsuran
c e ,
S w i t z e r l . ,
3 . 7
b i l l i o n
• 1989: Dansk Caution. Denmark.
• 1988: Lloyd Adriatico, Italy. 
53%,
• 1989: Rhin et Moselle, France. 
11%
• 1988: Società Italiana Cauzioni. 
Italy. 31%,
• 1988: Union Reinsurance Co.. 
UK, 85%,
3 .
Winterthu
r
Vers icher
u n g ,
Sw itzer l .
3 . 3
b i l l i o n
• 1988: Intercontinentale 
Assicurazioni. Italy, 100%, premia: 
UL463 billion
• 1987: Nordstern Versicherung. 
Germany, 37%.
• 1989: Transatlantische Allg. 
Versicherung and Tdecon 
Versicherung. Germany, total 
piemia of D M  200 million
• 1990: Wand AG. 74.9%, 
total premia: D M  65 million
*
4 .
Skandia
Forsakrin
g .
Sweden,
2 . 4
b i l l i o n
• 1986: Copenhagen Re. Denmark,
• 1989: National Insuranec 
¿Guarantee, U K , purchase price: 
£150 million
• 1989: Royal Chartered, Denmark, 
increase in stake from 53 %  to 
79%, purchase price: Dkr. 480 
million
Firm Acquisitions Joint Ventures Cooperations New Entry
5. Trygg-
Hansa
SPP
Ho ld in g ,
Sweden,
1 . 5
b i l l i o n
Sources: own compilation from Annual Reports; interviews with firm officials; newspaper clippings, EFIMA- 
database, EC Commission DG 15.
Appendix 3:
Questionnaire
for Study on
Cross-Border Entry in European Insurance
Address of Respondent:
Fiim-Name:
Address:
Name:
Unit:
Telephone:
Please return questionaire. if possible before 16 April 92. to: 
Tobias Hoschka 
Hohle Gasse 12 
D - 53 Bonn 2
1. The Impact of the Single European Financial Services Market
1.1. Th which insurance sectors do you expect intensified international 
competition in Europe after 1992?
Please assess the impact on a scale from 1-4: (1 — big impact, 2= sizeable impact, 3 = little 
change, 4 = no change)
1 2  3 4
Life
Property (fire, disaster)
Motor vehicles 
Health
Personal Liability 
Others:.......................
Further Comments:.....
1.2. In which market segments do you expect intensified international 
competition in Europe after 1992?
Please assess the impact on a scale from 1-4: (1 -  big impact, 2= sizeable impact, 3 = little 
change, 4 = no change)
1 2  3 4
Personal Customers 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Large Enterprises 
Multinationals
Others:.................................
Further Comments:...............
O O O Q
Q Q Q Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
o o o u
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
1.3.a) In which three EC markets do you expect the greatest impact o f the 
Single Market fo r financial services?
b) In which three countries is cross-border entry in insurance most likely?
Belgium
a)
□
b)
□
Denmark □ □
France □ □
Germany □ □
Greece □ □
Ireland □ □
Italy □ □
Luxembourg □ □
Netherlands □ □
Portugal □ □
Spain □ □
United Kingdom □ □
Further Comments:.................
1.4.In which three EC countries do you see the greatest market potential fo r  
your firm, concerning possible or actual international expansion?
4
1....................................................................
2......................................................
3......................................................
3
1.5. Why do you consider these three countries to be most interesting for your 
firm?
country: 1..................... 2 .................... 3..................
relatively untouched by foreign insurers □ □ □
significant market potential □ □ □
competitive advantage compared to
domestic insurers □ □ □
high margins □ □ □
important for domestic customers Q| □ □
□ □ □
□ □ □
Further Comments:
1.6. The Second and proposed Third Insurance Directives introduce the so- 
called "single passport" in insurance: a firm which is licensed in one EC 
country can open branches in all other EC countries without requiring an 
additional licence. In addition, foreign branches are regulated under the home 
country principle. Which consequences does this regulatory change have in 
your opinion?
b) Do you take the *single insurance passport* into account in your strategic 
planning o f European activities?
yes no
____________________________________ a  a _____________________________
4
If yes, how did you incorporate it into your strategy?
2. Foreign Insurers in your Domestic Market
2.1 Jn which insurance sectors and market segments do you consider foreign
insurers to be competitors?
(Foreign insurers are: l=Strong competitors, 2=signficant competitors, 3=moderate
competitors, 4=no significant foreign competitors
INSURANCE SECTORS:
1 2  3 4
Life Q Q Q O
Property (fire, disaster) Q Q Q Q
Motor vehicles O O O Q
Health O O O O
Personal Liability O O O Q
Others:............................................ O O O Q
MARKET SEGMENTS:
Personal Customers O O O Q
Small and Medium Enterprises p p p p
5
Large Enterprises O O O Q
Multinationals O O O Q
Others:...............  ..................................  Q Q Q O
Comments:.
2.2. Do you know o f examples where foreign insurers have introduced new or 
modified products in the domestic market or have offered particular services at
a significantly lower price than domestic competitors?
yes no
□  □
If yes, which insurer and which products? 
firm product/comment
2.3. Which strategy do foreign insurers mainly follow in your home market ?
aggressive price strategy
m
innovative strategy □adjusting to established domestic strategies 
further comments:............................
6
1.4. Do you expect an increase Tit cross-border entry activities in your 
domestic market after 1992?
Yes No
□  J
I f  yes, in which sectors and segments in particular?
(foreign entry is: l=very likely, 2=likely, 3=not very likely, 4-unlikety)
INSURANCE SECTORS:
1 2  3 4
Life O O O Q
Property (fire, disaster) O O O Q
Motor vehicles Q (  > (  > r ~ )
Health Q Q Q O
Personal Liability O O O Q
Others:................................................ O O O Q
MARKET SEGMENTS:
Personal Customers Q Q Q Q
Small and Medium Enterprises O O O Q
Large Enterprises Q Q Q Q
Multinationals O O O Q
Others:................................................. O Q O Q
Comments:........................................
2.5. Does increased foreign entry in your opinion lead to downward pressure 
on domestic prices, as the level o f competition increases?
yes no
□  □
Further Comments:
7
3. Current EC Activities of your Firm
3.1. In which segments and countries are the main activities o f your cross- 
border EC insurance activities (for example:Spain/Personal Customers/Life 
Insurance)?
Countries: Market segments/insurance Sectors:
Further Comments:.
3.2 In which EC countries did you first enter?
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
Country: ...................  Year of entry: .................. Form of Entry:
8
3.3.Is there a unified "European" strategy which your firm follows in all EC 
countries where it is present?
Yes No
□  □
Comments:.....................................................................................................................
3.4 What strategy do you pursue to make your firm attractive for customers 
who currently maintain a business relation with competition in the foreign EC 
countries in which you are active? How do you attempt to overcome switching 
costs associated with changing an established insurance relationship?
3.5. What does your firm offer which other indigenous firms in the foreign EC 
countries in which you are present do not offer in the same way or at the same 
conditions?
9
3.6.Do you know of examples where your firm has introduced new or modified 
products or services in the foreign EC countries in which you are present or 
has offered particular services at a significantly lower price than competitors?
yes no
□  J
if yes, which country/ies and which products/services?
3.7.Does your firm offer products/services at a lower price than competitors in 
the host country?
yes no
□  □
If yes, please give an example, if no, please explain why not:....................
3.8 a) Do you see synergy effects from operating Europe-wide?
yes no
□  □
b) If yes, please explain in which areas you attempt to exploit synergy effects 
between different international operating units? If no, please explain why not.
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c) Do you see scale or scope economies from operating Europe-wide?
yes no
□  J
d) If yes, in which areas and segments?................................................
3 .9 .a) Are there products/services which are distributed across several 
European countries in which you operate?
yes no
□  □
if yes, which:
b) Is there cooperation in technological areas between the EC subsidiaries/ 
branches? *
yes no
□  □
yes, in which areas?
urther Comments:
11
4. Concepts of Cross-Border Entry Activities
14. 1.  Where do you see the main barriers for cross-border penetration in 
insurance in other EC countries?
Please assess the significance of the listed barriers on a scale from 1-4: (1 = very important, 2 -  
important, 3 = not so important, 4 = unimportant)
1 2  3 4
regulatory barriers O O O Q
lack of intimate knowledge of foreign market O O O Q
lack of right distribution channels O O O Q
lack of suitable acquisition targets in foreign market O O O Q
lack of a level playing field for cross-border takeovers in tbe EC O O O Q
difficulty to acquire customers in foreign market O O O Q
difficulty to establish a reputation in the foreign market Q Q Q O
competitive disadvantage compared to local firms
in tbe foreign host market due to smaller scale of operation O O O Q
lack of a level playing field for cross-border takeovers in the EC 
collusive behaviour of local fiims in the foreign market
O O O Q
aimed at hindering foreign entry O O O Q
Q O Q Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
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4.2. Where do you see the main disadvantages o f foreign insurers during the 
first phase o f entering a market?
Please assess the significance on a scale from 1-4: (1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = not 
so important, 4 -  unimportant)
insufficient infrastructure (branches etc) 
acceptance by customers 
being "foreign"
difficulty of establishing a reputation 
lack of know-how of local market
1 2  3 4
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
( > Q Q (  )
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
Further Comments:
13
4.3. In order to analyse possible competitive advantages o f foreign insurers, a 
range o f factors is now listed which may convey firm-level or locational 
advantages on a foreign insurer. Please assess the importance o f each o f the 
following factors for the foreign EC activities of your firm:
Please answer according to the following scale: 1= very important, 2 -  important, 3= not so 
important, 4= unimportant
a) firm-level advantages: 1 2 3 4
"Follow the Customer": established 
customer base in home country which 
expands into host country
r
Positioning in host country, which will 
gain in importance for domestic C
customers
c :
c :
Qualified personnel, which has special 
know-how transferable to host country
Learning economies which can be 
transferred to foreign markets
Established reputation in particular 
markets
Network effects resulting in 
informational advantages from wide 
international presence
Others: .........................................
Others:
r
r
r
r
r
r
j
Further Comments:
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b) locational advantages:
Please answer according to the following scale: 1= very important, 2 -  important, 3= not so 
important, 4= unimportant
1 2  3 4
Lower Funding costs in the home 
country which permit to offer better 
conditions in the host country O Q Q o
Host country as source of lower funding 
costs Q Q Q o
Tax factors which lead to advantages in 
the host country or which can be 
transferred to home country Q Q Q o
Presence in the currency of the host 
country O O O o
Foreign regulatory factors which make a 
presence in the host country attractive for 
other markets (such as in offshore 
markets)
Q Q O Q
Domestic regulatory factors which 
convey a competitive advantage on the 
firm in the host country (esp. under new 
home country rule)
O O O O
Lower efficiency of the financial services 
system in the host market Q Q o O
High margins in host country which 
make entry profitable Q Q o O
Less competition in the host country 
leading to higher margins O Q o o
Diversification advantages resulting from 
operations in several geographic markets
* O O o o
Others ..........................................
Q Q Q o
Further Comments......................................
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5. Choice of Entry into the Foreign Market
5.1 What kind o f cross-border entry have you pursued in the EC (if not already
answered in question 3.2 above)?
Where, when and with whom?
^ ¿ D e  novo entry
^■^Majority acquisition
Strategic alliance
^■Jijoint Venture
^¡^Exporting (cross-border provision of
services from home country)
n i J  n thpf
16
5.2 Do you think it is possible to successfully enter the personal customer 
market through de novo entry or exporting?
Exporting:
Further Comments:
5.3 a) Are strategic alliances for you an alternative to acquisitions to enter a 
foreign market?
b) Which factors influence the decision between majority acquisition and 
alliance?
c)Where do you see disadvantages of such alliances?
Please assess the degree of the disadvantages on a scale from 1-4 (1= significant disadvantage, 
2= disadvantage, 3= not a significant disadvantage, 4 - no disadvantage at all):
yes no
De novo entry:
yes no
1 2 3 4♦
degree of profit potential
differences of corporate culture
differences in management attitudes
differences of corporate identity
Others:
coordination of strategic planning
Others:
17
Further Comments:
5.4 a)In which areas do you see opportunities for cross-border joint ventures?
research & development □
offering of common services/products □
marketing □
distribution □
Others: ....................................  Q i
Others: ....................................  Q i
Further Comments:.......................................................................................................
b) In which areas do you see disadvantages of Joint Ventures?
Please assess the degree of the disadvantages on a scale from 1-4 (1= significant disadvantage, 
2- disadvantage, 3= not a significant disadvantage, 4- no disadvantage at all):
1 2  3 4
degree of profit potential O O O Q
differences of corporate culture Q Q Q Q
differences of corporate identity O O O Q
differences in management attitudes O O O Q
coordination of strategic planning 
Others: ............ .............................  O O O Q
Others: .............. ........................... Q Q Q Q
Further Comments:.......................................................................................................
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S.S.Do you plan any (further) cross-bonier entry activities in the future?
yes no
□  □
i f  yes, in which countries and segments (e.g. life insurance/personal 
customers/Spain ) ?
Country: Segment:
Further Comments:
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
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Appendix 4:
Questionnaire
for Study on
Cross-Border Entry in European Banking
Address of Respondent:
Bank-Name:
Address:
Name:
Unit
Telephone:
Please return questionaire. if possible before 25 March 92. to; 
Tobias Hoschka 
Hohle Gasse 12
D - 53 Bonn 2 ____________________________
1. The Impact of the Single European Financial Services Market
1.1. In which segments do you expect intensified international competition in 
Europe after 1992?
Please assess àie impact on a scale from 1-4: (1 = big impact, 2= sizeable impact, 3 = little 
change, 4 = no change)
Investment Banking 
Retail Banking
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Large Enterprises 
Multinationals
Others:...................................
O O O Q
o o o o
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
o o o a
Further Comments:
1.2.a) In which three EC markets do you expect the greatest impact o f the 
Single Market for financial services?
b) In which three countries is cross-border enry most likely?
Belgium
a)
□
b)
□
Denmark □ □
France □ □
Germany 'J □
Greece Ql □
Ireland J □
Italy □ □
Luxembourg □ □
cont'd Page 2
Netherlands □ □
Portugal □ □
Spain □ □
United Kingdom □ □
Further Comments:...................
1.3./« which three EC countries do you see the greatest market potential for  
your bank concerning possible or actual international expansion?
1...................................................................
2 ......................................................
1.4. Why do you consider these three countries to be most interesting for your 
firm?
country: 1.
relatively untouched by foreign banks 
significant market potential
competitive advantage compared to 
domestic banks 
high margins
important for domestic customers
□ □ □□ □ □
□ □ □□ □ □□ □ □□ □ □□ □ □
Further Comments:
1.5.The Second EC Banking Directive introduces the so-called '’banking 
passport" on 1 January 1993: a bank which is licensed in one EC country can 
open branches in all other EC countries without requiring an additional licence. 
In addition, foreign branches are regulated under the home country principle. 
Which consequences, i f  any, does this bank passport have in your opinion?
b) Do you take the banking passport into account in your strategic planning of 
European activities?
yes no
□  □
I f  yes, how did you incorporate it into your strategy?
2. Foreign Banks in your Domestic Market
2.1.In which segments do you consider foreign banks to be competitors?
□Investment Banking 
Retail Banking
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Large Enterprises 
Multinationals
Others:..................................
Comments:.........................
Q j
□
□
□
□
2.2. Do you know o f examples where foreign firms have introduced new or 
modified products in the domestic market or have offered particular services at
a significantly lower price than domestic competition?
yes no
□  Ql
If yes, which bank and which products? 
bank product
3.Which strategy do foreign banks mainly follow in your home market ?
■ ■ □  aggressive price strategy 
innovative strategy
adjusting to established domestic strategies Q i
others:
2.4. Do you expect an increase in cross-border entry activities in your 
domestic market after 1992?
Yes No
□  □
I f  yes, in which segments in particular?
Investment Banking □
Private Retail Banking
Small and Medium Enterprises □
Large Enterprises Q i
Multinationals
Others:.............  .....................................  □
Further comments:..........................................................................................................
2.5. Does increased foreign entry in your opinion lead to downward pressure 
on domestic prices, as the level o f competition increases?
yes no
□  □
Further Comments:
3. Current EC Activities of your Bank
3.1. In which segments and countries are the main activities o f your EC 
branches and subsidiaries (e.g. Spain, Personal Customers)?
Countries: Market segments:
Further Comments:
3.2.a) Since when has your bank operated in other European countries?
19.......
b) In which EC countries did you first enter?
Country: ........................................... Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
Country: ................................. ......... Year of entry:
Country: ........................................... Year of entry:
Country: ..........................................  Year of entry:
3.3.Is there a unified "European" strategy which your bank follows in all EC 
countries where it is present?
Yes No
□  □
Comments:...........................................................................................................................
3.4 What strategy do you pursue to make your bank attractive fo r customers 
who currently maintain a business relation with competitiors in the foreign EC 
countries in which you are active? How do you attempt to overcome switching 
costs associated with changing an established banking relationship?
3.5. What does your bank offer which other indigenous banks in the foreign EC 
countries in which you are present do not offer in the same way or at the same 
conditions?
3 you know o f examples where your bank has introduced new or
modified products or services in the foreign EC countries in which you are 
present or has offered particular services at a significantly lower price than 
competitors?
yes no
a  a
if  yes, which country ties and which products/services?
3.7.Does your bank offer products/services at a lower price than competitors in 
the host country?
yes no
□  □
I f  yes, please give an example, if no, please explain why not: .....................
3.8 a) Do you see synergy effects from operating Europe-wide?
yes no
□  □
b) I f  yes, please explain in which areas you attempt to exploit synergy effects 
between different international operating units? I f  no, please explain why not.
c) Do you see scale or scope economies from operating Europe-wide?
yes no
□  □
d) I f  yes, in which areas and segments?..................................................
3.9.0) Are there products/services which are distributed across several 
European countries in which you operate?
yes no
□  □
if yes, which:
b) Is there cooperation in technological areas between the EC subsidiaries/ 
branches?
yes no
□  □
yes, in which areas?
Further Comments:
4. Concepts of Cross-Border Entry Activities
4. 1.  Where do you see the main barriers for cross-border penetration in 
insurance in other EC countries?
Please assess the significance of the listed barriers on a scale from 1-4: (7 = very important, 2 = 
important, 3 = not so important 4 = unimportant)
1 2  3 4
regulatory barriers Q Q Q Q
lack of intímate knowledge of foreign maiket Q Q Q Q
lade of right distribution channels Q Q Q Q
lack of suitable acquisition targets in foreign market Q (  >Q( )
lack of a level playing field for cross-border takeovers in the EC Q Q Q Q
difficulty to acquire customers in foreign market Q Q Q Q
difficulty to establish a reputation in the foreign market Q Q Q Q
competitive disadvantage compared to local firms
in the foreign host market due to smaller scale of operation Q Q Q Q
lack of a level playing field for cross-border takeovers in the EC 
collusive behaviour of local firms in the foreign market
O O O Q
aimed at hindering foreign entry O O O Q
O O O Q
o o o a
O O O Q
4.2. Where do you see the main disadvantages of foreign banks during the first 
phase of entering a market?
Please assess the significance on a scale from 1-4: (1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = not 
so important, 4 = unimportant)
insufficient infrastructure (branches etc) 
acceptance by customers 
being "foreign"
difficulty of establishing a reputation 
lack of know-how of local market
O O O Q
O O O Q
Q Q Q O
O O O Q
O O O Q
Q Q Q Q
O O O Q
Q O Q O
Further Comments:
4.3. In order to analyse possible competitive advantages o f foreign banks, a 
range o f factors is now listed which may convey firm-level or locational 
advantages on a foreign bank. Please assess the importance o f each o f the 
following factors for the foreign EC activities o f your firm :
Please answer according to the fallowing scale: 1= very important, 2= important, 5= not so 
important, 4= unimportant
a) firm-level advantages: 1 2 3 4
"Follow the Customer": established 
customer base in home country which 
expands into host country
Positioning in host country, which will 
gain in importance for domestic 
customers
Qualified personnel, which has special 
know-how transferable to host country
Learning economies which can be 
transferred to foreign markets
Established reputation in particular 
markets
Network effects resulting in 
informational advantages from wide 
international presence
Others: .........................................
Others:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
c
c
c
c.
c
c_
c
c :
J
Further Comments:
b) locational advantages:
Please answer according to die following scale: 1= very important, 2 - important, 3 -  not so 
important, 4= unimportant
1 2  3 4
Lower Funding costs in the home
country which permit to offer better ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
conditions in the host country
Host country as source of lower funding 
costs O O O o
Tax factors which lead to advantages in 
the host country or which can be 
transferred to home country Q O O o
Presence in the currency of the host 
country O Q o o
Foreign regulatory factors which make a 
presence in the host country attractive for 
other markets (such as in offshore 
markets)
Q Q o o
Domestic regulatory factors which 
convey a competitive advantage on the 
firm in the host country (esp. under new 
home country rule)
O Q o o
Lower efficiency of the financial services 
system in the host market Q Q o o
High margins in host country which 
make entry profitable O O o o
Less competition in the host country 
leading to higher margins Q Q Q Q
Diversification advantages resulting from 
operations in several geographic markets O Q O o
Others ..........................................
Q Q o o
Further Comments.......................................
1 A
5. Choice of Entry into the Foreign Market
5.1 What kind o f cross-border entry have you pursued in the EC (if not already
answered in question 3 2 above)?
Where, when and with whom?
Q ^ D e  novo entry
^¿M ajority acquisition
□ s tra te g ic  alliance
Q ijo in t Venture
QiExporting (cross-border provision of
services from home country)
5 .i Do you think it is possible to successfully enter the personal customer 
market through de novo entry or exporting?
De novo entry:
Exporting:
Further Comments:
yes no
□  □
yes no
□  □
5.3 a) Are strategic alliances for you an alternative to acquisitions to enter a 
foreign market?
yes no
□  J
b) Which factors influence the decision between majority acquisition and 
alliance?
c)Where do you see disadvantages o f such alliances?
Please assess the degree of the disadvantages on a scale from 1-4(1= significant disadvantage, 
2= disadvantage, 3= not a significant disadvantage, 4= no disadvantage at all):
degree of profit potential 
differences of corporate culture 
differences of corporate identity 
differences in management attitudes 
coordination of strategic planning 
Others: .....................................
O O O Q
O O O Q
Q Q Q Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
O O O Q
Further Comments:
5.4 a)In which areas do you see opportunities for cross-border joint ventures?
□research & development
offering of common services/products
marketing
distribution
Others: ....................................
Others: ..............
Further Comments:
□
□
□□
□
b) In which areas do you see disadvantages of Joint Ventures?
Please assess the degree of the disadvantages on a scale from 1-4(1= significant disadvantage, 
2= disadvantage, 3= not a significant disadvantage, 4= no disadvantage at all):
1 2  3 4
degree of profit potential 
differences of corporate culture 
differences of corporate identity 
differences in management attitudes 
coordination of strategic planning 
Others: ....................................
Others: ..............
Further Comments:
O O O Q  
O O O Q  
O O O Q  
Q Q Q Q  
O O O Q  
Q O Q  Q
o o o a
S.S.Do you pian any (further) cross-border entry activities in the future?
yes no
□  □
i f  yes, in which countries and segments (e.g. retail banking/personal 
customers/Spain ) ?
Country: Segment:
Further Comments:
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Bibliography
Adolf, R., Cramer, ]. and Ollmann, M. (1991), 'Banking mergers: a realistic assessment of 
synergy effects', Die Bank, 1/91,4-9
Aerthoj, O. (1990), The European insurance industry and the impact competition from banks 
will exert on if, in: D. Fair and C. de Boissieu (eds.), Financial Institutions in Europe 
Under New Competitive Conditions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Albert, M. (1987), How to ensure the security of reinsurance in spite of economic and social 
insecurity', Quarterly Letter of NRG (May), p.5-13
Akerlof, G. (1970), The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism'. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1962), 'Competition, monopoly, and the pursuit of pecuniary 
gain', in: Aspects of Labor Economics, Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972), Traduction, information costs and economic organisation', 
American Economic Review, 62, 777-95
Alexander, J. and Greeve, G. (1991), 'State-owned banks in France', The Banker, February, 8-10
Aliber, R. (1976), Toward a theory of international banking', Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, Economic Reoiew, Spring issue, 5-8
Aliber, R. (1984), 'International banking7, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16, 661-678
Areeda, P. and Turner, D. (1975), Tredatory pricing and related practices under section 2 of the 
Sherman Acf, Harvard Law Review, 88, 697-733
Arrow, K. (1962a), The economic implications of learning by doing’, Review of Economic 
Studies, 29, 153-173
Arrow, K. (1962b), 'Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inventions', in: R. 
Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press
Arrow, K. and Debreu, G. (1954), 'Existence of equilibrium for a competitive economy', 
Econometrica, 22, 265-90
Artis, M. (1988), 'Exchange controls and the EMS', European Economy, 36,163-181
Association of Dutch Insurers (1991), Annual Report 1990
Atrus, P. (1990), 'Comment on de Boissieu: The French banking system in the light of European 
financial integration', in: J. Dermine, (ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell
Athanasios, G., Subhash, C. and Miller, S. (1990), 'Returns to scale and input substitution for 
large U.S. Banks', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 22, 94-107
Aumann, R. (1959), 'Acceptable points in general cooperative n-persons games', in: A. Tucker 
and R. Luce (eds.), Contributions to the theory of games, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press
Ausubel, L. (1991), The failure of competition in the credit card market', American Economic 
Review, 81, 50-81
Baer, H. and Scheld, K. (1986), 'Interstate banking and intrastate branching: summing up' in: 
Toward Nationwide Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Bagehot, W. (1873), Lombard Street, reprinted in 1962 by Richard D. Irwin, Illinois: 
Homewood
Bailey, E. and Friedlaender, A. (1982), 'Market structure and multiproduct industries', Journal 
of Economic Literature, 20, 1024-1048
Bain, J. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Balakrishnan, S. and Koza, M. (1989), Organisation costs and a theory of joint ventures, 
Working Paper, INSEAD
Baltensperger, E. (1980), 'Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm', Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 6,1-37
Baltensperger, E. and Dermine, J. (1987), 'Banking deregulation in Europe', Economic Policy, 4, 
64-109
Baltensperger, E. and Dermine, J. (1990), 'European Banking: prudential and regulatory issues', 
in: European Banking in the 1990's, J. Dermine (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Bank for International Settlements (1987), Committee on banking regulations and supervisory 
practise, Proposals for international convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards, December
Bank of England (1977), A Guide to United Kingdom exchange control, London: Bank of England, 
H.M. Stationary Publications
Bank of England (1981), The effects of exchange control abolition on capital flows'. Quarterly 
Bulletin of the Bank of England, September
Banking Advisory Committee of the EC (1988), Report of the Chairman, 1985-1988, DG15, 
Commission of the EC, *
Banking Advisory Committee of the Commission of the EC (1991), Opinion on an EC Directive 
on Deposit Protection Schemes for Credit Institutions, mimeo, DG15, Commission of the 
EC
Bakker, T. (1991), 'Dutch banking: into the fast lane', The Banker, February
Baumol, W. (1977), 'On the proper cost tests for natural monopoly in a multiproduct industry7, 
American Economic Review, 67, 809-22
Baumol, W., Panzar, J. and Willig, R. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Bebear, C  (1990), The AXA Group strategy7, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 15, 359-363
Benston, G. (1965), 'Branch banking and economies of scale', Journal of Finance, 20,312-331
Benston, G., Hanweck, G. and Humphrey, D. (1982), 'Scale economies in banking: a restructuring 
and reassessment7, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 14, 435-456
Bell, F. and Murphy, N. (1968), 'Economies of scale and division of labour in commercial 
banking' Southern Economic Journal, October
Berger A., Hanweck, G. and Humphrey D. (1987), 'Competitive viability in banking: scale, 
scope and product mix economies', Journal of Monetary Economics, 20,501-520
Berger, A. and Hannan, T. (1989), The price-concentration relationship in banking'. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 71, 291-99
Berger, A. and Humphrey. D. (1991), 'Measurement and efficiency issues in banking', in: Output 
Measurement in the Services Sector, NBER, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Berghe, L. van den, (1990), '(De) regulation of insurance markets', in: Henri Louberge (ed.), 
Risk, Information and Insurance, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modem Corporation and Private Property, New York: 
Commerce Gearing House
Berlin, M., Saunders, A. and Udell, G. (1991), Deposit insurance reform: what are the issues 
and what needs to be fixed?', Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 735-752
Bemanke, B. (1983), 'Non-monetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the 
Great Depression', American Economic Review, 73, 257-276
Bemheim, D. and Whinston, M. (1990), 'Multimarket contact and collusive behaviour', Rand 
Journal of Economics, 21,1-26
Bester, H. (1985), 'Screening versus rationing in credit markets with imperfect information', 
American Economic Review, 75, 850-55
Bester, H. (1987), The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information', 
European Economic Review, 31, 887-99
Black, F. (1986), Tresidential address to the American Finance Association', Journal of 
Finance, 529-543
Blinder, A. (1991), 'Why are prices sticky? Preliminary results from an interview study', 
American Economic Review, May, 89-96
Bresnahan, T. and Salop, S. (1986), 'Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint 
ventures', International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 4, 155-175
Brimmer, A. and Dahl, F. (1975), 'Growth of American international banking: implications for 
public policy', Journal of Finance, 30, 341-63
British Bank Association (1988), Comment on the Second EC Banking Directive, London: 
British Banking Association
Brittan, Sir Leon (1991), 'financial Services and Financial Markets: a European Perspective', 
Speech held on 14 January 1991 before the American Chamber of Commerce, New York, 
mimeo, DG15, Commission of the EC
Broecker, T. (1990), 'Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition', Econometrica, 58, 429- 
52
Bruni, F. (1990), 'Banking and financial reregulation towards 1992: the Italian case', in: J. 
Dermine, (ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Bryan, L. (1990), The role of banking in society7, McKinsey Quarterly, 26, No.3,113-126
Bryan, L. and Allen, P. (1988), The changing world of banking: geographic strategies for the 
1990s', McKinsey Quarterly, 52-71
Boissieu, C. de (1990), Tlecent developments in the French financial system: an overview', in:
C. de Boissieu, Banking in France, London: Routledge
Boissieu, C. de (1990b), The French banking system in the light of European financial 
integration', in: ). Dermine, (ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell
Bolton, P. (1990), 'Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design', European Economic 
Review, 34, 303-310
Boriano, G. (1987), 'Location choice, product proliferation and entry deterrence', Review of 
Economic Studies, 54, 37-46
Bordo, M. (1986), ^Financial crises, banking crises, stock market crashes and the money supply: 
some international evidence, 1870-1933, in: F. Capie and G. Wood (eds.), Financial Crises 
and the World Banking System, London: MacMillan
Burgess, D. (1990), 'Services as intermediate goods: the issues of trade liberlisation', in: R. Jones 
and A. Krueger (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwells
Caminal, R., Guai, J. and Vives, X. (1990), 'Competition in Spanish banking', in: J. Dermine, 
(ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Capie, F. and Wood, G. (1990), 'Banking structure and banking stability after 1992', in: D. Fair 
and C. de Boissieu (eds.), Financial Institutions in Europe Under New Competitive 
Conditions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Casson, M. (1990), 'Evolution of multinational banking: a theoretical perspective', in: Banks as 
Multinationals, G. Owen (ed.), London: Routledge
Caves, R. (1982), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press *
Caves, R. (1989), 'Mergers, takeovers and economic efficiency', International Journal of 
Industrial Organisation, 7, 151-174
Chamberlin, E. (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press
Chandler, A. (1962), Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Chandler, A. (1982), The M-form: industrial groups, American style', European Economic 
Review, 19, 3-23
Clark, }. (1988), 'Economies of scale and scope at depository financial institutions: a review of 
the literature', Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 73,16-33
Coase, R. (1937), The nature of the firm', Economica, 4,386-405
Commission of the EC (1991), Twentieth Annual Report on Competition Policy, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
Commons, J. (1934), Institutional Economics, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
Chong, B. (1991), The effects of interstate banking on commercial banks' risk and 
profitability', Review of Economics and Statistics, 78-84
Cowling, K. et al. (1980), Mergers and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Cummins, ]. (1991), 'Statistical and financial models of insurance pricing and the insurance 
firm', Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58, 261-302
Darby, M. and Kamy, E. (1973), Tree competition and the optimal amount of fraud'. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 16, 67-88
Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz, J. (1988), 'Leaming-by-doing, market structure, and industrial and 
trade policies', Oxford Economic Papers, 40, 246-68
Dassesse, M. and Isaacs, S. (1985), EEC Banking Law, London: Lloyds of London Press
Davidson, C. and Denercke, R. (1984), 'Horizontal mergers and collusive behaviour', 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 2, 117-132
Davidson, C. and Denercke, R. (1985), 'Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand 
competition', Rand Journal of Economics, 16, 473-486
Davis and Lewis, M. (1987), Domestic and International Banking, London:
Demsetz, H. (1983), The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm', Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26,
Demsetz, H. (1982), 'Barriers to entry', American Economic Review, 72, 47-57
Dennig, U. (1990), 'Die europäische Sparkassen-Reformbewegung aus ordnungspolitischer 
Sicht', österreichisches Bankarchiv, 12/90, 971-983
Dermine, J. (1989), The specialisation of financial institutions, the EEC model', Working 
Paper, Paris: INSEAD
Dermine, J. (1991), THscussion on Vives', in: A. Giovannini and C. Mayer (eds.), European 
Financial Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dermine, J. and Roller, L. (1991), Economies of Scale and Scope in the French Mutual Funds 
(SICAV) industry, mimeo, Paris: INSEAD
Dewratipont, M. (1988), 'Commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third 
parties', Review of Economic Studies, 55, 377-90
Diacon, S. and Carter, R. (1990), Success in Insurance, London: John Murray
Diamond, D. (1984), 'Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring', Review of Economic 
Studies, 51, 393-414
Diamond, D. (1989), 'Reputation acquisition in debt markets', Journal of Political Economy, 97, 
828-62
Diamond, D. and Dybvig, P. (1983), 'Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity', Journal of 
Political Economy, 91, 401-419
Dueser, J. (1990), International Strategies of Japanese Banks: the European Perspective, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan
Dufey, G. and Giddy, I. (1981), 'Innovation in the International Financial Markets', Journal of 
International Business Studies, Fall issue, 33-51
Duffy, H. (1990), 'Bundling is key to retail banking', Bank Management, March, 18-23
Dunning, J. (1977), Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: a search for an eclectic 
approach', in: Ohlin, Hesselbom and Wijkman (eds.), The International Allocation of 
Economic Activity, New York: Holmes and Meier,
Dunning, J. (1980), Towards an eclectic theory of international production: some empirical 
results', Journal of International Business Studies, 11, 9-31
Dunning, J. (1988), The eclectic paradigm of international production: some emprical results'. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 1-31
Dunning, ). and Rugman, A. (1985), The influence of Hymer's dissertation on the theory of 
foreign direct investment', American Economic Review, 75, 228-
Eaton, B. and Lipsey, R. (1977), The theory of market preemption: the persistence of excess 
capacity and monopoly in growing spatial markets', Econometrica, 47,149-158
Enderwick, P. (1989) 'Some economics of service-sector multinational enterprises', in: P. 
Enderwick (ed.), Multinational Servive Firms, London: Routledge
Eisenberg, M. (1988), The current status of the regulation of financial services and products in 
the Unites States: developments and trends', in: M. de Cecco (ed.), Changing Money, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Erdevig, E. (1988), 'Small states teach a big banking lesson', Chicago Fed Letter, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, June 1988
Evanoff, D. and Fortier, D. (1986), 'Geographic expansion in commercial banking: inferences 
from intrastate activity', in: Toward Nationwide Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago
Fairbum, J. and Kay, J. (1989), 'Introduction', in: J.A. Fairbum and J. Kay (eds.) Mergers and 
Merger Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Fama, E. (1980), 'Agency problems and the theory of the firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88, 
288-307
Famy, D. (1990), Tourth Geneva Lecture: Corporate strategy of European insurers', Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance, 57, 372-389
Farrell, J. (1986), 'Moral hazard as an entry barrier', Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 440-449
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985), 'Standardization, compatibility, and innovation', Rand 
Journal of Economics, 16, 70-83
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1988), 'Dynamic competition with lock-in', Rand Journal of 
Economics, 19,123-137
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1990), 'Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysis', American 
Economic Review, 80, 107-126
Faßbender, H. and Leichtfuß, R. (1990), 'Banking in the new Europe: an interim assessment', 
Die Bank, May
Fecher, F., Perelman, S. and Pestieau (1991), 'Scale economies and performance in the French 
insurance industry', Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 16, 315-326
Finsinger, J. and Pauly, M. (1986), Introduction', in: Finsinger, J. and Pauly, M. (eds.). The 
Economics of Insurance Regulation, New York: StMartin's Press
Finsinger, J. (1986), 'A state-controlled market: the German case', in: Finsinger, J. and Pauly, M. 
(eds.), The Economics of Insurance Regulation, New York: StMartin's Press
Fitchew, G. (1990), 'Overview: European financial markets - the Commission's proposals', in: 
European Banking in the 1990's, J. Dermine, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Fitchew, G. (1990b), The European regulatory and supervisory framework', in: D. Fair and C. 
de Boissieu (eds.), Financial Institutions in Europe Under New Competitive Conditions, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Follak, K. (1991), 'European mortgage business and distribution: a German mortgage bank's 
perspective'. Österreichisches Bankarchiv, 1/91, 29-33
Franks, J. and Harris, R. (1989), 'Shareholder wealth effects of UK takeovers: implications for 
merger policy', in: J.A. Fairbum and J. Kay (eds.) Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. (1990), 'Capital Markets and Corporate Control: a study of France, 
Germany and the UK', Economic Policy, 10,189-231
Frieder, L. and Petty, P. (1991), 'Determinants of bank acquisition premiums: issues and 
evidence', Contemporary Policy Issues, 9, 13-24
Friedman, M. (1953), The methodology of positive economics', in: Essays in Positive Economics, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press
Friedman, M. (1959), The control of money', in: A Program for Monetary Stability, Bronx, N.Y.: 
Ford ham University Press
Friedman, J. (1971), 'A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames', Review of Economic 
Studies, 28, 1-12
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1983), 'Learning by doing and market performance', Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14,522-530
Gardener, E. (1992), 'Banking strategies and 1992', in: A. Mullineux (ed.), Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell
Geroski, P. (1989), Domestic and foreign entry in the UK: 1983-84', Working Paper, revised 
May 1989, London Business School
Giddy, I. (1985), 'Domestic regulation versus international competition in banking', Kredit und 
Kapital, Special Supplement No. 8
Gilbert, R. (1990), 'On the delegation of pricing authority in shared ATM networks'. Working 
Paper, revised October 1990, University of California at Berkely
Gilbert, R. and Vives, X. (1986), 'Entry deterrence and the free-rider problem', Review of 
Economic Studies, 53, 71-83
Gilligan, T. and Smirlock, M. (1984), 'An empirical study of joint production and scale 
economies in commercial banking', Journal of Banking and Finance, 8,67-76
Gilligan, T., Smirlock, M. and Marshall, W. (1984), 'Scale and scope economies in the multi­
product banking firm', Journal of Monetary Economics, 13,393-405
Giovannini, A. and Hines, ). (1991), 'Capital flight and tax competition: are there viable 
solutions to both problems?', in: A. Giovannini and C. Mayer (eds.), European Financial 
Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Goldberg, L. and Saunders, A. (1981), The growth of organisational forms of foreign banks in 
the United States', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 13, 365-74
Good hart, C  (1985), The Evolution of Central Banks, London: London School of Economics
Goodhart, C. (1989), Money, Information and Uncertainty, London: Macmillan
Goto, A. (1982), 'Business groups in a market economy', European Economic Review, 19,53-70
Greene, M. and Trieschmann, J. (1988), Risk and Insurance, Cincinnati, OH: South-Western 
Publishing Company
Greenwich Associates (1988), Europe 1992: Less Change Than Anticipated, Connecticut: 
Greenwich
Greenwich Associates (1990), Bankverbindungen Deutscher Großunternehmen 1990, Connecticut: 
Greenwich
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1980), Takeover bids, the free-rider problem and the theory of the
corporation', Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986), The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and
lateral integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719
Grubel, H., (1977), 'A theory of multinational banking', Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro, December, 349-64
Grubel, H. (1989), 'Multinational banking' in: P. Enderwick (ed.). Multinational Servive Firms, 
London: Routledge
Guttentag, and Herring, R. (1987), international LLR...', in: R. Portes and A. Swoboda 
(eds.)Threats to International Financial Stability , Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
Hannah, L. and Kay, ]. (1977), Concentration in Modem Industry, London: Macmillan
Hannan, T. and Rhoades, S. (1987), 'Acquisition targets and motives: the case of the banking 
industry', Review of Economic and Statistics, 67-74
Hart, O. and Holmstrom, B. (1987), The theory of contracts', in: Advances in Economic Theory, 
Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Hart, O. and Tirole, J. (1988), 'Contract renegotiation and Coasian dynamics', Review of 
Economic Studies, 55, 509-540
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990), Troperty rights and the nature of the firm', Journal of Political 
Economy, 98,1119-1158
Hawawini, G. and Rajera, E. (1990), The transformation of the European financial services 
industry: from fragmentation to integration', Working Paper, Paris: INSEAD
Hawawini, G. and Jacquillat, B. (1990), 'European equity markets: towards 1992 and beyond', 
in: J. Dermine, (ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Hay, G. (1976), 'Sequential entry and entry-deterring strategies', Oxford Economic Papers, 28, 
240-257
Heffeman, S. and Sinclair, P. (1990), Modem International Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Heckscher, E. (1949), The effect of foreign trade on the distribution of income', in: H.S. Ellis 
and L.A. Meltzer, (eds.), Readings in the Theory of International Trade, Philadephia, 
PA: Blackiston
Hellwig, M. (1991), 'Banking, financial intermediation and corporate finance', in: (eds.) , 
European Financial Integration,
Helm, D. (1989), 'Mergers, takeovers and the enforcement of profit-maximisation', in: J.A. 
Fairbum and J. Kay (eds.) Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press
Hennart, J. (1988), 'A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures'. Strategic Management 
Journal, 9, 361-374
Henrot, F. and Levy-Lang, A. (1990), 'Markets and products in the banking sector', in: C. de 
Boissieu (ed.), Banking in France, London: Routledge
Hertner, P. (1990), 'German banks abroad before 1914’, in: G. Jones (ed.). Banks as 
multinationals, London: Routledge
Hicks, J. (1935), The theory of monopoly: a survey', Econometrica, 3 ,1-20
Hicks, J. (1974), The Crisis in Keynesian Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Hindley, B. and Smith, A. (1984), 'Comparative advantage and trade in services', The World 
Economy, 7,369-389
Hirshleifer, J. (1976), 'Comment on Peltzman (Toward a more general theory of regulation)', 
Journal of Law and Economics, 29,
Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1989), The theory of the firm', in: R. Schmalensee and R. Willig 
(eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 1, Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Homstein, A. and Prescott, E. (1989), 'On measuring the output of insurance business', Research 
Department Working Paper 342, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Huertas, T. (1990), 'US multinational banking: history and prospects', in: G. Jones (ed.), Banks 
as multinationals, London: Routledge
Hughes, A. (1989), The impact of merger: a survey of empirical evidence for the UK', in: J.A. 
Fairbum and J. Kay (eds.) Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Humphrey, D. (1984), The US payments system: costs, pricing, competition and risk'. 
Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, New York: Salomon Brothers Center for the 
Study of Financial Institutions
Humphrey, D. (1990), 'Why do estimated of scale economies differ?', Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, September/October, 38-50
Humphrey, D. (1991), Troductivity in banking and effects from deregulation', Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, March/April, 16-28
Humphrey, T. (1989), 'Lender of last resort: The concept in history', Economic Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, March/April, 8-16
Hunter, W. and Timme, S. (1986), Technical change, organisation form and the structure of 
bank production', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 18,152-166
Hunter, W., Timme, S. and Yang, W. (1990), 'An examination of cost subadditivity and 
multiproduct production in large U.S. banks', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 22, 
504-525
Huveneers, C. and Steinherr, A. (1990), 'Universal banks: the prototype of successful banks in 
the integrated European market? A view inspired by German experience', European 
Investment Bank
Hymer, S. (1976), The International Operations of National Firms: a Study of Direct Foreign 
Investment, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (originally 1960)
Imfeld, D. (1991), 'Economies of scale in the insurance industry', Swiss Reinsurance Company, 
Sigma, 4/91
Jacklin, C. (1987), 'Banks and risk sharing: instabilities and coordination', in: S. Bhattacharya 
and N. Wallace (eds.), Financial Markets and Incomplete Information, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers
Jacklin, C. (1990), T>emand equity and deposit insurance', Research Paper No.1062, Graduate 
School of Business, Stanford University
*
Jacklin, C. and Bhattachrya, S. (1988), 'Distinguishing panics and information-based bank 
runs', Journal of Political Economy, 96, 568-592
Jacquemin, A. (1989), 'Horizontal merger policy7, European Economy, May 1989
Jacquemin, A. (1990), 'Horizontal concentration and European merger policy', European 
Economic Review, 34, 539-550
Jacquemin, A. and Slade, M. (1989), 'Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger', in: R. 
Schmalensee and R. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Ittdustrial Organisation, Vol.l, Elsevier 
Science Publishers B. V.
Jaffee, D. (1989), 'Symposium on Federal Deposit Insurance for S & L institutions', Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 3, 3-9
Jaffee, D. and Russell, T. (1976), 'Imperfect information and credit rationing', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 90, 651-66
Jensen, M. (1988), Takeovers: their causes and consequences', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
2,21-48
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs 
and ownership structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3,305-60
Joerges, C. (1991), 'Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die 
Renaissance der regulativen Politik', Working Paper, Department of Law, European 
University Institute, Florence, Italy
Jones, G. (1990a), 'Banks as multinationals' in: G. Jones (ed.), Banks as multinationals, London: 
Routledge
Jones, G. (1990b), 'Competitive advantages in British multinational banking since 1890', in: G. 
Jones (ed.), Banks as multinationals, London: Routledge
Jones, R. andRuane, F. (1990), 'Appraising the options for international trade in services', 
Oxford Economic Papers, 42, 672-687
Judd, K. (1985), 'Credible spatial preemption', Rand Journal of Economics, 16,153-166
Kane, E. (1987) 'Competitive financial reregulation: an international perspective', in: R. Portes 
and A. Swoboda (eds.), Threats to International Financial Stability, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Kane, E. (1989), The high cost of incompletely funding the FSLIC's shortage of explicit 
capital', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 31-47
Kareken, J. (1983), The first step in bank deregulation: what about the FDIC?', American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 198-203
Kareken, J. and Wallace N. (1978), 'Deposit insurance and bank regulation: a partial 
equilibrium exposition', Journal of Business, 51,413-438
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985), 'Network externalities, competition, and compatibility', 
American Economic Review, 75, 424-440
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1986a), Technology adoption in the presence of network 
externalities'. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 822-841
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1986b), Troduct compatibility choice in a market with 
technological progress', Oxford Economic Papers, 38,146-165
Kaufman, G. (1988), The truth about bank runs', in: C. England and T. Huertas (eds.). The 
Financial Sermces Revolution, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Kay, N. (1991), industrial collaborative activity and the completion of the internal market', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 14, 347-362
Kaye, G. (1991), 'Economies of scale in UK life insurance companies: an empirical approach', 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 16, 302-314
Kessides, I. (1990), Towards a testable model of entry: a study of the US manufacturing 
industries', Economica, 57,219-238
Kierzkowski, H, (1987), 'Recent advances in international trade theory: a selective survey', 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 3, 1-19
Kim, H. (1986), 'Economies of scale and economies of scope in multiproduct financial 
institutions: further evidence from credit unions', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
18,220-226
Kim, S. and Miller, S. (1983), Competitive Structure of the International Banking Industry, 
Lexington and Toronto
Kindleberger, C. (1969), The theory of foreign direct investment7, in: C. Kindleberger (ed.), 
American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment, New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press
Kindleberger, C. (1978), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, New York: 
Basic Books
King, M. (1990), 'International harmonisation of capital market regulation', European 
Economic Review, 34, 569-77
Klein, M. (1971), 'A theory of the banking firm', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 3, 205- 
218
Klein, B., Crawford, R. and Alchian, A. (1978), 'Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and 
the competitive contracting process', Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326
Klemperer, P. (1987a), 'Entry deterrence in markets with consumer switching costs', Economic 
Journal, 97, 99-117
Klemperer, P. (1987b), 'Markets with consumer switching costs', Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Klemperer, P. (1989), Trice wars caused by switching costs', Discussion Paper No. 40, Oxford: 
Nuffield College
Klemperer, P. (1990), Troduct line competition and shopping costs: why firms may choose to 
compete head-to-head', Discussion Paper No.55, Oxford: Nuffield College
Kogut, B. (1989), The stability of joint ventures: reciprocity and competitive rivalry7, Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 28, 183-198
Kopper, H. (1989), 'Europe 1992: strategic implications for financial services', speech held at 
the 1989 International Monetary Conference in Madrid, Spain, mimeo, Deutsche Bank 
AG, Frankfurt *
Kopper, H. (1990), Strategische Ausrichting einer Universalbank auf einen gemeinsamen EG- 
Finanzmarkt', österreichisches Bankarchiv, 2/90
Kreps, D. (1990), 'Corporate culture and economic theory' in: J. Alte and K. Shepsle (eds.), 
Rational Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982), 'Reputation and imperfect information', Journal of Economic 
Theory, 27, 253-279
Krugman, P. (1989), 'Industrial organisation and international trade', in: R. Schmalensee and 
R. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol.l, Elsevier Science 
Publishers B. V.
Kuerble, G. (1990), The exodus of the American life insurers from Germany - the Tontine and 
the developments prior to 1894', German Journal of Insurance, 583-623
Kutscher, R. (1987), Trojections 2000: overview and implications of the projections to 2000', 
Monthly Labor Review, 100, 3-9
Kwoka, J. (1985), The Herfindahl index in theory and practise', Antitrust Bulletin, 30, 915-947
Kwoka, J. (1989), The private profitability of horizontal mergers with non-Cournot and 
maverick behaviour', International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 7, 403-411
Laderman, E. and Pozdena, R. (1991), Interstate banking and competition: evidence from the 
behaviour of stock returns', Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Spring, 32-47
Lane, D. (1991), 'Banks in Italy: Much ado about something', The Banker, August
Learner, E. (1980), The Leontief paradox reconsidered', Journal of Political Economy, 88, 495- 
503
Leibenstein, H. (1966), 'Allocative efficiency vs. X-inefficiency', American Economic Review, 
56,392-415
Leibenstein, H. (1975), 'Aspects of the X-inefficiency theory of the firm', Bell Journal of 
Economics, 6, 580-606
Leibenstein, H. (1987), Inside the Firm: the Inefficiencies of Hierarchy, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press
Leland, H. (1979), 'Quacks, lemons and licensing: a theory of minimum quality standards', 
Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1328-1346
Leland, H. and Pye, D. (1977), 'Information asymmetries, financial structure and financial 
intermediation', Journal of Finance, 32, 371-387
Leontief, W. (1953), Domestic production and foreign trade: the American capital position re­
examined', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 37, 322-49
LeRoy, S. (1989), 'Efficient capital markets and martingales'. Journal of Economic Literature, 
27,1583-1621
Levich, R. (1990), The Euromarkets after 1992', in: J. Dermine, (ed.), European Banking in the 
1990's, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Levy, H. and Samat, M. (1970), International diversification of investment portfolios', 
American Economic Review, 60, 668-75
Llewellyn, D. (1989), 'Financial services and competition', Banking World, September, 28-34
Llewellyn, D. (1990), 'Competition, diversification and structural change in the British 
financial system', in: D. Fair and C. de Boissieu (eds.), Financial Institutions in Europe 
Under New Competitive Conditions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Llewellyn, D. (1992), 'Banking and financial services', in: D. Swann (ed.), The Single European 
Market and Beyond, London: Routledge
Manne, H. (1965), 'Mergers and the market for corporate control', Journal of Political Economy, 
73,693-706
Mariti, P. and Smiley, R. (1983), 'Cooperative agreements and the organisation of industry', 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 437-451
Markowitz, H. (1959), Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments, New York: 
W iley
Marris, R. (1963), 'A model of the managerial enterprise', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 
185-209
Martin, S. (1989), Sunk costs, financial markets, and contestability', European Economic 
Review, 33, 1089-1113
Martin, S. (1989b), Troduct differentiation and market performance in oligopoly', Working 
Paper No. 89/385, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Martin, S. (1992), Advanced Industrial Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Martin, S. (1992b), 'Engogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model', to be 
published in Journal of Economic Theory
Masera, R. (1990), Issues in financial regulation: efficiency, stability, information', in: D. Fair 
and C. de Boissieu (eds.). Financial Institutions in Europe Under New Competitive 
Conditions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Mayer, C  (1988), Discussion of Kay and Vickers: 'Regulatory reform in Britain', Economic 
Policy, October, 285-343
Mayer, C. (1990), The regulation of financial services: lessons from the United Kingdom for 
1992', in: European Banking in the 1990's, J. Dermine, ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Mayer, C. and Neven, D. (1991), 'European financial regulation: a framework for policy 
analysis', in: A. Giovannini and C. Mayer (eds.), European Financial Integration, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
McDowell, B. (1989), Deregulation and Competition in the Insurance Industry, New York: 
Quorum Books
McGee, J. (1980), Tredatory pricing revisited', Journal of Law and Economics, 23, 289-330
McKinsey (1990), 'Bridging the uncertainty gap with creative M&A: a tool for Eurobankers', 
Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the European Banking Practise, 
Copenhagen, 26 November 1990
Meeks, G. (1977), Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the Gains from Merger, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Mehr, R. (1986), Fundamentals of Insurance, Homewood IL: Irwin
Melitz, J. (1990), Tinandal deregulation in France', European Economic Review, 34, 394-402
Melvin, J. (1989), Trade in producer services: a Heckscher-Ohlin approach', Journal of 
Political Economy, 97, 1180-11%
Mengle, D., (1990), The case for interstate branch banking', Economic Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond, November
Merrick, D. and Saunders, A. (1985), 'Bank regulation and monetary policy', Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 17, 691-717
Mester, L. (1987), 'A multiproduct cost study of Savings and Loan Associations', Journal of 
Finance, 42,423-445
Metais, J. (1990), 'International strategies of French banks', in: C. de Boissieu (ed.), Banking in 
France, London: Routledge
Michalet, C.A. and Sauviat, C. (1981), 'L'intemationalisation des banquaires: le cas francais', 
in: C.A. Michalet (ed.), Interrvitionalisation des banques et des groupes financieres, 
Paris: Editions du CNRS
Micossi, S. (1988), The single European market: finance', Quarterly Review, Banco Nazional 
del Lavoro, 217-35
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1982), Tredation and entry deterrence', Journal of Economic Theory, 
27, 280-312
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1986), Trices and advertising signals of product quality7, Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 796-821
Monti, M. (1971), 'A theoretical model of bank behaviour and its implications for monetary 
policy7, L'lndustria, 2, 3-29
Morgan Guarantee Trust (1988), 'Financial markets in Europe: towards 1992',World Financial 
Markets, New York: Morgan Guaranty Trust
Moser, C. and Kalton, G. (1979), Survey Metheods in Social Investigation, Hants: Gower
Mueller, D. (1989), 'Mergers - causes, effects and policies', International Journal of Industrial 
Organisation, 7, 1-10
Murray, J. and White, R. (1983), 'Economies of scale and economies of scope in multiproduct 
financial institutions: a study of British Columbia credit unions, Journal of Finance, 38, 
887-902
Nelson, P. (1970), 'Information and consumer behaviour7, Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311- 
29
Nelson, R. (19?) 'Branching, scale economies, and banking costs', Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 9, 177-191
Nelson, R. (1988), 'Optimal banking structure: implications for interstate banking', 
Contemporary Policy Issues, 6, 13-23
Neuberger, J. and Zimmerman, G. (1990), 'Bank pricing of retail deposit accounts and the 
California rate mystery', Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Spring 1990,3-16
Neven, D. (1985), Two-stage (perfect) equilibrium in Hotelling's model', Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 33,317-325
Neven, D. (1990), 'Structural adjustment in European retail banking: some views from industrial 
organisation', in: J. Dermine (ed.), European Banking in the 1990’s, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell
Nonhoff, D. (1991), 'Lebensversicherung im EG-Binnenmarkt - Wechselwirkung im Hinblick 
auf Produkt- und Marktverfassung', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswirtschaft, 
September 1991,235-265
O'Brien, C. (1991), 'Measuring the output of life assurance companies', Geneva Papers on Risk 
and Insurance, 16, 207-235
Odagiri, H. and Hase, T. (1989), 'Are mergers and acquisitions going to be popular in Japan 
too?', International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 7, 49-72
Ohlin, B. (1967), Interregional and International Trade, revised edition: London: Oxford 
University Press
OECD (1983), The Internationalisation of Banking, Paris: OECD Publications
OECD (1989), Competition in Banking, Paris: OECD Publications
OECD (1991), Bank Profitability, Paris: OECD Publications
Onado, M. (1990), 'Competition in banking services and its implications: the Italian case', in:
D. Fair and C. de Boissieu (eds.), Financial Institutions in Europe Under New 
Competitive Conditions, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Outreville, J. (1990), Trice regulation and segmented insurance markets', in: Henri Louberge 
(ed.). Risk, Information and Insurance, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Padoa-Schioppa (1987), Efficiency, Stability and Equity, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Panorama of EC Industry (1990), Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities
Panzar, J. and Willig, R. (1977), 'Economies of scale in multi-output production'. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 91,431-93
Panzar, J. and Willig, R. (1981), 'Economies of Scope', American Economic Review, 71, 268-272
Penrose, E. (1959), Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Perry, M. and Porter, R. (1985), 'Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger', American 
Economic Review, 75, 219-227
Phlips, L. (1988), The Economics of Imperfect Information, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
#
Phlips, L. (1989), Time-series and cross-sectional studies of industrial structure', European 
Economic Review, 33, 321-324
Poitevin, M. (1989), 'Financial signalling and the deep-pocket argument', Rand Journal of 
Economics, 20, 26-40
Pool, B. (1990), Towards an Internal Market in Insurance, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC
Postlewaite, A. and Vives, X. (1987), 'Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon', Journal of 
Political Economy, 95, 485-491
Prescott, E. and Visscher, M. (1977), 'Sequential location among firms with foresight', Bell 
Journal of Economics, 8, 378-393
Prescott, E. and Visscher, M. (1980), 'Organisational capital', Journal of Political Economy, 88, 
446-71
Price Waterhouse (1988), The Costs of Non-Europe in Financial Services, Cecchini-Report, Vol. 
9, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
Prosperetti, L. (1991), 'Economies of scale in Italian life-insurance', Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance, 16, 282-292
Ravenscraft, D. and Scherer, F. (1987), Mergers, Sell-Offs, amd Economic Efficiency, 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Ravenscraft, D. and Scherer, F. (1989), The profitability of mergers', International foumal of 
Industrial Organisation, 7, 101-116
Rees, R. (1985), 'Cheating in a duopoly game', in: P. Geroski, L. Phlips, and A. Ulph (eds.), 
Oligopoly, Competition and Welfare, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Reynolds, R. and Snapp, B. (1986), The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint 
ventures', International Journal of Industrial Organisaztion, 4,141-153
Ricardo, D. (1971), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Roell, A. (1987), The regulation of takeovers', paper presented at the LSE conference on the 
economics of takeovers, mimeo, British Library of Economics and Political Science
Romer, D. (1985), 'Finanda] intermediation, reserve requirements and inside money: a general 
equilibrium analysis', Journal of Monetary Economics, 16,175-194
Rose, P. (1989), The Interstate Banking Revolution, Westport, Conn.: Quorum
Rose, P. (1989b), The banking firms making interstate acquisitions: theory and observable 
motives', Review of Business and Economics Research, 25, 1-18
Ross, T. (1988), 'On the price effects of mergers with freer trade'. International journal of 
Industrial Organisation, 6, 233-246
Rubinstein, A. (1979), 'Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion', ¡ountal of 
Economic Theory, 21,1-9
Rubinstein, A. (1980), 'Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames', International Journal of Game 
Theory, 9, 13-24
Salant, S. Switzer, S. and Reynolds, R. (1983), 'Losses from horizontal mergers: the effects of an 
exogenous change in industry structure on Coumot-Nash equilibrium', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 103, 345-356
Salop, S. (1990), 'Deregulating self-regulated shared ATM networks', Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, 1, 85-96
Sampson, G. and Snape, R. (1985), 'Identifying the issues in trade in services'. The World 
Economy, 8,171-182
Santomero, A. (1984), 'Modeling the banking firm', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16, 
576-602
Santomero, A. (1990), 'European banking post-1992: lessons from the United States', in: J. 
Dermine (ed.), European Banking in the 1990's, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Sapir, A. and Lutz, E. (1981), Trade in services: economic determinants and development- 
related issues', World Bank Staff Working Paper, The World Bank
Scharfstein, D. (1988), The disciplinary role of takeovers', Review of Economic Studies, 55, 
185-199
Scherer, F. (1988), 'Corporate takeovers: the efficiency arguments', Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2, 69-82
Scherer, F. and Ross, D. (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, third 
edition, Chicago: Rand Me Nally
Schlesinger, H. and Graf von der Schulenburg, J. (1991), 'Search costs, switching costs and 
product heterogeneity in an insurance market7, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58,109-119
Schmallensee, R. (1978), 'A model of advertising and product quality', Journal of Political 
Economy, 86,485-503
Schneider, U. (1991), The Harmonisierung des Bankrechts in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft7, 
österreichisches Bankarchiv, 5/91, 312-326
Schroath, F. (1988), 'Mode of foreign market entry: an analysis of the property and liability 
insurance industry, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 13, 361-376
Schroath, F. and Korth, C. (1989), 'Managerial barriers to the internationalisation of U.S. 
property and liability insurers: theory and perspectives', Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
56,630-48
Schulenburg, J. Graf von der (1989), Regulation and deregulation of insurance markets in the 
FRG, Working Paper, European University Institute
Schwartz, A. (1986), Tleal and pseudo-financial crises', in: F. Capie and G. Wood (eds.), 
Financial Crises and the World Banking System, London: MacMillan
Sealey, C. and Lindley, ). (1977), 'Inputs, outputs and a theory of production and cost at 
depository financial institutions', Journal of Finance, 32, 1251-66
Selten, R. (1978), The chain-store paradox', Theory and Decision, 9, 127-159
Semaya, F. (1991), 'State regulation of insurer insolvencies: is there a better alternative?', in: 
F. Semaya and V. Vitkowsky (eds ), The State of Insurance Regulation, Chicago: 
American Bar Association
Shaeffer, S. (1987), The design of bank regulation and supervision: some lessons from the 
theory of finance', in: R. Portes and A. Swoboda (eds.), Threats to International 
Financial Stability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Shaffer, S. (1988), 'A revenue-restricted cost study of 100 large banks', Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Research Paper, 8,1-35
Shaked, A. and Sutton, }. (1981), The self-regulating profession', Review of Economic Studies, 
48,217-34
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1982a), Imperfect information, perceived quality, and the formation 
of professional groups', Journal of Economic Theory, 27,170-181
Shaked, A. and Sutton, ]. (1982b), 'Relaxing price competition through product differentiation', 
Review of Economic Studies, 49, 3-14
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1990), 'Multi-product firms and market structure', Rand journal of 
Economics, 21,45-62
Shapiro, C. (1983), 'Optimal pricing of experience goods'. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 497-507
Shapiro, C. and Willig, R. (1990), 'On the antitrust treatment of production joint ventures', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 113-130
Sharpe, S. (1990), 'Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: a stylized 
model of customer relationships', Journal of Finance, 45,1069-1087
Shepherd, W. (1984), 'Contestability versus competition', American Economic Review, 74, 572- 
587
Shiller, R. (1991), 'Discussion of Blinder (1991)', American Economic Review, May, 97-98
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986), 'Large shareholders and corporate control', Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461-488
Simon, H. (1947), Administrative Behaviour, New York: Macmillan
Skogh, G. (1989), The transactions cost theory of insurance: contracting impediments and costs', 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 56, 726-732
Slade, M. (1989), Trice wars in price-setting supergames', Economica, 56, 295-310
Sleuwagen, L. and Dehandschutter, W. (1986), The critical choice between the concentration 
ratio and the H-index in assessing industry performance', Journal of Industrial Economics, 
35,193-208
Smith, A. (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Cannan Edition, New York: Modem Libraray
Spence, M. (1981), The learning curve and competition', Bell Journal of Economics, 12,49-70
Spence, M. (1983), 'Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure: a review', Journal 
of Economic Literature, 21, 981-990
Spencer, R. (1991), 'Guaranty associations: a look ahead', in: F. Semaya and V. Vitkowsky 
(eds.), The State of Insurance Regulation, Chicago: American Bar Association
Stein, ]. (1988), Takeover threats and managerial myopia'. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 
61-80
Steinherr, A. and Gilibert, P. (1989), The Impact of Financial Market Integration on the 
European Banking Industry, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, Research 
Report No. 1
Stigler, G. (1964), 'A theory of oligopoly', Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44-61
Stigler, G. (1968), The Organisation of Industry, Homewood, IL: Irwin
Stigler, G. (1971), The theory of economic regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2,
Stiglitz, J. and Weis, A. (1981), 'Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information', 
American Economic Review, 71, 393-410
Stiglitz, J. and Amott, R. (1990), The welfare economics of moral hazard', in: Henri Louberge 
(ed.), Risk, Information and Insurance, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Stokey, N. (1986), The dynamics of industry-wide learning', in: W. Heller, R. Starr and D. 
Starrett (eds.), Equilibrium Ananlysis: Essays in Honour of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Suret, ). (1991), 'Scale and scope economies in the Canadian property and casualty insurance 
industry', Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 16, 236-256
Tapp, J. (1986), 'Regulation of the UK Insurance Industry', in: Finsinger, J. and Pauly, M. (eds.), 
The Economics of Insurance Regulation, New York: St.Martin's Press
Teece, D. (1982), Towards an economic theory of the multi-product firm', journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organisation, 3, 39-63
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Tschoegl, A. (1982), Toreign bank entry into Japan and California', in: A. Rugman (ed.) New 
Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, London: Croom Helm
Varian, H. (1988), 'Symposium on takeovers', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 3-5
Veugelers, R. (1990), Scope Decisions of Multinational Enterprises, Ph.D dissertation, Catholic 
University of Louvain
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988), Privatization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Vives, X. (1990), 'Deregulation and competition in Spanish banking', European Economic 
Review, 34, 403-411
Vives, X. (1991), 'Banking competition and European integration', in: A. Giovannini and C. 
■Mayer (eds.), European Financial Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Waldman (1987), 'Non-cooperative entry deterrence, uncertainty and the free-rider problem', 
Review of Economic Studies, 54, 301-310
Waldman, M. (1991), The role of multiple potential entrants/sequential entrants in non- 
cooperative entry deterrence', Rand Journal of Economics, 22,446-453
Weizsacker, C.-C. von (1984), 'A welfare analysis of barriers to entry', Bell Journal of 
Economics, 11, 399-420 *
Wenk, T. (1987), Insurer insolvency: causes, effects and solutions', Journal of Insurance Issues, 10, 
35-48
Weizsacker, C.-C. von (1984), The costs of substitution', Econometrica, 52,1085-1116
White, L. (1989), The reform of federal deposit insurance', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 
11-29
Williams, (1986), The EEC Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations', 
International Comparative Law Quarterly, 35, 1
Williamson, O. (1967), 'Hierarchical control and optimum firm size', Journal of Political 
Economy, 2,123-138
Williamson, O. (1968), 'Economies as an antitrust defense: the welfare trade-offs', American 
Economic Review, 58, 18-31
Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications, New 
York: The Free Press
Williamson, O. (1981), The modem corporation: origins, evolution, attributes', Journal of 
Economic Literature, 19, 1537-1568
Williamson, O. (1984), 'Corporate governance', Yale Law Journal, 93, 1197-1209
Willimason, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press
Williamson, O. (1989), Transcation cost economics', in: R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (eds.), 
Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol.l, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Williamson, O. (1990), 'Introduction', in: M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O. Williamson, (eds.), 
The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties , London: Sage Publications
Willig, R. (1987), 'Corporate governance and market structure', in: A. Razin and E. Sadka 
(eds.), Economic Policy in Theory and Practise, London: Macmillan Press
Wilson, J. (1986), The Chase: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 1945-1985, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press
Yanelle, M. (1989), The strategic analysis of intermediation', European Economic Review, 33, 
294-301
Zimmerman, G. (1989), The growing presence of Japanese banks in California', Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco, Summer 1989,3-17




' .—
